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ý  '7 SUMMARY 
The  concern  of  this  work  is  with  'punishment'  and  its 
logical  application  in  discourse  to  Law  and  Education.  The 
thesis  is  divided  into  three  main  parts  and  sub-divided  into 
ten  chapters  preceded  by  an  introductory  section  aimed  at 
pointing  out  the  complexity  of  the  concept.  In  chapter  one, 
I  attempt  to  reconstruct  the  traditional  retributivist  posi- 
tion:  the  position  held  by  Kant,  Hegel  and  Bradley  -  the 
fundamental  point  being  that  punishment  appeals  to  our  capa- 
city  to  follow  rules.  I  consider  the  criticism  that  'retri- 
butive  punishment'  is  "vengeance  in  disguise"  and  reject  that 
criticism  after  examining  the  concept  of  revenge  and  the 
theory  of  James  Tyler.  Chapter  two  attempts  to  reconstruct 
the  traditional  utilitarian  position,  as  expounded  by  Paley 
and  Bentham.  The  problems  of  the  utilitarian  theory  are  then 
explicated;  in  particular  the  retributive  demand  that  the 
innocent  should  not  be  punished  show  it  to  have  more  content 
than  has  usually  been  thought  to  be  the  case.  The  question 
of  the  moral  justification  of  punishment  is  considered  in 
chapter  three  where  the  traditional  "theories  of  punishment" 
are  examined  for  their  intrinsic  importance.  First,  it  is 
argued  that  the  retribution  theory  is  essential  for  it  is 
the  only  theory  which  connects  punishment  with  desert.  Second, 
that  even  deterrence  requires  a  rule  awareness  on  the  part 
of  those  on  whom  punishments  are  imposed  and  that  it  serves 
to  strengthen  the  general  awareness  of  rules.  Third,  4that 
reform  is  in  general  workable  in  the  long  run  when  it  is 
i treated  not  as  external  or  extrinsic  end  to  which  punishment 
is  regarded  as  a  useful  means,  but  as  in  some  sense  internal 
or  intrinsic  parts  of  the  consequences  of  the  punishment 
itself.  We  should  not  set  out  to  reform  by  punishing; 
rather  in  punishing  we  should  also  hope  to  reform. 
Part  two  deals  exclusively  with  education,  discipline 
and  punishment.  Chapters  four  and  five  present  a  view  of 
education  culminating  in  the  explication  of  the  notions  of 
'need'  and  'interest'  deemed  as  a  necessary  prelude  to  a 
philosophical  discussion  of  'punishment'  in  an  educational 
context.  It  is  argued  that  the  child  should  go  to  school  to 
receive  discipline.  Genuine  'discipline'  must  be  distingui- 
shed  from  'behavioural  control',  the  latter  implying  a  more 
or  less  arbitrary  set  of  rules  compliance  with  which  is 
maintained  by  manipulating  rewards  and  punishments.  In 
chapter  seven,  I  examine  punishment  in  schools  and  argue 
that  educational  psychologists  in  the  main  have  misinterpreted 
the  logical  status  of  'reward  and  punishment':  and  this  mis- 
interpretation  is  linked  with  their  tendency  to  see  learning 
in  terms  of  conditioning,  discipline  in  terms  of  control  and 
education  in  terms  of  schooling.  In  a  parallel  way,  then, 
they  see  reward  and  punishment  in  terms  of  'reinforcement'. 
But  whether  one  only  'rewards'  children,  or  whether  one 
'punishes'  them  too,  in  either  case  one's  action  is  manipula- 
tive  and  its  pain  or  pleasure  to  the  child  is  a  'reinforce- 
ment',  rather  than  moral  desert,  if  the  rules  in  question 
define  behaviour  which  has  no  intrinsic  point. 
ii INTR0DUCT10N INTRODUCTION 
Philosophers  have  given  a  good  deal  of  attention  to 
the  meaning  of  punishment  and,  as  we  shall  see,  some 
arguments  about  its  justification  have  been  supposed  to 
rest  on  how  it  is  defined.  And  to  begin  we  shall  briefly 
consider  the  historically  important  definition  of  punish- 
ment.  Hobbes  defines  punishment  as  follows: 
1 
"A  punish- 
ment  is  an  evil  inflicted  by  public  authority  on  him  that'-. 
has  done,  or  omitted  that  which  is  judged  by  the  same 
authority  to  be  a  transgression  of  the  law;  to  the  end 
that  the-will  of  men  may  thereby  the  better  be  disposed 
to  obedience.....  All  evil  which  is  inflicted  without 
intention  or  possibility  of  disposing  the  delinquent  or, 
by  his  example,  other  men  to  obeySan  act  of  hostility, 
because  without  such  an  end  no  hurt  done  is  contained 
under  that  name.  "  A  feature  of  this  definition  is  that 
Hobbes  includes  a  purpose  for  punishment  within  the  defi- 
nition  itself,  and  for  this  reason  however  satisfactory 
the  definition  would  otherwise  be,  we  cannot  accept  it, 
at  least  in  toto.  We  want  to  be  able  clearly  to  distin- 
guish  questions  about  what  purpose(s)  the  practice  may 
be  used  to  forward.  Should  we  accept  Hobbes'  definition 
we  should  find  ourselves  in  the  position  that  while  dis- 
cussing  the  justification  of  punishment  on  retributive, 
deterrent  or  reformative  grounds  we  should  have  to  admit 
that  whatever  retributivism  justified  it  could  not  justify 
punishment.  Accepting  the  definition  would  therefore 
1 2 
amount  to  a  logical  bar  on  the  discussion  of  the  justifi- 
cation  of  punishment.  This  would  be  an  unfortunate  con- 
sequence,  but  there  is  no  good  reason  for  us  to  accept 
this  part  of  Hobbes'  definition.  Even  a  cursory  exami- 
nation  of  the  ordinary  uses  of  "punishment"  show  that  no 
such  reference  to  ends  is  entailled  by  it.  Hobbes  has 
offered  a  persuasive  not  a  descriptive  definition  of 
punishment. 
The  difficulty,  of  course,  with  precise  definitions 
of  words,  which  like  punishment,  we  use  to  characterise 
human  activities,  is  that  they  are  unlikely  to  give  suffi- 
cient  clarity  to  the  term  without  being  reduced  to  un- 
warranted  stipulation  or  vagueness.  To  overcome  this 
problem  Anthony  Flew2  has  suggested  five  criteria  for  the 
use  of  the  word  'punishment'  -in  its  primary  sense.  In 
other  words,  Flew  has  defined  what  he  calls  the  standard 
or  central  case  of  'punishment'  in  terms  of  five  elements. 
(i)  It  must  be  an  evil,  an  unpleasantness,  to 
the  victim. 
(ii)  It  must  (at  least  be  supposed  to)  be  for 
an  offence. 
(iii)  It  must  (at  least  be  supposed  to)  be  of  the 
offender. 
(iv)  It  must  be  the  work  of  personal  agencies. 
(v)  It  must  be  imposed  by  authority  (real  or 
supposed),  conferred  by  the  system  of  rules 
against  which  the  offence  has  been  committed. 3 
As  Professor  Flew  pointed  out,  the  first  three  ele- 
ments  can  be  supported  by  straightforward  appeal  to  the 
Concise  Oxford  Dictionary,  which  defines  "punish"  as 
"cause"  (offender)  to  suffer  for  an  offence.  'The  fourth 
and  fifth  criteria  can  be  supported  by  appeal  to  the 
Oxford  English  Dictionary,  which  prefaces  the  same  defini- 
tion  as  that  given  in  the  Concise  Oxford  Dictionary  with 
"As  an  act  of  superior  or  public  authority.  " 
Flew  and  most  other  writers  on  the  subject  agree  that 
while  there  are  various  different  criteria  for  the  use  of 
the  word  "punishment"  not  all  of  these  need  to  be  satis- 
fied  for  the  use  to  be  natural  and  legitimate.  It  would 
therefore  not  be  a  misuse  of  the  word  to  talk,  for  example, 
of  a  batsman  "punishing  the  bowling"  in  cricket,  an  expert 
driver  "punishing  the  gears"  of  his  car,  a  master  "punish- 
ing  his  dog",  and  a  fighter  "punishing  his  opponent"  in  a 
boxing  match.  However,  because  these  usages  disregard  one 
or  more  of  the  above  criteria  they  must  be  treated  as 
secondary  or  metaphorical  and  therefore  peripheral  to  the 
central  uses  of  the  term.  In  considering  "punishment"  in 
education,  for  instance,  the  word  will  be  confinad  to  its 
primary  sense,  unless  otherwise  stated. 
A  difficulty  which  arises  in  considering  the  place 
of  punishment  in  education  is  that  in  most  literature 
consideration  of  the  definition  of  punishment  is  almost 
always  related  to  punishment  in  a  legal  setting  and  the 
distinctive  meaning  of  punishment  in  school  situation  is 4 
seldom  pressed  very  far.  P.  N.  Nowell-Smith3  associates 
the  word  punishment  with  the  law.  He  writes:  ...  'punish- 
ment'  is  a  legal  term...  'Punishment,  is  a  complex  idea 
consisting  of  the  ideas  of  inflicting  pain,  on  someone 
who  has  broken  a  law.  '  In  his  definition  H.  L.  AO  Hart4 
also  regards  the  educational  case  as  sub-standard.  He 
writes:  "I  shall  relegate  to  the  position  of  sub-standard 
or  secondary  cases  the  following  among  many  other  possi- 
bilities:  (a)  Punishment  for  breaches  of  legal  rules 
imposed  or  administered  otherwise  by  officials  (decentra- 
lised  sanctions)  (b)  Punishments  for  breaches  of  non-legal 
rules  or  orders  (punishments  in  a  family  or  school). 
How  far  then  are  Flew's  criteria  a  contribution  to 
the  clarification  of  the  meaning  of  'punishment'  in  gene- 
ral,  and  in  particular,  in  the  context  of  the  school 
situation?  An  atempt  will  be  made  to  answer  this  question 
by  examining  each  criteria  in  turn. 
In  his  first  creteria  Flew  uses  "evil"  or  "unpleasant- 
ness"  instead  of  "pain"  as  essential  to  the  meaning  of 
punishment,  probably  on  the  grounds  that  these  terms  are 
wide  enough  to  cover  both  physical  pain  and  mental  suffer- 
ing.  He  may  also  have  in  mind  that  "pain"  usually  has 
physical  Implications  but  that  few  punishments  today  deli- 
berately  intend  physical  pain.  Hastings  Rashdall5  argues 
that  punishment  is  in  need  of  moral  justification  not 
because  it  is  a  deliberate  and  avoidable  infliction  of 
suffering  but  because  it  is  the  deprivation  of  a  good. 5 
Imprisonment  and  fines  are  deprivations  of  liberty  and 
property;  the  death  penalty  or  sentence  is  a  deprivation 
of  life  and  every  attempt  is  made  to  exclude  suffering. 
Even  so,  the  use  of  the  word  "evil"  is  misleading. 
Despite  Bentham's6  argument  that  deliberate  infliction  of 
pain  (as  in  punishment)  is  evil  very  few  people  or  teachers 
who  punish  offenders  or  children  for  wrongdoing  think  them- 
selves  as  doing  something  evil.  Doesn't  the  judgement 
as  to  whether  it  was  'evil'  or  not  occur  as  part  of  a 
moral  judgement  taking  account,  not  just  of  the  existence 
of  the  pain,  but  of  the  wider  context  of  actions  and  rela- 
tionships  in  which  the  pain  occurred?  It  is  more  likely 
that  teachers  interpret  punishment  as  the  deliberate 
causing  of  pain,  inflicted  to  bring  about  something  "good" 
and  it  would  be  difficult  to  understand  how  one  could 
ever  do  something  "good"  by  doing  'evil'. 
To  put  the  objection  another  way;  'evil'  is  inappro- 
priate  because  it  carries  too  much  moral  flavour.  The 
world  is  conceptually,  a  worse  place  the  more  evil  there 
is  in  it,  whereas  the  infliction  of  "pain"  or  "unpleasant- 
ness"  ma3  be  viewed  as  "good"  if  its  purpose  is  to  moti- 
vate  people  into  doing  what  is  theoretically  in  the  inte- 
rest  of  us  all. 
Punishment  is  obviously  not  something  done  to  anyone 
chosen  at  random  and  without  regard  to  his  previous  con- 
duct.  Punishment,  or  so  we  habitually  think,  is  imposed 
on  an  offender,  someone  who  is  found  to  have  broken  a  rule, 6 
to  have  done  something  prohibited.  This  is  the  substance  of 
Flew's  second  and  third  criteria,  punishment  must  be  for  an 
offence  and  of  an  offender. 
But  how  are  we  meant  to  interprete  "an  offence"?  If 
"an  offence"  is  assumed  to  be  an  action  that  goes  against 
a  rule  previously  stipulated,  then  it  may  be  denied  that 
punishment  is  always  preceded  by  an  offence.  Must  a  teacher 
always  have  announced,  before  punishing  a  child  who  has  done 
something  outrageous,  that  no  one  was  to  do  "that"?  If  there 
are  such  cases,  where  there  have  not  been  offences,  are  there 
also  cases  where  the  person  punished  is  not  an  offender;  that 
is,  someone  found  to  have  broken  a  rule?  If  this  interpre- 
tation  of  "an  offence"  is  adopted  then  there  necessarily 
are  such  cases. 
Professor  R.  S.  Peters?  in  his  account  of  punishment  speaks 
of  "a  breach  of  rules",  but  this  seems  no  more  profitable  as 
to  clarifying  the  concept  in  the  context  of  the  school  situa- 
tion  than  Flew's  use  of  "an  offence".  Even  if  the  notion  of 
"a  rule"  or  "an  offence"  were  clear,  it  would  not  be  possible 
to  relate  punishment  simply  to  "offences'  or  "breaches  of  rule,, 
for  such  a  characterisation  fails  to  distinguish  between  "punish- 
ment"  and  "penalisation".  As  John  Kleinig8  subjects:  "It  is 
the  latter  that  Peters  has  defined.  The  occasion  of  penali- 
zation,  and  the  fact  that  distinguishes  it  from  punishment 
is  that  the  person  punished  has  simply  broken  a  rule.  To 
constitute  punishment,  such  ruleWaking  must  also  be  recog- 
nised  as  involving  moral  guilt.  Thus  whereas  one  can  pena- 
lise  a  hockey  player  or  being  off-side  without  any  sugges- 
tion  of  punishment,  the  same  is  not  true  of  the  mur- 7 
derer  whose  penalty  is  seen  as  punishment.  There  is  a 
stigma  attached  to  being  punished  which  we  are  usually  re- 
luctant  to  associate  with  breaches  in  games  and  minor 
traffic  and  administrative  offences,  and  this  stigma  arises 
because  of  the  immoral  character  of  punishable  offences. 
What  is  being  suggested  is  that  "punishing"  and 
"penalizing"  have  different  logical  characteristics.  For 
example,  a  motorist  fined  for  illegal  parking  may  calcu- 
late  that  the  advantages  of  committing  the  offence  out- 
weigh  the  disadvantages  of  paying  the  fine  and  regard  it 
as  perfectly  reasonable  to  repeat  the  offence.  In  other 
words,  his  breaking  of  rules  is  advantageous  to  him  in 
terms  of  gains  or  penalties. 
Such  an  example  could  hardly  feature  as  punishment. 
For  this  reason  it  seems  misguided  to  look  at  the  process 
of  the  law  only  for  the  paradigm  cases  of  punishment. 
Very  often,  although  the  law  may  claim  to  be  punishing  a 
person,  what  actually  happens  is  that  he  is  merely  pena- 
lised  for  breaking  a  rule  which  he  personally  does  not 
regard  as  a  moral  rule  at  all.  According  to  Geldart9  the 
law  is  fundamentally  an  agency  for  the  preservation  of  a 
particular  social  order.  Punishment,  by  contrast,  is 
primarily  a  moral  matter.  Only  if  the  motorist  feels  that 
his  offence  is  something  which  is  "wrong"  in  moral  terms 
may  his  penalty  be  interpreted  as  punishment.  To  render 
punishment  effective  it  is  sometimes  necessary  for  the 
offender  as  well  as  the  penal  agent  to  realize  that  the 8 
deed  is  wrong.  One  is  thus  "penalized  for  breaking  autho- 
rised  rules,  but  only  when  the  rules  are  moral  ones  or 
when  one  endorses  the  rules  as  morally  justifiable  does 
the  breaking  of  them  constitute  doing  "wrong".  To  put  it 
in  another  way,  an  action  can  only  be  construed  as  punish- 
ment  if  it  is  as  a  consequence  of  the  breaking  of  a  moral 
rule,  and  the  distinction  between  a  moral  rule  and  a  non- 
moral  rule  is  a  matter  which  can  only  be  decided  by  the 
judgement  of  the  persons  concerned.  A  fuller  account  of 
what  constitute  penalties  and  punishments  will  be  taken 
up  later  in  this  work. 
It  follows  from  our  discussion  that  the  grounds  on 
which  we  distinguish  punishment  from  other  forms  of  un- 
pleasantness  is  its  infliction  for  some  moral  offence. 
Anthoy  Flew's  second  criterion,  that  cases  of  punishment 
must  be  "for  an  offence"  is  misleading  and  "for  a  moral 
offence"  would  be  more  exact.  The  point  about  'moral 
offence'  may  need  clarifying  further.  We  would  want  to 
include  not  just  mala  in  se  but  also  all  cases  where  we 
have  a  moral  obligation  to  obey  the  law  even  though  what 
the  law  enjoins  may  not  be  morally  required.  For  example, 
it  could  be  argued  that  it  is  morally  wrong  to  deliberately 
drive  on  the  wrong  side  of  the  road  because  we  have  a  moral 
obligation  to  obey  the  law  in  these  cases. 
It  may  also  be  suggested  on  the  basis  of  a  quite 
different  argument  that  punishment  is  not  always  of  an 
offender.  We  do  speak  of  collective  punishment  of  groups, 9 
such  as  classes  in  schools,  some  only  of  whose  members 
have  offended.  For  instance,  a  schoolmaster  might  declare 
that  he  was  keeping  his  whole  class  in  after  school  be- 
cause  three  paint  brushes  were  missing,  and  believed  stolen 
after  an  art  lesson.  Similarly,  with  "vicarious  liabili- 
ty";  an  employer  could  be  held  responsible  for  certain 
acts  of  his  employees.  Surely,  it  may  be  said,  neither 
the  "whole  class"  nor  the  "employer"  could  be  regarded  as 
offenders  in  a  literal  sense. 
These  examples  must  be  put  forward  as  instances  of 
what  we  would  ordinarily  regard  as  punishment,  and  also 
as  instances  where  some  element  specified  in  Flew's  crite- 
ria  for  standard  cases  of  punishment  is  missing.  Do  they 
then  show  that  he  has  not  captured  the  ordinary  nbtion  of 
punishment? 
The  crux  of  the  problem  surely  is  that  punis'ment  has 
necessarily  to  be  for  an  offence  (and  as  previously  argued, 
for  a  moral  offence).  The  innocent  are  "conceptually 
immune".  Anthony  Quinton10  defends  this  view  when  the 
points  out:  "the  absurdity  of  'I  am  punishing  you  for  some- 
thing  you  have  not  done'  is  analogues  to  that  of  'I  pro- 
mise  to  do  something  which  is  not  in  my  power'.  Unless 
you  are  guilty  I  am  no  more  in  a  position  to  punish  you 
than  I  am  in  a  position  to  promise  what  is  not  in  my  power. 
So  it  is  improper  to  say  'I  am  going  to  punish  you'  unless 
you  are  guilty,  just  as  it  is  improper  to  say  'I  promise 
to  do  this'  unless  it  is  in  my  power  to  do  it.....  guilt 10 
is  a  logically  necessary  condition  of  punishment..... 
This  argument  however  is  not  without  its  critics. 
K.  E.  Baier11  objects  against  Quinton:  "My  point  is  that, 
it  is  simply  not  true  that  'I  am  punishing  you  for  some- 
thing  you  have  not  done'  is  as  absurd  as  'I  promise  you 
to  do  something  which  is  not  in  my  power.?  It  need  not 
be  absurd  at  all.  The  executioner  may  whisper  it  to  the 
man  who  has  been  sentenced  to  death:  tI  am  punishing  you 
for  something  you  have  not  done'  would  be  analogous  to 
'I  promise  you  to  do  this  which  is  not  in  my  power'  only 
if  to  say  'I  am  punishing  you.....  were  to  punish  you, 
just  as  'I  promise  you'.....  is  to  promise  you. 
Baier  is  clearly  right  in  pointing  out  that  Quinton 
is  mistaken  in  taking  the  two  senses  of  'promising'  and 
'punishing'  to  be  analogous.  The  verb  'to  promise'  is  a 
performatory  word,  'to  punish'  is  not.  Flew's  criterion 
that  punishment  may  only  be  inflicted  on  an  offender  I.  e. 
the  guilty,  nevertheless  remains  secure.  Some  other  des- 
cription  must  be  given  to  the  practice  of  inflicting  pain 
or  unpleasantness  on  the  innocent,  unless  of  course  cases 
of  vicarious  or  collective  punishment  are  conveniently 
relegated  to  the  position  of  sub-standard  or  peripheral 
usages  of  the  concept.  This  is  indeed  a  move  H.  L.  A.  Hart 
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makes  to  prevent  what  he  calls  the  'definitional  stops  in 
discussions  of  punishment. 
Flew's  fourth  criterion,  that  punishment  should  be 
the  work  of  personal  agencies  seems  correct.  Clearly, 11 
punishment  is  not  a  matter  of  fortuitous  misfortune,  or 
in  the  school  situation,  the  natural  consequences  of  mis- 
behaviour.  Thus  a  pupil  who  disobeys  an  instruction  to 
remove  his  chewing  gum  before  diving  into  the  swimming 
pool,  and  consequently  almost  drowns,  may  be  said  to  have 
suffered  a  penalty,  not  punishment,  for  his  disobedience, 
The  Headmaster  who  speaks  of  a  boy's  broken  leg  astpunish- 
ment  for  running  in  the  corridor'  is  using  the  word  meta- 
phorically.  Pain  and  unpleasantness  occuring  to  people 
as  the  natural  consequences  of  an  action  may  be  refferred 
to  as  a  "penalty"  but  not  as  "punishment,  "  Nothing  will 
be  added  concerning  "divinely  instituted  punishments"  as 
these  seem  unlikely  to  occur  in  legal  or  educational 
contexts. 
The  fifth  criterion  is,  that  punishment  must  be  by  an 
authority  whose  rule  has  been  broken.  Flew  thinks  that 
direct  action  by  an  aggrieved  person  with  no  pretensions. 
to  special  authority  is  not  properly  called  punishment, 
but  revenge.  Peters13  also  argues  that  unpleasantness 
inflicted  without  authority  is  "revenge",  and  if  inflicted 
at  whim,  is  "spite".  He  states:  "The  pain  also  must  be 
inflicted  by  someone  who  is  in  authority,  who  has  a  right 
to  act  in  this  way.  Otherwise,  it  would  be  impossible  to 
distinguish  'punishment'  from  'revenge'.  People  in  autho- 
rity  can,  of  course,  inflict  pain  on  people  at  whim.  But 
this  would  be  called  'spite'  unless  it  were  inflicted  as 
a.  consequence  of  a  breach  of  rules  on  the  part  of  the 
sufferer. 12 
Firstly,  it  may  be  against  the  fifth  condition  that 
punishments  are  not  always  nor  are  they  necessarily  the 
work  of  authorities,  i.  e.,  persons,  or  groups  of  persons 
empowered  to  act  by  rules  that  have  something  like  general 
acceptance.  Direct  action  by  an  unauthorised  parent  who 
takes  it  upon  herself  to  'punish'  a  neighbour's  misbeha- 
ving  child,  may  in  ordinary  parlance,  be  called  punishment. 
VWar,.  criminals"  are  said  to  be  punished  despite  doubts  as 
to  whether  the  tribunals  of  the  winning  side  count  as 
authorities.  Even  in  legal  punishment,  there  is  no  parti- 
cular  person  who  punishes  the  offender,  The  question  'who 
punished  the  criminal?  '  is  usually  superfluous  since  in 
most  situations  there  is  only  one  agency  with  the  power  to 
punish.  It  is  true  that  different  individuals  within  the 
state  might  impose  and  administer  the  punishment  but  we 
are  interested  in  them  as  occupiers  of  roles  rather  than 
as  individuals.  Also,  how  are  we  to  describe  the  action 
of  a  school  caretaker  who  chastises  naughty  boys,  perhaps 
apprehended  kicking  his  coke  around  the  playground.  Would 
we  not  say  that  the  caretaker  was  inflicting  punishment 
for  the  purposes  of  correction  rather  than  to  speak  of 
"revenue"  or  "spite"  for  the  simple  reason  that  the  care- 
taker  did  not  have  any  authority  over  the  boys. 
Secondly,  punishment  obviously  is  not  revenge  although 
certain  of  its  supposed  justifications  would  go  some  way 
to  justifying  revenge,  and  some  of  those  who  punish  may 
sometimes  be  accused  of  sharing  motivations  with  those  who 13 
take  revenge.  However,  Peters'  and  Flew's  view  that  non- 
authoritative  infliction  of  unpleasantness  constitute 
revenge,  though  widespread,  might  be  challenged.  It  could 
be  objected  that  the  distinction  between  punishment  and 
revenge  is  to  be  located  elsewhere.  Revenge  is  the  get- 
ting  of  one's  own  back,  th,  2  notion  of  moral  wrong  being 
irrelevant  to  it.  Thus  a  games  master,  playing  football 
with  his  pupils,  may  take  revenge  on  an  opponent  because 
of  a  personal  injury  inflicted  in  the  course  of  the  game, 
not  because  of  a  wrong  committed  by  the  pupil.  The  dis- 
tinction  between  punishment  and  revenge  is  in  motives, 
not  status.  Because  the  revenge  argument  can  more  often 
than  not  confuse  the  concept  of  punishment  a  complete, 
section  has  been  devoted  to  its  analysis  elsewhere  in  this 
work. 
The  first  objection  is  often  answered  by  once  again 
pointing  to  the  distinction  between  the  central  cases  of 
punishment  and  the  more  peripheral  ones.  The  boy  who  says 
to  the  caretaker,  "You  cannot  punish  me",  is  conceptually 
corfect,  for  it  is  a  logically  necessary  condition  of 
standard  uses  of  the  word,  that-the  unpleasantness  must  be 
inflicted  by  somebody  who  has  the  right  to  act  in  this  way. 
What  is  done  to  "war  criminals"  may  be  taken  to  be  punish- 
ment  only  by  those  who  accept  that  tribunals  count  as 
authorities.  Those  who  do  not  accept  this  might  give  some 
other  description  to  instances  of  this  kind.  Such  as  ans- 
wer  will  only  do  however  if  it  can  be  established  that  it 14 
is  a  logically  necessary  condition  that  punishment  be  in- 
flicted  by  someone  in  authority. 
The  second  objection  appears  difficult  to  meet. 
Clearly,  unpleasantness  inflicted  without  authority  is  not 
necessarily  revenge;  it  might,  for  instance  be  pure  vindic- 
tiveness.  Furthermore,  Professor  Peters  is  wrong  to  suggest 
that  it  is  impossible  to  distinguish  punishment  from  revenge 
except  on  the  grounds  of  "having  a  right"  to  inflict  un- 
pleasantness.  The  difference  can  be  explained  in  terms  of 
motives.  Punishment  is  a  consequence  of  a  moral  wrong; 
revenge  is  getting  one's  own  back.  The  mistake  that  is 
made  by  both  Peters  and  Flew  is  to  argue  as'if  punishment 
is  necessarily  institutionalized.  This  is  just  not  so. 
One  can  be  punished  by  anyone  with  whom  one  shares  an 
interest,  and  if  one  fails  to  behave  in  a  way  appropriate 
to  that  interest.  To  insist  that  punishment  can  only  be 
given  by  some  agent  formally  authorized  or  empowered  to 
do  so  is  to  confuse  "being  punished"  with  "paying  a  penalty.  " 
One  is  penalized  for  infringing  the  authorised  rules  of 
an  institution,  but  one  is  punished  for  breaking  specifi- 
cally  moral  rules.  In  other  words,  any  moral  agent  is 
capable  of  inflicting  punishment.  Flew's  fifth  criterion 
is  therefore  inappropriate  to  the  meaning  of  punishment. 
Before  reformulating  Flew's  criteria  we  might  consi- 
der  whether  any  factors  have  been  overlooked  which  could 
affect  an  examination  of  the  relevance  and  justification 
of  punishment  in  law  and  education.  The  charge  might 15 
reasonably  be  made  that  the  analysis  is  casual  with  regard 
to  punishment  in  its  legal  setting.  The  answer  to  this 
is  that  we  can  never  hope  to  understand  the  place  of  pu- 
nishment  in  education  simply  by  looking  at  its  meaning  as 
exemplified  in  a  court  of  law.  And  as  already  argued  the 
distinctions  which  are  made  in  law  between  penalizing  and 
punishing  (if  indeed  any  are  made)  would  be  quite  inade- 
quate  to  cover  instances  of  punishment  in  education.  There 
is  still  the  problem,  however,  of  how  to  meet  cases  which 
appear  to  conform  to  all  logically  necessary  conditions 
so  far  specified  but  which  we  would  not  ordinarily  think 
of  as  cases  of  punishment.  Suppose,  for  example,  a  teacher 
accidentally  bangs  the  head  of  a  pupil  who  happens  to  be 
deserving  of  punishment,  while  carrying  out  some  other 
task.  Pain  has  been  inflicted  on  an  offender  by  an  appro- 
priate  moral  agent,  but  we  can  hardly  describe  the  blow  as 
punishment  -  at  least  not  seriously.  This  might  be  answered 
by  pointing  out  that  as  the  pain  is  incidental  to  some 
other  aim,  the  second  condition,  that  is  punishment  must 
be  for  an  offence,  is  not  met.  Another,  and  perhaps  more 
reliable  one,  would  be  to  add  the  word  "intentional""`  to 
the  first  condition. 
Professor  Flewºs  criteria  for  the  use  of  the  word 
"punishment"  in  its  primary  sense,  may  now  be  amended  to 
meet  the  requirements  of  the  use  of  the  word  in  the  context 
of  an  educational  situation: 
(i)  It  must  involve  an  intentional  imposition  of 16 
pain  or  some  other  form  of  unpleasantness. 
(ii)  It  must  be  for  a  moral  offence;  actual  or 
supposed. 
(iii)  it  must  be  imposed  on  an  offender. 
(iv)  It  must  be  the  work  of  personal  agencies. 
(v)  It  must  be  imposed  by  an  appropriate  moral  agent. 
A  final  problem  before  leaving  the  complexities  of 
the  meaning  of  the  word  "punishment"  concerns  what  Professor 
Peters14  describes  as  cases  of  "external  discipline".  For 
instance,  he  says  that  a  pupil  made  to  repeat  badly  comple- 
ted  school  work,  is  an  example  of  "external  discipline", 
not  punishment.  This  crucial'point,  Peters  thinks,  is  that 
in  a  school  situation  there  is  a  frequent  tendency  to  con- 
fuse  punishment  with  discipline.  This  is  unfortunate  be- 
cause  punishment  is  conceptually  distinct  from  discipline. 
The  notion  of  "discipline"  (which  will  be  fully  analysed 
later)  is  tied  to  the  learning  situation,  and  refers  to 
the  very  general  activity  of  submission  to  rules  or  a 
system  of  order,  whether  externally  brought  about  or  self 
imposed.  "Punishment"  on  the  other  hand  is  "a  much  more 
specified  notion",  and  refers  to  the  authoritative  imposi- 
tion  of  unpleasantness  in  consequence  of  a  breach  of  rules. 
Peters  thus  links  discipline  and  punishment  by  virtue 
of  their  connection  with  rules,  but  this  is  unhelpful  and 
unnecessarily  blurs  the  distinction.  As  already  argued, 
it  is  wrong  to  suggest  that  for  someone  to  be  punished  a 
rule  must  have  been  broken.  Children  are  frequently,  and 17 
rightly,  punished  without  having  broken  an  authorized  ruled 
Furthermore,  to  say  that  a  child  is  being  "externally  dis- 
ciplined"  is  not  only  something  different  from  punishment 
it  is  also  a  contradiction  in  terms.  The  whole  point  of 
the  term  "discipline",  in  an  educative  context  is  that 
the  orderliness  characteristic  of  it  is  "internal"  to  the 
activity  or  relationship  in  question.  There  is  really  no 
such  thing  as  "external  discipline".  A  child  can  only 
submit  to  the  proposed  form  of  order  if  he  can  at  least 
see  something  of  its  intrinsic  value. 
Etymologically,  discipline  is  rooted  in  the  idea  of 
"discipuli",  pupils.  Although  it  would  be  a  fallacy  to 
suppose  that  a  word  always  means  what  it  originally  meant, 
nevertheless,  in  the  school  situation  "discipline"  is 
generally  regarded  as  a  meansto  the  end  of  helping  the 
learning  of  the  "discipuli".  Our  educative  concern  is 
therefore  with  matters  of  discipline.  Because  the  form  of 
order  associated  with  extrinsic  control  is  logically  dis- 
tinct  from  the  form  of  order  associated  with  discipline 
the  contention  will  be  that  punishment  is  the  infliction 
of  various  forms  of  unpleasantness,  not  for  breaking 
authorized  rules  but  for  moral  wrongdoing,  or  in  other 
words  for  faults  of  discipline.  This  is  the  proper  link 
between  discipline  and  punishment.  When  so  interpreted 
punishment  becomes  something  educative.  The  child  is  re- 
quired  to  learn  something  from  his  punishment  not  because 
of  it,  as  in  the  case  when  punishment  is  interpreted  in  a 
legalistic  way  and  thought  of  merely  as  a  form  of  social 
control.  This  point  will  be  expanded  in  the  final  chapter. 1s 
In  many  ways  this  analysis  depart  from  most  of  the 
definitions  and  descriptions  provided  by  Philosophers  who 
have  considered  the  question  of  punishment.  But  this  is 
not  surprising  because  this  thesis  deals  with  a  broader 
topic,  and  it  is  my  ultimate  intention  to  justify  punish- 
ment  in  law  as  well  as  in  education.  The  difficulty  with 
many  of  the  recently  proposed  analyses  of  punishment  is 
that  they  are  advanced  to  justify  legal  punishment  only. 
15  But  as  McCloskey  rightly  points  out  11  .....  there  is  not 
a  single  core,  basic  use  of  punishment".  it  is  obvious 
that  I  have  tried  to  capture  a  notion  of  punishment  appro- 
priate  to  educational  situations,  but  in  so  doing  there 
has  been  no  deliberate  move  to  depart  from  the  most  common 
or  perhaps  ordinary  notion. 
A  final  point  about  legal  punishment:  To  attempt  a 
"complete￿  definition  of  such  a  complex  institution,  and 
one  subject  to  so  many  variations,  as  legal  punishment, 
would  be  to  overdo  our  ground  survey  by  hacking  through  a 
jungle  we  would  do  better  to  view  from  a  distance.  If  we 
are  to  consider  the  purpose  of  punishment,  we  need  a  defi 
nition  which  is  sufficiently  general  to  include  a  large 
number  of  variants.  Otherwise,  as  Hart  has  pointed  out, 
16 
debates  about  punishment  can  be  closed  off  too  easily  and 
soon  by  disclaiming  the  institution  under  attack.  it  should 
also  be  pointed  out  that  we  do  not  want  to  define  punish- 
Rent  in  such  a  way  as  to  tip  the  scale  in  favour  of  retri- 
butivism  or  utilitarianism. NCT:  S  AND  REFERENCES 
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THEORIES  OF  PUNISHMENT CHAPTER  ONE 
A.  RETRIBUTIVISM  -  CLASSICAL  THEORISTS 
1.  KANT 
2.  HEGEL 
3.  BRADLEY 
4,  CONCLUSION. 
B.  RETRIBUTION  AND  REVENGE 
1.  THE  REVENGE  ARGUMENT 
2.  TYLER'S  ARGUMENT. AS  RETRIBUTIVISM  -  CLASSICAL  THEORISTS 
1.  KANT 
Kant  has  been  classified  as  a  retributivist  and  the 
classification  is  usually  accompanied  by  a  reference  to 
some  part  of  the  following  passage  from  the  Rechtslehynt, 
which  is  worth  qusting  at  length. 
"Judicial  punishment  can  never  be  administered 
merely  as  a  means  for  promoting  another  good 
either  with  regard  to  the  criminal  himself  or 
to  civil  society,  but  must  in  all  cases  be  im- 
posed  only  because  the  individual  on  whom  it 
is  inflicted  has  committed  a  crime.  For  one 
man  ought  never  to  be  dealt  with  merely  as  a 
means  subservient  to  the  purpose  of  another, 
nor  be  mixed  up  with  the  subjects  of  real  right. 
Against  such  treatment  his  inborn  personality 
has  a  right  to  protect  him,  even  although  he 
may  be  condemned  to  lose  his  civil  personality. 
He  must  first  be  found  guilty  and  punishable 
before  there  can  be  any  thought  of  drawing  from 
his  punishment  any  benefit  for  himself  or  his 
fellow  citizens.  The  penal  law  is  a  categorical 
imperative;  and  woe  to  him  who  creeps  through 
the  serpent  windings  of  utilitatianism  to  disco- 
ver  some  advantage  that  may  discharge  him  from 
the  justice  of  punishment,  or  even  from  the  due 
measure  of  it,  according  to  the  Pharisaic  maxim: 
"It  is  better  that  one  man  should  die  than  the 
whole  people  should  perish.  ".  For  if  justice  and 
righteousness  perish,  human  life  would  ho 
longer  have  any  value  in  the  world..... 
But  what  is  the  mode  and  measure  of  punish- 
ment  which  public  justice  takes  as  its  principle 
and'standard?  It  is  just  the  principle  of  equa- 
lity,  by  which  the  pointer  of  the  scale  of  justi- 
ce  is  made  to  incline  no  more  to  the  one  side 
than  the  other,  It  may  be  rendered  by  saying 
that  the  undeserved  evil  which  anyone  commits  on 
another,  is  to  be  regarded  as  perpetrated  on  him- 
self.  Hence  it  may  be  said:  "If  you  slander 
another,  you  slander  yourself;  if  you  steal  from 
another,  you  strike  yourself;  if  you  kill  another 
you  kill  yourself.  "  This  is  the  Right  of  RETA- 
LIATION  (justalionis);  and  properly  understood, 
it  is  the  only  principle  which  in  regulating  a 
public  court,  as  distinguished  from  mere  private 
judgement,  can  definitely  assign  both  the  quality 
and  the  quantity  of  a  just  penalty.  All  other 
23 24 
standards  are  wavering  and  uncertain;  and  on 
account  of  other  considerations  involved  in 
them;  they  contain  no  principle  conformable 
to  the  sentence  of  pure  and  strict  justice.  " 
There  are  two  main  points  in  this  passage  to  which  we 
should  give  particular  attention: 
(i)  The  only  acceptable  reason  for  punishing  a  man 
is  that  he  has  committed  a  crime. 
(ii)  The  only  acceptable  reason  for  punishing  a  man 
in  a  given  manner  and  degree  is  that  the  punish- 
ment  is  "equal"to  the  crime  for  which  he  is 
punished. 
It  seems  to  me  that  these  propositions  express  rightly 
the  main  points  of  the  first  and  second  paragraphs  respect- 
ively.  We  shall  go  on  to  the  third  before  stopping  over 
these  pointsi  writers  on  retributivism  also  point  to  the 
following  passage  from  the  Rechtslehre. 
"Even  if  a  civil  society  resolved  to  dissolve 
itself  with  the  consent  of  all  its  members  - 
as  might  be  supposed  in  the  case  of  a  people 
inhabiting  an  island  resolving  to  separate  and 
scatter  themselves  throughout  the  whole  world  - 
the  last  murderer  lying  in  prison  ought  to  be 
executed  before  the  resolution  was  carried  out. 
This  ought  to  be  done  in  order  that  everyone 
may  realize  the  desert  of  his  deeds,  and  the 
bloodguiltiness  may  not  remain  upon  the  people; 
for  otherwise  they  will  all  be  regarded  as  parti- 
cipators  in  the  murder  as  a  public  violation 
of  justice.  "2 
This  passage  draws  our  attention  to  the  third  point 
namely  Kant  holds  that: 
(iii)  Whoever  commits  a  crime  must  be  punished  in 
accordance  with  his  desert. 25 
Taking  the  three  propositions  we  have  isolated  as 
expressing  the  essence  of  the  Kantian  retributivistic 
position,  we  must  now  ask  a  direct  and  obvious  question. 
What  makes  Kant  hold  this  position?  Why  does  he  think  it 
apparent  that  consequences  should  have  nothing  to  do  with 
the  decision  whether,  and  how,  and  how  much  to  punish? 
An  answer  to  this  question  might  follow  two  directions. 
One  would  lead  us  into  an  extensive  excursus  on  the  philo- 
sophical  position  of  Kant,  the  relation  of  this  to  his 
ethical  theory,  and  the  relation  of  his  general  theory  of 
ethics  to  his  philosophy  of  law.  In  short,  it  would  take 
our  question  as  one  about  the  consistency  of  Kant's  posi- 
tion  concerning  the  justification  of  punishment  with  the 
whole  of  the  Kantian  philosophy.  This  would  involve  dis- 
cussion  of  Kant's  reasons  for  believing  that  moral  laws 
must  be  universal  and  categorical  in  virtue  of  their  form 
alone,  and  divorced  from  any  empirical  content;  of  his 
attempt  to  make  out  a  moral  decision  -  procedure  based 
upon  an  "empty"  categorical  imperative;  and,  above  all, 
of  the  concept  of  freedom  as  a  postulate  of  practical  rea- 
son,  and  as  the  central  concept  of  the  philosophy  of  law. 
This  kind  of  answer,  however,  we  must  forego  here.  t  for 
while  it  would  have  considerable  interest  in  its  own  right, 
it  would  lead  us  astray  from  our  purpose,  which  is  to  un- 
derstand  as  well  as  we  can  the  retributivist  position,  not 
as  part  of  this  or  that  philosophical  system  but  for  its 
own  sake.  It  is  a  position  taken  by  philosophers  with 26 
diverse  philosophical  systems;  we  want  to  take  another 
direction,  then,  'in  our  answer.  Is  there  any  general 
(nonspecial,  nonsystematic)  reason  why  Kant  rejects  con- 
sequences  in  the  justification  of  punishment? 
It  seems  to  be  the  case  that  Kant  believes  that  con- 
sequences  have  nothing  to  do  frith  the  justification  of 
punishment  partly  because  of  his  assumptions  about  the 
direction  of  justification;  and  these  assumptions  are  be- 
lieved  also  to  be  found  underlying  the  thought  of  Hegel 
and  Bradley.  1ustification  is  not  only  of  something,  it 
is  also  to  someone:  it  has  an  addressee.  Now  there  are 
important  confusions  in  Kant's  and  other  traditional  justi- 
fications  of  punishment  turning  on  the  question  what  the 
"punishment"  is  which  is  being  justified.  But  if  we  are 
to  feel  the  force  of  the  retributivist  position,  we  can  no 
longer  put  off  the  question  of  the  addressee  of  justification. 
The  question  as  to  who  the  Kantian  justification  of 
punishment  is  directed  may  seem  a  difficult  one  to  answer, 
since  Kant  does  not  consider  it  himself  as  a  separate  issue. 
Indeed,  it  is  not  the  kind  of  question  likely  to  occur  to 
a  philosopher  of  Kant's  formalistic  leanings.  A  Kantian 
justification  or  rationale  stands,  so  to  speak,  on  its  own. 
It  is  a  structure  which  can  be  examined,  tested,  probed  by 
any  national  being.  Even  to  speak  of  the  addressee  of 
justification  has  an  uncomfortably  relativistic  sound,  as 
if  only  persuation  of  X  or  Y  or  Z  is  possible,  and  proof 
impossible.  Yet,  in  practice,  Kant  does  not  address  his 27 
proferred  justification  of  punishment  so  much  to  any  rational 
being  (which,  to  put  it  otherwise,  is  to  address  it  not 
'l  all),  as  to  the  being  most  affected:  the  criminal 
himself. 
The  criminal  is  the  one  who  is  cautioned  not  to  creep 
through  the  serpent-windings  of  utilitarianism.  It  is  the 
criminal's  rights  which  are  in  question  in  the  debate.  It 
is  the  criminal  we  are  warned  bot  to  mix  up  with  property 
or  things:  the  "subjects  of  Real  Right.  "  In  the  Kritic 
der  Praktischen  Vernunft,  the  intended  direction  of  justi- 
fication  becomes  especially  clear. 
"Now-the  notion  of  punishment,  as  such,  cannot' 
be  unlimited  with  that  of  becoming  a  partaker 
of  hapiness;  for  although  he  who  inflicts  the 
punishment  may  at  the  same  time  have  the  bene- 
volent  purpose  of  directing  this  punishment  to 
this  end,  yet  it  must  be  justified  in  itself 
as  punishment,  i.  e,  as  mere  harm,  so  that  if  it 
stopped  there,  and  the  person  punished  could 
get  no  glimpse  of  kindness  hidden  behind  this 
harshness,  he  must  yet  admit  that  justice  was 
done  him,  and  that  his  reward  was  perfectly 
suitable  to  his  conduct.  In  every  punishment, 
as  such,  there  must  first  be  justice,  and  this 
constitutes  the  essence  of  the  notion.  Benevo- 
lence  may,  indeed,  be  united  with  it,  but  the 
man  who  has  deserved  punishment  has  not  the 
least-'-reason  to  reckon  upon  this. 
As  this  matter  of  the  direction  of  justification  is 
central  in  our  understanding  of  traditional  retributivism, 
and  not  generally  appreciated,  it  will  be  worth  our  while 
to  pause  over  this  paragraph.  Kant  holds  here,  as  he 
later'holds  in  the  Rechtslehre,  that  once  it  has  been  accepted 
that  a  given  "mode  and  measure"  of  punishment  is  justified, 28 
then  "he  who  inflicts  punishment"  may  do  so  in  such  a  way 
as  to  increase  the  long-term  happiness  of  the  criminal. 
This  could'be  accompalished,  e.  g.,  by  using  a  prison  term 
as  an  opportunity  for  reforming  the  criminal.  But  Kant's 
point  is  that  reforming  the  criminal  has  nothing  to  do 
with  justifying  the  infliction  of  punishment.  It  is  not 
inflicted'because  it  will  give  an  opprotunity  for  reform, 
but  because  it  is  merited.  The  passage  does  not  require 
an  explanation;  it  is  transparently  clear.  Kant  wants  the 
justification  of  punishment  to  be  such  that  the  criminal 
"who  could  get  no  glimpse  of  kindness  behind  this  harshness" 
would  have"to  admit  that'  punishment  is  warranted. 
Let  us  suppose  we  tell  the  criminal,  "We  are  punish- 
ing  you  for  your  own  good.  "  This  is  wrong,  because  it  is 
then  open  to  him  to  raise  the  question  whether  he  deserves 
punishment,  -and  what  you  consider  good  to  be  .  If  he  does 
not  deserve  punishment,  we  have  no  right  to  inflict  it, 
especially  in  the  name  of  some  good  of  which  the  criminal 
may  not  approve.  So  long  as  we  are  to  treat  him  as  rational 
-a  being  with  dignity  -we  cannot  force  our  judgement  of 
good  upon  him.  This  is  what  makes  the  appeal  to  supposedly 
good  consequences  "wavering  and  uncertain.  "  They  waver 
because  the  criminal  has  as  mußh  right  as  anyone  to  question 
them*  They  concern  ends  which  he  may  reject,  and  means 
which  he  might  rightly  regard  as  unsuited  to  the  ends. 
Kant  distinguishes,  in  the  "supplementary  Explanations 
of  Principles  of  Right"  of  the  Rechtslehre,  between  'puni- 29 
tive  justice  (justia  punitiva)',  in  which  the  ground  of  the 
penalty  is  moräll  (quia  peccatum  est),  "  and  "punitive  expe- 
diency,  the  foundation  of  which  is  merely  pragmatic  (ne 
peccetur)  as  being  grounded  upon  the  experience  of  what 
operates  most  effectively  to  prevent  crime.  "  Punitive  jus- 
tice,  says  Kant,  has  an  "entirely  distinct  place  (locus 
justi)  in  the  topical  arrangement  of  the  juridical  concep- 
tions.  "  It  does  not  seem  reasonable-.  to  suppose  that  Kant 
makes  this  distinction  merely  to  discard  punitive  expedien- 
cy  entirely,  that  he  has  no  concern  at  all  for  the  ne.  "pecce- 
tur.  But  he  does  hold  that  there  is  no  place  for  it  in 
the  justification  of  punishment  proper:  for  this  can  only 
be  to  show  the  criminhl  that  the  punishment  is  just. 
The'question  may  be  put:  How  is  this  to  be  done? 
The  difficulty  is  that  on  the  on'R  hand  the  criminal  must 
be  treated  as  a  rational  being,  and  end  in  himself;  but  on 
the  other  hand  the  justification  we  offer  him  cannot  be 
allowed  to  appear  as  the  opening  move  in  a  rational  discu- 
ssion.  It  cannot  turn  on  the  criminal's  acceptance  of 
some  premise  which,  as  a  rational  being,  he  has  a  perfect 
right  to  question.  If  the  end  in  question  is  the  well- 
being  of  society,  we  are  assuming  that  the  criminal  will 
not  have  a  different  view  of  what  that  well-being  consists 
in,  and  we  are  telling  him  that  he  should  sacrifice  him- 
self  to  that  end.  As  a  rational  being,  he  can  question 
whether  any  end  we  propose  is  a  good  end.  And  we  have  no 
right  to  demand  that  he  should  sacrifice  himself  to  the 
public  well-being,  even  supposing  he  agrees  with  us  on 30 
what  that  consists  in.  No  man  has  a  duty,  on  Kant's  view 
to  be  benevolent.  4 
In  order  to  come  out  of  this  perplexity  we  have  to 
show  the  criminal  that  we  are  not  inflicting  the  punish- 
ment  on  him  for  some  questionable  purpose  of  our  own 
choice,  but  that  he,  as  a  free  agent,  has  exercised  his 
choice  in  such  a  way  as  to  make  the  punishment  a  necessary 
consequence.  "His  own  evil  deed  draws  the  punishment  upon 
himself".  5 
"The  undeserved  evil  which  anyone  commits  on 
another,  is  to  be  regarded  as 
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perpetuated  on  himself.  " 
But  may  not  the  criminal  rationally  question  this  asserted 
connection  between  crime  and  punishment?  Suppose  he  wishes 
to  regard  the  punishment  not  as  "drawn  upom  himself"  by 
his  own  "evil  deed?  "  Suppose  he'argues  that  no  good  pur- 
pose  will-be  served'by  punishing  him?  But  this  line  of 
thought  leads  into  the  "serpent-windings  of  utilitariani- 
sm,  "  for-if  it  is  good  consequences  that  govern,  then  just- 
ice  goes  by  the  board.  What  may  not  be  done  to  him  in  the 
name  of  good  consequences?,  What  proportion  would  remain 
between  what  he  has  done  and  what  he  suffers? 
7 
But  punishment  is  inflicted.  To  tell  the  criminal 
that  "he  draws  it  upon  himself"  is  all  very  well,  only  how 
do  we  justify  to  ourselves  the  infliction  of  it?  Kant's 
answer  is  found  early  in  the  Rechtslehre.  8 
There  he  relates 
punishment  to  crime  via  freedom.  Crime  consists  in  compul- 
sion  or  constraint  of  some  kind:  a'hindrance  of  freedom.  9 
If  it  is  wrong  that  freedom  should  be  hindered,  it  is  right 
to  block  this  hindrance.  But  to  block  the  constraint  of 31 
freedom  it  is  necessary  to  apply  constraint.  Punishment 
is  a  "hindering  of  a  hindrance  of  freedom.  "  Compulsion  of 
the  criminal  is,  then,  justified  only  to  the  extent  that 
it  hinders  his  compulsion  of  another. 
Could  we  rightly  understand  Kant  here?  Punishment 
comes  after  the  crime.  How  then  can  it  hinder  the  crime? 
The  reference  cannot  be  to  the  hindrance  of  future  crime, 
or  Kant's  doctrinereduces  to  a  variety  of  utilitatianism. 
The  picture  of  compulsion  versus  compulsion  is  clear  enough 
but  how  are  we  to  apply  it?  Our  answer  must  be  somewhat 
speculative,  since  there  is  no  direct  answer  to  be  found 
in  the  Rechtslehre.  The  answer  must  begin  from  yet  another 
extension  of  the  concept  of  crime.  For  the  crime  cannot 
consist  merely  in  the  act.  What  is  criminal  is  acting  in 
accordance  with  a  wrong  maxim:  a  maxim  which  would,  if  made 
universal,  destroy  freedom.  The  adoption  of  the  maxim  is 
criminal.  Should  we  regard  punishment,  then,  as  the  hind- 
rance  of'a  wrong  maxim?  But  how  do  we  hinder  a  maxim?  We 
show,  exhibit,  its  wrongness  by  taking  it  at  face  value. 
If  the  criminal  has  adopted  it,  he  is  claiming  that  it  can 
be  universalized.  But  if  it  is  universalized  it  warrants 
the  same  treatment  of  the  criminal  as  he  has  accorded  to 
his  victim.  So  if  he  murders-he  must  be  executed;  if  he 
steals  we  must  "steal  from"  him.  110  What  we  do  to  him  he 
willed,  in  willing  to  adopt  this  maxim  as  universalizai5le. 
To  justify  the  punishment  to  the  criminal  is  to  show  him 
that  the  compulsion  we  use  on  him  proceeds  according  to 32 
the  same  rule  by  which  he  acts.  This  is  how  he  "draws  the 
punishment  upon  himself.  "  in  punishing,  we  are  not  adopt- 
ing  his  maxim  but  demonstrating  its  logical  consequences 
if  universalized:  we  show  the  criminal  what  he  has  willed. 
This  is  the  positive  side  of  the  Kantian  rational  of  puni- 
shment. 
2.  HEGEL 
Hegel's11  account  of  punishment  has  attracted  more 
attention  and  disagreement,  in  recent  literature.  It  is 
the  Hegelian  metaph8sical  terminology  which  is  in  part 
responsible  for  the  disagreement,  and  which  has  stood  in 
the  way  of  an  understanding  of  the  retributivist  position. 
The  difficulty  turns  around  the  notions  of  "annulment  of 
crime",  and  punishment  as  the  "right"  of  the  criminal. 
Hegel  tells  us  that: 
"Abstract  right  is  a  right  to  coerce,  because  the 
wrong  which  transgresses  it  is  an  exercise  of 
force  against  the  existence  of  my  freedom  in  an 
eternal  thing.  The  maintenance  of  this  existent 
against  the  exercise  of  force  therefore  itself 
takes  the  form  of  an  external  act  and  an  exercise 
of  force  annu}iling  the  force  originally  brought 
against  it.  ºº1 
In  the  Common  Law,  Holmes  complains  that  by  the  use  of 
his  ldgical  apparatus,  involving  the  negation  of  negations 
(or  annulment),  Hegel  professes  to  establish  what  is  only 
a  mystic  (though  generally  felt)  bond  between  wrong  and 
punishment. 
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Hastings  Rashdall  asks  how  any  rational  con- 
nection  can  be  shown  betwew  the  evil  of  the  pain  of  punishment, 33 
and  the  twin  evils  of  the  suffering  of  the  victim  and  the 
moral  evil  which  "pollutes  the  offender's  sould.,  "  unless 
appeal  is  made  to  the  probable  good  consequences  of  punish- 
ment.  The  notion  that  the  «guilt"  of  the  offence  must  bey 
in  some  mysterious  way,  wiped  out  by  the  suffering  of  the 
offender  does  not  seem  to  provide  it. 
14 
Crime,  which  is 
an  evil,  is  apparently  to  be  "annulled"  by  the  addition  to 
it  of  punishment,  which  is  another  evil.  How  can  two  evils 
yeld  a  good? 
15 
But  it  seems  that  Hegel  is  following  the  Rechtslehre 
quite  closely  here,  and  his  doctrine  is  very  near  to  Kant's. 
In  the  notes  taken  at  Hegel's  lectures,  16 
we  find  Hegel 
quoted  as  follows: 
"If  crime  and  its  annulment  .....  are  treated  as  if 
they  were  unqualified  evils,  it  must,  of  course, 
seem  quite  unreasonable  to  will  ant  , 
'F-evil  merely 
because  "another  evil  is  there  already".....  But 
it  is  not  merely  a'question  of  an  evil  or  of  this 
that,  or  the  other  good;  the  precise  point  at 
issue  is  wrong,  and  the  righting  of  it.....  The 
various  considerations  which  are  relevant  to 
punishment  as  a  phenomenon  and  to  the  bearing  it 
has  on  the  particular  consciousness,  and  which 
concern  its  effects  (deterrent,  reformative,  etc.  ) 
on  the  imagination,  are  an  essential  topic  for 
examination  in  their  place,  expecially  in  connec- 
tion  with  model  of  punishment,  but  all  these  con- 
siderations  presuppose  as  their  foundation  the 
fact  that  punishment  is  inherently  and  actually 
just.  In  discussing  this  matter  the  only  impor- 
tant  things  are,  first,  the  crime  is  to  be  annulled 
not  because  it  is  the  producing  of  an  evil,  but 
because  it.  is  the  infringing  of  the  right  as  right, 
and  secondly,  the  question  of  what  the  positive 
existence)  is  which  crime  possesses  and  which  must 
be  annulled;  it  is  this  existence  which  is  the  real 
evil  to  be  removed,  and  the  essential  point  is  the 
question  of  where  it  Sits.  So  long  as  the  concepts 
here  at  issue  are  not  clearly  apprehended,  confu- 
sion  must  continue  to  reign  in  the  theory  of 
punishmento"17 34 
One  would  argue  that  this  passage  is  not  in  any  way 
likely  to  dethrone  confusion,  but  it  does  bring  us  closer 
to  the  basically  Kantian  heart  of  Hegel's  theory.  To 
"annul  crime"  should  be  redd  "right  wrong",  Crime  is  a 
wrong  which  consists  in  an  "infringement  of  the  right  as 
right.  "18ý,  It  would  be  unjust,  says  Hegel,  to  allow  crime, 
which  is  the  invasion  of  a  right,  to  go  unrequited.  For 
to  allow  this  is  to  admit-that  the  crime  is  "valid":  that 
is,  that  it  is  not  in  conflict  with  justice.  But  this  is 
what  we  do  not  want  to  admit,  and  the  only  way  of  showing 
this  is  to  pay  back  the  deed  to  the  agent:  coerce  the 
coercer.  For  by  intentionally  violating  his  victim's  rights, 
the  criminal  in  effect  claims  that  the  rights  of  others 
are  not  binding  on  him;  and  this  is  to  attackcLas  Recht 
itself:  the  system  of  justice  in  which  there  are  rights 
which  must  be  respected.  Punishment  not  only  keeps  the 
system  in  balance,  it  vindicates  the  system  itself. 
Apart  from  talking  about  punishment's  "annulment"  of 
crime,  Hegel  has  argued  that  it  is  the  "right  of  the  crimi- 
nal".  The  obvious  reaction  to  this  is  that  it  is  a  strange 
justification  of  punishment  which  makes  it  someone's  right 
for  it  is-at  best  a  strange  kind  of  right  which  no  one 
would  ever'want'to  claim!  McTaggart's  explanation  of  this 
facet  of  Hegel's  theory  is  epitomised  in  the  following 
quotation:  f 
"What,  then,  is  Hegel's  theory?  It  is,  I  think, 
briefly  this:  In  sin,  man  rejects  and  defies 
the  moral  law.  Punishment  is  pain  inflicted  on  him  because  he-has  done  this,  and  in  order  that 35 
he  may,  by  the  fact  of  his  punishment,  be  forced 
into  recognizing  as  valid  the  law  which  he  rejected 
in  sinning,  and  so  repent  of  his  sin  -  really  see 
repent,  and  not  merely  be  frightened  out  of  doing 
it  againa"19 
If  McTaggart  is  right,  then  we  are  obviously,  not 
going  to  find  in  Hegel  anything  relevant  to  the  justifica- 
tion  of  legal  punishment,  where  the  notions  of  sin  and 
repentance  are  out  of  place.  And  this  exactly  is  the  con- 
clusion  McTaggart  of  course  reaches.  "Hegel's  view  of 
punishment"  he  insists,  "cannot  properly  be  applied  in 
jurisprudence,  and...  his  chief  mistake  regarding  it  lay 
in  supposing  that  it  could.  "20 
But  though  McTaggart  may  be  right  in  emphasizing  the 
theological  aspect  of  Hegel's  doctrine  of  punishment,  he 
is  wrong  in  denying  it  a  jurisprudential  aspect.  In  fact, 
Hegel  is  only  saying  what  Kant  emphasized:  that  to  justify 
punishment  to  the  criminal  is  to  show  him  that  he  has 
chosen  to  be  treated  as  he  is  being  treated. 
"The  injury  (the  penalty)  which  falls  on  the 
criminal  is  not  merely  implicitly  just  -  as 
just  it  is  eo  ipso  his,  implicit  will,  an 
embodiment  of  his  freedom,  his  right;  on  the 
contrary,  it  is  also  a  right  established  with- 
in  the  criminal  himself,  i.  e.  in  his  objecti- 
vely  embodied  will,  in  his  action.  The  reason 
for  this  is  that  his  action  is  the  action  of  a 
rational  being  and  this  implies  that  it  is  some- 
thing  universal  and  that  by  doing  it  the  crimi- 
nal  has  laid  down  a  law  which  he  has  explicitly 
recognized  in  his  action  and  under  which  in  con- 
sequence  he  should  be  brought  as  under  his  right. 
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To  accept  the  retributivist  position,  theg1Ltis  to 
accept  a  thesis  about  the  burden  of  proof  in  the  justifica- 
tion  of  punishment.  Provided  we  make  the  punishment  "equal" 36 
to  the  crime  it  is  not  up  to  us  to  justify  it  to  the  crimi- 
nal,  beyond  pointing  out  to  him  that  it  is  what  he  willed. 
It  is  not  that  he  initiated  a  chain  of  events  likely  to 
result  in  his  punishment,  but  that  in  willing  the  crime  he 
willed  that  he  himself  should  suffer  in  the  same  degree  as 
his  victim.  But  what  if  the  criminal  simply  wanted  to  co- 
mmit  his  crime  and  get  away  with  it  (break  the  window  and 
run,  take  the  funds  gind  retire  to  Australia,  kill  but  live?  ) 
Suppose  we  explain  to  the  criminal  that  really  in  willing 
to  kill  he  willed  to  lose  his  life;  and  unimpressed,  he 
replies  that  really  he  wished  to  kill  and  save  his  skin. 
The  retributivist  answer-is  that  to  the  extent  that  the 
criminal  understands  freedom  and  justice  he  will  understand 
that  his  punishment  was  made  inevitable  by  his  own  choice. 
No  moral  theory  can  hope  to  provide  a  justification  of 
punishment  which  will  seem  such  to  the  criminal  merely  as 
a  nexus  of  passions  and  desires.  The  retributivist  addre- 
sses  him  as  a  rational  being,  aware  of  the  significance  of 
his  action.  The  burden  of  proof,  the  retributivist  would 
argue,  is  on  the  theorist  who  would  not  start  from  this 
assumption.  For  to  assume  from  the  beginning  that  the  cri- 
minal  is  not  rational  is  to  treat  him,  from  the  beginning, 
as  merely  a  "harmful  animal". 
"What  is  involved  in  the  action  of  the  criminal 
is  not  only  the  concept  of  crime,  the  rational 
aspect  present  in  crime  as  such  whether  the  in- 
dividual  wills  it  or  not,  the  aspect  which  the 
state  has  to  vindicate,  but  also  the  abstract 
rationality  of  the  individual's  volition.  Since 
that  is  so,  punishment  is  regarded  as  containing 37 
the  criminal's  right  and  hence  by  being  pu- 
nished  he  is  honoured  as  a  rational  being. 
He  does  not  receive  this  dues  of  honour  un- 
less  the  concept  and  measure  of  his  punish- 
ment  are  derived  from  his  own  act.  Still 
less  does  he  received  it  if  he  is  treated 
as  a  harmful  animal  who  has  to  be  made  harm- 
less,  or  w.  4th  a  view  to  deterring  and  re- 
forming  him.  "22 
To  address  the  criminal  as  a  rational  being  aware  of 
the  significance  of  his  action  is  to  address  him  as  a  per- 
son  who  knows  that  he  has  not  committed  a  "bare"  act;  to 
commit  an  act  is  to  commit  oneself  to  the  universalization 
of  the  rule  by  which  one  acted.  For  a  man  to  complain 
about  life  imprisonment  for  manslaughter  is  as  absurd  as 
for  a  man  to  complain  that  when  he  pushes  down  one  tray  of 
the  scales,  the  other  tray  goes  up;  whereas  the  action, 
rightly  considered,  is  of  pushing  down  and  up.  "The  cri- 
minal  gives  his  consent  already  by  his  very  act.  "23  "The 
Eumenides  sleep,  but  crime  awakens  them,  and  hence  it  is 
the  very  act  of  crime  which  vindicates  itself.  "24 
3.  F.  H.  BRADLEY 
Bradley  makes  a  contribution  to  the  retributive  theory 
but  this  contribution  is  regarded  as  adding  heat  but  not 
much  light.  The  central,  and  best  known  passage  is  the 
following: 
"If  there  is  any  opinion  to  which  the  man  of 
uncultivated  morals,  is  attached,  it  is  the 
belief  in  the  necessary  connection  of  punish- 
ment  and  guilt.  Punishment  is  punishment, 
only  where  it  is  deserved.  We  may  pay  the 
penalty  because  we  owe  it,  and  for  no  other 
reason;  and  if  punishment  is  inflicted  for 38 
any  other  reason  whatever  than  because  it  is 
merited  by  wrong,  it  is  gross  immorality,  a 
crying  injustice,  an  abominable  crime,  and 
not  what  it  pretends  to  be.  We  may  have  regard 
for  whatever  considerations  we  please.  -  our 
own  convenience,  the  good  of  society,  the 
benefit  of  the  offender;  we  are  fools,  and  worse 
if  we  fail  to  do  so.  Having  once  the  right 
to  punish,  we  may  modify  the  punishment  accord- 
ing  to  the  useful  and  the  pleasant;  but  these 
are  external  to  the  matter,  they  cannot  give 
us  a  right  to  punish,  and  nothing  can  do  that 
but  criminal  desert.  This  is  not  a  subject  to 
waste  words  over;  if  the  fact  of  the  vulgar 
view  is  not  palpable  to  the  reader  we  have  no 
hope,  and  no  wish  to  make  it  so.  "2' 
Bradley's  sympathy  with  the  "vulgar  view"  should  be 
apparent. 
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And  there  is  at  least  a  seeming  v9riation  be- 
tween  the  position  he  expresses  here  and  that  we  have 
attributed  to  Kant  and  Hegel.  For  Bradley  can  be  read 
here  as  leaving  an  open  field  for  utilitarian  reasoning 
when  the  question  is  how  and  how  much  to  punish.  Ewing 
interprets  Bradley  this  way,  and  argues  at  some  len§th 
that  Bradley  is  involved  in  an  inconsistency, 
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However, 
it  is  quite  possible  that  Bradley  did  not  mean  to  allow 
kind  and  quantity  of  punishment  to  be  determined  by  utili- 
tarian  considerations.  He  could  mean  as  Kant  meant,  that 
once  punishment  is  awarded,  then  "it"  (what  the  criminal 
must;  time  in  jail,  for  example)  may  be  made  use  of  for 
utilitarian  purposes.  But,  it  should  -i: 
'  by  this  time  go 
without  saying,  the  retributivist  would  then  wish  to  insist 
that  we  not  argue  backward  from  the  likelihood  of  attaining 
these  good  purposes  to  the  rightness  of  inflicting  the 
punishment. 39 
Bradley's  language  is  beyond  question  loose  when  he 
speaks,  in  the  passage  quoted,  of  our  "modifying"  the 
punishment,  "having  once  the  right  to  punish.  "  But  when 
he  says  that  "we  pay  the  penalty  because  we  owe5it,  and 
for  no  other  reason,  "  Bradley  must  surely  be  credited  with 
the  insight  that  we  may  owe  more  or  less  according  to  the 
gravity  of  the  crime.  The  popular  view,  he  says,  is  "that 
punishment  is  justice;  that  justice  implies  the  giving  what 
is  due.  "28  And,  "punishment  is  the  complement  of  criminal 
desert;  is  justifiable  only  so  far  as  deserved.  "29  If 
Bradley  accpets  this  popular  view,  then  Ewing  must  be  wrong 
in  attributing  to  him  the  position  that  kind  and  degree  of 
punishment  may  be  determined  by  utilitarian  considerations. 
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4o  CONCLUSION 
Three  propositions  can  be  drawn  from  the  viewpoints  of 
Kant,  Hegel  and  Bradley  -  these  are  the  points  central  in': 
Kant's  retributivism. 
(i)  The  only  acceptable  reason  for  punishing  a  man  is 
that  he  has  committed  a  crime. 
(ii)  The  only  acceptable  reason  for  punishing  a  man  in 
a  given  manner  and  degree  is  that  the  punishment 
is  "equal"  to  the  crime. 
(iii)  Whoever  commits  a  crime  must  be  punished  in  accord- 
ance  with  his  desert.  To  these  propositions 
should  be  added  two  underlying  assumption$S,  namely: 40 
1.  An  assumption  about  the  direction  of  justifica- 
tion:  to  the  criminal. 
2.  An  assumption  about  the  nature  of  justification: 
to  show  the  criminal  that  it  is  he  who  ha-  willed 
what  he  now  suffers. 
Trgditional  retributivism  cannot  be  dismised  as  unin- 
telligible,  or  absurd,  or  implausible.  31 
There  is  no  obvious 
contradiction  in  it:  and  there  are  no  important  disagreement 
between  the  philosophers  we  have  studied  over-what  it  con- 
tends.  Yet  in  spite  of  the  importance  of  the  theory,  no 
one  has  yet  done  much  more  thai  sketch  it  in  broad  strokes. 
If,  it  is  accepted  that  the  theory  turns  mainly  on  an  assump- 
tion  concerning  the  direction  of  justification,  then  this 
assumption  must  be  explained  and  defended, 
The  key  concept  of  "desert",  however,  is  intolerably 
vague.  What  does  it  mean  to  say  that  punishment  must  be 
proportionate  to  what  a  man  deserves?  This  seems  to  imply, 
in  theory  of  the  traditional  retributivists,  that  there  is 
some  way  of  measuring  desert,  or  at  least  balancing  punish- 
ment  against  it.  How  this  measuring  or  balancing  is  su- 
pposed  to  be  done,  we  will  discuss  latter. 
A  further  problem  is,  when  we  say  of  a  man  that  he 
"deserves  severe  punishment"  how,  if  at  all,  may  we  support 
our  position  by  arguments?  What  kinds  of  considerations 
tend  to  show  what  a  man  does  or  does  not  deserve?  There 
are  at  least  two  general  sorts:  those  which  tend  to  show 
that  what  he  has  done  is  a  member  of  a  class  of  actions 
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which  is  especially  heinous;  and  those  which  tend  to  show 
that  his  doing  of  this'action  was,  in  (or  because  of)  cir- 
cumstances,  particularly  wicked.  The  argument  that  a  man 
desserves  punishment  may  rest  on  the  first  kind  of  appeal 
alone,  or  on  both  kinds.  Retributivists  who  rely  on  the 
first  sort  of  consideration  alone  would  say  that  anyone 
who  would  do  a  certain  sort  of  thing,  no  matter  what  the 
circumstances  may  have  been,  deserves  punishment.  Kant, 
for  reasons  of  his  insistence  on  intention  as  a  necessary 
condition  of  committing  a  crime,  clearly  wishes  to  bring 
in  considerations  of  the  second  sort  as  well.  It  is  not, 
on  his  view,  merely  what  was  done,  but  the  intention  of 
the  agent  which  must  be  taken  into  account.  No  mater  what 
the  intention,  a  man  cannot  commit  a  crime  deserving  punish- 
ment  if  his  deed  is  not  atransgression.  But  if  he  does 
commit  a  transgression,  he  must  do  so  intentionally  to  co- 
mmit  a  crime;  and  all  crime  is  deserving  of  punishment. 
The  desert  of  the  crime  is  a  product  both,  -of  the  serious- 
ness  of  the  transgression,  considered  by  itself,  and  the 
degree  to  which  the  intention  to  transgress  was  present. 
If,  for  Kant,  the  essence  of  morality  consists  in  kqowingly 
acting  from  duty,  the  essence  of  immorality  consists  in 
knowingly  acting  against  duty. 
Perhaps  the  retributivist  can  avoid  the  question  of 
how  we  decide  that  one  crime  is  morally  more  heinous  than 
another  by  hewing  to  his  position  that  no  such  decision  is 
necessary  so  long  as  we  make  the  punishment  "equal"  to  the 42 
crime.  To  accomplish  this,  he  might  argue,  it  is  not  ne- 
cessary  to  argue  to  the  relative  wickedness  of  crimes, 
But  at  best  this  leaves  us  with  the  problem  how  we  do  make 
punishments  equal  to  crimes  -a  problem  which  will  not 
stop  plaguing  retributivist.  Then  also  therd'is  the  prob- 
lem  which  transgressions,  intentionally  committed,  the 
retributivist  is  to  regard  as  crimes.  Surely,  not  every 
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morally  wrong  action. 
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Finally  it  may  be  asked:  Has  the  retributivist  cleared 
himself  of  the  charge  that  the  theory  is  but  a  cover  for 
a  much  less  commendable  motive  than  respect  for  justice: 
elegant  draping  for  naked  revenge? 
33 B.  RETRIBUTION  AND  REVENGE 
1.  THE  REVENGE  ARGUMENT. 
2.  TYLER'S  ARGUMENT. 44 
1.  THE  REVENGE  ARGUMENT 
Retributivists  are  often,  and  in  a  variety  of  ways, 
accused  of  wishing  to  have  revenge  upon  the  criminal,  and 
deceiving  themselves  and  others  by  distinguishing  this 
wish  as  a  demand  of  justice.  This  accusation  is  seldom 
elaborated  into  an  argument;  although  there  does  seem  to 
be  an  argument  implicit  in  it.  It  is  that  since  the  re- 
tributivist  explicitly  ignores  the  consideration  of  the 
question  whether  any  good  consequences  may  be  expected 
from  punishment,  and  yet  insist  on  the  right  to  punish 
where  a  crime  has  been  committed,  his  position  is  morally 
indistinguishable  from  that  of  a  man  who  simply  insists 
on  revenge. 
Because  this  charge  is  inimical  to  the  retributivist 
position  it  may  be  worthwhile  to  explore  the  notion  of 
revenge  and  the  relationship  which  it  bears,  if  any,  to 
*retributive  punishment'.  We  shall  do  this  in  two  ways: 
first,  by  a  comparison  of  punishment  with  revenge  and 
secondly,  by  examining  a  retributive  account  of  punishment 
which  does  attempt  to  find  a  role  for  revenge  in  punishment. 
The  objections  which  may  be  raised  against  the  retri- 
butive  theory  along  these  lines  would  seem  to  resolve  them- 
selves  into  claims  such  as:  (i)  'Retributive  punishment' 
is  identical  with  the  taking  of  revenge.  K.  G.  Armstrong 
formulates  this  particular  criticism  as  the  contention  that 
"retributive  punishment  is  only  a  polite  name  for  revenge.  "34 45 
(ii)  The  retributive  theory  of  punishment  is  merely  a  ra- 
tionalization  of  the  desire  for  revenge.  (iii)  'Retribu- 
tive  punishment'  has  its  genesis  in  the  taking  of  revenge. 
(iv)  The  retributive  theory  of  punishment  justifies  the 
taking  of  revenge. 
To  begin  with,  it  could  be  argued  that  in  describing 
an  act  as  revenge  we  are  describing  not  only  the  act  but 
also  the  motives  from  which  it  was  done.  Similarly  in 
talking  of  'retributive  punishment'  we  might  be  referring 
to  punishment  inflicted  for  the  purpose  of  exacting  retri- 
bution.  But  punishment  may  sometimes  be  inflicted  for 
other  reasons.  So  even  if  'retributive  punishment'  is  re- 
venge  it  does  not  follow  that  punishment  as  such  is, 
The  act  of  revenge  is  a  natural  act.  Men  do  not  have 
to  learn  to  revenge  themselves.  No  institution  or  social 
setting  needs  to  be  presupposed  before  an  act  of  revenge 
can  take  place,  in  contrast  with,  for  example  raising  one's 
hat  to  a  lady  which  presupposes  a  social  setting  with  rules 
of  ettiqueth.  But  revenge  may  presuppose  a  concept  of 
personal  identity  while  some  manifestations  of  revenge  may 
presuppose  social  institutions  e.  g.,  if  I  revenge  myself 
for  the  act  of  Soldier  A  by  shooting  soldier  B  who  belongs 
to  the  same  force.  More  importantly  however  revenge  may 
also  be  taken  swiftly  while  enraged  or  cooly  after  settled 
deliberation.  Thus  it  would  be  more  plausible  to  identify 
the  instinctive  response  of  men  and  animals  with  revenge 
after  settled  deliberation. 46 
Revenging  oneself  for  an  injury  is  something  which  is 
open  to  all  men.  When  we  seek  revenge  we  do  not  need  to 
be  cloaked  in  any  authority  to  succeed.  when  somebody  has 
formed  an  intention  to  bring  about  harm  to  another  person 
this  harm  is  meant  as  a  response  to  a  harm  believed  to  have 
been  done  to  him  by  that  other  person.  Revenge  therefore 
has  a  feeling  of  personal  malevolence  involved  in  it.  But 
this  should  not  always  be  necessarily  the  case  because  a 
person  could  also  take  revenge  for  something  done  to  some- 
one  close  to  him,  Now,  there  are  two  important  points  here 
(i)  revenge  presupposes  rather  the  moral  wrongdoing  and 
harm  done  to  ourselves  or  our  associates  (ii)  punishment 
presupposes  moral  wrong  and  is  not  necessarily  for  something 
done  to  us  (cf  forgiveness  and  pardon).  In  taking  revenge 
we  make  no  appeal  to  an  idea  of  proportion.  Further,  whe- 
ther  'retributive  punishment'  is  justified  or  not  it  is 
still  punishment;  and  definitionally  it  is  true  of  punish- 
ment  that  it  can  only  be  exacted  by  a  representative  of 
authority.  But  when  we  seek  revenge  we  are  not  clothed  by 
an  authority  -  we  seek  it-simply  as  persons  who  have  been 
harmed.  Conversely,  the  punishments  we  are  handed  out  are 
seldom  (if  ever)  owing  to  a  harm  done  to  the  person  or  per- 
sons  handing  out  or  implementing  the  punishment.  Indeed 
it  would  usually  be  public  policy  that  they  should  not  be 
the  same  persons. 
The  paradigm  of  revenge  is  that  of  a  man  seeking  to 
harm  someone  for  harm  done  to  himself  or  someone  close  to 47 
him,  urged  on  by  feelings  of  hatred  and  resentment.  Thus 
the  idea  of  a  man  seeking  revenge  yet  not  at  the  same  time 
feeling  resentful  towards  the  object  of  revenge  strikes 
us  as  peculiar,  hence  in  need  of  explanation.  If  a  man 
did  not  feel  resentment  we  would  ask  what  was  the  reason 
for  seeking  revenge,  A  man  does  not-seek  revenge  to  re- 
lieve  his  feelings,  rather  the  resentment  felt  is  usually 
the  cause  of  his  action.  However,  the  term  revenge  covers 
another  slightly  differing  notion  from  that  just  mentioned. 
But  a  man  might  seek  revenge  and  yet  not  hold  any  feelings 
of  resentment  towards  the  person  who  had  done  the  harm. 
Thus  Anscombe35  writes,  "If  we  wanted  to  explain  e.  g.  re- 
venge,  we  should  say  it  was  harming  someone  because  he  had 
done  one  some  harm;  we  should  not  need  to  add  to  this  a 
description  of  the  feelings  prompting  the  action  or  the 
thought  that  had  gone  with  it.  "  Perhaps  so:  but  one  of 
the  things  we  want  to  know  is  the  force  of  the  because  here, 
and  this  Anscombe  does  not  explain.  However,  the  action 
of  a  man  who  acts  without  any  feelings  of  resentthent  begins 
to  look  a  little  more  like  'retributive  punishment',  but 
a  little  less  like  revenge  as  ordinarily  conceived. 
Revenge  then  is  reflective,  but  the  abstract  noun 
'vengeance4  covers  another  idea  expressed  by  the  verb  'to 
avenge'  which  does  not  express  this  limitation.  With  this 
verb  we  get  closest  to  the  idea  of  'retributive  punishment'. 
One  may  avenge  oneself,  byt  one  may  also  avenge  someone 
else.  There  is  no  restriction  on  who  may  avenge  a  particu- 
lar  deed*  Anyane  may  take  it  upon  himself  to  do  so,  and 
again  there  is  no  restriction  on  who  may  be  avenged,  Any- 48 
one  may  be  avenged  but  in  both  these  directions  the  idea  of 
punishment  is  highly  restricted.  Only  particular  persons 
in  authority  may  exact  punishment,  and  then  only  for  parti- 
cular  persons,  namely  those  making  up  the  community.  But 
one  essential  element  which  is  constant  in  revenge  and  aven- 
ging  is  that  they  both  involve  interpersonal  transactions. 
No  authority  is  claimed  by  those  either  revenging  themselves 
or  avenging  other  people.  They  may  claim  to  be  justified 
in  what  they  do  and  may  offer  justification,  but  they  do 
not  claim  that  which  they  do  by  virtue  of  a  particular  autho- 
rity.  Thus  the  exacting  of  revenge  cannot  be  the  same  as  the 
exacting  of  punishment,  not  even  'retributive  punishment'. 
Revenging  oneself  or  avenging  someone  else  is  often 
deplored  because  of  the  feelings  which  are  thought  to  be 
attendant  on  the  act.  But  if  they  need  not  be  present  in 
the  case  of  revenge,  even  less  do  they  need  to  be  present 
in  the  case  of  avenging. 
This  discussion  may  be  summarized  as  follows:  Revenge 
and  'Retributive  punishment'  are  not  identical.  Some  varie- 
ties  of  revenge  do  seem  to  have  more  in  common  with  'retri- 
butive  punishment'  than  others.  However,  it  is  doubtful 
whether  critics  have  had  the  variety  of  revenge  which  most 
closely  approximates  to  'retributive  punishment'  in  mind 
when  levelling  the  claim  that  'retributive  punishment'  is 
revenge.  One  good  reason  for  denying  that  'retributive 
punishment'  is  revenge  is  that  'retributive  punishment'  is 
punishment,  and  punishment  has  logical  features  not  shared 
with  revenge.  Even  should  these  conclusions  be  accepted 49 
however,  the  critic  is  not  obliged  to  withdraw  from  the 
field;  for  it  may  be  that  he  never  intended  to  claim  that, 
a  strict  identity  existed  between  revenge  and  'retributive 
punishment'  but  rather  that  in  some  sense  they  amount  to 
the  same  thing.  What  he  may  have  in  mind  is  that  'retri- 
butive  punishment'  is  revenge  by  proxy.  We  shall  encounter 
the  difficulties  of  this  view  in  our  examination  of  Tyler's 
theory  of  punishment  which  attempts  to  make  the  retributive 
theory  of  punishment  do  just  that. 
the  second  objection  to  the  retributive  theory  of. 
punishment  in  these  terms  is  to  the  effect  that  the  theory 
is  not  a  genuine  theory  at  all  and  that  retributive  reasons 
are  specious.  We  wish  to  revenge  ourselves  and  to  avenge 
each  other,  something  we  enjoy  doing,  but  at  the  same  time 
we  are  aware  that  the  practice  is  not  morally  acceptable, 
and  so  we  fabricate  a  theory  in  an  attempt  to  justify  our- 
selves.  Charles  Berg36  expresses  the  criticism  in'the 
following  words:  "The  attempt  to  justify  as  reasonable  is 
manifestly  absurd.  That  the  retributive  element  exists  in 
the  psychology  of  punishment  there  is  no  denying.  It  is 
an  emotional  force.  I  would  criticize  merely  the  attempt 
to  rationalize  it,  to  justify  it,  and  to  disguise  it  as  a 
function  of  the  reason.  " 
But  it  is  not  patently  obvious  that  retributivist  are 
rationalising  when  offering  reasons  for  their  views.  There 
may  be  well-recognised  marks  of  the  rationalizing  temper, 
and  these  marks  have  not  to  my  knowledge  been  observed  to 
characterize  retributivists  in  discussion.  Are  they,  we 50 
may  ask,  aware  or  half  aware  of  what  they  are  doing?  In 
such  a  case  they  stand  guilty  of  hypocrisy*  But  since 
this  charge  is  absurd,  we  may  take  it  that  they  are  not 
so  aware,  that  this  all  goes  on  may  be  subconsciously. 
This  suggestion  combined  with  the  apparent  absence  of 
noticeable  marks  of  rationalisation  suggests  that  the  cri- 
ticism  rests  upon  some  psychological  theory.  However,  then 
the  criticism  is  only  as  cogent  as  the  theory  is'verified" 
Is  there  any  psychological  theory  which  has  the  required 
degree  of  support?  We  may  say  finally  that  even  if  it  were 
true  that  the  retributivist  unbeknown  to  himself  was  en- 
gaged'in  rationalisation,  even  so  his  rationalisations, 
whatever  their  source,  may  be  productive  of  valid  reasons 
in  support  of  the  theory  he  desires  to  foster. 
The  third  point  which  a  critic  may  have  in,  mind  when 
denying  the  validity  of  the  retributive  theory  by  claiming 
that  it  is  merely  revenge,  albeit  masquerading  as  something 
else,  is  that  'retributive  punishment'  has  grown  out  of 
the  practice  of  vengeance;  -  and  so  to  the  extent  that  that 
practice  is  to  be  condemned,  so  is"retributive  punishment. 
There  are  two  rejoinders  to  this  criticism  -  one  factual 
and  the  other  logical.  It  may  be  true  that  in  looking  for 
the  original  signs  of  'retributive  punishment'  we  come 
across  the  practice  of  revenge.  But  it  may  still  not  be 
true  that  'retributive  punishment'  grew  out  of  revenge. 
$Retributive  punishment'  can  be  seen  as  having  imposed  con- 
straints  upon  the  practice  of  revenge,  which  constraints 
are  imposed  in  two  ways;  checking  the  pursuit  of  unlimited 51 
revenge  and  restricting  the  seeking  of  revenge  to  just 
those  persons  who  have  been  responsible  for  the  initial 
harm.  Suppose,  however,  that  we  concede  this  particular 
claim  to  the  critic,  agreeing  the  historical  origins  of 
'retributive  punishment'  are  to  be  found  in  revenge,  even 
so  it  would  not  follow  that  because  the  seeking  of  revenge 
is  to  be  condemned  'retributive  punishment'  is  therefore 
to  be  condemned.  To  think  so  is  to  fall  foul  of  the  falla- 
cy  which  J.  S.  Mill  describes  as  inferring  "the  nature  of 
the  effects  from  the  assumption  that  they  must  in  this  or 
that  property,  or  in  all  their  properties,  resemble  their 
cause.  "37  A  parallel  error  is  committed  by  Tyler  when  de- 
fending  the  retributive  theory  of  punishment.  There  is  no 
likelihood  of  the  notion  of  revenge  that  can  be  used  in 
this  way  to  repudiate  successfully  the  retributive  theory. 
The  fourth  possible  objection  which  may  be  made  is 
that  the  retributive  theory  of  punishment  justifies  the 
taking  of  revenge.  Evidently  it  does  not  do  so.  It  only 
justifies  the  infliction  of  punishment  and  nothing  else. 
It  may  be  thought  to  do  so  only  because  it  is  confused 
with  views  which  are  in  fact  quite  distinct.  Thus  Stephen 
writes: 
"In  cases  which  outrage  the  moral  feelings  of 
the  community  to  a  great  extent  the  feeling 
of  indignation  and  desire  for  revenge  which  is 
excited  in  the  minds  of  decent  people  is,  I 
, 
38  think,  deserving  of  legitimate  satisfaction;  " 
and  again:  "I  think  it  is  highly  desirable  that 
criminals  should  be  hated,  that  the  punishment 
inflicted  on  them  should  be  so  constructed  as 
to  give  expression  to  that  hatred  and  to  justi- 
fy  it  so  far  as  the  public  provision  of  means 52 
for  expressing  and  gratifying  a  healthy`3ngatural 
sentiment  can  justify  and  encourage  it. 
This  view  of  punishment,  applauding  and  encouraging 
the  expression  of  revengeful  feelings  through  the  medium 
of  the  penal  system  may  justly  be  called  institutionalised 
revenge,  but  it  is  a  mistake  to  identify  such  a  view  with 
those  of  retributivism.  Every  society  is  obliged  to  take 
account  of  feelings  of  revenge  and  hatred  towards  criminals 
which  may  reside  in  the  breasts  of  the  populace  for  as 
Holmes  says: 
"People  would  gratify  the  passion  of  revenge 
outside  the  law  if  the  law  did  not  help  them; 
the  law  has  no  choice  but  to  satiny  the 
craving  itself  and  thus  avoid  the  evils  of 
private  retribution  (of  lynching)"40,  but  "at 
the  same  time  the  passion  is  not  one  which 
we  wish.  to  encourage  either  in  private  indi- 
viduals  or  in  lawmakers.  "41 
There  is  no  reason  why  a  retributivist  should  not  agree 
with  this  sentiment.  It  is  rather  the  utilitarian  who  may 
be  called  upon  to  institutionalise  revenge;  and  make  part 
of  punishment  at  least  'vengeance  in  disguise'* 
If  it  were  true  that  'retributive  punishment'  were 
nothing  but  institutionalised  revenge  or  'vengeance  in 
disguise',  then  should  we  cease  to  be  moved  by  the  feelings 
of  revenge  there  could  be  no  reason  given  for  continuing 
to  punish  retributively. 
Few  retributivists  would  be  prepared  to  accept  this 
conclusion.  However,  though  a  retributivist  may  support  a 
theory  of  punishment  which  neither  explicitly  nor  implictly 
refers  to  revenge,  that  revenge  does  hive  a  connection  with 
retributivism  is  a  belief  which  is  not  altogether  without 53 
foundation.  Some  writers  have  allowed  the  notion  of  re- 
venge  to  play  a  central  role  in  their  theory  of  punishment 
and  described  themselves  as  retributivists.  It  therefore 
behoves  us  to  examine  the  theory  of  one  of  such  retribu- 
tivists. 
When  we  search  our  minds  for  an  example  of  a  retribu- 
tivist  who  stressed  the  primacy  of  revenge  in  judicial 
punishment  we  naturally  think  of  James  Stephen  and  may  be 
especially  of  his  pronouncement  that,  "The  criminal  law 
stands  to  the  passion  of  vengeance  in  much  the  same  rela- 
tion  as  marriage  to  the  sexual  appetite.  "42  Stephen 
thought  the  desire  for  revenge  which  he  supposed  arose  in 
the  community  in  consequencecf  serious  crimes  to  be  "de- 
serving  of  legitimate  satisfaction.  "  But  he  was  also  pre- 
pared  to  appeal  to  prudence  when  justifying  criminal  pu- 
nishment,  for  "Let  us  not  forget  that  there  is  always  a 
natural  resentment  in  any  society  against  those  who  have 
attacked  it.  Will  people  be  satisfied  to  see  one  who  is 
guilty.  of  horrible  crimes  simply  reformed,  and  not  give 
vent  to  social  horror  and  resentment  against  the  miscreant?  " 
Further,  he  saw  the  justification  of  punishment  consisting 
in  part  in  its  utility  as  an  instrument  for  enforcing  mo- 
rality.  This  being  so,  Stephen's  retributivism  is  a  much 
qualified  thing  and  rather  than  consider  Stephen's  theory 
then  I  shall  examine  a  retributive  theory  of  punishment 
advocated  by  Alexander  Tyler. 54 
l 
2.  TYLER'S  ARGUMENT 
Tyler's43  theory  of  punishment  constitutes  a  classic 
formulation  of  the  retributive  account  of  punishment  and 
would  be  worth  considering  for  that  reason  alone.  But  the 
point  of  particular  interest  is  that  Tyler  has  sought  to 
make  the  role  of  revenge  central  to  his  theory  by  trying 
to  relate  retribution  to  revenge.  Our  conclusion  will  be 
that  he  fails  to  do  this,  that  the  theory  of  punishment  to 
which  Tyler  in  fact  subscribes  is  logically  independent  of 
considerations  of  revenge  and  that  we  shall  be  provided 
with  additional  reason  for  thinking  that  criticisms  direc- 
ted  at  the  retributive  theory  on  the  ground  that  in  some 
way  it  implies  revenge  are  misplaced. 
I  shall  not  follow  strictly  the  order  in  which  Tyler 
presents  his  arguments.  Instead  I  shall  follow  what  I 
believe  to  be  a  more  logical  order.  Tyler  holds  that  the 
individual  has  the  prima  facie  duty  to  seek  revenge  for  an 
injury  sustained.  He  says: 
"Among  the  original  lines  of  our  moral  constitu- 
tion,  two  of  the  most  remarkable,  and  which  bind 
eminently  to  support  the  bonds  of  society,  are 
gratitude  for  benefits  received.....  and  resent- 
ment  of  injuries  which  incites  to  revenge,  or  to 
the  punishment  of  the  aggressor.  As  on  experien- 
cing  an  important  service  from  our  neighbour,  an 
emotion  of  gratitude  increases  in  the  mind,  and 
we  feel  there  is  a  debt  created  which  we  are  un- 
easy  till  we  discharge;  by  a  reciprocal  act  or 
testimony  of  beneficience,  so  upon  the  receiving 
of  an  injury  a  feeling'of  resentment  is  raised 
which  is  not  appeased  till  an  adequate  revenge 
is  taken  of  the  offender,  #44 
Tyler  is  suggesting  that  just  as  we  are  bound  to  dis- 
charge  debts  measured  by  the  beneficence  of  others,  so 55 
"pars  passu"  we  are  bound  to  discharge  injury  upon  those 
who  injure  us.  These  duties,  it  seems  to  be  implied,  are 
on  the  same  footing,  on  two  sides  of  the  same  cöin.  The 
marks  of  the  duty  in  the  two  cases  are  feelings  of  grati- 
tude  and  resentment.  If  these  putative  duties  are  para- 
llel  then  Tyler  has  provided  an  argument  to  support  his 
claim  that  seeking  revenge  is  a  duty  if  as  would  be  widely 
acknowledged,  discharge  of  such  debts  is  a  duty.  But  in 
fact  no  such  parallelism  exists.  It  is  perfectly  consis- 
tent  both  to  maintain  that  we  are  obliged  to  discharge 
debts  arising  from  the  beneficent  actions  of  others  and  to 
deny  that  we  are  obliged  to  injure  those  who  injure  us. 
They  are  logically  independent  propositions. 
Elsewhere,  Tyler  writes  of  "This  retribution  or  re- 
venge,  which  by  the  law  of  nature,  belongs  to  the  person 
himself  who  is  injured",  and  at  this  point  he  clearly  has 
in  mind  some  idea  of  natural  right  which  men  possess,  but 
he  nowhere  explains  on  what  it  is  grounded  or  how  such 
rights  are  to  be  distinguished  from  non-rights.  We  can 
easily  enough  construct  a  valid  argument  which  has  as  its 
conclusion  that  there  does  exist  a  right  of  revenge,  thus: 
"It  is  natural  to  seek  revenge  for  injury 
endured;  whatever  it  is  natural  to  do  we 
have  a  right  to  do.  " 
Therefore,  we  have  a  right  to  seek  revenge.  However, 
inspite  of  Tyler's  reflections  on  feelings  which  are  "con- 
genial.....  to  the  nature  of  man",  it  is  unlikely  that  he 
would  have  been  prepared  to  accept  the  major  premises  of 56 
this  argument.  In  fact  to  do  so  would  be  self-defeating 
for  any  criminal  would  thereby  be  provided  with  an  argu- 
ment  of  which  he  could  avail  himself  in  defence  of  his 
own  criminal  activities. 
Assuming,  however,  that  it  is  virtuous  to  seek  reven- 
ge,  still  "This  retribution  or  revenge,  which  by  the  law 
of  nature,  belongs  to  the  person  himself  who  is  injured, 
it  has  become  necessary  in  every  civilised  society  to  su- 
rrender  to  the  public.  "45  One  of  the  reasons  offered  for 
so  doing  is  that  of  'utility';  the  prevention  of  confusion 
and  disorder  arising  from  acts  of  private  vengeance.  A. 
second  consideration  is  that  of  justice  -  "it  is  necessary 
for  the  accomplishment  of  justice  that  the  retribution 
should  be  precisely  commensurate  to  the  injury.  But  there 
is  a  natural  propensity  in  every  man  to  overate  the  inju- 
ries  he  has  sustained,  and  to  exceed  in  the  measure  of  his 
revenge".  46 
Thus  Tyler  concedes  that  the  taking  of  revenge 
cannot  constitute  the  whole  of  a  theory  of  punishment. 
What  he  thinks  it  can  do  is  provide  the  justification  and 
right  to  punish.  The  state's  right  to  punish  being  deri- 
vative  from  the  individual's  original  right  to  seek  revenge. 
47 
But  to  be  justly  exacted  the  revenge  taken  via  the  insti- 
tutions  of  the  state  must  itself  be  regulated  as  without 
such  regulation  there  would  be-no  justice.  This  suggestion 
introduces  a  novel  principle  into  the  theory. 
So  far  Tyler's  theory  appears  to  have  been  the  follow- 
ing:  the  individual  exercise  of  revenge  is  virtuous  or  falls 57 
under  a  natural  right,  But  if  everyone  exercised  this 
virtue  or  a  right  on  the  appropriate  occasions  civil  chaos 
would  ensue.  It  is  therefore  derivable  that  an  institution 
be  created  the  function  of  which  is  to  exact  revenge  on 
behalf  of  the  injured  parties.  The  amount  and  quality  of 
suffering  to  be  meted  out  should  be  in  accord  with  their 
wishes.  But  in  fact  Tyler  rejects  this  theory.  Punish- 
ment  is  to  be  regulated  and  determined  by  reference  to 
considerations  of  justice.  If  a  particular  injured  party 
does  not  desire  revenge  it  does  not  follow  that  the  crimi- 
nal  is  not  to  be  punished.  Siminarly,  a  party  may  desire 
an  "excessive"  punishment  but  such  punishment  will  not  be 
administered.  In  short,  the  particular  desires  of  such 
persons  are  not  to  be  considered  at  all.  Tyler's  comments 
as  to  how  this  regulation  and  determination  is  to  be  carried 
out  are  general  and  vague.  We  are  told  that  revenge  or 
punishment  is  no  further  just  than  when  it  is  approved  of 
by  the  conscience  of  every  reasonable  and  impartial  man; 
48 
but  we  are  not  told  how  to  identify  such  men  or  what 
"impartial"  is  to  mean  here.  If  it  means  "moved  by  no 
particular'  emotions  towards  the  incident,  "'there  may  be  no 
impartial  men  for  we  have  already  been  informed  that  the 
relevant,  emotions  need  not  be  confined  to  those  persons 
who  are  the  victims  of  the  offence.  Tyler  rules  out  the 
unreflecting  assumption  that  the  criminal  should  suffer  to 
the  same  extent  as  the  victim  of  the  offence.  This  is  a 
natural  view  but  he  claims  that  careful  reflection  would 58 
show  us  that  justice  requires  the  punishment  to  exceed  the 
harm  occasioned.  To  what  extent  then  is  the  criminal  to 
be  punished? 
On  occasions  he  seems  to  be  thinking  that  the  criminal 
is  to  be  punished  in  proportion  to  the  actual  amount  of 
harm  done.  For  example,  in  one  place  he  writes  of  the 
criminal  being  "made  to  suffer  himself  the  same  dggree  of 
loss  and  pain  which  he  has  occasioned  to  another.  "49  In 
another  place  he  sounds  undecided.  "'the  atrocity'of  a 
crime,  or  the  moral  guilt  which  it  involves  ought  to  be  in 
every  cased....  "50  Elsewhere  he  notes  that  "The  amount  of 
the  punishment  of  crimes  ought  in  every  case  to  depend  on 
the  moral  turpitude  of  the  criminal.  "51  How  then  are  we 
to  measure  the  subjective  guilt?  Once  more  Tyler  refers 
to  the  impartial  mind  and  writes:  !!  Nature  has  furnished 
an  infallible  criterion  in  that  indignation  which  arises 
in  the  impartial  mind  upon  the  commission  of  an  offence 
and  which  always  keeps  its  just  proportion  to  the  magnitude 
of  the  offence.  ', 
52 
But  he  is  not  content  to  leave  the 
matter  there.  Then  he  continues:  "As  justice  requires  that 
every  injury  should  be  followed  by  an  adequate  portion  of 
vengeance  against  the  offender,  to  the  resentment  or  indig- 
nation  which  the  injury  exacts  ought  in  every  case  to  be 
the  measure  of  this  vengeance.  "53  The  vengeance  taken  is 
not  to  be  total  but  "adequate"  and  the  resentment  or  indig- 
nation  is  not  the  resentment  or  indignation  of  the  offended 
mind  but  of  the  impartial  mind.  Once  again  we  ask:  What 
is  "adequate"  vengeance  and  where  is  the  impartial  mind  to 59 
be  found?  It  could  not  be  a  sufficient  test  of  impartia- 
lity  that  one  was  not  injured  by  the  offence,  for  even  then 
one  might  still  be  partial  in  being  too  indignant  or  re- 
sentful  or  not  sufficidntly  so. 
Tyler's  account  gives  rise  to  the  question  what  pre- 
cisely  is  the  purported  relationship  between  the  phenome- 
non  of  revenge  and  #retributive  punishment'?  It  is  a 
question  to  which  there  is  no  clear  answer,  for  Tyler 
equivocates  continually  in  his  use  of  the  terms  "vengeance". 
His  equivocation  on  these  terms  is  a  certain  sign  that  he 
has  not  satisfactorily  defined  the  relationship.  However, 
the  difficulties  which  Tyler's  theory  does  face  are  typi- 
cally  those  which  face  a  retributive  theory  of  punishment, 
difficulties  which  are  irrelevant  to  a  view  of  punishment 
as  institutionalised  revenge. 
Our  brief  examination  of  Tyler's  theory  demonstrates 
one  fact  clearly,  a  satisfactory  theory  of  punishment 
cannot  be  erected  solely  on  considerations  of  revenge. 
When  Tyler  asks  how  much  punishment  is  to  be  inflicted  he 
is  obliged  to  enquire  beyond  the  notion  of  revenge  for  an 
answer.  A  judicial  system  which  simply  canalized  revenge 
would  be  an  unjust-system.  The  "impartial"  mind  decides 
what  punishment  is  deserved  and  may  well  give  a  reasonable 
account  of  punishment.  Tyler  has  himself  confused  a  retri- 
butive  theory  of  punishment  with  a  revenge  theory  of  punish- 
ment.  However,  it  is  clear  that  he  does  in  fact  support  a 
retributive  theory  and  not  a  revenge  theory  for  at  crucial 60 
points  in  his  account  he  prefers  retributive  answers  (what- 
ever  difficulties  they  may  entail)  to  the  questions  raised 
and-not  the  answer  which  would  be  given  by  a  supporter  of 
a  revenge  theory. 
We  shal  conclude  this  discussion  by  asking  why  Tyler 
wrote  the  appendix.  The  answer  constitutes  a  partial 
rebuff  to  those  critics  of  retributivism  who  cavalierly 
level  it  "barbaric".  At  the  beginning  of  bis  essay  he 
expresses  himself  as  much  concerned  about  the  then  cruelty 
of  English  penal  practices,  and  protests  against  ghat  he 
calls  "the  barbarism  and  absurdity  of  the  penal  laws  of 
the  most  enlightened  nation.  "54  His  protest  is  one  against 
the  severity  of  punishments  then  current;  "With  what  in- 
dignation  do  we  need  those  statutes  which  enact  the  punish- 
ment  of  death  for  setting  fire  to  a  haycock,  breaking  down 
the  head  of  a  fish-pond  or-cutting  an  apple  tree  in  an 
orchard.  "  He  is  similarly  indignant  over  the  extension  of 
punishment  to'innocent  people  recommended  by  some  of  his 
contemporaries. 
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Such  barbaric  practices  and  suggestions 
Tyler  attributes  to  a  mistaken  jurisprudence,  to  a  belief 
that  the  primary  function  of  a  criminal  punishment  is  to 
prevent  crime.  "Whence  has  that  disproportionate  severity 
arisen?  Solely  from  our  departing  from  the  just  princi- 
ple  of  commensurating  the  vengeance  of  the  law  to  the  moral 
guilt  of  the  offender.  "56  Were  this  mistake  rectified 
criminal  punishment  would  be  both  just  and  humane. 61 
Thus  Tyler's  reason  for  examining  the  foundations  of 
punishment  is  to  provide  reasons  for  eradicating  cruelty 
and  injustice  from  the  practice  of  the  law*  The  retri- 
butive  theory  which  Tyler  recommended  was  a  weapon  utilised 
for  human  purpose  as  well  as  a  criterion  of  justice. NOTES.  AND  REFERENCES 
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1o  WILLIAM  PALEY 
The  utilitarian  theory  of  punishment  can  be  regarded 
as  but  a  subheading  of  a  highly  developed  general  theory 
of  ethics  which  has  had  numerous  advocates  in  the  history 
of  philosophy,  and  remains  popular  today.  It  is  therefore 
tempting  to  begin  our  analysis  with  some  general  formula- 
tion  of  utilitarianism  (e.  g.  "An  act,  policy,  course  of 
action,  or  practice  is  right  if  and  only  if  the  set  of  con- 
sequences  it  initiates  would  be  better  on  the  whole  than 
the  consequences'initiated  by  any  alternative  act,  policy, 
course  of  action  or  practice")  and  to  show  how,  if  this 
general  position  be  accepted,  the  special  utilitarian 
theory  of  punishment  follows,  But  this  approach  would  be 
mistaken.  It  would  lead  us  to  settle  by  fiat  a  vigorous 
debate  among  utilitarians  over  the  way  in  which  the  general 
position  should  be  formulated  and  defended.  (Should  acts 
be  justified  by  references  to  rules,  rules  by  reference  to 
practices,  and  practices  by  reference  to  their  tendency  to 
maximize  good  consequences;  or  should  we  reserve  the  right 
to  short-cut  the  rules  and  practices,  and  calculate  the 
consequences  of  the  act?  And  what  are  the  consequences 
which  should  be  maximized?  ).  It  would  also  lead  us  to 
ignore  the  real  possibility  that  a  philosopher  might  without 
inconsistency  adopt  a  utilitarian  position  with  respect  to 
punishment,  but  reject  it  as  a  general  theory  of  ithics. 
My  concern  must  be,  rather,  to  delineate  the  general 
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outline  of  the  traditional  utilitarian  theory  of  punish- 
ment:  to  set  it  out,  as  far  as  possible,  in  propositions 
which  can  be  contrasted  with  those  taken  as  expressing  the 
retributive  position.  To  accomplish  this  it  will  be  nece- 
ssary  to  turn  again  to  the  history  of  philosophy,  to  phi- 
losophers  generally  accepted  as  promulgating  a  utilitarian 
view  of  punishment.  Here,  as  in  the  previous  section,  we 
will  make  no  attempt  to  survey  the  whole  field,  but  will 
discuss  positions  which  would  be  universally  accepted  as 
paradigmatic:  those  of  William  Paley  and  Jeremy  Bentham. 
There  are  advantages  in  beginning  with  Paley  beyond 
that  of  mere  chronological  appropriateness.  Paley's  formu- 
lation  of  the  utilitarian  theory  of  punishment  was  enour- 
mously  influential,  since  it  was  expressed  in  a  book  which 
was  a  text  at  Cambridge,  and  a  standard  reference  on  philo- 
sophy,  running  through  fifteen  editions  in  Paley's  own  life- 
time.,  This  book  was  so  highly  regarded  and  so  conservative 
in  tendency,  that  Sir  Samuel  Romily,  the  great  reformer  of 
the  English  criminal  law,  was  obliged  to  devote  a  large  pro- 
portion  of  his  major  address  of  1810  to  a  critical  analysis 
of  it.  2 
More  importantly  for  our  purposes,  it  provides  us 
with  a  bold  and  uncomplicated  first  statement  of  the  posi- 
tion  we  wish  to  understand. 
"The  proper  end  of  human  punishment  is  not,  "  Paley 
tells  us,  "the  satisfaction  of  justice,  but  the  prevention 
of  crimes".  And  since.  the  prevention  of  crimes  is  the 
"sole  consideration  which  authorizes  the  infliction  of 71 
punishment  by  human  laws",  punishment  must  be  proportioned 
to  prevention,  not  to  guilt.  "The  crime  must  be  prevented 
by  some  means  or  other;  and  consequently,  whatever  means 
appear  necessary  to  this  end,  whether  they  be  proportionate 
to  the  guilt  of  the  criminal  or  not,  are  adopted  rightly, 
because  they  are  adopted  upon  the  principle  which  alone 
justifies  the  infliction  of  punishment  at  all".  Since 
punishment  is  itself  an  evil,  it  should  be  resorted  to 
only  when  a  greater  evil  can  be  prevented.  "The  sanguinary 
laws  which  have  been  made  against  counterfeiting  or  dimi- 
nishing  the  gold  coin  of  the  kingdom  might  be  just,  until 
the  method  of  detecting  the  fraud  by  weighing  the  money, 
was  introduced  into  general  usage".  The  facility  with  which 
a  crime  can  be  committed  constitutes  a  ground  for  more 
severe  punishment.  The  stealing  of  cloth  from  bleaching 
grounds  must  be  punished  more  severely  than  most  other 
simple  felonies  not  because  this  crime  is  in  its  "own'  nature 
more  heinous"  but  because  the  property  is  more  exposed. 
3 
"From  the  justice  of  God",  says  Paley,  "we  are  taught 
to  look  for  a  graduation  of  punishment,  exactly  proportioned 
to  the  guilt  of  the  offender",  But,  not  finding  this  pro- 
portion  in  human  law,  we  question  its  wisdom.  However, 
we  must  recognize  that: 
"When  the  care  of  the  public  safety  is  entrusted 
to  men,  whose  authority  over  their  fellow  crea- 
tures  is,  limited  by  defects  of  power  and  know- 
ledge;  from  whose  utmost  vigilance  anc&sagacity 
the  greatest  offenders  offen  lie  hid;  whose 
wisest  precautions  and  speediest  pursuit  may  be 
eluded  by  artifice  or  concealment;  a  different 
necessity,  a  new  rule  of  proceeding  results  from 72 
the  very  imperfection  of  their  faculties.  In 
their  hands  the  uncertainty  of  punishment  must  be 
compensated  by  the  severity.  The  ease  with  which 
crimes  are  committed  or  concealed,  must  be  coun- 
teracted  by  additional  penalties  and  increased 
terrors.  The  very  end  for  which  human  government 
is  established,  required  that  its  regulations  be 
adapted  to  the  supression  of  crimes.  This  end, 
whatever  it  may  do  in  the  plandcof  infinite  wis- 
dom,  does  not  in  the  designation  of  temporal 
penalties,  always  coincide  with  the  proportionate 
punishment  of  guilt.  "4 
This  is  a  flat  opposition  to  retributivism.  To  Kant's 
thesis  that  the  only  reason  for  which  we  may  punish  is  that 
a  crime  has  been  committed,  Paley  replies  that  the  only  reason 
for  punishment  is  the  prevention  of  crime,  To  Kant's  thesis 
that  the  only  ground  for  choosing  a  given  "mode  and  measure" 
of  punishment  is  that  it  equals  to  crime,  Paley  counters 
that  mode  and  measure  must  be  determined  by  the  utility  of 
the  proposed  punishment  in  preventing  crime.  Paley  could 
not  agree  that  the  last  prisoner,  in  Kant's  example  of  the 
dispersing  community,  should  be  executed;  since  he  holds  if 
crime  can  be  prevented  by  means  short  of  punishment  it  should 
be,  but  it  is  a  truism  that  if  the  community  is  dispersed 
the  opportunity  for  crime  will  not  arise  again,  in  the  commu- 
nity.  To  each  of  the  propositions  to  which  we  reduced  Kan- 
tian  retributivism,  Paley  would  oppose  a  contrary  proposition. 
(i)  The  only  acceptable  reason  for  punishing  a  man 
is  that  punishing  him  will  serve  the  end  of  the 
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(ii)  The  only  acceptable  reason  for  punishing  a  man  in 
a  given  manner  and  degree  is  that  this  is  the 
manner  and  degree  of  punishment  most  likely  to 
prevent  the  crime. 
(iii)  Whether  or  not  a  man  should  be  punished  depends 
upon  the  possibility  of  preventing  the  crime  in 
question  by  non-punitive  means. 
But  it  seems  to  me  that  Paley's  theory  of  punishment  is 
but  a  sketch,  so  cryptic  that  one  could  not  envisage  what 
direction  he  might  have  taken  in  developing  it. 
2.  BENTHAM 
Bentham's  utilitarian  theory  of  punishment  is  regarded  as 
the  most  comprehensive  theory  in  the  history  of  philosophy. 
5 
Bentham  extends  the  work  of  William  Paley  by: 
(1)  Providing  a  general  theoretical  foundation  for  the 
justification  of  punishment; 
(2)  Distinguishing  carefully  between  punishment  and  other 
"remedies"  for  crime; 
(3)  Drawing  the  limits  beyond  which  punishment  should  not 
be  applied;  and 
(4)  Offering  rules  for  the  determination  of  manner  and 
degree  of  punishing. 
In  the  wealth  of  important  material  to  be  found  in  Ben- 
tham's  published  work  on  the  subject  of  punishment,  any 
selection  is  bound  to  seem  arbitrary;  yet  select  we  must. 
Our  object  will  be  merely  to  give  some  indication  of  what 
traditional  utilitarianism  with  respect  to  punishment  is 
like  in  its  most  highly  developed  form. 74 
Bentham  is  not  content  to  begin  with  the  purpose  of 
punishment,  but  thinking  of  punishment  as  but  one  tool  in 
the  hands  of  the  legislator,  asks  what  the  end  is  which 
this  and  other  legislative  tools  should  be  made  to  serve. 
This  end  is  "to  augment  the  total  happiness  of  the  commu- 
nity;  and  therefore,  in  the  first  place,  to  exclude,  as  far 
as  may  be,  everything  that  tends  to  subtract  from  happi- 
ness:  in  other  words  to  exclude  mischief"6. 
This  broader  foundation  will  allow  Bentham  to  include 
more  under  punishment  than  prevention  of  crimes  as  they 
arise  and  to  take  a  wider  view  of  prevention  than  Paley  did. 
Bentham  agrees  with  Paley  that  punishment  is  itself  an 
evil  and  should,  if  used,  be  used  as  sparingly  as  possible: 
"Upon  the  principle  of  utility,  if  it  ought  at  all  to  be 
admitted,  it  ought  only  to  be  admitted  in  as  far  as  it 
promises  to  exclude  some  greater  evil.  "  But  here  again  he 
takes  a  wider  view,  by  setting  for  himself  the  task  of 
discriminating  between  those  situations  in  which  punishment 
should  be  used  and  those  in  which  it  should  not. 
The  mischief  of  crime  obstructs  happiness  but  the  mis- 
chief  of  punishment  does  too;  so  we  must  be  chary  in  our 
use  of  punishment  and  look  about  for  other  means  of  dealing 
with  the  mischief  of  crime.  All  such  means,  including 
punishment,  Bentham  terms  "remedies",  and  there  are  four 
sorts:  (a)  Preventive  (b)  Suppressive  (c)  Satisfactory,  and 
(d)  Penal  remedies  or  Punishment. 
(a)  The  first  of  these  remedies  has  an  unfortunate  title, 75 
since  on  Bentham's  view,  punishment  is-,  preventive  also. 
What  he  has  in  mind  are,  first,  direct  moves  which  can  be 
made  by  the  police  or  private  citizens,  like  admonitions, 
threats,  or  seizure  of  arms,  to  prevent  the  occurrences  of 
a  particular  crime  which  is  thought  likely  to  occur;  as 
when  we  see  a  man  apparently  preparing  to  commit  armed 
robbery  and  warn  him  away. 
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Secondly,  there  is  the  whole 
vast  class  of  indirect  moves  which  can  be  made  to  prevent 
crime:  indirect  in  that  they  refer  not  to  this  or  that 
particular  crime,  but  to  a  class  of  crimes  which  might  be 
committed  -  preventive  medicine  as  opposed  to  treating  the 
cholera  of  crime  when  it  breaks  out.  Under  this  important 
heading,  Bentham  discusses8  at  length  such  topics  as  remo- 
val  of  temptations  to  crime,  like  easily  concealed  arms 
and  tools  for  the  counterfeiting  of  money;  substituting 
innocuous  for  dangerous  desires  and  inclinations;  and  put- 
ting  people  on  guard  against  certain  types  of  offences. 
(b)  Supressive  remedies  "tend  to  put  a  stop  to  an  offence 
in  progress,  but  not  completed,  and  so  prevent  the  evil, 
or  at  least  a  part  of  it.  "9  Bentham  gives  no  examples  but 
mentions  that  suppressive  means  are  the  same  as  preventive 
ones.  The  difference  apparently  lies  in  the  stage  of  the 
game  at  which  they  are  applied:  the  crime  of  murder  is 
suppressed  if  we  warn  his  victim  to  leave  town  or  pass  and 
enforce  a  law  prohibiting  the  sale  of  weapons  which  can 
easily  be  concealed. 
(c)  Satisfactory  remedies  "consist  of  reparations  or  in- 76 
demnities,  secured  to  those  who  have  suffered  from  offences. 
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They  assume  the  crime  done  and  try  to  remove  all  or  part 
of  the  mischief  it  caused.  Thus  the  money  taken  from  the 
bank  must  be  returned,  the  damage  to  a  house  repaired,  the 
public  calumny  publicly  admitted  to  be  false.  The  object 
is  to  make  it  as  if  the  crime  had  never  occurred.  The 
object  is  not,  as  with  Kant's  Principle  of  Equality,  that 
the  criminal  must  suffer  in  the  way  and  to  the  degree  that 
his  victim  suffered;  but  that  the  suffering  of  the  victim 
must  somehow  be  compensated  to  him.  11 
(d)  Punishment  is  distinguished  from  the  other  remedies 
for  the  chief  of  crime  in  that,  like  satisfactory  remedies, 
it  occurs  only  after  the  crime,  but,  unlike  satisfactory 
remedies,  its  purpose  is  preventive:  "to  prevent  like 
offences,  whether  on  the  part  of  the  offender  or  of  others.  "12 
"What  is  past  is  but  one  act;  the  future  is 
infinite.  The  offence  already  committed 
concerns  only  a  single  individual;  similar 
offences  may  affect  all.  in  many  cases  it 
is  impossible  to  redress  the  evil  that  is  done; 
but  it  is  always  possible  to  take  away  the  will 
to  repeat  it;  for  however  great  may  be  the 
advantage  of  the  offence,  the  evil  of  the  punish- 
ment  may  be  always  made  out  to  outweigh.  "1p 
The  punishment  which  serves  to  deter  the  criminal  from 
repeating  his  crime  is  called  by  Benthan  "particular  pre- 
vention.  "  This  may  be  achieved  in  three  ways:  by  taking 
away  from  the  criminal  the  physical  power  of  repeating  his 
offence  (incapacitation),  by  taking  away  the  desire  of 
offer)ding  (reformation),  or  by  making  him  afraid  of  offend- 
ing  (intimidation).  It  is  general  prevention,  however, 77 
the  prevention  of  crime  by  example  of  the  punishment  suffered 
by  the  offender,  which  "ought  to  be  the  chief  end  of  punish- 
ment,  as  it  is  its  real  justification".  14 
"That  punishment  which,  considered  in  itself, 
appeared  base  and  repugnant  to  all  generous 
sentiments,  is  elevated  to  the  first  rank  of 
benefits,  when  it  is  regarded  not  as  an  act 
of  wrath  or  of  vengeance  against  a  guilty  or 
unfortunate  individual  who  has  given  way  to 
mischiev6us  inclinations,  but  as  an  indispen- 
sable  sacrifice  to  the  common  safety.  i15 
The  lima  tsof  punishment:  When  we  understand  that  punish- 
ment  is  but  one  of  the  remedies  which  may  be  used  against 
crime,  and  the  conditions  under  which  and  the  purpose  for 
which  it  should  be  used,  we  are  ready  to  approach  the  topic 
of  the  limits  of  punishment:  "cases  unmeet  for  punishment". 
Given  the  general  preventive  end  of  punishment,  it  ought 
not  to  be  inflicted  where  it  is  (a)  groundless  (b)  ineffi- 
cacious  (c)  unprofitable  or  (d)  needless.  Since  punishment 
is  in  itself  an  evil,  the  burden  of  proof  is  on  him  who 
would  inflict  it,  and  this  is  so  even  though  a  crime  has 
been  committed.  This  contrasts  with  the  traditional  retri- 
butivism,  where  the  burden  is  on  the  criminal  to  show  why 
he  should  not  be  punished  equally  with  his  crime,  but  does 
not  rest  (provided  the  proper  proportion  is  observed)  on 
the  person  inflicting  punishment. 
(a)  Punishment  is  groundless  when  there  is  no  mischief 
for  it  to  prevent.  For  example,  even  though  it  seemed  mis- 
chievous  (breaking  into  a  man's  house,  burning  his  fields), 
yet  the  "victim"  gave  his  (free  and  fairly  obtained)  con- 78 
sent;  or  though  it  is  mischievous  it  was  necessary  as  a 
means  to  an  over-all  good  (tearing  down  a  man's  house  to 
get  material  for  plugging  the  dike). 
(b)  Punishment  is  inefficacious  when  it  cannot  act  preven- 
tively.  Examples  are  ex-post  facto  laws;  laws  not  suffi- 
ciently  promulgated;  punishment  of  infants  or  insane  persons, 
or  persons  under  physical  compulsion. 
(c)  Punishment  is  unprofitable  when  the  punishment  would 
produce  more  evil  than  the  offence  it  is  meant  to  prevent 
(capital  punishment  for  picking  pockets). 
(d)  Punishment  is  needless  when  the  mischief  can  be  pre- 
vented  at  a  "cheaper  rate".  This  limitation  comes  about 
when  there  is  some  means  short  of  punishment  which  accom- 
plish  the  same  thing.  (Instructing  misguided  people  con- 
cerning  the  moral  principles  by  which  they  should  be  guided). 
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Rules  for  the  determination  of  :rJ  manner  and  degree  of 
punishment:  It  is  here  that  the  subtlety  and  caution  of 
Bentham  are  especially  apparent.  He  could  not  be  satisfied 
by  the  claim  that  the  crime  must  be  prevented  by  some  means 
or  other  and  the  proportion  between  guilt  and  punishment 
must  therefore  be  ignored.  Among  the  factors  which  Bentham 
considers,  'are  the  need  to  set  penalties  in  such  a  way  that 
where  a  person  is  tempted  to  comtiit  one  of  two  crimes  he 
will  commit  the  lesser,  that  the  evil  consequences  (mischief) 
of  the  crime  will  be  minimized  even  if  the  crime  is  committed, 
that  the  least  amount  possible  of  punishment  be  used  for 
the  prevention  of  a  given  crime. 79 
3.  CONCLUSION 
A  close  look  at  both  Paley  and  Bentham's  arguments 
lead  one  to  draw  the  conclusion  that  Bentham  moves  well 
beyond  Paley  in  intelligibility  and  careful  analysis.  Does 
the  Benthamite  analysis  conflict  with  the  Paleian  position: 
force  us  to  alter  the  formulation  of  the  utilitarian  theory 
of  punishment  which  we  understood  Paley  to  express?  It 
does  not  so  much  require  alteration  as  careful  qualifica- 
tion  of  the  bare  and  bold  Paleian  pronouncements: 
(i)  The  only  acceptable  reason  for  punishing  a  man 
is  that  punishing  him  will  serve  the  end  of  the 
prevention  of  crimes. 
To  this  Bentham  would  say,  but  we  must  not  forget  that 
there  are  some  deeds  it  will  not  be  worthwhile  to  denomi- 
nate  crimes  and  try  to  prevent;  nor  that  prevention  is  it- 
self  a  very  complex  notion,  the  analysis  of  which  bears 
importantly  on  the  means  we  use. 
(ii)  The  only  acceptable  reason  for  punishing  a  man 
in  a  given  manner  and  degree  is  that  this  manner 
and  degree  of  punishment  is  most  likely  to  pre- 
vent  the  crime. 
Bentham  would  add:  Consistently  with  the  reduction  of 
mischief  in  general!  We  cannot  look  at  the  prevention  of 
each  crime  as  a  separate  problem.  we  want  to  reduce  the 
mischief  of  all  crime  at  the  least  possible  expense.  Other- 
wise,  we  will  fall  into  feckless  severity  as  did  Paley  himself. 80 
(iii)  whether  or  not  a  man  should  be  punished  depends 
upon  the  possibility  of  preventing  the  crime  in 
question  by  nonpunitive  means. 
To  this  Bentham  would  agree,  since  punishment  is  but 
one  of  four  possible  remedies  for  crime,  and  should  be 
reserved  until  remedies  involving  less  misbhief  have  been 
tried, 
Paley  looks  only  to  the  prevention  of  the  crime  in 
question,  or  (at  best)  of  crimes  in  general.  For  Bentham, 
prevention  of  crime  is  but  a  subheading  under  prevention 
of  mischief,  and  that  a  subheading  under  the  promotion  of 
happiness.  But  since  there  is  no  question  but  what  mischief 
must  be  prevented  if  happiness  is  to  be  promoted,  and  that 
crime  is  mischief,  the  justification  of  punishment  turns 
inevitably  only  on  the  prevention  of  crime  at  the  least 
cost,  in  mischief,  of  the  means  used. 
It  is,  of  course,  the  word  "only"  which  gives  trouble, 
for  the  retributivist  creed  has  an  "only"  in  it  too:  it  is 
only  by  reference  to  desert  that  punishment  may  be  justi- 
fied,  Both  of  these  positions  can  be  questionable. 
If  we  were  to  follow  out  the  lead  developed  in  the 
previous  section,  we  would  look  for  the  addressee,  if  there 
is  one,  of  the  Benthamite  justification  of  punishment.  And 
we  would  find  that  Bentham  does  not  appear  to  have  so  much, 
in  mind  justification  to  the  criminal  (or  to  any  of  us  who 
might  have  to  play  that  role)  as  justification  to  the  non- 
involved  citizen  whose  interest  is  simply  in  the  best  order- 81 
ing  of  society.  But  to  make  this  out  in  detail  would  be 
tedious.  It  might  also  be  misleading,  for  it  might  suggest 
the  whole  controversy  could  be'resolved  by  showing  that  the 
retributivist  is  talking  to  one  addressee  and  is  concerned 
with  one  set  of  problems,  and  the  utilitarian  to  another 
and  another  set  of  problems. 
Perhaps  in  the  process  of  examining  the  various  theo- 
ries  of  punishment  we  should  be  in  a  position  to  distinguish 
a  number  of  disparate  undertakings  which  have  traditionally 
been  lumped  together  as  "the  justification  of  punishment". B.  PROBLEMS  OF  THE  UTILITARIAN  THEORY 
1.  INTRODUCTORY  STATEMENT 
2.  REVISED  UTILITARIANISM:  RAWLS 
3o  SOME  DETAILED  ANALYSES 
4.  RETROSPECTIVE  ENACTMENTJSTRICT  LIABILITY 83 
1.  INTRODUCTORY  STATEMENT 
The  utilitarian  is  committed  to  doing  whatever,  in 
any  given  situation,  is  likely  to  promote  public  happiness; 
or  if  it  is  impossible  to  promote  happiness,  in  the  circum- 
stances,  at  least  to  minimize  unhappiness,  and  thus  he  is 
committed  to  the  minimization  of  mischief,  which  is  merely 
any  state  of  affairs  that  brings  about  unhappiness.  This 
means,  so  far  as  punishment  is  concerned,  that  he  will 
punish  when,  and  only  when,  and  in  such  a  way,  and  to  the 
extent  that,  there  is  likely  to  be  less  mischief  than  if 
he  did  not  punish,  or  punished  in  some  other  way. 
But  sometimes  the  best  way  to  minimize  mischief  would 
be  to  punish  an  innocent  man.  This  argument  is  usually 
directed  against  that  wider  form  of  utilitarianism  which 
takes  as  its-;  principle  the  promotion  of  consequences  "good 
on  the  whole",  but,  for  simplicity,  I  confine  this  state- 
mdnt  of  it  to  a  form  uniform  with  the  Benthamite  utilitaria- 
nism  described  in  chapter  one. 
If  the  thesis  that  punishment  of  offenders  deters 
other  potential  offenders  is  correct,  then  the  greatest 
need  for  punishment  is  when  offences  are  on  the  increase. 
It  is  not  however  always  easy  to  find  someone  to  punish 
just  when  the  crime  wave  is  getting  under  way.  And  some- 
times,  by  the  nature  of  the  ci''rcumstances,  criminals  are 
very  hard  to  catch.  Few  law  enforcement  officials  may  be 
available,  or  those  present  may  be  inadequately  equipped, 
or  criminals  may  develop  effective  warning  systems.  The 84 
very  nature  of  the  offence  may  make  apprehension  difficult, 
as  in  theft  by  servants,  vandalism,  and  the  writing  of 
threatening  letters. 
The  time  may  be  suitable  for  a  deterrent  example.  A 
stiff  term  of  imprisonment,  an  execution,  could  frighten 
would-be  criminals,  bring  home  to  them  the  legal  consequences 
of  the  crime  they  comtemplate.  And  is  the  deterrent  example 
less  useful  if  the  "criminal"  is  innocent,  unknown  to  all 
but  the  judge?  Would  not  a  consistent  utilitarian  judge 
sometimes  be  constrained  by  the  principle  of  the  minimiza- 
tion  of  mischiefto  make  use  of  "misplaced"  punishment  for 
the  reduction  of  crime?  Now,  as  a  utilitarian,  could  he 
fail  to  punish  a  man  guilty  in  the  eyes  of  everyone  but 
himself,  if  an  example  were  needed?  This  argument,  if  stated 
in  its  most  general  form,  would  emphasise  "misplaced" 
punishment.  That  is  to  say,  punishment  inflicted  in  such 
a  way  as  to  fall  on  wrong  shoulders,  or  too  hard  on  the 
right  ones.  Thus  there  would  be  included,  besides  simple 
punishment  of  an  innocent  man,  group  punishment  for  an  in- 
dividual's  crime,  punishment  for  crimes  not  yet  commited 
but  expected,  and  punishment-of  the  guilty  for  more  heinous 
crime  than  they  actually  committed. 
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This  alleged  consequence  of  the  utilitarian  position 
is  so  unwelcome  that  it  constitutes  one  of  the  strongest 
arguments  against  the  utilitarian  theory  of  ethics  in  gene- 
ral,  and  opponents  are  held  to  be  most  conspicuously  wrong' 
when  this  implication  of  their  doctrine  of  punishment  is 
clearly  made  out. 85 
The  classic  example  of  expression  of  the  moral  repul- 
sion  felt  by  the  philosopher  when  he  contemplates  the 
punishment  of  the  innocent  is  the  passage,  already  quoted 
at  length,  from  F.  H.  Bradley,  and  apparently  directed 
against  the  philosophy  of  J.  S.  Mill.  Here  Bradley  cries 
out  that: 
"if  punishment  is  inflicted  for  any  other  reason 
whatever  than  because  it  is  merited  by  wrong, 
it  is  a  gross  immorality,  a  crying  injustice,  an  18 
abominable  crime,  and  not  what  it  pretends  to  be.  " 
Obviously  the  way  to  answer  the  charge  that  utilita- 
rians  would  have  to  sanction.  punishment  of  the  innocent, 
is  to  deny  that  the  consequences  of  punishing  an  innocent 
man  would  ever  be  better  than  the  consequences  of  not 
punishing  him.  This  is  argued  by  appealing  to  the  extreme- 
ly  bad  consequences  of  punishing  an  innocent  man.  These 
consequences,  it  is  held,  are  so  far-reaching  and  so  super- 
latively  bad  in  their  total  effect  that  it  is  impossible 
that  it  could  ever,  be  productive  of  the  best  consequences 
to  punish  an  innocent  man.  The  most  that  can  be  done  by 
punishing  an  innocent  man  is  to  produce  good  consequences 
for  a  limited  number  of  people  over  a  limited  span  of  time. 
But  since  punishing  an  innocent  person  subverts  the  very 
foundations  of  the  system  of  law,  and  since  without  law 
human  existence  would  be  misery,  the  effects  of  punishing 
the  innocent  person  extend  farther  and  are  more  fraught 
with  misery  than  the  effects  of  not  punishing  him  could 
ever  be.  No  mater  how  pressing  the  reasons  seem  to  be  for 86 
punishing  him,  the  good  consequences  of  punishing  him  could 
not  possibly  extend  as  far  as  the  bad  ones.  For  in  not 
punishing  him,  one  is  not  subverting  the  system  of  law. 
In  fact,  to  refuse  to  punish  an  innocent  person,  under  cir- 
cumstances  in  which  excellent  consequences  would  result 
from  punishing  him,  is  to  give  strong  support  to  the  system 
of  law,,  The  utilitarian  may  even  go  so  far  as  to  say  that 
the  greater  the  temptation  to  punish  an  innocent  man,  be- 
cause  of  the  excellent  consequences  which  would  result,  the 
greater  good  is  done  in  refusing  to  punish'  him  and,  in- 
stead,  upholding  the  system  of  law. 
The  reply  to  this  utilitarian  defence  is  that  it  is 
simply  not  true  that  the  consequences  of  punishing  an  inno- 
cent  are  always  worse  than  those  of  not  doing  so.  Certainly 
there  is  no  necessary  connection  between  the  punishment  of 
the  innocent  and  the  subversion  of  law.  How  is  the  law' 
supposed  tobe  subverted?  The  answer  turns  on  what  happens 
if  it  is  discovered  that  a  person  has  been  punished  for  a 
crime  of  which  he  is  not  guilty.  If  it  should  come  to  the 
notice  of  the  public  that  as  a  matter  of  policy,  a  judge 
has  senteced  an  innocent  person,  for  the  purposes  the  judge 
deems  good,  what  would  be  the  effect  of  this  news?  It 
would  lessen  the  respect  people  have  for  the  judiciary. 
Indeed  the  foundations  of  the  law  would  be  weakened. 
The  critic  however  afgues  that,  all  of  this  weakening 
of  the  foundations  cannot  take  place  unless  the  fact  that 
an  innocent  man  has  been  punished  (knowingly)  by  the  govern- 87 
ment  is  generally  known.  If  it  is  kept  quiet  then  the  founda- 
tions  are  not  weakened.  So  there  is  nothing  wrong,  on  con- 
sistently  utilitarian  grounds,  with  punishing  an  innocent 
person,  so  long  as  the  practice  can  be  kept  quiet. 
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The  utilitarian  can  argue  that  there  will  certainly  be 
difficulty  of  keeping  the  punishment  of  the  innocent  person 
quiet.  For  not  only  must  the  news  be  kept  from  the  populace 
but  also  from  the  officials  of  government,  if  subversion  of 
the  law  is  to  be  avoided.  If  officials  hear  that  an  official 
has  punished  an  innocent  for  a  seemingly  good  reason,  then 
they  are  going  to  begin  to  feel  free  to  do  likewise,  even 
when  men  are  not  guilty.  Obviously  such  a  practice  would 
-lead  to  injustice  and  chaos. 
An  answer  such  as  this  still  leaves  open  the  possibility 
that  there  might  be  circumstances  in  which  the  judge  could 
be  very  sure  that  only  he  knows  that  he  is  using  an  innocent 
man  for  exemplary  purposes;  and  here  the  consistent  utilita- 
rian  judge  has  no  choice.  The  defence  from  the  extremely 
bad  consequences  of  punishing  the  innocent  shows  at  most  that 
the  utilitarian  would  most  of  the  time  not  punish  the  innocent. 
But  if  he  could  keep  it  quiet  he  would  punish  the  innocent 
whenever  good  seemed  likely  to  result  from  it.  If  the  utili- 
tarian  could  be  said  to  be  occasionally  committed  to  the 
approval  of  the  punishment  of  the  innocent,  then  he  would  also 
-  on  occasion  -  have  to  approve  the  reward  of  the  guilty. 
Let  us  suppose  it  is  discovered  by  a  group  of  distin- 
guished  psychiatrists  that  our  approach  to  criminal  conduct 88 
has  been  all  wrong.  To  punish  the  man  who  has  committed  a 
crime  has  bad  effects  in  several  ways.  Many  crave  punish- 
ment,  and  it  is  because  they  crave  it  that  they  commit  the 
crime.  Other  criminals  will  be  only  further  embittered 
and  deranged  by  the  punishment.  with  some  criminals  the 
crime  is  so  compulsive  that  the  threat  of  punishment  has 
little  or  no  deterrent  effect. 
20 
But  suppose  that  it  is 
found  that  what  will  reduce  the  crime  rate  is  to  treat  the 
criminal  not  harshly  but  sympathetically.  Specifically  it 
is  found  that  what  ought  to  be  done  is  to  givethe  criminal 
.a 
chance  to  start  life  afresh  under  favourable  auspices. 
Suppose  also  that  a  successful  experiment  has  proved  that 
if  criminals  are  remoed  from  their  former  surroundings, 
given  fifty  acres  of  land,  a  tractor,  seedling,  and  govern- 
ment  support  and  advice  for  a  period  of  three  years,  there 
is  a  good  chance  that  they  will  become  productive  and  peace- 
ful  citizens. 
Again  we  shall  assume  that  a  dangerous  criminal  commits 
a  violent  and  premeditated  assault  upon  an  innocent  man. 
The  criminal  is  duly  examined  and  presented  with  his  fifty 
acres  and  tractor,  and  is  carefully  coached  and  nurtured 
by  the  government  for  three  years.  At  the  end  of  these  three 
years,  the  programme  having  succeeded,  he  has  become  a  pros- 
perous  and  active  member  of  the  Farming  Community,  has  built 
a  neat  home,  and  has  bought  two  adjoining  farms.  At  the 
end  of  fifteen  years  he  is  the  proprietor  of  a  large  estate 89 
on  which  cattle  roam  and  has  enrolled  his  daughter  in  a 
public  school. 
In  the.  meantime,  the  victim  of  the  assault  has  drifted 
from  bad  to  worse.  The  injuries  he  has  received  from  the 
criminal  result  in  his  losing  his  job,  going  on  relief,  in 
his  loss  of  respect,  in  his  living  a  life  of  loose  wander- 
ing,  and  in  his  final  reduction  to  selling  pencils  on  a 
street  corner.  The  criminal  now  makes  it  a  habit  to  buy 
his  pencils  from  his  victim,  and  that  to  soothe  his  con- 
science  he  pays  his  victim  an  additional  ten  pence  for 
each  pencil  he  buys. 
The  foregoing  example  has  the  anti-utilitarian  advan- 
tage  that  the  more  successful  the  programme  is  in  reducing 
the  crime  rate  by  rehabilitating  the  criminal,  the  greater 
will  be  the  injustice  in  the  relative  status  of  criminal 
and  victim.  The  conclusion  is  that  to  show  that  a  policy 
is  justified  on  utilitarian  grounds  is  not  to  show  that  it 
is  morally  justifiable;  and  that  considerations  of  justice 
can  conflict  with  considerations  of  utility. 
On  this  analysis  therefore  the  utilitarian  judge  will 
not  only  occasionally  punish  the  innocent,  but  also  he  will 
from  time  to  time  reward  the  guilty.  To  punish  an  inno- 
cent  or  reward  a  guilty  person  seems  the  very  paradigm  of 
injustice;  and,  to  the  extent  that  we  value  justice,  we 
seem  unable  to  accept  the  utilitarian  position  in  so  far 
as  it  bears  on  punishment.  Even  if  it  can  be  shown  that 
the  utilitarian  judge  would  very  seldom  punish  an  innocent 90 
or  reward  a  guilty  person,  he  would  (we  are  sure)  refrain 
on  principle  from  such  acts,  for  he  is  guided  by  only  one 
principle:  The  maximization  of  public  happiness.  Guided 
by  this  one  principle  he  cannot  but  regard  the  prisoner 
before  the  bar  as  a  possible  lever  for  the  public  weal. 
But  to  make  use  of  prisoners  in  this  way  is  to  ignore  or 
offend  against  the  demands  of  justice.  Indeed  this  is  the 
centre  of  gravity  of  the  argument. 
2.  REVISED  UTILITARIANISM:  RAWLS 
It  should  be  clear  now  that  so  far  as  the  traditional 
utilitarian  position  is  concerned,  there  is  little  more 
that  can  be  said  in  reply  to  the  punishment  of  the  innocent 
argument.  A  valid  answer  would  seem  to  lie  in  a  better 
understanding  of  utilitarianism  than  the  traditional  utili- 
tarian  had.  It  rests  on  the  distinction  of  levels  of  dis- 
cussion  in  the  utilitarian  argument.  This  distinction  was 
first  made  clear  by  contemporary  philosophers  not  so  much 
interested  in  taking  sides  in  the  traditional  dispute, 
as  in  the  distinction  itself. 
The  formulation  of  utilitarianism  which  has  been 
thought  to  avoid  the  criticism  that  utilitarianism  permits 
the  punishment  of  the  innocent  is  that  of  Rawls.  Rawls2l 
investigates  the  importance  for  utilitarianism  of  distin- 
guishing  between  two  kinds  of  moral  justification,  justify- 91 
ing  a  rule  or  practice  and  justifying  a  particular  action 
falling  under  it,  The  first  kind  of  justification,  says 
Rawls,  is  the  legislator's  concern  and  it  turns  mainly  on 
utilitarian  considerations.  The  legislator  is  concerned 
with  the  question  whether  it  would  be  best  on  the  whole  to 
prohibit  a  certain  kind  of  action,  and  how  much  it  ought 
to  be  penalized.  The  second  kind  of  justification  is  the 
concern  of  the  judge,  and  it  is  settled  by  retributive-like 
arguments.  The  judge  is  not  qua  judge  entitled  to  consider 
whether  it  would  be  best  on  the  whole  to  punish  a  kind  of 
action,  and  he  is  severely  limited  in  his  decision  how  and 
how  much  to  punish.  The  judge's  concern  is  with  the  ques- 
tions  what  the  defendant  has  in  fact  done,  and  whether 
that  which  he  has  done  is  against  the  law.  Utilitarian 
considerations  are  appropriate,  the9,  to  legislative- 
discu-ssions;  whereas  retributive  ones  are  appropriate  to  judi- 
cial  discussions.  The  apparent  conflict  between  the  two 
views  is  resolved  by  showing  that: 
"these  views  apply  to  persons  holding  different 
offices  and  different  duties,  and  suited  diffe- 
rently  with  respect  to  the  system  of  rules  that 
make  up  the  criminal  law.  "22 
A  clear  objection  to  this  resolution  of  the  difficulty 
is  that  utilitarianism  if  taken  as  the  oily  principle  of 
justification,  in  legislative  discussions,  is  likelytojustify 
that  which  would  be  "cruel  and  arbitrary".  Even  with  the 
best  of  intentions,  utilitarians  might  find  themselves 
favouring  the  infliction  of  suffering  on  innocent  persons. 92 
Retributivists  might  insist  that: 
"there  is  noway  to  stop  the  utilitarian  prin- 
ciple  from  justifying  too  much  except  by  addi- 
ing  to  it  a  principle  which  distributes  cer- 
tain  rights  to  certain  individuals.  "23 
This  would  be  an  abandonment  of  the  strong  position 
that  it  is  solely  by  reference  to  utility  that  punishment 
is  justified  in  legislative  discussions.  Rawls  argues  that 
the  position  is  not  to  be  abandoned  so  quickly.  For  by 
concentrating  on  the  distinction  between  justifying  rules 
and  justifying  actions  falling  under  the  rules,  one  can 
see  that  the  utilitarian  legislator  would  be  extremely  un- 
likely  to  favour  the  infliction  of  suffering  on  innocent 
individuals.  Qua  legislator,  he  does  not  make  decisions 
about  which  particular  individuals  are  to  be  made  to  suffer. 
What  is  he  accused  of,  then?  It  must  be  of  adopting  the 
position  that  the  institution  of  punishment,  in  which 
suffering  is  inflicted  only  on  the  guilty  should  be  super- 
ceded  by  an  institution  in  which  it  may  be  inflicted  on  the 
innocent  as  well.  He  is  accused  of  advocating  a  change  in 
the  whole  system,,  '  But  the  ground  on  which  he  would  favour 
abandoning  punishment  for  a  system  in  which  the  innocent 
may  sometimes  for  good  reason'be  made  to  suffer  (Rawls  calls 
this  "Telismentl),  24 
would  have  to  be  that  he  thinks  that 
the  consequences  6f  adopting  "Telishment"  would  be  better 
than  the  consequences  of  retaining  punishment.  "Telishment" 
is  the  institution  in  which  some  group  of  officials  has  the 
right  to  decide  under  certain  specified  circumstances  that 93 
it  would  be  well  to  inflict  suffering  on  ("telish")  one  or 
more  persons  who  are  innocent  of  the  crime  "for"  which  they 
are  telished. 
What  is  important  is  to  consider  the  probable  conse- 
quences  of  such  an  institution  to  see'that  the  utilitarian 
is  extremely  unlikely  to  favour  it  over  punishment.  These 
probable  consequences  are  that  (1)  since  there  is  no  real 
check  on  the  officials  who  may  telish,  the  right  to  telish 
will  be  abused  for  those  officials,  personal  ends;  and 
(2)  the  detterrent  effect  of  the  penal  system  as  a  whole 
will  be  undermined,  since  a  man  may  be  telished  even  though 
he  has  not  broken  the  law,  and  therefore  when  he  is  con- 
templating  a  crime,  fear  of  the  penalty  does  not  provide 
the  motive  for  refraining  that  it  does  in  punishment. 
This  is,  briefly,  an  answer  which  could.  be  used  by 
the  utilitarian  to  defend  himself  against  the  "punishment 
of  the  innocent"  argument.  It  is  perhaps  a  stronger  de- 
fence  than  any  offered  by  the  traditional  utilitarians. 
3.  SOME  DETAILED  ANALYSES 
The  moral  justification  for  the  practice  of  punish- 
ment  is  today  sought  almost  invariably  in  deterrent  and 
reformatory  terms.  For  those  who  subscribe  to  simple  hedä- 
nistic  utilitarian  theories  of  morals,  retributivism  is 
ruled  out,  a  priori,  by  their  moral  beliefs.  One  could 
not  therefore  hope  to  shift  their  position  on  punishment 
without  first  refuting  their  general  moral  theory.  It  is 94 
also  the  case,  however,  that  most  of  that  great  majority 
of  people  who  do  not  subscribe  to  hedonistic  utilitaria- 
nism  reject  or,  more  commonly,  ignore  the  retributive 
theory  of  the  moral  justification  of  punishment.  The 
reason  is  probably  that  many  people,  particularly  philoso- 
phers,  can  see  no  rational  justification  for  inflicting 
suffering  for  its  own  sake.  Even  though  they  admit,  as 
for  instance  Anthony  Flew25  does,  that  criminal  desert 
gives  us  the  right  to  subject  the  criminal  to  various  un- 
pleasant  processes  such  reformatory  measures, 
/ 
and  this  can 
be  described  as  a  modified  form  of  the  retributive  theory, 
they  cannot  see  any  point  in  just  making  the  criminal 
suffer.  The  purpose  of  punishment  is  therefore  only  seen 
in  its  immediate  useto'the  community,  and  this  use  is 
thought  to  be  best  served  by  deterring  and  reforming. 
The  deterrence  theory,  among  several  other  utilita- 
rian  theories,  is  characterized  as  an  account  of  the  justi- 
fication  of  punishment  which  looks  to  the  future.  It  is 
contrasted  in  this  form  with  the  retribution  theory  which 
is  often  spoken  of  as  looking  to  the  past  for  its..,  justifica- 
tion  of  punishment.  The  deterrence  theory  (like  reform  and 
prevention)  finds  no  justification  for  action  in  a  past 
offence  and  its  arguments  depend  entirely  upon  the  conse- 
quences  of  punishment.  This  view  that  punishment  is  justi- 
fied  by  the  value  of  its  consequences  is  compatible  with 
any  ethical  theory  which  allows  meaning  to  be  attached  to 
moral  judgements.  It  holds  merely  that  the  infliction  of 95 
suffering  is  of  no  value  or  of  negative  value  and  that  it 
must  therefore  be  justified  by  further  considerations. 
In  our  review  of  the  traditional  utilitarian  position 
we  saw  that  a  philosopher  who  typifies  this  point  of  view 
is  the  founder  of  utilitarianism,  Jeremy  Bentham.  26 
He  says: 
"General  prevention  ought  to  be  the  chief  end  of 
punishment  as  it  is  its  real  justification.  If 
we  could  consider  an  offence  which  has  been  com- 
mitted  as  an  isolated  fact,  the  like  of  which 
would  never  recur,  punishment  would  be  useless. 
It  would  be  only  adding  one  evil  to  another.  But 
when  we  consider  that  an  unpunished  crime  leaves 
the  path  of  crime  open,  not  only  to  the  same 
delinquent  but  also  to  all  those  who  may  have  the 
same  motives  and  opportunities  for  entering  upon 
it  we  perceive  that  punishment  inflicted  on  the 
individual  becomes  a  source  of  security  to  all". 
Elsewhere  he  suggests: 
27 
"All  punishment  is  mischief:  all  punishment  in 
itself  an  evil,  Upon  the  principle  of  utility, 
if  it  ought  at  all  to  be  admitted,  it  ought 
only  to  be  admitted  in  as  far  as  it  promises 
to  exclude  some  greater  evil.  " 
Bentham's  case  is  that  punishment  is  a  technique  of 
social  control  which  operates  to  reform  the  criminal,  to 
prevent  him  from  repeating  the  offence,  and  to  deter  others 
from  similar  offences.  What  Bentham  meant  exactly  by  pre- 
vention  and  reform  has  already  been  explained  in  the  tradi- 
tional  account.  But  according  to  the  interpretation  offered 
here  if  the  damage  to  the  offender  outweighs  the  expected 
advantage  to  society,  it  loses  its  justification,  for  then 
it  produces  more  mischief  than  it  prevents.  The  calculus 
would  also  have  to  take  into  account  the  strength  of  the 
deterring  effect  upon  others. 96 
But  it  seems  the  strongest  utilitarian  case  for  punish- 
ment  is  that  it  serves  to  deter  potential  offenders  by  in- 
flicting  suffering  on  actual  ones.  How  can  we  be  sure 
whether  many  people  are  really  deterred?  Is  it  an  established 
truth  that  punishment  does  in  fact  deter  or  a  mere  supposi- 
tion?  Naturally  philosophers  have  been  reluctant  to  consi- 
der  this  question  for  it  could  be  settled  only  by  other  than 
philosophical  methods.  As  it  is  an  essential  part  of  the 
utilitarian  argument  we  shall  discuss  it  more  fully  in  the 
next  section.  In  the  meantime  we  assume  that  the  claim 
could  be  no  other  than  an  assumption  because  researchers 
have  so  far  devised  no  satisfactory  methods  of  setting  up 
appropriate  control  groups  so  as  to  make  available  the  re- 
levant  statistics. 
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There  are  seieral  important  and  quite  subtle  objections 
to  the  utilitarian  justification  of  punishment.  A  pertinent 
criticism  of  the  deterrence  view  is  one  advanced  by  Kant  and 
supported  by  both  Hegel  and  Bradley*as  we  saw  in  the  tradi- 
tional  debate.  It  is  the  retributivist  claim,  that  to 
treat  a  man  as  an  end  in  himself  also  involves  treating 
punishment  as  an  end  in  itself.  To  punish  a  man  simply 
because  this  will  deter  him  and  other  from  committing 
offences  in  the  future  is  to  treat  him  only  as  a  means  and 
not  as  an  end.  Kant,  Hegel  and  Bradley  all  agreed  that  to 
treat  a  man  in  this  way  is  an  affront  to  human  dignity. 
It  is  a  view  which  receives  some  confirmation  from  the  re- 
mark  of  an  ex-convict,  which  is  quoted  by  Mabbott:  29 97 
"To  punish  a  man  is  to  treat  him  ag  equal. 
To  be  punished  for  an  offence  against  rules 
a  sane  man's  right". 
It  may  be  replied  to  this  objection  that  there  is  no- 
thing  in  the  utilitarian  appteach,  as  Bentham  understood 
it,  that  denies  the  principle  encapsulated  in  Kant's  injun- 
ctiono  The  criminal  must,  like  anyone  else,  "count  for  one"; 
but  he  must  not  count  for  "more  than  one".  Providing  that 
in  weighing  advanta§es  and  disadvantages  to  everyone  we  do 
not  lose  sight  of  the  offender's  welfare  altogether;  we  are 
not  bound  to  treat  it  as  our  sole  legitimate  concern. 
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This  would  clearly  be  too  weak  to  satisfy  those  who 
employ  Kant's  rule  to  support  reformative  theories  of  punish- 
ment.  They  would  argue  that  punishment  is  not  justified 
simply  by  the  prevention  of  offences  and  although  punishment 
may  protect  the  interests  of  others,  it  must  also  serve  the 
interests  of  the  offender. 
A  reply  such  as  this  to  the  objection  is  altogether 
too  weak,  for  it  entirely  misses  the  point  Kant  was  making. 
If  we  punish  the  offender  according  to  what  he  has  done,  we 
at  least  -treat  him  like  a  man,  like  a  responsible  moral 
agent.  If  we  punish  on  a  deterrent  principles  (i.  e*  what 
punishment  given  to  this  offender  will  effectively  deter 
others  from  imitating  his  offence?  )  we  are  using  him  as 
a  mere  means  to  somebody  elsets  end,  and  surely  Kant  was 
right  when  he  objected  to  that.  Kant  claims  that  "rational 
nature  exists  as  an  end  in  itself".  31 
By  this,  he  seems 
to  mean  that  all  rational  beings,  including  people,  are 98 
ends  in  themselves.  In  other  words,  every  person  is  in- 
trincically  good.  From  this,  Kant  infers  that  it  can  never 
be  morally  right  to  treat  a  person  as  if  he  were  simply  a 
useful  object  for  your  own  purposes.  This  view,  which  is 
the  second  version  of  the  categorical  imperative,  is  stated 
by  Kant  in  a  variety  of  ways: 
"Act  in  such  a  way  that  you  always  treat  huma- 
nity,  whether  in  your  own  person  or  in  the  per- 
son  of  any  other,  never  simply  as  a  means,.  but 
always  at  the  same  time  as  an  end.  "32 
"A,  rational  being,  by  his  very  nature  an  end 
and  consequently  an  end  in  himself,  must  serve 
for  every  maxim  as  a  condition  limit  ng  all 
merely  relative  and  arbitrary  ends.  "  3 
"So  act  in  relation  to  every  rational  being 
(both  to  yourself  and  to  others)  that  he  may 
at  the  same  time  count  in  your  maxim  as  an 
end  in  himself.  "34 
We  shall  understand  Kant  to  be  saying  in  these  passages 
that  one  ought  never  to  act  in  such  a  way  to  treat  anyone 
merely  as  a  means.  In  other  words,  an  act  is  morally 
right  if  and  only  if  the  agent,  in  performing,,,  it,  refrains 
from  treating  any  person  merely  as  a  means,  According  to 
this  statement  there  is  a  moral  prohibition  against  treat- 
ing  anyone  merely  as  a  means.  We  should  however  recognize 
that  this  claim  does  not  rule  out  treating  a  person  as  a 
means.  Kant's  statement  embodies  an  important  moral  insight, 
one  that  many  would  find  plausible.  It  is  the  idea  that  it 
is  wrong  to  "use?  people  as  proponents  of  the  deterrence 
theory  bry  to  do.  people  are  not  mere  objects,  to  be  mani- 
Pulated  to  serve  our  purpose.  We  cannot  treat  people  as  we 
treat  wrecked  cars,  or  wilted  flowers.  Such  things  can  be 99 
thrown  out  or  destroyed  when  we  no  longer  have  any  use  for 
them.  People,  on  the  other  hand,  have  dignity  and  worth, 
and  must  be  treated  accoedingly.  This  what  Kant  says  seems 
fairly  plausible. 
Perhaps  the  most  serious  criticisms  of  the  deterrent 
theory  centre  around  the  claim  that  if  punishment  is  justi- 
fied  by  deterrence  alone  one  is  committed  to  immoral  prac- 
tices.  The  first  of  these  is  that  it  would  be  possible  to 
justify  punishments  divorced  from  the  relative  seriousness 
of  offences.  In  other  words,  we  should  not  bother  about 
whether  or  not  punishments  were  unfairly  severe,  so  long  as 
they  effectively  put  a  stop  to  the  repetition  of  offences. 
Thus,  if  the  only  way  to  deter  people  from  trivial  offences 
were  to  impose  major  penalties  it  would  appear  justifiable 
to  flog  a  man  for  a  parking  offence,  since  flogging  would 
certainly  have  the  effect  of  deterring  him  and  others  from 
parking  their  cars  in  wrong  places.  As  K.  G.  Armstrong35 
remarks: 
"Let  him  be  whipped  to  death,  publicly  of  course 
for  a  parking  offence;  that  would  certainly  deter 
me  from  parking'on  the  spot  reserved  for  the  Vice- 
Chancellor!  " 
There  is  also  the  point  that  by  making  a  penalty  stiff 
enough  in  theory  to  deter  anyone,  in  practice  we  are  bound 
to  make  it  unfairly  severe  for  someone,  which  would  make 
nonsense  of  the  retributive  significance  of  the'punishment' 
as  being  "something  which  is  morally  de+.  served.  " 
The  stock  reply  to  this  criticism  is  that  such  objec- 
tions  derive  from  taking  into  consideration  what  amounts  to 
a  parady  of  the  deterrence  theory.  It  is  quite  true  that 100 
repugnant  consequences  would  follow  from  the  simple  princi- 
ple  that  any  punishment  is  justified  if  it  deters,  and  for 
that  reason  such  a  principle  is  morally  indefensible.  The 
proper  deterrence  theory,  as  expressed  by  Bentham,  is  that 
a  penalty  may  be  justified  only  when  the  distress  it  causes 
to  the  offender  is  not  greater  than  the  distress  that  would 
result  if  he  and  others,  undeterred,  offended  in  the  future. 
Again  this  mode  of  reply  misses  the  point  of  the  objection. 
Even  allowing  the  deterrence  theory,  Bentham's  more  reason- 
able  form,  what  is  at  issue  is  that  the  detterence  princi- 
ple  is  insufficient  by  itself  to  justify  punishment,  for 
if  we  exdlude  from  our  considerations  the  questions  of 
whether  an  offender  deserves  to  be  treated  in  a  particular 
way  injustices  could  occur,  Moreover,  it  is  obvious  that 
Bentham  was  more  concerned  with  deterrence  and  prevention 
than  with  justice,  for  he  held  that  where  detection  is 
difficult,  and  the  risk  of  punishment  accordingly  diminished, 
greater  severity  ought  to  compensate  for  the  uncertainty, 
On  this  view,  a  seriously  but  easily  detected  offence  would 
warrant  lesser  penalties  than  a  minor  but  less  easily  de- 
tec¬ed  one;  an  intolerable  situation  for  anyone  committed 
to  the  principle  of  justice  and  a  belief  that  the  degree  of 
punishment  should  be  related  to  the  degree  of  wickedness 
involved  in  the  offence. 
Another  "immoral  practice"  permitted  by  a  deterrence 
theory  of  justification  is  what  might  be  labelled  "victimi- 
zation"  or  "punishing  the  innocent".  If  it  were  only  a 101 
question  of  deterring  and  preventing  people  from  committing 
offences,  then  perhaps  we  might  find  that  we  needed  on 
occasion  not  only  to'punish'  the  guilty  but  also  the  inno- 
cent,  since  this  would  maybe  deter  the  innocent  but  tempted. 
Perhaps  also,  we  should  "punish"  not  only  the  offender  but 
also  his  family  and  friends,  since  probably  this  would  add 
greatly  to  the  deterrent  effect  of  the  "punishment".  The 
point  is  succinctly  made  by  Benn  and  Peters36  in  the 
following  words: 
"Critics  of  the  utilitarian  approach  content 
that  it  would  justify  punishing  not  only  the 
guilty  but  the  innocent  too.  For  if  punish- 
ment  is  justified  solely  by  its  effects,  would 
it  not  be  permissible  to  manufacture  evidence 
against  an  innocent  man,  in  order  to  provide 
an  example  to  others?  If  there  were  an  out- 
break  of  crimes  particularly  difficult  to  de- 
tect,  and  if  people  generally  could  be  per- 
suaded  than  an  innocent  man  had  in  fact  commi- 
tted  such  a  crime,  would  not  the  utilitarian 
conditions  for  punishment  be  adequately  justi- 
fied?  Alternatively,  if  the  advantage  of 
deterrence  could  be  achieved  by  merely  seeming 
to  punish  a  criminal,  would  it  not  be  wrong  to 
do  more  than  pretend  to  punish  him,  since  the 
advantages  could  then  be  had  without  disadvan- 
tages,  " 
Unfortunately,  they  then  proceed  to  make  the  usual 
riposte  to  the  sort  of  charges  against  detterent  theories 
of  punishment.  Such  charges,  they  insist  involve  a  logical 
impossibility,  for  it  follows  from  the  definition  of  'punish- 
ment  that  suffering,  inflicted  on  the  innocent  cannot  be 
"punishment".  Moreover,  this  will  not  do,  for  this  is  a 
sense  in  which  definitions  do  not  settle  substantive  moral 
questions.  The  reply  might  be  made,  "This  is  a  serious 102 
moral  and  practical  point  which  you  want  to  dismiss  with  a 
terminological  quibble.  I  will  therefore  re-phrase  the 
objection.  Why  shouldn't  wee  in  certain  circumstances,  do 
to  the  innocent  that  which,  when  it  is  done  to  the  guilty, 
is  known  as  punishment?  "  H.  L.  A.  Hart37  does  in  fact  make 
a  similar  objection: 
".....  riot  only  will  this  definitional  stop  fail 
to  satisfy  the  advocate  of  "Retribution"  it 
would  prevent  us  from  investigating  the  very 
thing  which  modern  scepticism  most  calls  in 
question:  namely  the  rational  and  moral  status 
of  our  preference  for  a  system  of  punishment 
under  which  measures  painful  to  individuals  are 
to  be  taken  against  them  only  when  they  have 
committed  an  offence.....  ...  No  account  of 
punishment  can  afförd  to  dismiss  this  question 
with  a  definition.  " 
It  looks  as  though  at  this  point,  those  who  offer  a 
moral  justification  for  the  practice  of  punishing  in  terms 
of  deterrence,  are  in  a  difficult  position;  for  on  their 
view  what  morally  licenses  us  to  inflict  unpleasantness 
on  a  man  is  not  that  he  is  guilty,  (for  that  merely  gives 
us  a  logical  licence  to  use  the  word  "punishment"  to  refer 
to  the  infliction  of  pain  or  unpleasantness)  but  that  there 
will  be  a  socially  useful  consequence  in  terms  of  deterrence. 
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In  "Ethics  and  Education"  Professor  R.  S.  Peters, 
recognises  the  problem  but  does  not  really  face  up  to  it. 
With  his  example  of  a  schoolmaster  who,  because  he  cannot 
find  the  culprit,  keeps::  the  whole  class  in,  he  argues  that, 
unless  a  person  is  involved  in  some  kind  of  offence  and  so 
places  himself  in  a  category  which  makes  him  different  from 
others,  be  cannot  fairly  be  given  discriminatory  treatment. 103 
Noting  the  traditional  view  that  in  general  it  is  more 
useful  to  be  fair,  he  observes  that  in  the  event  of  a  clash 
of  principles,  for  most  utilitarians,  utility  would  take 
priority  over'fairness.  But  this  option  is  not  open'to 
Professor  Peters,  for  his  position  is  that  "both  fairness 
and  the  consideration  of  interests  are  fundamental  princi- 
ples  of  a  rational  morality  and  that  they  are  ...  logically 
independent  of  each  other.  "  This  in  the  case  of  the  school- 
master,  where  two  fundamental  principles  conflict,  Peters 
could  provide  no  rational  solution. 
There  is  a  further  line  of  criticism  of  the  deterrence 
theory  which  might  involve  asking  how  the  utilitarian 
axiom  that  pain  is  evil  can  be  established.  It  is  assumed, 
virtually  without  question,  that  pain  is  always  evil  and 
that  therefore,  since  punishment  is  painful,  it  is  an  evil 
which  could  only  be  justified  by  showing  it  to  be  necessary 
to  the  avoidance  of  some  greater  evil  than  itself.  This 
really  involves  a  fundamental  objection  to  utilitarianism 
in  general  and  far  wider  issues  than  punishment  are  implied 
here.  It  is  possible,  at  least  to  suggest  however,  the 
need  forfar  more  analyses  to  be  make  of  the  relationship 
between  pain  and  evil,  for  there  is  some  room  for  doubt 
about  the  necessary  evil  of  all  pain.  If  I  have  toothache, 
for  example,  is  my  pain  'evil'?  If  I  get  kicked  on  the 
shins  during  a  football  match,  is  the  pain  of  this  an  'vil'r,? 
If,  in  making  prodigious  efforts  to  arrive  at  some  crucial 
judgement  or  solve  some  intractable  problem,  I  experience 
at  times  the  'pains'  of  frustration,  anxiety,  disappoint- 
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ment  and  so  on,  are  these  #evil*?  The  answer  would  cer- 
tainly  depend,  not  just  on  the  existence  of  the  pain,  but 
also  on  the  extent  in  which  the  pain  occurred.  it  would 
arise  as  part  of  a  moral  judgement  taking  all  the  circums- 
tances  into  consideration. 
Hitherto,  it  has  been  assumed  that  the  detterence  theory 
is  that  punishment  is  justified  by  the  fact  that  it  deters 
and  for-no  other  reason.  The  one  and  only,  and  a  sufficient, 
justification  of  punishment  is  that  it  deters  people  from 
wrongdoing.  Punishment  on  this  view  is  therefore  valuable 
only  as  a  means  to  a  desired  end.  As  we  have  seen  such  a 
theory  does  or  would  in  certain  circumstances,  justify  vic- 
timisation.  Now  because  it  could  not  be  agreed  that  victi- 
misation  could  ever  be  morally  justified,  even  on  grounds 
of  utility,  an  attempt  might  be  made  to  deal  with  the  prob- 
lem  by  reformulating  the  theory.  As  victimizing  a  man 
amounts  to  treating  him  in  a  way  that  he  does  not  deserve, 
this  possibility  is  easily  avoided  by  re-stating  the  theory 
as:  the  imposing  of  a  penalty  on  a  man  who  is  an  offender 
is  justified  if  it  deters  him. 
Now  apart  from  the  fact  that  we  no  longer  have  a 
detterent  theory  per  se,  in  that  the  retributive  considera- 
tion  of  desert  has  been  brought  in,  it  is  open  to  at  least 
one  formidable  objection.  What  of  the  man,  guilty  of 
wrongdoing,  who',  is  not  deterred  by  punishment?  According 
to  this  theory  the  man  should  go  unpunished,  for  punish- 
ment  is  only  justified  if  it  in  fact  deters. 105 
4.  RETROSPECTIVE  ENACTMENT/STRICT  LIABILITY 
One  of  the  major  claims  of  the  retributive  theory  is 
that  the  innocent  ought  not  to  be  punished.  It  is  sometimes 
said,  as  we  have  seen,  that  this  claim  presents  no  difficulty 
for  a  utilitarian  theory  of  punishment  because  in  the  pri- 
mary  meaning  of  $pünishment'  the  punishment  of  the  innocent 
is  a  logical  impossibility.  We  can  then  as  a  preliminary 
discount  the  primary  meaning  of  'punishment'  as  the  relevant 
meaning.  Rather  than  considering  all  other  possible  mean- 
ings  of  the  word  'punish'  of  which  there  may  be  an  indefi- 
nite  number,  it  will  be  more  enlightening,  bearing  in  mind 
that  we  are  dealing  with  atmoral  injunction,  to  consider 
whom  we  might  conceivably  direct  our  injunction. 
There  may  be  other  classes  of  person  to  whom  the  injunc- 
tion  may  be  directed  besides  legislators,  judges  and  juries 
and  the  police,  but  these  seem  to  be  the  most  important  and 
we  shall  restrict  our  attention  to  these.  When  might  "the 
innocent  ought  not  to  be  punished"  be  said  to  legislators? 
It  might  be  said  that  when  there  is  a  question  of  restros- 
pective  penal  legislation  being  enacted  it  would  be  unjust 
to  so  legislate  because  it  would  mean  punishing  people  for 
doing  something  which  at  the  time  was  not  a  crime  and  that 
this  is  an  instance  of  punishing  the  innocent.  The  rule 
more  precisely  formulated  would  read:  a  person  who  does 
something  which  at  some  time  is  prohibited  by  penal  law 
should  not  be  punished  for  so  acting  unless  the  enactment 106 
of  the  penal  law  antedates  the  time  of  the  action.  If  asked 
for  justification  of  this  rule  the  reply  which  would  most 
likely  be  given  is  that  for  any  law  a  person  ought  to  be 
given  a  chance  to  conform  his  behaviour  to  the  dictates  of 
the  law.  But  why,  in  view  of  the  patent  justice  of  this 
requirement  should  anyone  need  to  assert  it?  Only  because 
there  is  occasionally  a  demand  for  such  laws.  This  demand 
occurs  mostly,  we  may  suppose,  where  a  statute  which  was 
intended  to  cover  the  particular  action,  through  some  fail- 
ure  of  draughtmanship  or  other  technical  oversight,  does 
not  do  so;  where  the  offence  is  a  very  serious  offence; 
and  where  the  act  in  question;;  is  widely  believed  to  be  im- 
moral.  Perhaps  also  cases  where  a  past  action  may  cause 
serious  future  'harm.  Under  such  circumstances  there  gene- 
rated  a  strong  desire  not  to  let  people  get  away  with  some- 
thing  'due  to  a  mere  technicality'.  A  utilitarian  might 
hold  that  the  claim  interpreted  in  this  way  presents  no  di- 
fficulty  for  utilitarianism  since  punishment  is  justified 
only  so  far  as  it  serves  the  future  good  of  society  and 
retrospective  punishment  could  not  perform  this  function 
-  not  at  least  on  a  long  term  view  of  social  good.  It  is 
however  possible  that  the  public  outcry  against  some  parti- 
cular  deed  is  so  great  that  unless  some  action  is  taken 
over  it  there  would  be  serious  risk  of  civil  disorder. 
Might  it  not  then  be  possible  to  find  utilitarian  justifi- 
cation  for  the  retrospective  enactment  of  such  a  law,  and 
in  this-way  come  into  conflict  with  the  claim  that  the 107 
innocent  ought  not  to  be  punished? 
Another  set  of  circumstances  to  which  the  claim  would 
be  relevant  would  be  that  in  which  legislators  were  presen- 
ted  with  a  Bill  and  asked  to  consider  it  should  form  part 
of  the  criminal  law.  -There  may  be  no  doubt  about  the  worth 
of  the  Bill,  but  there  may  arise  controversy  over  the  cri- 
terion  of  guilt  to  be  applied  -  is  the  law  to  be  one  of 
strict  liability  or  are  the  traditional  criteria  to  be 
followed?  Though,  technically,  only  the  guilty  should  be 
punished,  yet  in-a  morally  important  sense  punishment  would 
occasionally  be  imposed  upon  the  innocent.  There  is  not, 
it  must  be  admitted,  a  settled  utilitarian  position  on  the 
question  of  the  rightness  of  laws  of  strict  liability, 
though  as  Glanville'  Williams  has  pointed  out  the  demand  for 
such  laws  is  one  that  has  been  fostered  by  utilitarians.  39 
However  the  matter  is  resolved  finally  to  the  satisfaction 
of  utilitarians  it  will  come  about  solely  by  a  consideration 
of  the  advantages  and  disadvantages  of  instituting  such 
conditions  for  laws, 
The  retributive  theory  of  punishment  in  maintaining 
that  the  innocent  should  not  be  punished  protest  not  only 
against  the  practice  of  imposing  penalties  on  those  who 
have  not  transgressed  in  law  but  also  against  the  practice 
of  imposing  penalties  on  those  who  would  not  have  conformed 
their  behaviour  to  the  law's  requirements.  The  cases  of 
strict  liability  are  known  at  present  more  in  the  civil  law 
than  in  the  criminal  law,  but  it  would  be  splitting  hairs 108 
to  deny  that  the  penalties  levied  are  punishments.  With 
this  example  in  mind  let  us  turn  to  a  query  by  Rawls: 
"Will  not  a  difference  of  opinion:  as  to  the 
proper  criterion  of  just  law  make  the  proposed 
reconciliation  unacceptable  to  retributivists? 
Will  they  not  question  whether  if  the  utilita- 
rian  criterion  is  used  as  the  criterion  it 
follows  that  those  who  have  broken  the  law  are 
guilty  in  a  way  which  satisfies  the  demands 
, 
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that  those  punished  deserved  to  be  punished,  " 
Rawls,  then,  produces  an  argument  which  a  considera- 
tion  of  the  examples  of  strict  liability  will  show  to  be 
fa]lacious.  He  says: 
"Suppose  that  the  rules  of  the  criminallaw  are 
justified  on  utilitarian  grounds.  Then  it 
follows  that  the  actions  which  the  criminal  law 
specifies  or  offers  are  such  that  if  they  were 
tolerated,  terror  and  alarm  would  spread  in 
society.  Consequently,  retributivists  can  only 
deny  that  those  who  are  punished  deserve  to  be 
punished  if  they  deny  that  such  actions  are 
wrong.  This  they  will  not  want  to  do.  "41 
We  may  begin  by  observing  that  utilitarians  will  re- 
cömmend?  r  laws  which  will  have  a  greater  scope  than  that  of 
preventing  terror  and  alarm.  Many  traffic  laws  have  utili- 
tarian  justification  but  the  offences  they  prohibit  seldom 
give  rise  to  terror  and  alarm.  Now  there  are  demands  which 
a  law  may  make,  where  it  is  unreasonable  to  expect  that 
the  demands  can  always  be  met.  A  man  may  exercise  all 
due  care  and  yet,  still  fail  to  meet  the  requirements  of 
the  law.  The  retributivist  will  describe  such  law  as  un- 
just,  and  unjust.  not  because  it  produced  an  undesirable 
state  of  affairs,  but  because  it  could  lay  a  man  open  to 
punishment  when  he  is  neither  morally  culpable  nor  indeed 109 
responsible  for  the  state  of  affairs,  for  which  he  is  being 
punished.  Liability  without  responsibility  is  unjust.  Even 
so,  we  may  be  able  to  find  utilitarian  justification  for  the 
enforcement  of  such  laws.  A  law  of  strict  liability  may  be 
justified  on  the  grounds  that  it  is  so  important  to  attain 
the  end  that  punishment  of  the  morally  innocent  or  non-res- 
ponsible  may  be  used  "pour  encourager  les  autres".  As  stated 
above  we  already  have  laws  of  strict  liability  in  both  civil 
and  criminal  law.  One  could  speculate  that  such  laws  do 
have  utilitarian  justification  though  unacceptable  to  a 
retributivist,  once  again  it  seems  that  we  are  able  to  drive 
a  wedge  between  the  two  theories  to  prevent  a  reconciliation. 
Our  example  shows  us  one  point  at  which  Rawls'  reasoning 
is  faulty.  He  says: 
"Consequently  retributivists  can  only  deny  that 
those  who  are  punished  deserve  to  be  punish  d 
if  they  deny  that  such  actions  are  wrong.  i4 
We  may  say  that  it  is  wrong  for  a  dairy  to  permit  milk 
to  become  infected  and  at  the  same  time  hold  that  the  person 
who  was  responsible  for  seeing  that  it  did  not  become  so 
infected  did  not  deserve  punishment.  it  dons  not  follow 
from  the  fact  that  some  action  which  the  law  prescribes  to 
be  done  was  not  done  that  there  is  somebody  who  deserves 
punishment  for  not  performing  that  action.  If  it  does  appear 
to  so  follow  that  is  only  because  'desert'  has  been  defined 
in  some  forward-looking  utilitarian  way  which  avoids  any 
reference  to  responsibility  as  the  retributivist  would  under- 
stand  that  term.  Laws  of  strict  liability  are  unjust  laws 110 
but  the  justifications  offered  for  them  have  been  entirely 
utilitarian. 
The  demand  that  the  innocent  ought  not  to  be  punished 
is  one  which  could  be  directed  towards  judges  and  juries. 
In  fact  a  large  part  of  the  rationale  of  court  procedure 
could  be  given,  in  terms  of  this  demand  for  it  is  one  which 
has  a  large  parttD  play  in,  the  practice  of  the  courts.  If 
we  enquire  of  many  procedures  employed  by  the  courts  what  is 
their  utility?  No  satisfactory  answers  can  be  given,  for 
their  justification  is  not  that  they  aid  justice  but  that 
they  combine  to  preventing'injustice  in  the  form  of  finding 
guilty  and  fit  for  punishment  those  who  are  not  in  fact 
guilty.  It  is  sometimes  said  of  the  courts  that  they  are  so 
concerned  with  preventing  the  punishment  of  the  innocent  that 
their  main  function,  that  of  punishing  the  guilty,  is  one 
which  they  attend  to  only  imperfectly.  The  innocent  ought 
not  to  be  punished  means  partly  to  judge  that  kules  of  evi- 
dence  ought  to  be  such  that  only  hard  data  in  the  form  of 
documents  and  other  articles,  testimony  of  the  senses  and 
expert  professional  opinions  are  to  be  accepted  as  evidence; 
it  will  also  mean  that  relation  of  evidence  to  verdict  must 
be  such  that  there  can  be  no.  reasonable  doubt  of  the  man's 
guilt.  Doubtless,  it  means  other  things  as  wello  When  all 
are  taken  together  the  courts  are  seen  to  take  a  very  strict 
view  of  the  matter.  They  need  not  have  done  so;  they  could 
have  demanded  less  strict  tests,  tests  which  would  have 
better  served  the  public  welfare.  Here,  at  least,  the  prin- 
ciple  appears  to  have  had  absolute  sway. 111 
The  directive  might  be  given  to  the  police;  a  reminder 
that  convictions  are  nothing  if  they  are  not  convictions  of 
the  guilty.  Clearly,  the  directive  may  impinge  upon  police 
practice  in  various  ways  which  it  would  serve  no  purpose  to 
enquire  into,  for  by  now  the  point  would  have  been  established 
the  principle  that  only  the  guilty  ought  to  be  punished  is 
relevant  to  a  variety  of  practices.  For  the  utilitarian  to 
point  out  that  in  its  primary  sense  "punishment"  implies 
"guilt"  is  not  relevant  to  the  question  whether  utilitaria- 
nism  does  justify  any  of  the  above  practices.  Whether  uti- 
litarianism  does  justify  any  of  these  practices.  may  be 
debated,  but  if  any  of  them  can  be  so  justified  then  in  the 
relevant  sense  utilitarianism  does  justify  the  punishment 
of  the  innocent.  Against  all  these  practices  (and  many 
others  as  well)  the  retributivist  objects  whatever  the  ad- 
'vantages  to  society  from  the  adoption  of  them. 
S.  CONCLUSION 
The  demand  that  the  innocent  should  not  be  punished 
shows  it  to  have  more  content  than  has  usually  been  thought 
to  be  the  case.  It  can  be  seen  from  our  discussion  that 
the  charge  against  the  utilitarian  for  punishing  the  inno- 
cent  may  take  different  forms.  But  punishing  the  innocent 
offends  against  the  principle  of  treating  others'as  rule 
following  members  of  a  kingdom  of  ends. 
Recent  attempts  (such  as  that  of  Rawls)  to  reconcile 
the  traditional  utilitarian  and  retributivist  positions  on 112 
the  rational  of  punishment  by  distinguishing  different 
levels  of  punishment  -  justification  fail.  It  may  be  per- 
fectly  justifiable  to  refrain  from  punishing  to  a  lesser 
(greater?  )  degree  than  what  is  deserved.  We  may  also  be 
justified  in  not  enacting  laws  which  require  or  permit 
punishment  of  the  morally  innocent  (i.  e.  those  who  do  not 
deserve  to  be  punished),  even  where  considerations  of  uti- 
lity  alone  would  require  enactment  of  such  laws.  Hence 
laws  permitting  punishment  of  those  who  have  acted  neither 
intentionally  nor  carelessly  (e.  g.  strict  liability  sta- 
tutes)  might  be  unacceptable  even  if  it  could  be  shown  that 
such  laws  would,  if  operative,  have  great  deterrent  force. 
Indeed,  the  principle  of  retributive  justice  require 
inter  alia,  that: 
(i)  Only  those  guilty  of  an  offence  at  the  time  of 
the  commission  of  an  act  ought  to  be  punished 
for  that  act; 
(ii)  Only  those  guilty  of  an  act  which  could  have  been 
conformed  to  the  laws  requirements  ought  to  be 
punished; 
(iii)  Only  those  guilty  of  an  offence  ought  to  be 
subject  to  detention  the  purpose  of  which  is  to 
combat  crime; 
But  these  requirements  are  barren  until  the  details 
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2.  THE  'THREAT'  OF  PUNISHMENT 
3o  THE  REFORMATORY  THEORY. 1.  'RETRIBUTIVE  PUNISHMENT':  MORAL/SOCIAL  SATISFACTION 
As  we  have  noted  the  traditional  retribution  theory 
maintains  that  we  are  morally  obliged,  or  at  least  permitted 
to  punish  those  who  are  deserving,  of  it  and  pr6hibited  from 
punishing  anyone  else.  The  essential  condition  of  retribu- 
tivism  is  therefore  that  punishment  is  only  justified  by 
guilt.  Other  principles  of  the  doctrine  (which  have  been 
maae  clear  in  the  traditional  arguments)  claim  that  the 
function  of  punishment  is  the  annulment  of  wrongdoing,  that 
punishment  must  fit  the  crime  and  that  offenders  have  a 
right  to  punishment  -  as  moral  agents  they  ought  to  be  treated 
as  ends,  not  merely.  as  means. 
KanttsI  famous  statement  with  which  we  opened  the  tra- 
ditional  debate  is  not  merely  asserting  that  we  are  morally 
justified  in  punishing  an  offender,  but  rather  that  we  have 
a  categorical  obligation  to  do  so.  This  is  so,  we  are  told, 
"only  because  the  individual  on  whom  it  is.  inflicted  has 
committed  a  crime". 
2 
If  we  are  to  take  Kant's  words  seriously 
then  they  must  be  interpreted  in'such  a  way  that  we  have  a 
moral  obligation  to  punish  a  man,  not  simply  because  his 
act  was  against  the  criminal  law  as  it  stood,  but  because  he 
acted  wrongly  or  immorally.  In  other  words,  we  are  obliged 
to  support  a  man's  punishment  'because  it  is  his  desert  for 
his  deeds'. 
It  would  be  useful  to  consider  more  fully  the  meaning 
and  implications  of  "desert"  claims  but  before  doing  so  it 
would  be  as  well  to  clear  away  the  problem  of  what  is  some- 
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times  called  "logical  retribution".  This  is  the  theory  that 
A 
retributivism,  properly  understood,  is  not  moral'.  but  a  logi- 
cal  doctrine,  and  that  it  does  not  provide  a  moral  justifi- 
cation  of  the  infliction  of  punishment  but  an  elucidation 
of  the'use  of  the  word.  'Desert',  we  are  told,  is  not  moral 
but  rather  a  logical  condition  of  punishment.  To  say  that 
a  man  was  punished  although  he  did  not  deserve  it  (because 
he  was  not  guilty)`is  to  say  something  self-contradicting  in 
virtue  of  the  meaning  of  the  term  "punishment".  The  point 
is  best  put  by  Anthony  Quinton  "...  the  necessity  of  not 
punishing  the  innocent  is  not  moral  but  logical.  It  is  not, 
as  some  retributivists  think,  that  we  may  not  punish  the 
innocent  and  must  only  punish  the  guilty.  Of  course,  the 
suffering  or  harm  in  which  punishment  consists  can  be  and 
is  inflicted  on  innocent  people  but  that  is  not  punishment, 
it  is  judicial  error  or  terrorism,  or  in  Bradley's  character- 
istically  repellent  phrase  "social  (sometimes"moral")  sur- 
gery".  This  infliction  of  suffering  on  a  person  is  only 
properly  described  as  punishment  if  that  person  is  guilty. 
The  retributivist  thesis,  therefore,  is  not  a  moral  doctrine, 
but  an  account  of  the  meaning  of  the  word  'punishment'... 
'Punishment'  resembles  the  word  'murder',  it  is  infliction 
of  suffering  on  the  guilty  and  not  simply  infliction  of 
suffering,  just  as  murder  is  wrongful  killing  and  not  simply 
killing 
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Writers  who  have  agreed  with  Quinton  include  Anthony 
Flew  and  S.  I.  Benn.  Benn,  for  example,  preserves  the  idea 120 
that  to  inflict  pain  on  someone  who  had  not  committed  an 
offence  would  not  be  punishment  at  al.  L  For  a  pain  or  depriva- 
tion  to  constitute  an  act  of  punishment  it  must  be  inflicted 
on  someone  who  has  committed  an  offence.  There  is  therefore 
no  punishment  without  guilt. 
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This  is  a  verbal  or  logical 
point  which  meets  the  retributivist's  demand  that  punishment 
requires  pain  to  be  inflicted  for  guilt  but  denies  retribu- 
tivism  the  status  of  moral  justification. 
It  is  certain  that  no  one,  not  even  the  utilitarian 
could  expect  to  deny  with  any  hope  of  success,  the  conceptual 
connection  between  'retribution'  and  what  is  ordinarily  meant 
by  'punishment'.  'Punishment'  logically  involves  'retribu- 
tion',  for  'retribution'  implies  doing  something  to  someone 
in  return  for  what  he  has  done.  Indeed,  it  is  part  of  the 
meaning  of  the  term  'punishment'  that  it  must  involve  pain 
or  unpleasantness  and  that  it  must  be  as  a  consequence  of  an 
offence.  It  is  surprising  though  that  there  should  have  been 
such  ready  acceptance  by  Quinton,  Flew  and  Benn  of  this  'logi- 
cal'  account  of  retribution  for  it  has  long  been  accepted  as 
one  of  the  three  'theories'  of  punishment,  and  hence  as  doing 
more  than  giving  the  'meaning'  of  the  word. 
It  would,  perhaps,  be  philosophically  ludicrous  to  argue 
against  Quinton,  Flew  and  Benn  on  historical  grounds.  Nor 
would  it  be  sufficient  to  point  to  the  authority  of  Bradley, 
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who  maintained,  ".....  our  people  believe  to  this  day  that 
punishment  is  inflicted  for  the  sake  of  punishment";  even 
though  this  is  presently  supported  by  many  ordinary  people 
as  can  be  seen  by  recent  favourable  comments  on  the 121 
increase  in  severity  of  punishments.  Nevertheless,  I  shall 
take  the  claim,  that  retributivists  have  been  merely  con- 
cerned  to  assert  that  punishment  can  be  of  the  guilty  only 
when  this  is  an  assertion  not  about  what  is  morally  allow- 
able  but  rather  about  the  meaning  of  the  term  'punishment', 
to  be  false.  It  is  obviously  necessary  to  point  out  that 
punishment  must  be  of  an  offender  for  an  offence,  but  as 
A.  R.  Manser6  says,  ".....  this  is  not  a  stage  in  the  eluci- 
dation  of  punishment;  it  is  rather  a  datum  from  which  any 
elucidation  must  start.  "  The  traditional  retribution  theory 
maintains  that  we  are  morally  obliged  to  punish  wrongdoers 
and  is  not  the  view  that  we  are  not  to  describe  unpleasant- 
ness  as  punishment  if  those  upon  whom  it  is  inflicted  are 
not  guilty. 
The  claim  that  the  retributive  theory  can  be  shown  to 
be  wrong  by  such  simple  facts  of  language  usage  as,  for  in- 
stance,  that  it  makes  sense  to  say,  'He  was  punished  for 
something  he  did  not  do,  '  because  among  other  things,  the 
theory  demands  that  to  say  a  man  was  punished  for  a  crime 
logically  necessitates  that  he  committed  it,  is  therefore 
mistaken.  K.  G.  Armstrong?  has  shown  that  while  a  fact  about 
how  the  word  'punishment'  is  used  might  well  show  that  a 
theory  of  punishment  in  the  definitional  sense  was  wrong, 
such  a  fact  could  not  show  that  a  theory  dealing  with  the 
moral-justification  had  done  so  incorreCtly,  except  in  the 
sense  that  it  had  dealt  with  something  other  than  punishment. 122 
To  make  these  points  much  more  explicit  it  will  be 
useful  to  adopt  Armstrong's8  analyses.  He  argues  that  the 
way  ethical  terms  are  used  certainly  can  show  that  a  general 
moral  theory  is  incortect,  but  this  is  not  true  mf  the  way 
that  non-ethical  terms  are  used.  Now  'punishment'  is  not 
in  iteeif  an  ethical  term:  'punishment',  like  all  activity 
words,  can  occur  in  ethical  propositions,  but  such  proposi- 
tions  are  not  made  ethical  by  virtue  of  its  presence.  Nor 
if  the  general  moral  theory  was  correct,  and,  by  hypothesis,. 
the  term  'punishment'  had  been  correctly  defined,  could 
the  theory  of  punishment  be  shown  to  be  a  misapplication  of 
the  general  moral  theory  by  some  fact  about  word  usage.  But 
to  establish  the  truth  of  this  last  assertion  we  will  have 
to  make  a  short  excursion  -  as  Armstrong9  does  -  into  the 
field  of  Eithics. 
When  it  has  been  settled  what  it  is  for  an  activity  to 
be  moral  or  good  (general  moral  theory),  we  still  have  to 
decide  whether  each  particular  activity,  in  this  case  the 
activity  of  punishing,  is  a  case  of  a  moral  or  good  activity. 
The  method  employed  to  decide  this  varies  with  the  general 
moral  theory,  but  it  will  turp  out  to  be  one  of  the  follow- 
ing  kinds  of  prodedure: 
(1)  An  appeal  to  intuition  in  the  broadest  sense.  To 
decide  whether  a  particular  type  of  activity  is 
good,  a  duty,  what  one  ought  to  do  etc.,  one  has 
simply  to  reflect  on  it  and  one  can  just  'see' 
the  answer  (Moore,  Ross,  in  fact  the  majority  of 
recent  theories). 123 
(ii)  A  factual  calculation  of  the  total  amounts  of 
pleasure  and  pain  that  the  action  causes 
(Hedonistic  Utilitarianism). 
(iii)(a)  A  check  on  whether  God  has  told  us,  by 
Revelation,  to  do  it.  (The  theory  that  Good  is 
that  which  God  enjoins.  ) 
(b)  A  check  on  whether  the  majority  of  the 
community  approves  of  it.  (The  theory  that  Mora- 
lity  is  Social  Convention,  i.  e.  Social  Externalism) 
(c)  A  simple  statement  of  whether  the  speaker 
himself  likes  or  approves  of  it  (subjectivism) 
and  wants  others  to  do  so  too  (Stevenson, 
Emotivists  generally). 
(iv)  Settling  whether  it  is  in  accordance  with  Human 
Nature  and  Man's  Final  End,  both  by  examining 
our  internal,  intuitive  attitude  to  it  and  by 
reasoning  from  what  we  already  know  of  Man's 
nature  and  destiny.  (Thomist  theory.  ) 
(v)  Checking  it  against  a  set  of  specific  criteria 
of  various  sorts  provided  by  the  general  theory 
for  determining  what  is  in  accordance  with  the 
Moral  Law  (Kant)  or  what  are  genuine  moral  rules 
(Baler). 
Now  if  we  consider  all  these  methods  it  can  be  seen 
that  in  no  case  could  the  theory  of  punishment  (moral  justi- 
fication)  produced  by  their  use  the  upset  by  facts  about 
the  use  of  the  word  'punishment'.  It  should  be  remembered 124 
that  the  data  about  what  it  is  for  an  activity  to  be  good, 
moral,  etc.,  and  what  punishment  is  are,  in  each  case, 
correct  by  hypothesis.  In  method  (i)  no  further  data  at 
all  are  introduced,  so  there  is  no  possibility  of  error 
through  false  information.  In  method  (ii)  the  additional 
information  is  scientific,  mainly,  psychological;  it  is  about 
how  men  feel,  not  about  how.  they  use  words.  In  method  (iii) 
there  is  room  for  error  over  (a)  what  God  has  commanded, 
or  (b)  what  the  majority  of  the  community  does  approve  of  - 
it  is  very  doubtful  whether  one  could  make  an  error  over 
(c)  what  oneself  approves  of  or  likes  -  but  neither  of  these 
could  be  shown  to  be  erroneous  by  the  way  the  word  'punish- 
ment'  is  used  in  sentences  not  about  Revelation  or  approval. 
In  method  (iv)  an  error  could  only  come  in  through  a  false 
notion  of  Human  Nature  or  mistakes  about  Man's  Final  End; 
but  our  ideas  about  Man's  Nature  and  End  are  in  no  way  de- 
pendent  on  the  question  of  which  sentences  using  the  word 
'punishment'  make  sense  and  which  do  not.  In  method  (v) 
the  possible  sources  of  error  will  vary  with  the  criteria 
put  up  by  the  general  moral  theory  for  determining  whether 
an  activity  constitutes  a  breach  of  a  genuine  moral  rule. 
However,  the  only  criterion  which  could  be  shown  to  have 
been  misapplied  by  our  noting  that  it  made  sense  to  use  the 
word  'punishment'  in  some  given  non-ethical  sentence  would 
be  one  which  specified  that  this  must  not  be  the  case,  e.  g. 
'An  activity,  to  be  moral  must  be  such  that  the  word  signi- 
fying  it  cannot  sensibly  be  used  in  such-and-such  sort  of 
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of  morals  which  would  lead  to  the  use  of  method  (v)  has 
such  a  criterion,  and  it  is  hard  to  see  what  reason  there 
could  ever  be  for  introducing  such  a  one. 
The  point  therefore  is  that  even  if  a  theory  of  the 
moral  justification  of  punishment  can  be  wrong  in  the  sense 
of  being  a  misapplication  of  the  correct  general  theory, 
whichever  that  may  be,  its  wrongness  can  never  be  proved 
by  an  appeal  to  language  habits.  Indeed  we  are  concerned 
with  what  is  right  and  wrong,  not  with  questions  about 
language. 
We  shall  return  once  again  to  examine  'retributivism' 
as  a  moral  theory  of  justification  but  before  doing  so 
R.  S.  Peters10  statement  that  punishment  .....  is  retributive 
by  definition;  ...  But  definitions  .....  settle  no  substan- 
tial  questions"  merits  some  attention.  It  seems  that  what 
Professor  Peters  is  maintaining  is  that  grounds  for  punish- 
ing  people  could  not  be  found  by  inspecting  the  concept. 
But  is  it  true  that  we  do  not  frame  concepts  such  that  the 
justification  of  the  activity  they  refer  to  is  an  integral 
part  of  the  concept?  If  we  examine  notions  like  'murder' 
or  'stealing'  we  find  that  they  are  terms  used  in  the  English 
Language  to  reflect  a  system  of  values.  For  instance,  given 
our  present  conceptual  schema  it  is  analytically  true  that 
'murder'  and  'stealing'  are  wrong*  We  distinguish  'murder' 
from  'manslaughter'  by  reference  to  the  reasons  for  the  be- 
haviour  and  not  by  reference  to  the  overt  empirical  features 
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distinguish  one  concept  of  murder  from  other  concepts  about 
killing,  but  also  gives  the  grounds  for  its  wrongness.  If 
the  same  is  true  bf  punishment  it  would  seem  to  be  entirely 
appropriate  to  find  grounds  for  punishing  people  by  inspect- 
ing  the  concept.  This  would  show  that  the  retributive.  4' 
aspect  of  the  definition  of  'punishment'  is  not  simply  a 
logically  necessary  condition,  but  also  the  ground  for  the 
justification  which  'punishment'  inherently  possesses. 
Ill 
Having  shown  that  the  retributive  theory  cannot  be 
disposed  of  by  writing  guilt  into  the  concept  of  punishment, 
upon  what  does  its  attractiveness  as  a  moral  theory  of  justi- 
fication  lie,  and  canthe  notion  of  'retribution',  which  is 
a_necessary  element  in  the  concept,  in  itself,  provide 
adequate  ground  for  justification?  In  the  first  place,  the 
retributive  theory  is  often  rejected  because  the  popular 
notion  of  what  is  meant  by  'retribution'  confuses  it  with 
revenge  and  spite,  or  perhaps  more  literally,  with  retalia- 
tioný  The  idea  of  'getting  one's  own  back'  and  'the  punish- 
ment  fitting  the  crime'  is  then  literally  interpreted  in 
terms  of  the  lex  talionis;  'an  eye  for  an  eye'  'a  tooth 
for  a  tooth?.  But  unlike,  revenge,  spite  and  retaliation, 
retribution  is  the  just  Desert  of  action.  As  has  been  argued 
so  often,  there  is  nothing  necessarily  just  about  taking 
'an  eye  for  an  eye'.  Some  people,  for  example,  might  have 
only  one  'eye'.  Moreover,  such  an  injunction  would  encounter 
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the  lex  talionis  prescribed  for  a  blind  man  who  blinded  some- 
one  else?  How  does  one  punish  a  blackmailer,  a  sodomite  or 
a  dope  pedlar  or  as  J.  Laird12  so  aptly  puts  it,  "what  ge- 
nuine  equivalence"  is  there  between  an  old  eye  and  a  young 
eye,  or  between  a  short-sighted  eye  and  an  emmetropic  one? 
But  in  any  case  such  objections  entirely  miss  the  point. 
The  retributivist!  s  concern  is  not  with  the  form  of  punish- 
ment  but  with  its  severity.  All  that  the  retributivist  is 
concerned  with  or  requires  is  that  there  should  be  some 
equivance  between  the  gravity  of  offences  and  severity  of 
punishments.  But  the  further  question  that  comes  into  focus 
is:  how  would  one  balance  gravity  of  offence  and  severity 
of  punishment?  The  simple  answer  is  that  this  is  not  supposed 
to  be  done'on  the  basis  of  mathematical  calculation.  In 
The  Ethical  Theory  of  Hegel,  Reyburn  writes: 
13 
"The  equivalence  of  the  wrong  and  its  undoing 
is  one  of  value,  not  of  detailed  quality,  and 
the  law  recognises  this  principle  when  it 
grants  compensation  for  injury  and  punishes 
by  fine  and  imprisonment.  " 
The  more  serious  the  offence,  the  more  serious  the 
punishment.  Moreover,  it  is  hard  to  believe  that  the  an- 
cient  injunction  of  the  lex  talionis  was  intended  to  be  in- 
terpreted  in  such  a  literal  fashion.  It  probably  had  two 
functions.  On  the  one  hand,  in  an  environment  in  which 
bloody  revenge  was  not  common,  it  required  to  seek  to  impose 
no  more  than  a  just  penalty  on  the  offender.  On  the  other 
hand,  it  probably  functioned  to  afford  compensation  to  the 
victim  for  it  is  immediately  followed  by,  "And  if  a  man  smite 128 
the  eye  of  his  servant,  or  the  eye  of  his  maid,  and  destroy 
it,  he  shall  let  him  go  free  for  his  eye's  sake.  And  if  he 
smite  out  his  man  servant's  tooth,  or  his  maidservant's 
tooth;  he  shall  let  him  go  free  for  his  tooth's  sake". 
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it  is  emphasised  with  force  that  in  the  area  of  the 
moral  justification  of  the  practice  of  punishment  a  Retri- 
butive  theory  is  essential,  because  it  is  the  only  theory 
which  connects  punishment  with  desert,  and  so  with  justice, 
for  only'as  a  punishment  is  deserved  or  undeserved  can  it 
be  just  or  unjust.  It  is  therefore  necessary  to  be  clear 
as  to  what  is  meant  by  the  claim  that  a  man  'deserves  a 
penalty'.  This  is  not  uncomplicated  because  the  claim 
may  be  taken  to  mean  a  number  of  things,  some  of  which  are 
open  to  serious  objections. 
to  begin  with  we  can  discard  the  notion  of  desert 
which  implies  the  imposition  of  penalty  involving  an  action 
very  like  the  man's  action  in  his  offence.  Apart  from  the 
reasons  already  suggested,  this  notion  would  rule  out  de- 
fences  such  that  the  accused  was  grossly  provoked  or  that 
his  action  was  unintentional.  All  that  would  cou  ht  would 
be  that  he  actually  did,  which  might,  fairly  obviously, 
be  unjust.  For  instance  would  any  society  seek  to  punish 
a  motorist  who  runs  over  a  small  child,  discovered  to  have 
been  hiding  beneath  the  car,  unknown  to  the  driver?  Neither, 
could  we  allow  claims  that  a  man  deserves  something  where 
all  that  is  intended  is  that  it  is  right  that  he  gets  it. 
When  the  supposed  reason  is  identical  with  the  supposed 
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An  interpretation  of  desert  which  has  certainly  given 
force  to  the  retribution  theory  is  that  exemplified  in  the 
remark,  "His  punishment  is  the  repayment  of  his  debt  to 
society".  What  appears  to  lie  behind  such  claims  is  that 
a  man  is  rightly  punished  because  his  punishment  brings 
satisfaction  to  others.  It  is  important  to  see  that  to 
defend  a  man's  punishment  as  deserved  in  this  sense,  is  not 
simply  to  rest  one's  case  on  an  equivalence  between  penal- 
ties  and  grievances,  but  to  defend  punishment  as  providing 
satisfaction  for  the  victim  of  the  offence  and  others! 
Such  a  doctrine  may  have  relevance  in  the  justifidation  of 
punishment  in  a  legal  setting,  but  would  be  entirely  out 
of  place  in  justifying  punishment  in  education  (i.  e.  schools). 
Nor  has  it  any  partto  play  in  pure  retributive  theory, 
where  justification  for  punishing  a  man  is  found  wholly  in 
his-past  action  and  a  relationship  between  that  and  the 
penalty  in  so  far  as  it  affects  him. 
Another  understanding  of  desert  claims,  which  sees 
them  as  referring  to  a  penalty  system,  is  that  connected 
with  the  notion  of  responsibility  for  action.  If  a  man 
was  aware  of  two  options,  and  being  free  to  choose  between 
them,  opted  for  one,  knowing  the  intention  of  society  to 
penalize  that  course  of  action,  then  he  could  be  spoken  of 
as  "deserving  of  punishment".  He  was  responsible  for  his 
action  and  performed  it  with  a  knowledge  of  possible  conse- 
quences  according  to  a  penalty  system.  He  knew  what  he  was 
getting  into  so  it  "served  him  right".  It  might  be  thought 
that  these  last  two  interpretations  of  "desert"  in  themselves 
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a  man.  It  will  be  accepted  that  this  may  be  so  if  the  sole 
concern  is  with  the  justification  of  punishment  in  the  legal 
sphere.  Here,  of  course,  much  could  depend  upon  the  notions 
of  'freedom'  and  'responsibility'  (which  will  be  discussed 
fully  elsewhere  in  this  work),  The  Law,  however,  makes  no 
logical  distinction  between  penalizing  and  punishing  and 
the  retributive  significance  of  punishment  in  seeing  some- 
thing  as  morally  deserved. 
Attention  is  also  drawn  to  a  further  important  argument 
namely:  that  to  say  a  man  deserves  to  suffer  is  not  to  give 
anything  that  could  count  as  a  reason  for  punishment.  The 
point  IS  emphasised  by  Benn  and  Peters  in  the  following 
statement: 
Is 
To  say,  with  Kant,  that  punishment  is  a  good 
in  itself,  is  to  deny  the  necessity  for  justi- 
fication;  for  to  justify  is  to  provide  reasons  t 
in  terms  of  something  else  accepted  as  valuable. 
But  it  is  by  no  means  evident  that.  punishment 
needs  no  justification,  the  proof  being  that 
many  people  have  felt  the  need  to  justify  it. 
What  is  being  asserted  is  that  punishment  is  only  to 
be  justified  by  giving  reasons  in  terms  of  something  else 
accepted  as  valuable,  in  terms  of  something  other  than  it- 
selfo  Now  Anthony  ?  1ew16  makes  several  logical  points 
about  the  notion  of  justißcation  but  this  is  not  one  of 
them.  -  Why  should  it  be  supposed  that  a  description  of 
punishment  alone,  cannot  count  as  a  reason  for  its  justi- 
fication?  Why  should  it  be  thought  that  a  feature  of  a 
thing  itself,  or  in  the  case  of  punishment,  more  than  one 
feature,  cannot  be  the  basis  of  its  acceptability?  Certain- 131 
ly  what  is  distinctive  about  'retributivism'  is  that  it 
treats  punishment  as  an  end  in  itself,  otherwise  it  would  be 
open  to  the  charge  of  disguised  utilitarianism.  And  do  we 
not  justify  other  such  ends  as,  for  example,  "education", 
"happiness"  and  "friendship",  by  picking  certain  featurds 
intrinsic  to  them?  There  seems  no  reason  for  supposing 
that  the  same  cannot  be  true  of  institutions  like  'punishment'. 
The  reader  is  reminded  that  the  purpose  of  this  section 
is  to  examine  the  traditional  retributive  theory  for  its 
intrinsic  importance.  A  great  deal  more  could  be  written 
about  the  retributive  theory  but  for  the  purpose  of  this 
work  enough  has  been  said  to  show  thit  many  of  the  current 
objections  rest  on  confussion  and  mis-statements  of  the 
problem.  There  are  several  factors  which  will  crop  up  in 
other  sections.  For  example,  there  is  the  mistaken  belief 
that  a  retributive  moral  justification  of  punishment  would 
make  the  infliction  of  pain  on  the  guilty  a  positive,  ines- 
capable  obligation,  instead  of  merely  creating  a  right  to 
inflict  pain  which,  like  other  rights,  it  may  in  some  cir- 
cumstances  be  foolish  or  mean  to  exercise.  On  the  other 
hand,  in  the  area  of  penalty-fixing  (which  is  admittedly  a 
problem  for  a  purely  retributive  theory)  it  has  been  poi'hted 
out  that,  the  charge  that  retributive  theories  of  penalty- 
fixing  are  barbarous  is  based  on  the  mistaken  assumption 
that  the  only  such  theory  is  the  lex  talionis.  By  being 
retributive  punishment  should  be  an  imposition  of  fair 
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What  emerges  from  the  foregoing  which  is  particularly 
relevant  to  the  present  discussion,  is  the  unique  ability 
of  the  theory  to  connect  punishment  with  the  notions  of  c.  1 
desert  and  justice,  Yet  it  is  because  it  has  failed  to 
give  an  adequate  account  of  the  retributive  or  "morally 
fitting"  character  of  punishment  that  'Retributivism'  has 
so  often  been  rejected.  From  Hegel  to  Bradley  onwards  the 
distinctively  retributive  element  of  the  theory  as  a  mora- 
lly  intelligible  response  to  wrongdoing  has  been  largely 
unexplained.  Also,  why  is  it  the  case  that  wrongdoing 
merits  punishment  and  not  something  else  such  as  rewards, 
or  good-humoured  quips  or  indeed  anything?  Granted  that 
wrongdoing  deserves  a  retribution,  why  does  it  have  to  be 
in  the  form  of  punishment?  This,  of  course,  is  a  funda- 
mental  problem  for  the  retributivist  and  it  is  one  which 
is  not  shared  by  the  detterence  theorists.  The  short 
answer  is  that  the  idea  of  giving  back,  not  just  anything, 
but  rather  what  one  should  give  back  in  response  to  some- 
one's  action,  is  something  which  is  built  into  the  genera- 
lly  accepted  notion  of  retribution.  Retribution,  it  will 
be  maintained,  is  the  just  desert  of  action.  If  someone 
does  right  and  is  rewarded,  or  wrong  and  is  punished  this 
is  probably  what  he  justly  deserves.  No  other  response 
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2.  THE  'THREAT'  OF  PUNISHMENT' 
In  citing  the  purpose  of  punishment  as  a  deterrence 
Ted  Honderich  writes: 
17 
"It  is  suggested  that  because  of  the  posibility 
of  punishment  some  significant  number  of  poten- 
tial  offenders,  individuals  contemplating  possi- 
ble  offences  in  a  serious  way,  do  not  in  fact 
go  ahead.  Other  men  who  find  themselves  in  situ- 
ations  which  they  did  not  anticipate  or  intend, 
perhaps  situations  where  they  are  provoked,  are 
said  to  be  restrained  by  the  prospect  of  a  pen- 
alty.  Others  who  do  commit  certain  offences  are 
restrained  from  more  serious  ones  because  of  the 
greater  possible  penalties...  The  individuals 
in  each  of  these  three  classess  may  not  have  been 
punished  in  the  past0  The  explanation  of  their 
behaviour  may  be  'threat$  of  punishment,  some 
other  aversion  to  it,  or  a  prudential  calculation. 
What  is  typically  not  mentioned  is  the  further 
proposition  that  the  practice  of  punishment  may 
have  a  role  in  the  creation,  transmission,  and 
reinforcement  of  the  unreflective  attitudes  of 
many  people  for  whom  the  question  of  breaking 
the  law  never  or  rarely  arises  in  a  serious  way.  " 
It  is  important  to  distinguish  the  possible  types  of 
motivation  that  underlie  successful  deterrence.  We  must 
ask  both  how  the  punishers  themselves  see  'deterrence',  and 
also  about  the  presuppositions  of  the  various  ways  of  seeing 
it,  -and  again  how  those  deterred  see  things  and  how  and  why 
they  are  'deterred'  from  criminal  activities.  We  may  start 
with  the  criminal  or  potential  criminal  who  is  frightened 
,..  into  abjuring  crime.  We  can  certainly  conceive  of  cases 
where  men  are  simply  so  frightned  or  scared  that  they  don,.  Ot 
commit  the  crimes  they  are  contemplating,  or  they  commit 
less  serious  ones.  A  paradigm  case  of  this  would  be  that 
of  a  man  who  sets  out  to  rob  a  rich  man's  house  and  passes 
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committed  the  same  crimes  themselves.  The  sight  so  terri- 
fies  him  that  he  turns  round  and  goes  straight  home.  Or 
we  can  imagine  a  similar  would-be  criminal  watching  a  tele- 
vision  programme  that  realistically  portrayed  life  in  an 
ordinary  prison.  The  experience  so  frightens  him  that  he 
immediately  resolves  to  'go  straight'),.  In  these  cases  the 
mere  fear  or  'threat'  of  punishment  is,  we  are  to  imagine, 
enough  to  bring  about  the  decision  to  be  law-abiding. 
We  may  distinguish  from  this  the  cases  of  the  pruden- 
tial  calculation.  A  man  is  tempted  to  rob  a  nearby  garage. 
He  then  reads  in  the  paper  of  a  man  being  jailed  for  six 
months  for  a  very  similar  offence.  He  begins  to  think  about 
his  project  again  and  asks  whether  the  risk  is  worth  taking. 
The  thought  of  prison  does  not  exactly  frighten  him,  but 
he  finds  it  unattractive.  True,  the  proceeds  of  the  robbery 
would  be  useful  but  he  might  find  it  harder  to  get  rid  of 
the  stolen  goods  than  he  thought,  and,  anyway,  he  would  be 
cut  off  from  all  his  friends  while  in  prison.  After  much 
deliberation  he  eventually  decides  not  to  go  ahead  with  his 
plan.  It  simply  wouldn't  be  worth  the  risk,  he  concludes. 
But  there  is  also  another  kind  of  case.  A  milk  round- 
man  who  has  been  perfectly  honest  for  most  of  his  life  sudden- 
ly  wants  money  badly.  He  plans  to  burgle  the  house  of  a 
deaf  old  pensioner  who,  he  knows,  always  keeps  some  money  in 
a  particular  drawer  of  her  bureau  in  the  front  room.  Next 
day  he  reads  in  the  paper  an  account  of  the  trial  of  someone 
who  had  done  very  much  the  same  thing.  He  is  struck  by  words 
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of  the  judge  to  the  accused  when  sentencing  him:  "You  have 
committed  a  mean  and  despicable  act  to  a  harmless  and  de- 
fenceless  person  just  for  the  sake  of  your  own  selfish  gain. 
I  am  therefore  going  to  send  you  to  prison  for  six  months.  " 
The  judge's  desription  of  the  act  particularly  catches  his 
attention  and  it  gradually  dawns  on  him  that  his  own  project 
is  also  mean  and  despicable;  he  decides  not  to  steal  to  get 
out  of  his  difficulties  after  all. 
It  seems  to  me  that  in  the  above  examples  'deterrence' 
is  effective  in  three  different  sort  of  ways.  In  the  first 
case  the  motivation  is  totally  non-rational,.  in  the  second 
it  is  prudential,  in  the  third  it  is  moral.  In  reality,  of 
course,  pone  of  these---is  very  likely  to  occur  in  its  pure 
form.  A  man  who  is  terrified  into  being  honest  may  be  tem- 
porarily  deterred  by  sheer  terror,  but  if  this  'fear'  or 
'threat'  is  to  have  any  more  or  less  permanent  effect  it 
must  have  some  clearly  grasped  cognitive  content  and  be 
linked  closely  to  prudential  calculation.  It  may  also,  of 
course,  lead  to  moral  considerations.  Sheer  terror  at  the 
prospect  of  something  highly  unpleasant  may  lead  a  man,  for 
instance,  to  imagine  himself  in  need  of  his  parents'  pro- 
tection;  this  thought  may  lead  to  the  remembrance  of  their 
moral  teaching  and  the  genuine  realisation  that  the  contem- 
plated  action  is  wrong.  Then,  possibly,  the  'disowning' 
of  such  'sentimentality'  may  drive  him  back  to  the  position 
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starts  with  prudential  calculation  may  either  find  the  re- 
sults  of  his  computation  reinforced  by  fear  or  be  led  on 
insensibly  to  the  sphere  of  the  moral.  He  may,  for  instance 
think  of  the  disgrace  and  shame  of  being  tried  for  the  action 
he  is  thinking  of  doing,  and  these  things  may  lead  him  to 
realize  their  instrinsic  evil. 
Honderich  points  to  the  role  of  the  practice  of  punish- 
ment  in  "the  creation,  transmission,  and  reinforcement  of 
the  unreflective  attitudes  of  many  people  for  who  the  ques- 
tion  of  breaking  the  law  never  or  rarely  arises  in  a  serious 
way". 
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This  should  be  expanded  thus:  The  fact  that  certain 
actions  are  punished,  especially  if  they  are  normally  punished 
by  imprisonment,  and  tried  by  jury,  is  inseparably  bound  up 
in  many  people's  minds  with  their  intrinsic  immorality  or 
injustice.  Punishability  is  thus  a  sign  or  indicator  of 
moral  evil,  at  least,  where  severe  punishments  are  concerned 
(clearly  nobody  thinks  that  the  existence  of  a  fine  of  CS-for 
a  parking  offence  implies  that  parking  in  certain  places  is 
morally  evil).  One  of  the  major  arguments  against  ceasing 
to  punish,  say,  certain  kinds  of  sexual  act  (behavfbur  which 
has  great  moral  significance  and  importance  in  any  case)  is 
that  such  an  action  will  inevitably  be  interpreted  as  a  moral 
sanctioning  of  such  acts,  if  not  as  straight  forward  moral 
approval.  Thus  people  are  'deterred'  from  many  crimes  be- 
cause  the  existence  of  punishments  for  such  acts  constantly 
puts  them  in  mind  of  the  fact  (and  in  some  cases  even  'teaches' 
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But  it  should  be  seen,  too,  that  fear,  prudence  and 
morality  are  not,  as  it  were,  equal  partners  in  the  motiva- 
tional  struggle  underlying  'deterrence'.  Being  quite  sim- 
ply  frightened  out  of  something  is,  in  all  but  pathological 
cases,  a  very  temporary  state.  Human  equilibrium  can  only 
be  found  in  prudence  or  morality.  But  here,  too,  there  13  a 
significant  difference.  Though  prudence,  is  for  the  purposes 
of  this  discussion,  a  mere  weighing  of  personal  advantages, 
and  disadvantages,  it  is  one  of  the  four  'cardinal  virtues'. 
Imprudence  is,  in  many  cases,  itself  blameable,  even  if  not 
punishable.  It  therefore  has  a  very  close  connection  with 
morality  and  tends  to  pass  over  into  it.  A  man  who  is  open 
to  prudential  reasons  is  open  to  at  least  partsof  morality. 
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Thus  a  man  who  refrains  from  crime  for,  reasons  of  prudence 
isv  so  to  speak,  on  a  sort  of  slippery  slope.  The  sorts 
of  reasoning  he  uses  to.  persuade  himself  that  his  attempt 
at  crime  is  'not  worth  it'  because  of  the  unpleasantness  its 
commission  would  bring  upon  him  is  by  its  very  nature  capa- 
ble  of  extension  to_.  other  people  in  other  situations. 
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Uhless  he-deliberately  and,  to  certain  extent,  artificially 
'blocks'  certain  lines  of  argument,  he  is  always  'in  danger' 
of  seeing  that  the  contemplated  crime  itself  involves  un- 
pleasantness  towards  others  like  himself.  That  is,  the 
truly  prudent  man  'naturally'  tends  to  become  the  just  man 
-  though-,  of  course,  human  ingenuity  can  provide  all  sorts 
of  barriers  to_this  development.  The  passage  from  prudence 
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is,  centring  on  justice,  honesty,  veracity,  etc.  )  is  also 
'naturally'  encouraged  by  the  fadt  that  some  of  the  prudent 
man's  reasoning  inevitably  raises  the  moral  issue  itself. 
Part  of  the  material  of  his  deliberations  will  be  the  facts 
that  ex-prisoners  find  it  harder  to  find  work,  that  the 
general  public  disapproves  of  crime,  indeed  that  prison  is 
an  unpleasant  place.  This  inevitability  raises  the  question 
'why?  '  ,  and  though  the  impervious  'sociologically'  oriented 
type  of  would-be  criminal  can  always  answer  in  terms  of 
'society's  norms'  or  of  'middle-class  morality'  and  further 
postpone  the  personal  confrontation  with  the  demands  of  mora- 
lity,  it  is  hard  for  a  man  to  competely  avoid  raising  the 
question  of  whether  or  not  the  contemplated  acts  are  in- 
trinsically  immoral. 
The  upshot  of  this  discussion  is  that  much  talk  of 
'deterrence'  as  the  cause  of  a  reduction  in  crime  or  of 
'being  deterred'  as  a  reason  for  not  committing  crimes,  or 
of  committing  fewer,  or  less  serious,  crimes,  disguises 
some  response  to  the  moral  prohibitions  that  undoubtedly 
apply  to  most  criminal  acts.  Such  a  response  may  be  pretty 
minimal,  not  much  more  than  conformity  to  respectable 
'moves',  but  in  many  cases  'being  deterred'  may  well  amount 
to  the  morally-inspired  repudiation  of  criminal  activity. 
We  must  now  consider  a  further  important  range  of  points 
that  arise  from  the  consideration  that  'deterrence'  is, 
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here  with  certain  obvious  grounds  for  lack  of  success. 
Desperate  need,  lack  of  imagination,  foolhardiness  etc.  - 
these  are  obvious  reasons  why  deterrence  doesn't  always 
work,  and  raise  practical  questions  about  how  to  overcome 
such  need  or  such  obtuseness  or  insensitivity.  What  I 
want  to  consider  now  are  the  more  or  less  deliberate  re- 
fusals  to  be'deterred.  Normally  when  people  talk  of  a 
'deterrent  punishment'  they  have  in  mind  an  exceptionally 
severe  punishment,  a  punishment  whose  severity  greatly 
exceeds  what  is  normally  thought  to  be  appropriate.  Hang- 
ing  a  man  for  stealing  a  loaf  of  bread  is  obviously  unjust 
even  if  it  does  deter.  What  it  does  not,  we  may  well  see 
behind  this  failure  a  kind  of  despair  or  necessity  on  the 
part  of  the  thieves  or  a  reckless  bravado  displayed  in 
what  is  seen  as  a  war  of  the  poor  against  the  rich,  or  a 
complete  contempt  for  the  officials  and  rulers  of  the  so- 
ciety  in  accordance  with  whose  laws  such  a  grotesquely 
excessive  punishment  could  be  laid  down.  For  the  fact  is 
that  men  cannot  be  compelled  to  be  law-abiding.  They  can 
always  refuse  to  co-operate,  even,  such  is  the  human  spirit 
if  this  means  almost  certainly  death.  And  what,  for  those 
who  are  not  already  in  the  position  of  outlaws,  leads  to 
such  co-operation  is  fairness  of  the  law.  For  the  mass  of 
men  the  success  of  'deterrence'  depends  on  the  acceptance 
of  the  punishments  as  independently  just  and  fair.  Why 
should  a  man  deal  justly  by  his  neighbour  (especially  a 
rich  and  powerful  neighbour)  in  a  state  whose  systems  of 141 
punishments  so  klatantly  flouts  all  feeling  for  the  justice 
of  an  'equivalent'  sentence?  Certainly  prudence  and  mora- 
lity  (if  not  primitive  feeling)  counsel  him  against  injustice. 
But  where  reason  and  justice  are  so  systematically  mocked 
by  the  authorities,  the  feeling  c  ,  for  morality  and  even  pru- 
dence  in  its  citizens  may  well  also  wither. 
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It  is  not  being  suggested  that  'deterrent'  and  'exem- 
plary'  sentences  never  'work'.  They  may  well.,,  -,  for  instance, 
achieve  their  end  in  some  kind  of  emergency.  If,  for  example, 
a  nation  experiences  an  acute,  but  probably  temporary  short- 
age  of  oil,  and  in  an  effort  to  conserve  petrol  supplies, 
bans  Sunday  driving  and  threatens  to  fine  offenders  some 
astronomical  sum,  we  may  well  at  first  gasp  with  amazement 
at  the  disproportion  between  sentence  and  offence,  When, 
however,  we  reflect  that  one  purpose  of  the  fantastic  fines 
is  to  drive  home  a  complacent  and  unimaginable  populace  the 
seriousness  of  the  situation  and  the  selfishness  of  arroga- 
ting  to  oneself  privileges  other  people  are  being  denied, 
we  may  feel  less  resistance  to  the  prima  facie  injustice. 
An  injustice  it  still  remains,  however,  and  it  is  clear 
that  too  much  of  this  sort  of  thing  would  at  the  very  least 
rightly  topple  a  government.  The  end  also  may  be  achieved 
in  a  society  in  a  sort  of  permanent  'state  of  emergency', 
like  the  situation  immediately  following  a  revolution,  ör 
in  a  society  so  brow-beaten  by  a  secret  police,  or  a  tyran- 
nical  oligarchy  that  the  sense  of  justice  has  become  numbed, 142 
along  with  an  appreciation  of  the  value  of  individual  free- 
dom,  but  in  an  advanced  democracy  it  is  fairly  clear  that 
the  ability  to  make  'deterrent'  sentencing  'work'  (that  is, 
serve  as  a  'threat(  to  reduce  the  incidence  of  seriousness 
of  specific  type  of  crime)  is  greatly  restricted,  and  that 
this  is  largely  due  to  the  existence  of  a  population  who 
are  sensitive  to  spectacular  deviations  from  what  they  have 
learnt  are  the  appropriate  sentences  for  particular  offences. 
It  may  also  be  added  that  of  course  there  is  room  for  manoeu- 
vre  within  the  area  of  discretion  usually  left  to  the  judge 
in  sentencing.  Since  the  general  public  are,  by  and  large, 
only  sensitive  to  a  large  deviations  from  standard  practice, 
they  will  not  notice  the  small  deviations  introducible  for 
'deterrent'  reasons.  But  there  will  always  be  a  prima  facie 
injustice  about  such  departure  from  precedent. 
We  may  now  look  at  . 
'deterrence'  from  the  point  of  view 
of  the  deterrers,  and  explore  some  of  the  underlying  atti- 
tudes  and  presuppositions  here.  As  far  as  the  attempt  to 
use  'blind'  fear  or  terror  goes  we  may  surely  agree  with 
Hegel  when  he  writes: 
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"To  base  a  justification  of  punishment  on.  threat 
is  to  liken  it  to  the  act  of  a  man  who  lifts 
his  stick  to  a  dog.  " 
The  implication  is  that,  barring  exceptional  circums- 
tances,  order  is  paramount,  justice  does  not  very  much 
matter,  and  that  the  general  public  are  a  bunch  of  savages 
who  cannot  be  expected  to  co-operate.  It  is,  in  fact,  a 
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to  non-compliance.  Such  'deterrence'  shows'complete  con- 
tempt  for  the  citizen  and  for  all  sense  of  values.  An  over- 
all  policy  of  'deterrent'  sentencing  could  only  be  justified 
when  the  sense  of  justice  really  did  seem  about  to  disappear 
from  the  mind  of  the  average  citizen.  But  in  itself  such 
a  policy  would  do  little  or  nothing  to  salvage  the  feeling 
for  justice.  It  would  rather  create  the  impression  that 
it  really  had  disappeared. 
A  government  whose  deterrent  purpose  primarily  took 
the  form  of  an  appeal  to  prudence  could  not  depart  so  far 
from  the  justice  of  'equivalence'.  At  the  same  time  its 
emphasis23  -  "if  you  commit  this  crime  you  will  be  punished 
with  this  amount  of  severity,  so  I  should  advise  you  to 
think  again',  -  conspicuously  lacks  the  element  of  appeal 
to  the  basic  moral  values  which  underlie  most  systems  of 
justice.  We  may  well  not  wish  to  go  all  the  way  with  Plato 
when  he  says  that  the  function  of  the  state  is  to  educate 
and  improve  its  citizens,  but  in  its  system  of  justice,  it 
surely  must  have  some  concern  with  improving  more  than  the 
merely  outward  side  of  social  behaviour.  A  purely  pruden- 
tial  emphasis  would  tend,  in  that  it  ignored  the  essential 
connection  between  moral  ug  ilt.  and  punishment  and  the  sym- 
bolic  disgrace  of,  at  any  rate,  imprisonment,  to  create  a 
nation  of  cynics  and  would  encourage  people  to  find  ways 
of  out-witting  or  by-passing  the  law.  And,  of  course,  in 
so  far  as  the  'prudential'  approach  is  different  from  the 
'moral'  approach  in  that  muchh  more  use  is  made  of  'deterrent' 
sentencing,  it  would  -barring,  again  genuinely  exceptional 144 
circumstances  -  tend  to  erode  the  general  sense  of  justice 
which  would  still  be  palely  reflected  in  the  general  system 
of  punishment,  though  increasingly  in  an  'empty'  and  mean- 
ingless  form. 
'But',  it  may  be  objected,  'the  point  of  such  an  approach 
-a  much  more  widespread  appeal  to  deterrence  as  the  main 
rationale  of  punishment  -  is  moral,  in  that  the  appeal  is 
made  in  the  name  of  benevolence,  to  create  a  society  where, 
in  the  end,  all  are  better  off  since  there  is  much  less 
crime'.  But  the  question  basically  is  this:  can  you  bypass 
justice  on  your  way  to  a  benevolently  -  inspired  'good' 
society?  In  so  far  as  this  is  interpreted  as  a  question  of 
fact  the  answer,  on  the  evidence  available  so  far,  is  plain- 
ly  'no'.  Considered  as  a  question  about  the  'logic'  of 
morality  or  political  science  the  answer  is  surely  still 
negative.  Justice,  it  will  be  maintained,  is  more  'basic', 
more  'fundamental',  than  benevolence  in  that  its  demands 
are  more  urgent  and  more  pressing.  Only  a  government  whose 
citizens  were  reduced  to  the  condition  of  brain  -  washed 
imbeciles  could  justifiably  put  benevolence  before  justice. 
Only  the  'moral'  appeal  to  'detterence'  implies  a 
completely  acceptable  attitude.  Here  the  existence  of  pu- 
nishment  'deters'  in  that  it  draws  men's  attention  to  what 
they  are  assumed  to  have  forgotten.  Men  Are  here  solemnly 
warned  to  give  their  minds  properly  to  what  they  are  doing 
or  planning  or  tempted  to  do.  They  are  invited  to  contem- 
plate  the  suffering  which,  they  are  to  suppose,  inevitably 
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senses.  The  punishment  that  'deters,  is  here  not  a  meaning- 
less  quantum  of  pain,  but  the  symbol  of  the  injustice  of 
the  crime  to  which  it  is  the  response.  The  appeal  is  made 
to  the  erring  fellow-citizen,  the  lapsed  equal,  and  is  essen- 
tially  one  addressed  to  his  higher  faculties,  not  the  low 
cunning  or  man-of-the-world  smartness  of  the  morally  indi- 
fferent,  but  the  intelligence  of  the  citizen  of  a  democracy 
who  has  some  genuine  concern  for  the  values  that  underlie  it, 
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The  problem  however  is  that  such  an  attitude  is  some- 
times  inappropriate.  Organised  crime  may  almost  become  a 
war  against  society,  and  this  applies  quite  obviously  to 
much  politically  inspired  bombing  or  assassination.  But 
the  man  who  kills,  robs,  and  cheats  for  'economic'  reasons 
has  still  an  interest  in  the  continuance  of  the  freedom  of 
civilized  society,  To  confirm  him  in  his  'outlawry'  by 
threatening  him  with  'the  big  stick'  may  be  to  say  farewell 
to  any  chance  of  reclaiming  him.  On  the  other  hand  -  and 
this  is  a  point  we  may  be  thought  to  have  neglected  o  far 
-  the  mormal  law-abiding  citizen  may  well  think  he  has  been 
unjustly  treated  if  the  activities  of  the  professional 
criminal  -  let  alone  the  anarchist  killer  -  are  not,  stamped 
upon  by  all  the  resources  of  'law  and  order'.  Does  he  not 
pay  his  taxes  so  that  he  may  be  able,  among  other  things, 
to  sleep  soundly  in  his  bed  at  night?  This,  of  course,  is 
an  excellent  argument  for  having  a  highly  trained  and  effi- 
cient  system  of  crime  detection.  However,  it  still  does 
not  alter  the  strength  of  the  points  made  above.  'Deterrence' 146 
in  the  form  of  spectacularly  severe  punishments,  is  only 
likely  to  'work'  in  the  end  if  it  can  be  seen  to  be  inde- 
pendently  just  and  fair  -  though  occasional  departures  from 
justice  may  be  tolerated  -  since  only  under  these  conditions 
does  it  have  much  hope  of  making  men  just.  And  again,  to 
quote,  from  William's  remarks  about  the  utilitarian  approach 
in  general: 
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"One  disturbing  effect  of  people  being  active 
and  conscious  utilitarians  (and  hence  putting 
a  strong  emphasis  on  deterrence  as  the  purpose 
and  justification  of  punishment)  is  that  it  tends 
to  debase  the  moral  currency:  a  Greasham's  law 
operates,  by  which  the  bad  acts  of  bad  men  elicit 
from  better  men  acts  which,  in  better  circumstances, 
would  also  be  bad". 
Thus  we  must  say  to  the  average  law-abiding  citizen  that 
in  the  end,  the  ideas  of  justice  and  injustice  would  them- 
selves  lose  their  meaning  if  the  idea  of  a  just  (i,  e.  equi- 
valent)  punishment  were  totally  abandoned.  'Deterrent' 
sentencing  may  be  justifiable  sometimes,  but  there  is  always 
a  prima  facie  injustice  about  it.  Once  it  can  be  lightly 
resorted  to  without  the  sense  of,  strain  and  shock  which  it 
still  produces  in  many  countries,  then  society  will  have 
got  its  moral  priorities  badly  wrong. 
The  concept  of  'economic  deterrence'  has  not  been 
mentioned  so  far.  It  is  clear  that  this  notion  was  intro- 
duced  to  answer  some  of  the  objections  to  a  stress  on  simple 
deterrence  as  the  purpose  of  punishment.  It  is  noted,  for 
example,  that  exceptionally  sevem  sentOnces  for  deterrent 
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or  suffering  over  and  above  that  brought  about  by  the  extra 
pain  of  the  punishment  itself.  The  utilitarian  still  will 
have  to  note  these  'extra'  pains  as  simple  quanta  of  suffer- 
ing  to  be  thrown  into  the  balance  with  the  suffering  the 
same  punishment  without  the  extra  'shock'-element  would 
cause.  But  it  is  clear  that  this  extra  pain  is  a  justified 
sense  of  moral  outrage  at  being  treated  much  more  severely 
than  one  deserves.  The  concept  of  'economic  deterrence', 
in  other  words,  conceals  the  fact  the  general  public  has  a 
rough  idea  of  what  punishment  is  usually  just  for  a  parti- 
cular  offence  and  can  without  great  difficulty  spot  the 
injustice  of  deterrent  sentencing.  It  is  in  fact  the  exis- 
tence  of  a  widely  diffused  sense  of  justice  that  makes  sole 
stress  on  deterrence  the  plausible  approach  to  punishment 
it  sometimes  appears  to  be.  'Deterrence  theory',  as  a 
branch  of  utilitarianism  in  general,  tends  to  come  up  with 
calculations  of  the  severity  of  punishment  appropriate  in 
a  given  case  which  do  not  dicfer  as  strikingly  as  we  might 
expect  from  traditional  retributive  calculations,  simply 
because  it  has  to  take  account  of  a  deeply  engrained  sense 
of  justice  among  the  general  public. 
Our  conclusions  about  deterrence  may  be  summarized 
as  follows:  In  the  first  place,  deterrence  has  been  widely 
Championed  as  the  purpose  of  punishment  because  it  is  clear- 
ly  good  that  crime  should  be  reduced  or  kept  to  a  minimum, 
and  because  punishment,  except  when  it  is  wildly  unjust, 
does  by  its  very  nature  deter.  A  just  punishment  is  like 148 
an  argument  addressed  to  any  reasonable  man;  a  system  of 
just  punishments  is  like  a  standing  reminder  of  the  demands 
of  justice.  Successful  deterrence  thus,  by  and  large, 
presupposes  the  just  of  punishment;  it  does  not  create  it. 
However  the  practical  question  about  deterrence  is  whether 
it  is  right,  'and,  if  so,  to  what  extent,  to  depart  from 
the  just  sentence  for  'deterrent'  reasons.  It  has  been 
argued  that  though  this  is  sometimes  justified  it  is  norma- 
lly  only  under  very  exceptional  circumstances  (at  least 
in  some  societies).  In  the  vast  majority  of  cases  dete- 
rrent  sentences  would  not  make  men  just  in  the  end  -  though 
there  might  be  short-term  gains  in  the  form  of  a  reduction 
in  certain  sorts  of  crime.  Not  only  would  the  system  of 
justice  itself  fall  into  disrepute,  and  criminals  and  would- 
be  criminals  fail  to  be  made,  or  kept  just,  but  theImoral 
currency',  in  Willianls:  phrase,  would  itself  be  debased.  All 
this  might  conceivably  be  justified  in  an  extremely  unstable 
society;  but  in  any  civilized  society  with  an  appreciatiqn 
of  the  value  of  justice  and  freedom  it  could  only  mark  a 
general  moral  and  social  deterioration. 
This  discussion  is  unique  in  so  far  as  it  concentrates 
on  certain  aspects  of  deterrence  which  are  not  commonly 
discussed  as  they  should  be.  it  is  clear,  too,  that  deter- 
rence  would  'work'  better  with  some  types  of  crime  than 
with  others  (for  instance,  its  effect  on  'crime  or  passion, 
is  likely  to  be  minimal,  at  the  very  least).  It  is  also 
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itself  the  way  is  open  to  its  extension  to  the  'punishment' 
of  the  criminal's  family,  or  to  the  widespread  detention 
of  those  who,  it  may  be  thought,  are  likely  to  commit  crimes 
in  the  future.  But  if  deterrence  is  to  be  the  sole  consi- 
deration  we  may  well  challenge  the  validity  and  feasibility 
of  the  empirical  work  which  must  underlie  it.  Can  one  pre- 
dict  the  behaviour  of  people  well  enough  without  moulding 
them  in  some  way  to  fit  one's  predictions?  There  is  no 
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3.  THE  REFORMATORY  THEORY 
Reform  is  considered  to  be  one  of  the  main  ingredients 
of  the  Utilitarian  approach  to  punishment.  Unfortunately 
however  this  theory  is  subject  to  various  interpretations 
and  its  advocates  too  often  mistake  it.  It  is  important 
therefore  to  make  clear  from  the  outset  precisely  what  the 
relation  of  reform  to  punishment  is.  Whereas  it  is  not 
logically  possible  to  claim  to  have  punished  someone  without 
thereby  performing  a  retributive  act,  it  is  empirically 
possible  to  inflict  punishment  upon  someone  without  thereby 
reforming  the  offender  in  anyway  or  deterring  people  from 
further  offences.  There  is  no  conceptual  connection  be- 
tween  punishment  and  reform;  instead,  reform  (like  detterence) 
is  thought  to  provide  the  reason  or  purpose  or  justification 
for  engaging  in  punishment  in  terms  of  social  control. 
It  is  to  be  noted  too  that  some  theories  dealing  with  the 
reform  of  criminals  are  not  at  all  theories  of  punishment. 
Where  criminality  is  conceived  of  as  disorder  or  disability 
certain  practice3of  treatment,  as  opposed  to  punishment,  are 
recommended.  Instances  of  such  practices  would  be  "house 
of  correctionft,  psycho-surgical  and  psychological  treatment 
or  social  care  and  social  welfare  -  all  of  which  aim  to  eli- 
minate  some  of  the  need  to  commit  certain  offences.  it  seems 
to  me  however  that  it  is  a  mistake  to  refer  to  any  of  these 
forms  of  'treatment'  as  'reform'.  'Treatment  has  nothing 
to  do  with  punishment  whatever,  it  is,  in  fact,  a  highly 
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It  is  also  important  to  distinguish  reforming  a  man 
by  punishment  and  reforming  him  while  he  is  being  punished. 
Rashdall25  made  the  point  clearly: 
"Now,  of  course,  it  is  the  duty  of  the  state  to 
endeavour  to  reform  criminals  as  well  as  to  pu- 
nish  them.  But  when  a  man  is  induced  to  abstain 
from  crime  by  the  possibility  of  a  better  life 
being  brought  home  to  him  through  the  ministra- 
tions  of  a  prison  Chaplain,  or  (according  to  a 
system  which  is,  I  be]3ave,  adopted  in  some 
American  prisons)  by  the  lectures  of  the  Moral 
Philosopher  attached  to  the  prison,  through 
education,  through  a  book  from  the  prison  library 
or  the  efforts  of  a  Discharged  Prisoners'  Aid 
Society,  he  is  not  reformed  by  punishment  at  all". 
Thomas  McPherson26  comments  upon  Rashdall's  statement 
in  the  following  words: 
"In  practice,  it  may  be  extremely  difficult  to 
decide  between  these  possibilities.  Again,  how 
does  one  establish  clearly  whether  a  criminal 
has-been  reformed  or  merely  effectively  deterred 
from  repeating  his  crime?  Although  some  Utili- 
tarians  would  not  consider  it  imporatnt  to  make 
the  distinction  -  good  consequences  are  good 
consequences  -  it  is  important  to  bear.  the  diffe- 
rence  in  mind  if  one  is  concerned  with  improve- 
ments  in  the  penal  system". 
Moreover  we  need  to  distinguish  theories  dealing  with 
reformative  measures  to  accompany  the  punishment  from  those 
which  hold  that  the  suffering  intrinsic  to  the  notion  of 
punishment  is  itself  reformative.  In  the  first  case  it 
might  be  said  that  punishment  is  justified  because  it  pro- 
vides  opportunities  for  steps  to  be  taken  to  reform  offenders 
and  to  reduce  offences.  Detention  in  prison  or  reform 
centre  may  not  be  in  itself  an  essential  part  of  the  process 
of  inculcating  moral  principles  or  "socialising"  offenders, 
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for  psycho-theraputic  treatment.  However,  taken  by  itself 
this  reformative  doctrine  is  open  to  ready  dismissal  for, 
as  a  justification  of  punishment  it  portrays  a  premiss  that 
is  undoubtedly  false.  What  is  suggested  is  that  certain 
steps  may  be  taken  which  will  improve  men  morally  and  make 
them  law-abiding,  and  that  punishment  is  justified  because 
it  enables  these  steps  to  be  taken.  But  what  one  also  needs 
to  be  established  is  that  only  punishment  would  provide  the 
opportunity  or  the  best  opportunity.  While  it  may  be  ad- 
mitted  that  some  form  of  restraint  would  be  necessary  for 
an  attempt  to  be  made  in  the  suggested  ways,  this  is  not 
to  say  that  punishment  need  be.  There  is  no  necessary 
connection  between  the  intentional  imposition  of  unpleasant- 
ness,  which  is  an  essential  element  of  punishment,  and  re- 
formative  measures  of  this  sort. 
But  this  difficulty  is  escaped  by  the  second  doctrine 
namely,  that  the  suffering  involved  in  punishment  can  it- 
self  have  a  reformative  effect.  The  most  important  way  in 
which  this  occurs  is  that  it  is  said  to  contribute  to"a 
change  in  the  beliefs  of  offenders  and  others  as  to  the 
wrongfulness  of  certain  actions,  thereby  affecting  a  change 
for  the  better  in  behaviour.  Punishment  then,  as  A.  C.  Ewing27 
describes,  has  the  effect  of  emphasizing  to  a  man  his  immo- 
rality: 
"It  is  not  onljr'pain,  that.  is-  characteristic  of 
punishment,  it  is  pain  inflicted  because  of 
wrong  done  and  after  a  judicial  dicision 
involving  a  moral  condemnation  by  an  organ 
representing  sodietyo  It  is  not  only  that 154 
the  man  suffers  pain,  but  that  he  suffers  as 
a  consequence  the  condemnation  of  his  act  by 
society  as  immoral  and  pernicious.  Now  this 
surely  is  a  striking  way  of  bringing  home  to 
him,  so  far  as  external  symbols  can,  the 
wickedness  of  his  conduct.  It  is  generally 
admitted  that  recognition  of  one's  sins  in  some 
form  or  other  is  a  necessary  condition  of  real 
moral  generation,  'and  the  formal  and  impressive 
condemnation  by  society  involved  in  judgement 
is  an  important  means  towards  bringing  about 
this  recognition  on  the  part  of  the  offender.  " 
There  is  yet  another  variation  of  the  reform  theory 
which  is  the  doctrine  that  punishment  is  justified  because 
it  has  a  moral  effect  on  individuals  other  than  those  who 
actually  experience  it.  Ewing28  thinks  that  as  well  as 
helping  the  offender  to  realize  the  "badness  of  his  action" 
it  may  also  help  others  to  realize  the  badness  of  the  action 
in  question  before  committing  it.  This  obviously  differs 
from  a  purely  deterrent  theory,  because  a  person  who  abstains 
from  crime  simply  because  he  is  deterred  does  so  through 
fear  of  suffering  and  not  because  he  thinks  it  wicked;  where- 
as  a  person  who  abstains  because  the  condemnation  of  the 
crime  by  society  has  brought  its  wickedness  home  to  him 
abstains  from  moral  motives  and  not  merely  from  the  fear  of 
unpleasant  consequences  to  himself. 
This  view  restson  an  assumption  that  individuals  may 
not  realise  the  extent  of  the  wrongfulness  of  an  action  unless 
it  is  one  that  is  punished  by  society.  Such  an  assumption 
virtually  amounts  to  saying  that  members  of  a  society  could 
not,  or  would  not,  regard  offences  as  wrongful  without  the 
demonstration  of  punishment.  But  such  a  crude  conception 155 
of  the  relationship  between  accepted  morality  and  the  prac- 
tice  of  punishment  would  be  unacceptable.  There  is  no 
reason,  however,  why  it  cannot  be  accepted  that  the  making 
of  an  action  into  a  punishable  offence  may  serve  to  fortify 
beliefs  as  to  its  immorality,  but  this  hardly  amounts  to  a 
strong  justification  for  punishment.  Once  again  it  would 
be  an  attempt  to  justify  punishment  solely  by  its  effects 
-a  view  considered  to  be  mistaken.  To  accept  a  principle 
to  the  effect  that  punishment  would  be  justified  solely  in 
virtue  of  its  influece  or  moral  beliefs  and  further  conse- 
quences  in  behaviour  -  more  especially  justifying  punishment 
by  its  effects  on  others  -  would  be  to  commit  oneself  to 
victimization. 
Furthermore,  there  is  a  special  objection  to  this  kind 
of  reformative  doctrine  and  to  others  of  similar  kind.  To 
attempt  to  reform  by  punishment  is  to  endeavour  to  change 
beliefs  and  attitudes  of  members  of  society  with  respect  to 
certain  actions.  Thus  to  suppose  that  this  is  necessarily 
desirable  is  to  assume  that  punishment  will  always  create 
or  re-inforce  attitudes  that  certainly  are  right.  This 
would  be  an  error,  for  at  any  time,  the  law  includes  ele- 
ments  which  are  open  to  question;  and  what  is  required  is 
not  that  members  äf  society  should  be  influenced  in  some 
direction  by  the  practice  of  punishment,  but  that  there  be 
unrestrained  discussion  of  the  issues  in  dispute.  Undoubtedly, 
moral  progress  and  rational  decision-making  would  be  impeded 
if  the  practice  of  punishment  coerced  judgement  in  one  di- 
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impressed  by  condemnations  issued  by  others.  One  is  more 
admired  as  a  moral  agent  if  one  obeys  the  law  out  of  sym- 
pathetic  and  impartial  awareness  of  the  reasons  which  pro- 
vide  backing  of  laws,  and  of  effect  on  others  if  they  are 
broken.  We  are  also  to  be  reminded  of  a  further  difficulty 
concerned  with  the  changing  of  beliefs  and  attitude  by 
means  other  than  argument  and  giving  of  reasons.  The  gene- 
ral  case  against  such  means  is  that  these  are  values  of 
the  first  importance  in  maintaining  the  place  in  society  of 
rational  discussion.  The  practice,  of  punishment  is  then 
primarily  seen  as  attempting  to  change  behaviour. 
The  reform  theory  may  therefore  be  objected  to  on  the 
grounds  that:  (1)  it  places  insufficient  limitation  on  what 
may  be  done  to  individuals  in  order  to  secure  certain  be- 
haviour.  (2)  it  fails  to  take  into  account  limitations 
having  to  do  with  justice  and  equality  of  treatment.  The 
ideals  of  reform  and  individualization  of  punishment  which 
have  been  increasingly  accepted  into  modern  penal  practice, 
under  certain  circumstances,  plainly  run  counter  to  princi- 
ples  of  justice..  K.  Cj.  Armstrong29  comments  as  follows: 
"If  the  aim  in  punishing  is  the  reform,  or  "cure", 
of  the  offender,  then  the  logical  pattern  of  penal- 
ties  would  be  for  each  offender  to  be  given  refor- 
matory  treatment  until  sufficiently  changed  for 
the  experts  to  certify  him  as  reformed.  " 
There  would  no  longer  be  any  basis  for  the  principle 
of  a  definite  limit  to  punishment.  And  since  the  aim  of 
the  reform  theory  is  to  eliminate  the  tendency  to  commit 
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ing  him?  Let  him  be  punished  for  what  he  is,  not  for  what 
he  has  done! 
This  is  not  to  suggest  that  punishment  is  never  justi- 
fiable  as  reformative;  but  it  is  questionable,  even  on 
utilitarian  grounds  alone,  whether  the  reformative  benefits 
of  punishment  would  justify  it.  Also,  it  just  does  not  take 
into  account  features  of  the  practice  of  punishment  which 
are  essential  to  which  any  justification  of  it  might  have. 
However,  given  that  punishment  is  necessarily  for  other 
reasons,  the  desirability  of  arranging  the  conditions  of 
punishment  in  such  a  way  that  there  is  some  possibility  of 
the  offender  being  "morally  improved"  while  he  is  being 
punished,  cannot  be  denied. 
In  this  way,  then,  punishment  can  reform.  Punishment 
is  essentially  symbolic.  The  walls  of  a  man's  prison  do 
'speak'  to  him  if  he  has  ears  to  hear  (though  certainly  the 
conditions  in  many  prisons  today  make  it  very  difficult  to 
'hear'  this  'message').  A  prisoner  may  well  see  in  his 
degradation  and  shame  the  outward  symbol  of  his  own  inner 
state  and  be  filled  with  genuine  feelings  of  remorse  and 
repentance.  And  this,  if  people  will  let  it,  can  lead  to 
a  real  re-integration  of  the  ex-criminal  into  society  and 
a  reconciliation  between  him  and  his  victim.  Such  things 
are  certainly  possible  and  occasionally  do  happen. 
But  we  must  see  that  such  a  result  presupposes  the 
imposition  of  a  just  punishment.  It  is  sometimes  thought 
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were  possible  to  'reform'p'by  methods  the  prisoner  found 
pleasant  we  would  be  logically  bound  to  take  this  path  to 
the  desired  endo  But  this  entirely  misses  the  point  of  what 
reform  iso  There  is,  first  of  all,  the  prisoner  himself. 
He  cannot  be  reformed  unless  he  fuly  realises  the  evils  he 
has  committed.  But  such  full  realisation  necessarily  re- 
sults  in  remorse'-and  repentance,  which  are  in  themselves 
very  painful.  Ideally  the  pain  of  the  punishment  itself, 
symbolises,  encourages  and  somehow  induces  the  'inner  pain 
of  repentance  (though,  of  course,  repentance  may  also  pre- 
cede  the  serving  of  the  sentence),  And  the  punishment  is 
necessarily  then  accepted  by  the  criminal  -  so  far  as  it  is 
indepandently  just.  He  himself  perceives  his  need  to  ex- 
piate  his  crime,  to  pay  his  debt.  He  too  responds  to  the 
mysterious  demand  for  expiation.  Not  that  the  repentance 
and  the  acceptance  of  the  justice  of  expiation  necessarily 
go  together.  The  one  can  exist  without  the  other.  But 
each  has  a  necessary  tendency  to  produce  its  fellow,  be- 
cause  each  makes  the  wrongdoer  more  sensitive  in  general  to 
the  demands  of  justice  and  morality.  A  man  who  has  fully 
repented  and  fully  submitted  to  these  demands  is  then, 
'reformed'.  He  has  got  clear  of  his  guilt,  he  is  a  new 
man,  again,  he  can  look  the  world  in  the  eye.  But  the  world, 
too,  cannot  accept  the  criminal  unless  he  has  suffered  - 
except  of  course  in  the  case  where  forgiveness  or  mercy  are 
possible.  A  full  and  genuine  acceptance  of  the  wrongdoer 
is  simply  not  humanly  possible  unless  the  demand  for  expiation 159 
is  somehow  met,  or  acknowledged  or  superceded.  This  $reform, 
cannot  possibly  be  achieved  through  purely  benevolent  means 
unless  it  takes  the  form  of  forgiveness  and  mercy.  Some 
kind  of  'purification'  through  suffering  is  indispensable. 
It  should  also  be  clear  now  that  'reform'  cannot  possi- 
bly  be  anyone's  policy  in  punishing,  as  conceivably,  but 
illegitimately,  deterrence  can.  It  may  be  possible  to  try 
and  deter,  by  imposing  savage  sentences  to  try  and  frighten 
people  away  from  crime,  but  there  is  no  analogous  way  in 
which  a  judiciary  may  try  and  reform.  You  can't  make  any- 
one  better,  nor  is  there  any  plausible  way  of  trying.  The 
most  that  can  be  done  is  to  arrange  the  details  of  punish- 
ment  that  reform  is  possible.  For  reform  is  ultimately 
the  free  response  of  the  wrongdoer  to  moral  value.  Indeedp 
we  may  say  similar  thine  about  ?  moral  deterrence'.  Like 
reform,  such  'deterrence'  is  intrinsically  bound  up  with 
just  punishment.  But  their  relationship  to  punishment  is 
rather  like  that  of  happiness  to  morality.  There  is  no 
guarantee  that  the  moral  man  will  be  happy.  But  somehow 
there  is  an  intrinsic  connection  between  the  two.  This  con- 
nection  is  more  than  the  insight  that  the  moral  man  deserves 
happiness.  It  is  rather  that  the  moral  man  will  tend  to 
be  happy.  But  he  will  not  achieve  this  'natural'  consequence 
or  end  of  morality  if  he  aims  at  it  too  strenuously.  Happi- 
ness  is  no  more  than  the  utterly  appropriate  by-product  of 
the  moral  life.  It  is,  I  suggest,  the  same  with  deterrence 160 
and  reform.  If  they  are  deliberately  aimed  ate  or,  in  the 
former  case,  aimed  at  too  frequently  (for  it  is  clear  that 
not  every  deterrent  sentence  is  wrong),  they  will  not  be 
achieved.  Somehow  the  attempt  is  self-stultifying.  But 
if  the  aim  is  to  do  justice,  they  will  tend  to  follow  as 
natural  accompaniments.  Clearly  there  are  many  exceptions 
to  this  tendency  and  it  might  even  be  thought  ridiculous 
to  say  that  reform  and  deterrence  'naturally'  follow  punish- 
ment  in  societies  where  crime  is  on  the  increase.  The  point 
might  then  be  better  expressed  as  follows:  if-you  want  to 
achieve  deterrence  and  reform  in  fully  acceptable  ways  yoY 
had  better  concentrate  first  and  foremost  on  retributive 
justice.  There  is,  under  normal  circumstances,  no  better 
way  of  proceeding. 
These  arguments  try  to  show  that  the  two  most  widely 
canvassed  'purposes'  or  'ends'  of  punishment  are,  rightly 
construed,  desirable  'by-products'  of  just  punishment. 
Though  we  can  sometimes  use  punishment  in  order  to  'deter', 
such  occasions  must  be  strictly  limited  and  only  reluctantly 
sanctioned;  to  become  too  interested  in  deliberate  deterrence 
would  be  both  extremely  unjust  to  the  individuals  punished 
and  would  be  self-defeating  in  the  end.  Reform,  on  the  other 
hand,  cannot  be  deliberately  aimed  at.  All  that  can  be 
done  is  to  encourage  it  by  various  means  or  to  ensure  by  the 
control  of  the  punishment  itself  that  it  is  possible.  But 
as  in  the  case  of  deterrence,  the  success  of  the  'policy' 
will  be,  in  general,  unlikely  unless  the  punishments  are 161 
accepted  as  just.  We  can  say,  then,  that  deterrence  and 
reform  are  in  general  justifiable  or  'workable'  in  the  long 
run  when  they  are  treated  not  as  external  or  extrinsic  ends 
to  which  punishment  is  regarded  as  a  useful  means,  but  in 
some  sense  internal  or  intrinsic  parts  or  consequences  of 
the  punishment  itself.  We  should  not  set  out  to  'reform' 
or  'deter'  121  punishing;  rather  in  punishing  we  should  also 
hope  to  reform  and  deter. 
The  crucial  point  about  utilitarian  views,  however, 
is  that  it  is  parasitic  on  a  view  of  men  as  capable  of 
following  and  understanding  rules. NOTES  AND  REFERENCES 
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1.  NEEDS  AND  VALUES  IN  EDUCATION 
The  view  of  education  as  the  development  of  rationality 
through  the  acquisition  of  certain  kinds  of  objectively  true 
knowledge  goes  back  at  least  as  far  as  Plato  and  it  was  this 
Platonic/Christian  tradition:  in  educational  practice  that 
Rousseau  inveighbd  against  his  Emile.  Rousseau  urged  us  to 
start  from  the  child  in  making  our  educational  provision 
rather  than  from  the  subject  matter. 
"We  know  nothing  of  childhood  and  with  our 
mistaken  notions  the  further  we  advance  the 
further  we  go  astray.  The  wisest  writers 
devote  themselves  to  what  a  man  ought  to 
know,  without  asking  what  a  child  is  capable 
of  knowing.  They  are  always  looking  for  the 
man  in  the  child,  without  considering  what 
he  is  before  he  becomes  a  man.  "11 
Thus  did  Rousseau  begin  a  movement  that  was  taken  up 
by  educators  like  Dewey  and  Montessori  and  that  has  culmina- 
ted  in  many  of  the  changes  that  we  can  see  in  schools  today. 
This  view  of  education  is  sometimes  characterized  as 
'progressive  education';  sometimes  it  is  called  'child-cen- 
tred'  or  'learner-centred'.  At  root  it  is  an  attempt  to 
provide  a  form  of  educational  guidance  on  the  basis  of  the 
'needs'  or  'interests'  of  the  child.  Rousseau's  own  proposals 
for  the  practice  of  education  do  not  help  us  much  here  since 
basically  they  amount  to  the  advice  that,  in  the  early  years 
of  childhood  at  least,  we  should  try  to  leave  the  child  alone 
to  develop  naturally,  to  grow,  and  thus  protect  him  from  the 
corrupting  influences  of  society  -a  primitive  version  of 
one  aspect  of  the  view  currently  being  put  forward  by  certain 
sociologists. 
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However,  it  is  now  widely  believed  that  all  decisions 
as  to  curriculum  content  shoult  be  made  by  reference  to  the 
needs  of  the  children.  Some  psychologists  have  tried  to 
discover  for  us  the  needs  of  children  in  order  to  provide 
us  with  the  basic  knowledge  we  must  have  to  begin  to  plan  a 
curriculum  along  these  lines.  Maslow,  for  example  has  pro- 
posed  a  theory  of  motivation  in  terms  of  need  reduction. 
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He  has  identified  three  sorts  of  need  -  primary  needs,  those 
for  food,  air,  sleep  and  so  one  emotional  needs,  those  for 
such  things  as  love  and  security,  and  social  needs,  those 
for  acceptance  by  a  group  and  the  confidence  that  comes  from 
an  awareness  that  one  has  something  to  offer  to  a  group. 
The  theory  is  that  if  these  needs  are  reduced,  the  patterns 
of  behaviour  associated  with  this  need  reduction  will  be 
reinforced  and  that  this  is  how  learning  takes  place. 
Such  a  theory  may  help  us  in  our  search  for  effective 
methods  of  teaching;  it  does  not  help  us  with  questions 
about  the  content  of  our  teaching.  For  all  such  theories 
of  need  or  attempts  to  define  need  must  involve  some  kind  of 
evaluation  on  the  part  of  the  person  propounding  the  view 
and  more  so  on  the  part  of  anyone  attempting  to  implement  it. 
Once  one  gets  beyond  the  needs  for  food,  drink,  sleep  and 
other  physical  requirements  of  this  kind,  it  becomes  increa- 
singly  difficult  to  separate  what  a  child  needs  from  what 
he  wants  or  from  what  someone  thinks  he  ought  to  have.  In 
other  words  'need'  is  a  term  which  has  a  prescriptive  as 
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well  as  a  descriptive  connotation. 169 
John  S.  Brubacher  comments  as  follows: 
"There  seem  to  be  two  meanings  of  the  word 
'need',  one  prescriptive  and  the  other  moti- 
vational.  Thus  it  makes  some  difference 
whether  needs  stem  from  a  social  requirement 
or  whether  they  are  "felt"  needs,  of  the  stu- 
dent  himself.  Prescriptive  needs  will  fur- 
ther  vary  depending  on  whether  "needs" 
means  necessity  or  mere  deficiency,  and  they 
will  vary  much  further  if  one  raises  the 
question  "need  for  what?  "5 
Despite  these  ambiguities  however  needs-philosophies 
of  education  still  form  the  received  doctrine  upon  which 
majority  of  teachers  would  claim  to  base  their  practice. 
Colleges  of  Education  courses,  for  example,  are  still  for  the 
most  part  heavily  weighed  with  studies  in  educational  psy- 
chology  and  its  application  to  'methods  of  teaching'  and 
there  is  a  continuing  bias  within  educational  psychology 
itself  towards  needs-interpretations  of  human  action  and 
motivation. 
The  general  assumption  tends  to  be  that  the  more  we 
know  about  the  psychological  development  of  children,  the 
better  -  automatically,  or  without  further  serious  reflec- 
tion  -  we  will  understand  what  they  need  for  their  educa- 
tion.  But  this  would  only  be  true,  if  children  were  like, 
say,  machines  or  plants  or  something  whose  efficient  func- 
tioning  or  'healthy'  development  were  matters  determinable 
by  reference  to  fairly  rigid,  settled  standards  and  criteria 
of  value.  In  that  case,  plainly,  the  more  'facts'  we  know 
about  how  the  machine  worked  or  the  plant  grew,  the  'better' 
we  would  be  able  to  look  after  and  control  it.  But  whereas 170 
machines  and  plants  do  not  themselves  have  a  sense  of  values 
children  do.  Children  are  not  merely  things  of  more  ©r  less 
value,  as  machines  and  plants  are.  They  themselves  place 
more  or  less  value  on  things. 
A  child's  education  is  not  merely  something  which  looks 
after  him  while  he  produces  more  or  less  valuable  product 
such  as  could  be  got  from  a  machine.  The  important  point 
about  a  child's  education  is  that  it  contributes  to  his 
senseoof  value.  This  is  not  something  which  is  brought  about 
merely  by  'meeting  his  needs',  whether  they  were  'healthy' 
ones,  or  promoted  his  'healthy'  development,  or  not.  On 
the  contrary,  without  some  sort  of  educated  sense  of  values 
it  would  not  be  possible  in  the  first  place  to  make  judgements 
as  to  what  the  'needs'  were.  'Needs'  have  no  existence:  in 
abstraction  from  the  valuation  of  goals.  To  state  that 
something  'meets  a  need',  individual  or  societal,  raises, 
rather  than  settles  questions  as  to  its  value.  Moreover, 
even  if  its  value  for  individual  or  societal  survival  were 
agreed,  its  educational  value  would  be  another  question 
altogether. 
Educational  psychologists  and  social  psychologists  are 
now  conscious  of  these  criticisms  and  are  now  therefore  care- 
ful  to  try  to  detach  their  investigations  of  matters  of  'fact' 
about  children  and  their  'needs'  from  the  questions  about 
the  value  of  different  forms  of  needs  -  satisfaction  and 
about  the  relative  value  of  different  needs.  This  point  has 
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'...  We  cannot  infer  a  duty  to  teach  in  some 
particular  way  from  the  descriptive  senten- 
ces  of  psychologyi6 
This  distinction,  however,  between  the  states  of  affairs 
which  we  judge  tin  fact'  to  exist  and  those  which  we  judge 
that  it  would  be  of  value  to  achieve,  is  by  no  means  a  sim- 
ple  one. 
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And,  when  drawn  by  psychologists  in  an  oversim- 
plified  way,  the  rest  very  often  is  merely  to  cut  psychology 
adrift  from  education  altogether,  the  one  entirely  surrounded 
by  'facts',  the  other  by  values.  Thus  Margaret  Clark  writes: 
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'The  Role  of  the  teacher  and  the  function  of 
education  are  basically  important  issues  which 
should  be  considered  by  any  teacher  in  training. 
Such  issues  are,  however,  not  within  the  remit 
of  psychologist.  The  psychologist  is  concerned 
with  'what  is'  and  not  'what  ought  to  be'? 
What  then,  can  an  'educational'  psychologist  be  concerned 
with?  In  spite  of  disclaimers,  whenever  psychology  is  'applied' 
to  education,  value  -  assumptions  are  made.  Even  to  argue 
that  it  is  not  the  business  of  psychologists  to  prescribe 
what  teachers  ought  to  do,  but  just  to  describe  what  is  lia- 
ble  to  happen  when  they  do  it,  is  still  to  assume  that  psy- 
chologists  somehow  know  what  'it'  is,  which  it  is  their  proper 
business  to  describe.  The  'role'  of  the  'psychologist'  is 
it  self,  in  common  with  other  'roles',  not  just  a  matter  of 
'what  it  is'  but  also  of  'what  ought  to  be'.  'Facts'  and 
'values'  cannot  be  simply  wrenched  apart  in  this  way.  With- 
out  value-assumptions  one  would  not  even  know  that  it  was 
one's  business  to  look  at  the  facts. 
Another  example  of  this  situation  is  provided  by  K.  M. 
Evans  the  social  psychologist.  In  her  book  'Attitudes  and 172 
Interests  in  Education9  she  explains  that  it  is  not  for 
psychologists  which  attitudes  and  interests  'educators' 
should  know  how  to  develop  in  children.  When  the  question 
later  arises  as  to  how  in  that  case  she  managed  to  decide 
which  attitudes,  interests  and  modes  of  development  she 
ought  to  study  in  her  book,  the  answer  which  she  gives  is 
that  this  is  just  a  matter  of  one's  'philosophical'  prefe- 
rences: 
"To  legislate  for  the  education  of  children  is 
a  great  responsibility  and  a  task  which  should 
not  be  approached  lightly.  In  what  ways  it  is 
good,  for  them  and  for  society,  that  they  should 
develop...?  The-question  is  really  philosophi- 
cal,  and  we  are  all  philosophers  enough  to  be 
able  to  attempt  to  answer  it.  ""10 
Elsewhere  she  continues: 
"...  the  author  has  made  philosophical  decisions 
about  what  attitudes  and  experiments  are  educa- 
tionally  important.  Even  psychologists  are 
people  and  have  their  predilections.  "  1 
These  passages  seedº. 
I 
to  suggest  that  when  psychologists 
tell,,.  us  what  our  'developmental  needs'  are,  their  advice  to 
us  will  be  strongly  coloured  by  their  personal  philosophy 
or  'predilections'.  Yet,  on  the  other  hand,  if  they  are 
utterly  'scientific'  and  keep  their  'predilections'  right 
out  of  their  picture  of  'the  facts'  it  would  be  impossible 
for  them  to  explain  what  the  point  of  our  looking  at  'the 
facts'  could  possibly  be. 
'Developmental  norms'  at  most,  indicate  some  of  the 
typical  'needs'  of  typical  children  as  judged  by  typical  or 
consensual  standards  of  value.  in  practice  therefore  they 
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trying  to  work  in  highly  individualized,  personal  relation- 
ships  with  particular  children.  Indeed,  they  may  as  often 
prove  misleading,  I  would  think,  as  helpful,  since  the  values 
built  into  them  could  well  be  quite  extraneous  to  the  values 
arising  from  the  teacher's  relationships  with  this  or  that 
individual  child.  Such  norms,  in  other  words,  can  as  easily 
disort,  as  guide,  a  teacher's  decisions  as  to  what  he  should 
in  a  particular  case,  making  him  liable  to  act  in  such  a  way 
as  to  make  the  norms,  as  it  were,  come  true.  The  norms  are 
no  substitute  for  personal  decision  and  judgement  -  indeed, 
they  are  themselves  a  generalized  outcome  of  it.  The  most 
that  they  can  do  is  to  suggest  a  range  of  possible  alterna- 
tives  from  which  a  teacher  might  be  wise  to  choose.  To  be 
able  to  understand  only  what  is  'normal',  however,  must  at 
times  be  as  much  a  handicap  as  a  help  to  a  teacher. 
A  newly  qualified  teacher  fully  equipped  with  a  good 
knowledge  of  developmental  norms  normally  is  confronted  by 
particular  children  each  with  his  own  particular  sense  of 
values  and  each,  therefore,  with  particular  individual  needs 
and  ways  of  behaving.  It  is  quite  impossible  for  that 
teacher  either  to  understand  those  children's  values  or  to 
predict  what  they  will  be  likely  to  do  to  preserve  and  pro- 
mote  them,  if  the  main  part  of  what  he  is  relying  on  in  the 
way  of  'theory'  is  his  generalized  knowledge  of  some  of  the 
sorts  of  things  which  'children  in  general'  value  and  doe 
One  can  say  that  'children  generally'  need  security,  self- 
esteem,  affection  and  so  on,  or  that  at  various  ages  and 
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positive  indications,  to  become  more  independent  or  to  form 
close  peer-group  relationships,  to  have  plenty  of  conversa- 
tion  with  adults  or  to  have  plenty  of  non-verbal  'concrete 
experiences'  ...  and  so  on.  But  exactly  which  of  these  things 
they  will  need,  and  when  and  why  and  of  what  quality,  and 
whether  they  should  be  given  them  without  further  ado  or 
should  have  to  work  for  them,  and  in  what  sort  of  context 
they  will  recognize,  or  appreciate,  or  accept,  or  value  them, 
when  they  get  them  -  these  are  problems  of  vital  importance, 
and  which  in  practice  a  teacher  will  be'making  decisions 
every  moment  of  the  day,  and  over  the  surface  of  which  his 
mere  knowledge  of  general  norms  will  slip  with  almost  total 
￿  ..  superficiality, 
The  situation  seems  to  be  that  developmental  norms  can 
tell  us  only  what  things  a  child  of  a  certain  sort  may  need, 
if  it  is  assumed  also  that  it  would  be  valuable  for  him  to 
develop  in  a  certain  direction.  They  cannot  tell  us  which 
sort  of  child  this  or  that  one  is,  nor  distinguish  for  us 
the  directions  in  which  he  should  mote.  A  particular  child's 
actions  can  only  be  understood  in  the  context  of  what  he 
personally  intends  or  means  to  be.  What  he  intends  or  means 
is  in  turn  something  which  we  can  only  fathom  to  the  extent 
that  will  gain  knowledge,  not  just  of  children  in  general' 
and  their  needs,  but  of  the  values  of  this  particular  child. 
Not  even  someone's  actions  (let  alone  his  needs  for 
action)  can  be  identified  without  reference  to  his  intentions, 
purposes  and  values.  This  contention  raises  wider  philoso- 175 
phical  issues  concerning  human  action-and  much  discussion  of 
the  issues  involved  for  which  we  have  no  space  is  described 
in  'Free  Action'  by  A.  I.  Melden. 
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In  the.  meantime,  it  is 
hoped  that  it  is  clear  at  least  that  while  we  may  say  that 
if  someone  means  or  wants  to  play  patience  then  he  will  need 
a  pack  of  cards,  nevertheless,  from  the  observable  fact  of 
his  getting  out,  a  pack  of  cards  we  cannot  infer  anything  in 
particular  about  the  game  that  he  means  or  wants  to  play. 
He  might  not  even  be  intending  to  play  a  card  game,  but  just 
to  check  that  the  pact  is  complete,  or  to  compare  the  designs 
Of-the  kings  of  the  four  suits,  or  to  build  himself  a  house 
out  of  the  cards  or  simply  to  begin  tidying-up  the  drawer 
in  which  the  cards  are  stored.  Similarly,  from  the  fact 
that  statistically  significant  samples  of  children  act  in 
certain  ways  at  certain  ages  and  stages,  nothing  in  particu- 
lar  can  be  inferred  about  the  significance  of  this  or  that 
action.  Behavioural  norms  do  not  explain  actions:  they 
themselves  need  explaining. 
It  seems  therefore  misleading  to  write,  as  Clark  does 
that: 
"With  our  present  level  of  knowledge  it  is  some- 
times  only  possible  to  predict  the  likely  outcome 
of  a  series  of  actions,  rather  than  to  state 
with  absolute  certainty  the  inevitabl  consequences 
of  certain  environmental  variables.  nli 
This  statement  has'the  implication  that  it  is  only  a 
matter  of  time  before  all  the  variables  will  have  been  dis- 
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covered  and  psychologists  will  thus  be  able  to  'state  with 
absolute  certainty  the  inevitable  consequences'14  of  them 176 
in  terms  of  predictions  about  children's  behaviour.  But 
there  will  never  be  more  than  'likely'  outcomes  to  situations 
in  which  human  beings  are  involved.  Action  is  not  the  in- 
evitable  consequence.  '  of  anything,  since  in  part  at  least 
it  is  always  undertaken  with  particular  values,  purposes 
and  intentions  in  mind.  The  sort  of  deterministic  psycholo- 
gy  which  assumes  that  actions  involving  people  are  no  diffe- 
rent  in  kind  (but  only  in  complexity)  from  happenings  in- 
volving  material  bodies,  will  never  provide  educational 
and  practical  guidance  in  classroom  decisions  involving 
particular  children. 
The  point  .1  have  been  trying  to  bring  out  so  far  is 
that  there  is  nothing  unambiguously  'good'  about  'meeting 
children's  needs',  even  when  they  are  said  to  be  development- 
ally  'normal'  ones,  and  even  when  contiditions  of  lifer  at 
schoöl  and  elsewhere  are  arranged  in  such  a  way  that  needs 
can  only  be  met  when  individuals  perform  'educationally  de- 
sirable'  tasks.  In  its  extreme  form  the  latter  strategy  'in- 
volves  the  reduction  of  'learning'  and  'teaching'  to  condi- 
tioning;  thus  raising  additional  difficulties  -  some  account 
of  which  we  must  now  turn. 
2p  THE  PROCESS  OF  LEARNING  AND  INDIVIDUAL  NEEDS 
In  this  section  I  shall  argue  that  there  are  important 
differences  between  'teaching'  and  'learning'  on  one  hand 
and  'conditioning'  on  the  other,  and  also  that  if  'education' 
were  no  more  than  socially  approved  conditioning  there  would 
be  no  point  in  encouraging  children  to  attend  school. 177 
Usually  the  needs  of  the  individual  are  thought  of  as 
a  sort  of  driving  force  or  motivating  condition  which  can  be 
activated  by  presenting  an  appropriate  stimulus  or  incentive 
to  the  individual.  Hunger,  for  example,  is  one  of  such 
drive  or  motivating  force.  The  presentation  of  food  acts 
as  a  stimulus  or  incentive  to  the  hungry  individual  to 
spring  into  action  appropriate  to  the  satisfaction  of  his 
need  for  food,  What  is  here  referred  to  as  'need  for  food' 
i  ,n  is  not  just  an  empirically  observable  'facts  but  something 
which  can  only  be  identified  in  the  context  of  an  evaluation 
of  the  whole  state  of  affairs  of  which  it  is  a  part.  that 
'drives'  the  individual,  whether  it  is  food  or  independence 
that  he  is  seeking,  is  not  his  'needs'  but  his  sense  of 
what  is  important  and  valuable.  it  is  from  his  evaluations 
that  his  'needs'  derive,  not  vice  versa. 
But  to  a  psychologist  who  starts  from  the  assumption 
that  people  only  act  when  they  are  driven  to  and  that  what 
drives  them  to  act  is  their  needs,  it  follows  that  'learning' 
is  merely  the  set  of  behavioural  changes  which  an  organism 
makes  in  order  to  adjust  to  emerging  environmental  conditions 
of  needs  -  supply.  In  other  words  learning  is  '...  a  rela- 
tively  permanent  change  in  a  behavioural  tendency  and  is  the 
result  of  reinforced  practice.  The  reinforced  practice  ...  is 
the  cause  of  learning'.  The  'reinforcement'  so  to  speak, 
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is  the  gratification  of  a  need.  In  effect  what  D.  Cecco  is 
implying,  then,  is  that  by  manipulating  the  conditions  under 178 
which  children  can  secure  need  -  gratifications  one  can 
bring  about  behaviour  changes,  in  the  same  sort  of  way  that 
by  manipulating  the  supply  of  carrots  one  can  modify  the 
behaviour  of  donkeys.  tf  the  manipulated  conditions  are 
relatively  regular,  then  the  modifications  in  behaviour 
will  become  relatively  permanent.  The  manipulations,  on 
this  view,  constitute  'teaching';  the  modifications  consti- 
tute  'learning".  Any  modifications  could  be  demanded,  and, 
so  long  as  living  conditions  at  school  were  consistently 
arranged  so  that  needs  could  only  be  gratified  upon  produc- 
tion  of  those  modifications  in  behaviour,  some  children  at 
least  would  manage  the  task.  In  theory,  then,  the  modifi- 
cations  which  could  count  as  'education'  are  entirely  open 
to  anyone  to  decide,  upon  any  grounds  he  chose.  Presumably, 
in  practice  some  educators  would  take  the  view  that  there 
is  no  need  at  all  to  take  a  decision. 
In  addition  to  the  confusion  involved  in  taking  'needs' 
rather  than  valuations  as  the  'driving  force'  behind  beha- 
vioural  change  there  are  further  several  points  at  which 
the  foregoing  model  of  teaching,  learning  and  education 
is  inadequate. 
In  the  first  place  an  essential  feature  of  successful 
conditioning  is  the  regularity  which  the  behaviour  to  be 
'learned'  is  reinforced,  and  with  which  other  behadour- 
receives  negative  reinforcement.  Now  a  relatively  permanent 
response  to  regularity  is  not  one  which  could  itself  be 
acquired  by  conditioning,  since  successful  conditioning 179 
depd.  nds  upon  it.  Unless,  then,  the  animal  (or  child  or 
whatever  is  being  conditioned)  has  already  learned  to  dis- 
tinguish  'regular'  from  'irregular'  conditions,  the  whole 
process  could  not  even  get  started.  Or,  if  it  could,  then, 
how  it  started  would  be  inexplicable.  Theories  of  condi- 
tioning,  therefore,  far  from  'explaining'  learning  seem  to 
require  an  account  of  'learning'  in  order  to  explain  them. 
Learning  (or  at  least  some  learning)  involves  getting  to 
see  a  meaning  or  significance  or  import  in  some  area  of 
one's  experience. 
Similarly,  if  'teaching'  involves  something  to  do  with 
trying  to  show  someone  the  significance  or  import  of  some 
feature  of  their  experience,  although  this  could  account 
for  someone's  learning  something  and,  therefore,  could  account 
for  his  becoming  conditioned  to  expect  certain  reinforcements 
to  be  regularly  associated  with  certain  kinds  of  behaviour, 
the  conditioning  itself  :  could  never  be  the  same  thing  as 
the  teaching,  any  more  than  it  could  be  the  same  thing  as 
the  learning.  Any  behavriour,  theoretically,  could  be  asso- 
ciated  by  conditioning  with  the  receipt  of  positive  reinfor- 
cements.  For  instance,  one  could  set  out  to  condition  child- 
ren  to  wiggle  their  ears  whenever  the  headmaster  entered 
the  classroom,  by  regularly  rewarding  those  who  managed  to 
do  so  and  penalizing  those  who  did  not.  Only  some  children 
would  ever  master  the  task,  just  as  only  some  children  would 
ever  manage  to  master  other  tasks  set  in  school.  The  point 
however,  is  that  not  even  those  who  did  become  successfully 180 
conditioned  would  have  been  taught  to  do  so  by  the  reinforced 
practice,  They  would  first  have  had  to  learn  to  see  the 
whole  process  as  'practising'  the  mastery  of  certain  task. 
The  practice  itself  would  not  enable  them  to  do  this,  since 
it  would  merely  be  practice  of  the  task  -  not  practice  in 
seeing  repeated  attempts  at  the  task  as  'practice'. 
Again,  merely  being  rewarded  whenever  they  wiggled 
their  ears  at  the  right  time,  although  it  would  be  nice  for 
them,  would  not  itself  teach  them  what  'the  right  time'  was, 
However  often  they  did  the  right  thing  at  the  right  time 
by  chance,  and  were  rewarded,  and  however  desirable  it 
therefore  became  to  them  to  do  it  again,  doing  the  right 
thing  at  the  right  time  would  still  be  a  matter  of  chance, 
unless  they  managed  to  grasp  what  'the  right  time'  meant. 
The  desirability  of  something  does  not  increase  the  likeli- 
hood  of  its  happening  by  chance,  nor  does  it  show  why  it 
happens.  One  could  be  conditioned,  then,  to  expect  a  reward 
if  one  wiggled  at  the  right  time.  But  one  could  not  be 
conditioned  to  recognize  'the  right  time'.  This  is  something 
which  one  would  have  to  learn,  and  which  one  could  possibly 
be  taught. 
Moreover,  both  teaching  and  learning  are  activities 
which  are  only  identifiable  by  reason  of  their  intrinsic 
point  or,  to  put  it  another  way,  because  there  is  some  inte- 
lligible  reason  for  undertaking  them.  Like  'needing',  they 
are  not  identifiable  or  recognizable  because  of  their 
empirical  features  alone.  Just  as  one  cannot  recognize  that 
someone  is  engaging  in  an  activity  'because  he  needs  to', 181 
merely  by  observing  him,  nor  identify  an  action  as  a  'needful' 
one  merely  by  checking  its  empirical  features  against  some 
fixed  or  standard  pattern  for  'needful'  actions  in  general, 
so,  also,  there  is  no  standard  list  of  actions  which  must  be 
performed  when  one  is  'teaching'  or  when  one  is  'learning' 
and  which  make  these  activities  recognizable.  Only  when 
observable  actions  intelligLbly  exemplify  the  logical  point 
of  'teaching'  and  'learning',  can  they  be  identified  as 
actions  within  the  overall  'activities'  of  teaching  and  learn- 
ing.  16 
By  contrast,  conditioning  and  being  conditioned  by 
definition  as  processes  identifiable  solely  by  their  obser- 
vable  features  -  since  the  only  features  of  anything  which 
theorists  of  conditioning  will  admit  to  exist  are  the  empiri- 
cal  observable  ones.  Therefore  there  is  a  fixed  or  standard 
list  of  empirical  features  by  means  of  which  (in  theory  at 
least)  'conditioning'  processes  may  be  recognized.  Further, 
it  follows  that  there  is  no  intrinsic  point  to  conditioning. 
What  is  being  associated  with  what,  in  a  conditioning  situa- 
tion,  is  of  no  logical  consequence  whatever.  It  simply  does 
not  matter.  One  could  (in  theory)  be  conditioned  to  do  any- 
thing,  without  this  making  any  difference  to  the  fact  that 
what  was  happening  to  one  was  that  one  was  'being  conditioned'. 
Teaching  aims  at  trying  to  bring  about  learning.  This 
is  not  the  same  thing  as  trying  to  bring  about  a  change  of 
behaviour  or  belief,  although  it  may  have  those  consequences 
as  well.  Again,  the  point  of  'learning'  is  to  try  to  understand 
how  to  act  or  how  to  interpret  one's  experience  in  a  meaning- 182 
ful  way;  but  this  too,  is  not  at  all  the  same  sort  of  thing 
as  merely  undergoing  a  fairly  permanent  change  in  one's 
behaviour  or  in  the  state  of  one's  mind.  By  contrast, 
the  only  point  of  'conditioning',  from  the  conditioner's 
point  of  view,  is  whatever  good  or  bad  ends  the  process  is 
being  employed  as  a  means  to,  and,  from  the  conditionee's 
point  of  view,  whatever  'positive  reinforcements'  he  can 
manage  to  get  out  of  it.  Both  of  these  'points'  are  extrin- 
sic,  in  other  words,  to  the  process  itself.  In  itself, 
any  particular  example  of  the  process  could  be  both  a  ge- 
nuine  example  of  'conditioning'  and  yet  also  intrinsically 
pointless.  'Intrinsically  pointless  teaching'  and  'intrin- 
sically  pointless  learning',  however,  are  self-contradictory 
notions.  If  there  were  nothing  intelligible  to  understand, 
one  could  not  conceivably  'learn'  it.  And  if  one  were 
trying  to  get  someone  to  do  something  entirely  unintelligi- 
ble  to  you  both,  one  could  not  possibly  be  'teaching'  him. 
In  sum,  then,  one  can  change  someone's  behaviour  by 
changing  the  environmental  conditions  surrounding  him,  and 
if,  for  example,  one  regularly  gives  him  a  team  point  or  a 
gold  star  when  he  writes  a  complete  sentence  or  adds  up  num- 
bers  correctly,  then  the  change  in  his  behavriour  may  possi- 
bly  become  quite  permanent.  In  the  very  general  sense,  too, 
that  such  behavioural  changes  were  not  due  solely  to  matura- 
tion,  I  suppose  that  one  could  call  the  changes  'learning' 
and  the  process  of  inducing  them  'teaching'.  Philosophers 
of  education  such  as  Scheffler17  and  Langford18  would  argue 183 
that  both  'teaching'  and  'learning'  involve,  centrally, 
some  reference  to  the  meaningfulness,  or  rationality,  or 
perhaps  intelligibility,  of  the  content  of  what  is  being 
'taught'  and  'learned'.  'Teaching'  and  'learning'  in  this 
sense  cannot  be  accounted  for  in  terms  of  conditioning, 
since  their  content  is  as  important  as  the  observable  me- 
thods  which  they  employ.  Indeed,  it  seems  unlikely  that. 
'conditioning'  itself  can  be  accounted  for,  without  reference 
to  'teaching'  and  'learning'  in  a  more  restricted  sense. 
Pupils  could  be  conditioned  to  expect  reward  for  certain 
kinds  of  behaviour,  but  it  is  hard  to  see  how  the  acquisi- 
tion  of  the  ability  to  behave  in  those  ways  could  itself, 
by  reference  to  the  process  of  conditioning  alone,  be`inte- 
lligible. 
These  account  for  some  of  the  serious  theoretical  di- 
fficulties  involved  in  the  reduction  of  'teaching'  and 
'learning'  to  'conditioning'  which  is  required  by  the  value  - 
gap  in  needs  -  based  theories  of  education.  But  even  if 
teaching  and  learning  were  no  more  than  socially  approved 
conditioning  there  would  still  be  the  practical  difficulty 
of  deciding  which  goals  should  be  approved.  The  pupil's 
'needs'  could  provide  no  scientific  or  other  pointer  to 
guide  such  a  decision,  since,  the  existence  of  'needs'  it- 
self  presupposes  the  existence  of  acceptable  standards  of 
value.  One  would  be  arguing  in  a  circle  if  one  said  that 
the  'agreed  goals'  were  good  simply  because  children  'needed' 
them  if  one  had  already  formed  the  opinion  that  they  were  good. 184 
A  clear  way  out  of  this  impasse  is  to  argue  that  what 
the  children  'really'  need  is  What  meets  the  needs  of  so- 
ciety.  This  claim  has  it  that  the  'true'  guide  in  the 
diagnosis  of  individual  need  is  societal  need.  'The  needs 
of  society'  on  this  view  are  the  same  as  the  Ireal'needs 
of  its  individuals.  We  shall  now  turn  to  examine  'societal 
needs'  to  see  if  they  can  provide  solutions  to  the  problem 
so  far  identified. 
3,  EDUCATION  AND  SOCIETAL  NEEDS 
The  claim  has  often  been  made  that  a  child's  education 
is  meaningful  only  when  it  meets  'societal  needs',  A  part- 
nership  between  individual  and  societal  needs  (and  thus 
between  individual  and  societal  values)  is  however  not  an 
easy  one.  In  practice,  the  two  sets  of  needs  are  liable  to 
conflict,  According  to  some  sociologists  the  conflict  is 
explicit  and  unavoidable.  Waller  makes-the  following  point: 
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"Typically  the  school  is  organized  on  some  variant 
of  the  autocratic-  principle  .....  the  social  nece- 
ssity  of  subordination  is  a  condition  of  human 
achievement,  and  the  general  tradition  governing 
the  attitudes  of  students  and  teachers  toward  each 
other,  set  the  limits  of  variation.  " 
In  this  model,  societal  needs,  are  explicit  and  always 
override  individual  needs. 
One  of  the  most  convincing  recent  sociological  account 
of  schooling  is  to  be  found  in  Robert  Dreeben!  s  'On  What  Is 
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In  this  work  the  question  scarcely  Learned  in  School. 
arises  as  to  whether  or  not  schooling  is  valuable.  The  book 
is  an  account  of  what  just  happens  to  children,  as  a  result 
of  their  going  to  school.  Briefly,  they  "acquire"  societal 185 
norms..  Dreeben21  explains  how  children  learn  specifically: 
1.  To  act  independently  rather  than  co-operatively. 
2.  To  try  to  come  up  to  certain  standards  of  exce- 
llence  which  are  identical  for  all. 
3.  To  regard  themselves  primarily  as  members  of 
classes  or  types  of  person,  rather  than  as  per- 
sons,  and 
4.  To  value  the  type-casting  features  of  themselves 
and  to  devalue  the  rest. 
The  purposes  behind  the  setting  up  of  the  conditions 
for  the  acquisition  of  these  norms  (i.  e.  the  setting  up  of 
schools)  are  of  course  societal,  not  personal*  The  first 
norm  is  'needed'  societally  because  adult  workers  and  citi- 
zens  must  be  able  to  make  many  sorts  of  decision  by  themselves 
regardless  of  others.  That  is,  the  need  to  make  a  decision 
(e.  g.  as  an  employer,  as  a  soldier,  as  a  motorist)  overrides 
the  value  of  considering  the  interests  of  others.  Similarly 
the  other  three  norms  are  prerequisites  for  the  rating  of 
individuals  for  the  purpose  of  giving  calculated  economic 
rewards  for  work  donee 
The  job  of  the  school,  then,  is  to  produce  belief  in  the 
value  of  these  norms  -  these  are  the  'educational  goals'. 
The  'method'  employed  is  of  course  to'make  use  of  the  child's 
current  individual  needs  (for  security.,  esteem  etc.  ),  with- 
holding  gratification  of  these  until  the  child  appears  to 
be  'learning'  to  view  the  world  (and  thimself)  in  the  required 
'adult'  fashion,  According  to  Dreeben,  it  is  the  child's 
self-esteem  (his  image  of  an  adequate,  successful  self) 186 
which  is  made  to  depend  upon  his  adopting  the  new  role. 
Through  a  variety  of  'socializing'  situations,  such  as 
public  questioning  and  testing  in  front  of  his  peers,  va- 
rious  forms  of  competitive  self-assessment,  and  ritualized 
examination  procedures  which  reward  'independent'  effort 
and  punish  co-operation  as  'cheating',  the  child  is  slowly 
but  unavoidably  shamed  into  adulthood.  Elsewhere  Dreeben 
continues: 
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"...  the  same  activities  and  sanctions-from  which 
some  pupils  derive  gratification  and  enhancement 
of  self-respect.....  may  create  experiences  that 
threaten  the  self-respect  of  others.  Potentiali- 
ties  for  success  and  failure  are  inherent  in  the 
tasks  performed  according  to  achievement  criteria 
(norm  2).  Independence  (norm  1)  manifests  itself 
as  competence  and  autonomy  in  some,  but  as  a 
heavy  burden  of  responsibility  and  inadequacy  in 
others.  Universalistic  treatment  (norm  3)  repre- 
sents  fairness  for  some,  cold  impersonality  to 
others.  Specificity  (norm  4)  may  be  seen  as  si-  tuational  relevance  or  personal  neglect.  " 
In  such  a  situation,  failure  is  not  justa  risk,  it  is 
a  certainty. 
23 
The  educational  methods  could  not  work-at 
all  (for  some)  unless  there  were  actual  failures  as  well  as 
successeso  The  point  of  the  methods  in`  its  effectiveness 
is  to  promise  success,  and  therefore  to  threaten  failure. 
A  similar  warning  is  given  by  Dreeben24  by  reminding 
us  of  the  logical  circumstance  that  if  psychological 
'health'  is  dependent  of  the  satisfaction  of  needs  then  in 
a  needs  -  based  system  of  schooling  there  cannot  be  anyone 
who  is  not  at  all  times  more  or  less  psychologically  'ill'. 
Nevertheless,  whether  it  is  right  that  children  (or  anyone) 
in  this  way  should  be  stripped  of  what  they  value  in  order 
to  be  clothed  in  what  we  value  -  and  whether,  indeed,  even 187 
we  value  it,  when  we  see  its  true  colours  -  is  not  what  is 
at  issue  in  the  book.  Dreeben  does  not  claim  to  be  descri- 
bing  anything  valuable.  He  does  not,  for  example,  name  the 
process  'moral  education'  -  but  merely  'the  acquisition  of 
norms'.  Looking  at  his  account  of  the  way  in  which  the  norms 
are  acquired,  however,  it  is  plain  that  the  whole  process 
involves  the  destruction,  not  the  development,  of  values. 
The  children  change  (if  they're  lucky  enough  to  be  able  to) 
because  they  have,  to  keep  their  self-respect.  They  acquire 
not  a  mere  educated  sense  of  values,  but  just  a  temporarily 
useful  set  of  norms.  The  manipulative  psycho-social  mecha- 
nisms  employed  are  fundamentally  the  same  as  those  which, 
for  example  De  Cecco  described  as  'learning'  and  'teaching' 
or  which  K.  M.  Evans  calles  'attitude  change'.  But  whereas 
Dreeben  refers  to  the  process,  when  it  occurs  in  schools, 
simply  as  'schooling',  De  Cecco  and  Evans  call  it  'education', 
thus  making  assumptions  about  the  value  of  the  process  which 
Dreeben  is  careful  to  avoid. 
We  could  rightly  comment  on  Dreeben's  accuracy  as  ex- 
ceptional.  Most  Sociologists  who  stress  societal  needs, 
refer  to  the  process  of  meeting  them  as  'education'.  The 
individual  is  said  only  to  be  able  to  develop  'healthily' 
if  he  satisfies  his  individual  need  to  fit  security  into 
the  pattern  set  by  the  rules  and  practices  of  his  society. 
Alternatively  he  is  said  to  be  'deprived'  and  'disadvantaged', 
if  he  lacks  the  sort  of  'education'  which  societally  is  "` 
claimed  to  be  desirable.  D.  F.  Swift,  25 
for  example,  des- 188 
tribes  these  'educational'  (i.  e.  societal)  goals  as  being: 
1.  To  inculcate  the  values  and  standards  of  society. 
2.  To  maintain  societal  solidarity. 
3.  To  transmit  the  knowledge  which  makes  up  the 
social  heritage,  and 
4.  To  develop  more  of  such  knowledge. 
Thus,  just  as  on  the  one  hand  we  find  'education'  des- 
cribed  as  something  of  utility  to  the  individual  in  terms  of 
ambiguously  'good'  goals  such  as  healthy  growth,  self-reali- 
zation,  personal  freedom,  socialization,  etc.,  so,  on  the 
other  hand  we  find  it  declared  to  be  equally  'good'  for 
society,  in  terms  .  -equally  ambiguous,  such  as  social  stabili- 
ty,  social  continuity,  social  innovation  and  so  on. 
In  Education  for  Teaching,  Garforth26  stated  this  posi- 
tion  with  great  explicitness.  He  wrote: 
"We  must  be  clear  ...  that  education  is  essentially 
instrumental;  it  is  not  an  end  in  itself,  as  is 
sometimes  loosely  said,  but  a  means  both  to  fulfil- 
ment  in  the  individual  and  to  stability  and  progress 
in  society.  It  is  a  tool  ...  to  achieve  the  aims 
which  society  sets  before  itself.  " 
It  is  argued  that  in  terms  of  the  possible  achievement 
of  something  valuable,  such  an  'education'  as  this  is  entirely 
empty,  since  there  is  nothing  in  it  which  is  valued  for  its 
intrinsic  worth,  Not  only  is  each  set  of  goals  (the  indivi- 
dual  and  the  societal)  liable  to  cancel  out  the  other  -  as, 
for  example,  societal  'solidarity'  is  liable  to  obliterate 
particular  or  individual  sub-cultures.  Within  itself,  too, 
each  set  of  goals  is  in  fact  self-callcelling,  as  for  example, 
innovation  cancels  'continuity'  or  'knowledge'  cancels  'incul- 189 
cation',  and  as  what  is  'personal'  is  cancelled  by  what  is 
merely  'selfish'  or  what  is  'healthy'  by  what  is  merely 
'socializing'.  There  is  no  principal  guidance  here  for  the 
resolution  of  the  conflict  situations  which  the  theory  makes 
in  practice  inevitable.  And  what  is  good  about  the  'need' 
to  go  to  school,  remains  obscure. 
Barry  points  out  that  just  as  one  does  not  always  value  what 
one  needs,  so  one  does  not  always  deserve  it  either. 
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In 
practical  situations  where  one  'need'  seems  to  conflict  with 
another,  it  is  impossible  to  decide  on  the  basis  of  need 
alone  what  should  be  done,  since  one  has  not  yet  clarified 
the  valuable  features  of  the  respective  goals  of  the  conflic- 
ting  needs,  and  thus  one  cannot  judge  in  a  reasonable  manner 
which  one  should  be  described  for  the  sake  of  the  greater 
value  which  might  come  of  the  'other. 
4.  SOME  CONCLUDING  REMARKS 
It  appears  from  our  discussion  that  all  needs-based 
'education'  is  'compensatory',  rather  than  of  intrinsic 
value.  It  starts  by  diagnosing  what  the  children  have  not 
got,  and  then  sets  out  to  make  up  their  deficiences  ,  rather 
than  to  try  to  help  them  to  realize  the  potentialities  of 
value  inherent  in  what  they  have  already,  When  the  term 
'compensatory  education,  is  selectively  applied  to  groups 
of  children  regarded  as  being  particularly  lacking  or  defi- 
cient,  then  as  Bernstein  has  written,  this  implies.  28 
"...  that  something  is  lacking  in  the  family,  and 
so  in  the  child...  and  the  children  are  looked 
at  as  deficit  systems.  iP  only  they  were  like 
middle-class  parents,  then  we  could  do  our  job... 190 
If  children  are  labelled  'culturally  deprived', 
then  it  follows  that  the  parents  are  inadequate, 
the  spontaneous  realizations  of  their  culture, 
its  images  and  symbolic  representations  are  of 
reduced  value  and  significance.  Teachers  will 
have  lower  expectations  of  the  children,  which 
the  children  will  undoubtedly  fulfil.  All  that 
informs  the  child,  that  gives  meaning  and  purpose 
to'him  outside  of  the  school,  ceases  to  be  valid 
and  accorded  significance  and  opportunity  for 
enhancement  within  the  school.  " 
Bernstein  continues,  'this  may  mean  that  the  contents 
of  the  learning  in  the  school  should  be  drawn  much  more  from 
the  child's  experience  in  his  family  and  community. 
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And 
he  concludes: 
30 
"we  should  start  knowing  that  the  social  experience 
the  child  already  possesses  is  valid  and  significant, 
and  that  this  social  experience  should  be  reflected 
back  to  him  as  being  valid  and  significant,  It  can 
only  be  reflected  back  to  him  if  it  is  part  of  the 
texture  of  learning  experience'we  create,  " 
However,  this  is  true  hot  just  for  some  children  and  for 
some  learning  but  for  all,  if  schooling  is  to  be  in  any  way 
educative. 
Children  of  today  are  increasingly  disciplined  to  be 
manipulated  by  hope  and  fear  into  doing  blindly  what  adults 
tell  them  that  they  need.  But  unless  children  are  asleep, 
under  hypnosis  or  in  a  state  of  shock,  it  is  one  of  the 
most  obvious  facts  about  them  that  they  are  always  both 
'started'  and  'going'  already.  The  educative  task  of  teachers 
is  not  to  give  them  a  series  of  shocks  followed  by  motiva- 
tional  pushes  and  pulls  in  directions  alien  to  their  own, 
but  to  try  to  help  them  to  see  significance  of  goals  which 
already  they  find  interesting  and  take  to  be  of  some  possible 191 
value.  Making  use  of  a  child's  interest  as  a  means  of  some 
extrinsic  end  never  reveals  what  that  interest  itself  is 
worth  in  terms  of  human  feeling,  but  devalues  it  by  treating 
it  as  no  more  a  prerequisite  for  something  else.  Of  course, 
it  is  true  that  society,  if  it  is  to  continue  in  itsý.,  present 
direction  of  growth,  'needs'  skilled  manpower,  law-abiding 
citizens  and  so  on.  It  is  tru-e,  too,  that  schooling  may  be 
as  efficient  as  a  wqy  as  any  of  'meeting  these  needs',  in 
the  short  run  at  least.  Certainly  it  is  such  'schooling' 
which  governments  and  local  authorities  want,  and  which  they 
are  prepared  to  sponsor.  My  concern,  however,  has  been  to 
.  show  that  such  'schooling'  is  not  'education',  -or  that  its 
value's 
far  from  being  shown  by  describing  it  as  being  'needed', 
is  thereby 
presupposed.  When,  therefore,  such  documents  as 
the  SPenS  Report,  for  example,  advise  us  that  '....  before 
everything  the  school  should  provide  for  the  pre-adolescent 
and  adolescent  years  a  life  which  answers  to  their  special 
needs', 
31 
not  only  is  no  guidance  about  'schooling'  contained 
in  such  a  tautology.  As  an  authoritative  statement  about 
the  kind  of  values  to  be  sought  in  education,  its  termilogy 
is  extremely  misleading. 
of  course,  not  all  'individual  needs'  should  be  gratified, 
How  are  we  to  decide  which  should  and  which  should  not?  By 
reference  to  'societal  needs'?  But,  similarly,  not  all 
'societal  needs'  should  be  satisfied.  How  are  we  to  decide 
which  of  them  should  be  'answered'  and  which  should  not? 
There  is  no  way  out  of  this  impasse.  Once  we  have  equated 
'schooling'  with  'education'  and  thus  reduced  'teaching'  and 192 
'learning'  to  conditioning,  we  have  generated  insoluble 
moral  and  practical  problems  for  teachers  and  children  in 
schools. 
In  order  to-bypass  this  difficulty  with  the  idea  of 
'needs'  to  provide  us  with  educational  guidance  without  at 
the  same  time  losing  the  advantages  that  are  thought  to  be 
associated  with  an  approach  that  takes  full  cognisance  of 
the  psychology  of  the  child,  some  educationists  have  stressed 
the  desirability  of  using  children's  interests  as  the  cri- 
terion.  it  is  argued  that  children  learn  best  through 
interest,  that  they  are  manifestly  not  interested  in  much 
of  what  is  presented  to  them  by  a  'traditional'  curriculum 
and  thus  do  not  learn  in  the  full  sense  of  the  word  and 
that  we  might  achieve  more  success  if  we  were  to  find  out 
what  interests  them  and  work  from  that.  32,  It  is  this 
notion  of  'interest'  to  which  I  must  now  turn. NOTES  AND  REFERENCES 
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1.  'LEARNING  THROUGH  INTEREST' 
Children  are  said  to  learn  through  interest  and  for 
that  reason  teachers  are  advised  to  take  into  account  'child- 
ren's  interest'  in  the  execution  of  their  duties.  But  when 
it  comes  to  identifying  specifically  the  kind  of  interests 
being  referred  to  one  begins  to  encounter  all  sorts  of  problems. 
Nevertheless  'children  learn  through  interest'  becomes 
plain  when  the  phrale  is  interpreted  to  mean  that  children 
must  be  'made'  interested  in  what  is  in  their  and  others' 
interests,  so  that  they  will  learn  it.  Teaching,  then,  on 
this  view  will  be  just  a  matter  of  teaching  students  some 
psychologically  effective  methods  of  'making  children  inte- 
rested'  in  what  is  (by  general  agreement)  in  everybody's 
interest.  Thus  K.  M.  Evans  writes: 
1 
"Just  as  we  can  arrange  for  our  children  to 
acquire  particular  information  and  to  learn 
particular  skills,  so  we  can  arrange  for  them 
to  acquire  particular  attitudes  and  interests. 
The  techniques  needed  are  fairly  well  understood.  j. 
It  is,  then;  a  matter  of  mastering  these  techniques,  By 
arranging  for  dhildren  to  become  interested  in  acquiring  the 
information  and  skills  which  are  in  their  and  others'  inte- 
rests,  teachers  can  enable  them  to  learn  these  things 
'through  interests. 
The  question  to  ask,  however,  is:  Why  go  to  the  extent 
,x 
of  getting  children  interested?  t4hat  is  the  special  virtue, 
in  their  learning  all  these  good  things  'through  interest'? 
if  we  can  'arrange'  for  children  to  acquire  desirable  infor- I 
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mation,  skills,  attitudes  and  interests,  why  should  teachers 
go  to  the  trouble  of  arranging  for  them  to  become  interested 
in  acquiring  them?  Is  there  something  about  'learning4through 
interest'  which  not  only  explains  one  of  the  ways  in  which 
we  can  get  children  to  learn,  but  which  is  itself  'in  their 
interest'  somehow?  Are  'interests'  not  just  motivational 
aid  to  learning  something  otherwise  dull,  but  also  themselves 
the  sorts  of  things  which  dhildren  ought  to  be  occupied  with 
and  learning  about  in  school?  But  what  do  we  do  about  those 
tridial  things  such  as  talking  and  playing  and  so  on  in 
which  children  take  interest? 
At  this  point,  we  should  remind  ourselves  of  the  mono- 
graph  on  the  subject  which  Dewey2  wrote  which  was  directed 
against  those  who  could  see  no  relevance  in  interest  for 
education  except  in  terms  of  its  making  school  a  more  plea- 
sant  and  confortable  place  for  everyone  concerned,  by  in- 
creasing  pupil's  motivation  and  thereby  facilitating  teachers' 
control.  In  other  words  he  was  concerned  to  argue  that 
children's  interests  should  not  be  treated  just  as  a  motiva- 
tional  aid,  His  point  was  that  children  will  not  only  learn 
quickly  what  they  are  interested  in,  and  that  they  will 
learn  it  in  an  untroublesome  and  co-operative  sort  of  way, 
but  also  that  what  they  are  interested  in  is  what  they  will 
learn  best.  The  presence  of  interest.,  Dewey  pointed  out, 
maximises  the  likelihood  that  the  pupil,  when  what  he  is 
interested  in  proves  difficult  or  problematic,  will  put 
forth  and  sustain  not  just  his  greatest  but  also  his  best 199 
possible  effort  to  master  its  difficulties.  Whether  the 
interesting  activity  is  obviously  in  his  and  others'  inte- 
rest,  as  in  learning  to  read,  or  not  so  obviously  so,  as  in 
learning  to  reach  the  tip  of  his  nose  with  his  tongue,  the 
significance  of  his  interest  is  the  same  in  either  case, 
namely,  that  it  will  invoke  his  'best'  efforts. 
But,  what  ib  the  significance  of  the  word  'best'  in 
Dewey's  argument?  What  is  the  particular  'virtue'  of  inte- 
rest  in  education?  Dewey's  opponents  did  not  stop  for  a 
moment  to  reply  that  although  interested  pupils  perhaps  learn 
'best'  in  the  sense  of  most  rapidly  and  vigorously,  what 
they  learn  is  nevertheless  not  always  'best'  in  the  sense 
of  being  most  'in  everybody's  interest'.  What  about  such 
childishly  interesting  activities,  for  example,  as  biting 
one's  nails?  Many  children  exhibit  great  interest  in  acti- 
vities  such  as  this,  and  no  doubt  they  learn  'best'  about 
such  activities  when  they  are  interested  in  them,  taking 
great  pains  over  them  and  making  eiery  possible  effort  to 
get  them  right.  When  apparently  there  is  no  virtue  in  an 
activity,  such  as  in  biting  one's  nails,  how  can  it  make 
sense  to  say  that  children  do  it  'beste  when  they  are  inte- 
rested?  if  there  is  no  'good'  in  it,  how  could  it  be  done 
'better'  or  'best'. 
In  these  senses,  then,  who  would  say  that  children  should 
go  to  school  in  order  to  engage  in  interesting  activities 
(however,  effortfully,  undertaken  and  however  well  executed 
eventually)  such  as  hair-pulling,  bullying,  chair-banging, 200 
teacher-baiting  ...  and  so  on?  What  about  all  the  trivial 
sorts  of  things  which  children  show  occasional  interest  in, 
such  as  wiggling  their  ears,  standing  on  one  leg,  making 
themselves  go  cross-eyed,  poking  blotting  paper  into  ink 
bottles  or  sticks  into  cracks  in  floors.....?  And  what 
about  those  zctereotyped  and  boringly  derivative  occupations 
which  seem  to  make  up  the  whole  impoverished  gamut  of  battle 
pictures  criss-crossed  with  never  fading  tracer  bullets  and 
explosions  labelled  'Boom!  '  and  Pow!  ';  the  continual  chatter 
about  football,  television,  pop  records;  the  comic-reading 
and  gum-chewing;  the  pushing  and  showing  and  all  the  point- 
less,  tedious,  repetitzive  and  often  blindly  stupid  or  unkind 
things  which  children  do,  apparently,  with  great  interest? 
Is  this  what  they  should  go  to  school  for,  just  to  go  on 
doing  these  'with  interests?  Could  this  be  'education'  on 
Dewey's  view? 
It  is  indisputable  that  if  teachers,  believing  themselves 
to  be  'progressive',  following  Dewey,  and  so  on,  ever  acted 
consistently  on  such  an  interpretation  of  Dewey  as  this, 
most  of  the  children  in,  their  classes,  and  probably  the 
teachers  themselves  too,  would  be  very  badly  damaged  before 
the  end  of  their  first  half  term.  In  practice,  students  in 
colleges  of  education  who  start  with  this  view  (  and  there 
are  many)  sensibly  abandon  it  as  soon  as  they  are  in  a  posi- 
tion  to  do  so.  An  indiscriminately  interest-gratifying  view 
of  schooling  is  plainly  just  as  silly  as  an  indiscriminately 
needs-gratifying  one.  It  is  no  more  educative  to  pander  to 201 
every  inclination  which  children  have,  than  it  is  to  satisfy 
everyone  of  their  demands  on  sight.  But  what,  then,  did 
Dewey  mean?  How  could  it  be  in  the  child's  educational  in- 
terest  for  him  to  'learn  through  interest'?  How  could  inte- 
rest  be  more  than  a  sometimes  dangerous  -  and  in  any  case, 
rather  'soft'  -  motivational  apparatus? 
In  the  discussions  which  followed  we  shall  consider  in 
turn  three  of  the  several  philosophical  problems  raised  by 
Dewey's  apparently  straightforward  slogan.  First,,  'learning 
through  interest'  requires  at  the  very  least  that  we  be  able 
to  identify,  recognize  or  diagnose  what  interest  a  child 
actually  has.  How  can  this  be  done?  What  does  it  mean  to 
attempt  such  a  task?  Second',,,  having  analysed  what  Would 
be  involved  in  locating  a  child's  interests,  how  could  these 
be  fostered  or  developed?  Also,  in  what  sense,  if  any,  would 
it  be  possible  to  start  him  off  on  a  totally  'new'  interest? 
In  other  words,  how  could  children's  interests  be  aroused 
or  possibly  'made',  and  sustained?  Third,  what  are  we  to 
think  about  the  interests  which  children  undoubtedly  have 
in  trivial,  harmful  or  antisocial  activities?  In  what  sense, 
if  any,  are  children  learning  'best'  when  they  are  learning 
'through'  these?  For  that  matter,  in  following  any  interest, 
what  is  it  of  specifically  educational  value  which  children 
are  supposed  to  be  learning  thereby  and  which  they  could  not 
learn  as  well  in  any  other  way?  Dewey's  writings  on  interest 
raise  a  lot  of  problems  and  without  some  attempt  to  think 
clearly  and  carefully  about  them,  one's  educational  theory 202 
-  where  it  has  any  connection  at  all  with  what  in  practice 
one  actually  does  -  will  remain  caught  in  that  ideological 
feather  bedding  of  permissiveness  which,  as  Cremin3  and 
Hofstadter4  have  argued,  has  been  the  bane  of  education 
for  more  than  fifty  years. 
2.  IDENTIFICATION  OF  CHILDREN'S  INTEREST 
To  begin  with,  wet  shall  raise  a  few  questions:  How 
do  we  recognise  a  'feeling  of  interest'  when  we  'feel'  it? 
How  are  we  to  recognize  the  existence  of  such  feelings  in 
others,  and  in  children  particularly?  These  are  logical 
questions,  not  psychological  ones.  Very  often  one  finds 
that  the  bulk  of  psychological  work  makes  no  reference  to 
'interests'  at  all  or  reduces  the  notion  of  'interest'  to 
the  logical  status  of  'felt'  need.  Reliance  upon  psycholo- 
gists  therefore  does  not  help  us  to  clarify  the  nature  of 
'feeling  of  interest'.  Indeed  such  an  approach  to  'interests' 
can  give  rise  to  emptiness  in  terms  of  scientific  practical 
guidance.  Thus  Woodworth5  writes:  "The  drive  to  actualize 
one's  capacities  would  accordingly  be  an  important  source 
of  a  great  variety  of  human  interests.  "  But  how  would  it 
help  us  in  school  to  know  that  any  child  showing  an  interest 
in  anything  was  doing  so  because  he  was  being  'driven'  to 
'actualize  his  capacities'?  Would  this  help  either  to 
explain  why  he  was  doing  it,  or  to  justify  us  in  helping  him 
to  do  it? 
It  seems  to  me  that  the  logical  features  of  interests 
is  something  which  must  be  clarified  before,  not  after,  con- 
ducting  psychological  research  into  them.  To  assume  as 203 
Woodworth6  and  others  do,  that  'interests'  stem  from  'drives' 
and  'needs'  is  to  prejudge  issues  of  a  scientific  sort,  which 
could  show  that  one  is  only  interested  in  something  because 
one  'needs'  to  be.  And  on  the  face  of  it,  in  ordinary  dis- 
course  we  do  not  use  the  words  'need'  and  'interest'  in  this 
way  at  all*  In  this  section,  then,  we  shall  be  concerned 
first,  with  questions  about  the  logical  categorization  of 
feelings  of  interest,  both  in  respect  to  the  sort  of  'feel- 
ings'  which  they  are  and  to  the  sort  of  notion  which  'inte- 
rest'  itself  is,  and,  second,  with  the  questions  about  any 
special  problems  which  may  arise  in  connection  with  identi- 
fying  and  recognizing  such  feelings. 
(i) 
We  may  speak  of  interest  in  the  sense  of-someone  owning 
or  acquiring  an  'interest'  say,  in  a  business  enterprise. 
By  the  'interest'  which  children  'learn  through'  we  mean  the 
things  which  they  actually  find  interesting  or  'feel  interested' 
in.  One  could  own  'an  interest'  in  a  factory  manufacturing 
yet  not  find  the  faintest  nor  feel  the  slightest  bit  interested 
in  its  activities.  As  A.  R.  White?  writes,  'An  interested 
party  may  be  a  bored  one'.  The  kind  of  'interests'  we  are 
concerned  with  are  not  a  sort  of  or  liability  which  one  can 
get  hold  of  or  lose  like  a  piece  of  property.  They  are  a 
kind  of  inclination  or  disposition.  According  to  6Jhite8 
'interest'  is  an  inclination  to  engage  in  some 
one  or  more  perceptual,  intellectuwl,  or  prac- 
tical  activities  that  are  appropriate  to  the 
particular  object  of  interest.  ' 
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in  his  earlier  book  White  puts  it  in  this  form: 
9 
"To  feel  interested  in  anything  is  to  feel 
attracted  to  it;  to  feel  inclined  to  give 
attention  to  it;  naturally,  it  also  involves 
feeling  disinclined  to  attend  to  other  things, 
and  feeling  vexed,  unhappy  or  uncomfortable, 
when  prevented  from  giving  attention  to  it.  " 
Feeling  inclined  in  this  way  is  to  have  an  'occurent'' 
interest,  Thus  to  be  interested,  if  this  is  occurring  now, 
entails  giving  one's  attention.  This  occurrence  sense  of 
, being  interested'  refers  to  'showing'  or  'taking'  an  inte- 
rest  at  this  moment;  and  implies  that  at  this  moment  I  am 
thinking  about  or  giving  my  mind  to  whatever  it  is  .  'Being 
interested'  can  be  used  in  the  'dispositional'  sense,  which 
is  used  to  characterise  someone.  To  say  that  I  am  interested 
in  model  railways,  in  this  sense,  is  to  imply  that  there 
are  frequent  occasions  when  I  am  interested  in  the  occurrence 
sense.  Being  interested  in  the  dispositional  sense  is  a 
reason  why  one  is  interested  in  the  occurrence  sense,  'Why 
are  you  taking  so  much  interest  in  that  old  chair?  '  'Well, 
I  have  an  interest  in  antique  furniture,  '  To  feel  interested 
is  to  experience  interest,  to  find  oneself  being  inclined 
or  drawn  towards  the  object  of  one's  interest.  To  have  an 
interest  in  the  dispositional  sense  does  not  require  that  one 
constantly  feels  interested. 
The  'interest  of  children',  then,  are  the  fairly  settled 
dispositions  which  they  have  to  notice,  to  pay  attention  to 
and  to  engage  in  some  appropriate  activity  with  certain  sorts 
of  things  rather  than  others,  An  'interested'  child,  there- 
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absorbed  in  ways  appropriate  to  his  interest.  The  word 
'appropriate'  here  refers  to  the  child's  interest,  and  not 
necessarily  to  anybody's  view  of  what  might  be  'appropriate' 
to  him.  Most  boys,  for  example,  will  say  that  they  are 
interested  in  'football',  but  they  may  be  able  to  play  it 
just  as  well  with  any  object  which  will  roll  about  fairly 
freely  when  kicked,  as  with  a  'real'  football. 
Indeed  what  we  mean  by  'football',  for  example,  must 
be  an  inclination  towards  attentive  activity  in  a  flexible 
orange  of  matters,  some  of  which  might  be  perhaps  only  very 
loosely  connected  with  what  we  might  understand  as  the  game. 
To  insist  that  the  boys  play  to  the  strict  rules  of  our 
version  of  the  game  may  be  the  very  thing  which  they  are 
not  interested  in.  Thus  an  interest  may  sometimes  seem 
'inappropriate'  to  both  the  person  who  shows  it  and  any 
conventional  views  as  to  its  nature,  and  yet  we  still  regard 
it  as  a  perfectly  genuine  interest. 
What  is  of  interest  to  the  child  will  depend  upon  what 
it  is  that  he-notices  or  goes  on  attending  to  and  what  he 
regards  as  'appropriate  activity'.  Any  label,  such  as  'foot- 
ball'  which  he  gives  to  his  interest  will  designate  no  more 
that  a  fraction  of  what  the  interest  actually  is,  and  any 
particular  label  may  sometimes  prove  more  misleading  than 
helpful  as  a  way  of  identifying  the  interest.  One  mistake, 
then,  which  we  may  commit  about  the  identification  of  child- 
ren's  interests  is  to  assume  that  they  are  necessarily  going 
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further  mistake  in  identification  may  arise  over  the  kind 
of  'feeling'  which  we  may  assume  that  children's  interests 
contain.  Whike  compares  'feelings  of  interest',  first, 
with  what  he  calls  'sensory  and  perceptual  feelings': 
'Feeling'  interested  is  obviously  not  a  per- 
ceptual  feeling  like  feeling  a  hole  in  my  pocket 
nor  is  it  an  exploration  like  feeling  for  a  light 
switch.  Neither  is  someone  who  is  interested  in 
what  he  is  doing  necessarily  having  any  sensations, 
faint  or  acute,  study  or  intermittent,  localisable 
or  general.  Such  sensations  would  distract  him 
from  the  object  of  his  interest'.  10 
To  plunge  children  merely  into  a  range  of  sensory  and 
perceptual  'feelings'  then,  as  teachers  might  do  when  they 
are  trying  to  stimulate  creative  writing,  for  example,  i8 
as  likely  to  destort  children  from  their  interests  as  to 
promote  them.  When  'feeling'  his  way  along  the  branch  of 
a  tree,  for  example,  or  'feeling'  the  sorts  of  sensations 
which  are  part  of  interesting  activities  such  as  swimming, 
a  child  might  get  to  'feel  interested'  in  the  sensory  and 
perceptual  'feelings',  in  abstraction  from  any  interesting 
pursuit  of  which  they  formed  a  part,  is  something  which  we 
would  expect  to  find  in  a  person  of  rather  exceptional  and 
specialized  training,  such  as  a  neurologist  or  a  phenomeno- 
logical  psychologist.,  And  in  any  case,  the  'sensory  and  per- 
ceptual  feelings'  would  diferr  from  the  'feeling  of  interest'. 
A.  R.  White 
II 
says  'feelings'  of  interest  may  be  confused 
with  moods  and  emotions:  "An  interest  is  not  a  mood,  like 
cheerfulness  or  gloominess;  it  has  a  definite  object, 
'  A 
characteristic  thing  about  moods  such  as  depression,  for 
example,  is  their  pervasiveness,  their  lack  of  an  identifiable i 
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focus.  If  one  'feels'  depressed,  everything  is  depressing. 
If  one  'feels'  interested,  one  'feels'  it  about  something 
in  particular.  The  sort  of  mood-setting,  then,  such  as 
playing  gramophone  records  or  covering  a  corner  of  the  class- 
room  with  different  shades  of  green  which  may  go  on  when 
teachers  nowadays  are  trying  to  'spark  off  interest'  is 
often  misconceived. 
Emotions,  on  the  other  hand,  at  least  are  a  little  more 
akin  to  'feelings  of  interest,  '  than  are  mood-states.  How- 
ever,  being  in  a  emotional  state  is,  as  White  points  out, 
quite  different  from  being  interested.  In  particular, 
'feelings  of  interest'  lack  the  excited  or  'stirred-up' 
quality  which  one  finds  in  emotions  such  as  fear,  anger,  joy 
and  so  on.  One  can  be  afraid,  for  example,  too,  without 
necessarily  being  interested  in  whatever  it  is  that  one  is 
afraid  of,  just  as  one  can  be  interested  (e.  g.  in  electrical 
storms)  without  necessarily  feeling  emotional  about  the  in- 
teresting  object  in  any  way  at  all.  According  to  White, 
12 
"feeling  interested  is  not  an  emotional  or  stirred-up  state, 
such  as  feeling,  excited  or  thrilled,  agitated  or  surprised. 
You  cannot  be  'beside  yourself'  or  'speechless'  with  interest, 
nor  does  increasing  interest  disturb  your  concentration,  as 
mounting  excitement  or  antiety  may.  "  This  quotation  can  be 
interpreted  to  mean  that  emotions,  like  moods,  are  only  cir- 
cumstantially  not  logically  connected  with  'feeling  of  interest'. 
As  a  result  of  this  confusion  teachers  tend  to  interest 
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thing  most  likely  to  prevent  an  interest  from  developing. 
Merely  excited  children,  whose  emotions  have  been  agitated 
or  'stirred-up'  by  some  purportedly  'interesting'  prospect 
which  their  teacher  has  conjured  up,  are  typically  very  de- 
manding,  very  dependent  and  in  a  highly  unstable  state  which 
increasingly  approaches  the  limit  of  their  self-control. 
Teachers  promising  a  class  outing,  a  film,  a  garne,  or  doing 
anything  which  is  not  itself  interesting  but  merely  an 
'exciting'  or  'stimulating'  prelude  to  activities  or  events 
which  the  children  are  led  to  believe  will  be  interesting, 
are  putting  their  children  into  a  sort  of  Christmas  Eve 
situation  whose  outcome  is  as  likely  to  be  deflating  as  ins- 
piring.  They  are  not  arousing  'feeling  of  interest',  but 
merely  stirring  up  emotions.  What  is  'sparked  off',  and 
what  so  soon  fizzles  out,  is  excitement,  not  interest.  The 
mistake  lies  in  confusing  an  emmotional  state,  or  what.  White 
calles  'agitation'  with  a  'feeling  of  interest'. 
Interests,  as  we  have  seen,  are  inclinations  and  for. 
the  most  pare,  of  course,  people  are  'inclined'  to  seek 
pleasure  and  , mwoid  pain.  However,  there  are  many  things 
which  we  are  inclined  to  do,  but  which  we  are'not  .  nece- 
ssarily  interested  in  doing.  Habits  and  impulses,  for  exam- 
ple,  may  show  the  kind  of  behaviour  which  one  is  regularly. 
or  irregularly  'inclined'  or  'prone'  to  engage  in  under  cir- 
cumstances.  I  may  now  and  again  experience  an  impulse,  or 
irregularly  'feel-inclined',  towards  a  pipe-smoking  'habit'. 209- 
But  I  do  not  necessarily  'feel  an  interest'  in  what  I'am 
either  habitually  or  impulsively  inclined  to  do.  SiminärlY. 
the  objects  of  my  likings  and  preferences,  although  they 
show  some  forMs  currently  taken  by  my  inclinations  to  seek, 
pleasure  and  avoid  pain,  are  not  necessarily  the  same  as 
things  which  I  currently  find  interesting. 
Children,  surely,  have  innumerable  likings  and  prefe- 
rences  and  are  also  especially  prone  to  behaving  impulsively 
and  to  forming  rather  rigid  and  stereotyped  habits  of  action. 
None  of  these  four  forms  of  #inclination',  however,  is  lo- 
gically  in  the  same  category  as  the  inclination  to  notice, 
to  pay  attention  to,  and  to  engage  in  action  appropriate  to 
one's  interests.  The  connection  of  children's  likes  and 
preferences,  impulses  and  habits,  therefore,  with  their  inte- 
rests,  where  it  exists  at  all  is  probably  entirely  fortui- 
tous.  Letting  children  just  do  as  they  like  or  prefer,  or 
as  impulse  or  habit  inclines  them,  is  therefore  not  the  same 
thing  at  all  as  letting  them  'pursue  their  interests'. 
(ii) 
We  now  turn  to  the  second  problem  of  identifying  child- 
rents  interests,  First  we  must  know  what  sort  of  thing  we 
are  looking  for.  A.  'feeling  of  interest'as  we  tried  to  in- 
dicate  above  is  not  a  set  of  sensations',  nor  a  mood  or  emo- 
tion  ,  nor  an  inclination  to  get  pleasure,  nor  an  impulse  or 
habit.  It  is  rather  aninclination  to  notice  something,  to 
pay  continuing  attention  to  and  to  try  to  enter  into  some 
active  relationship  with  it  which  seems  appropriate  to  its 
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interesting  features.  Second,  however,  we  must  now  ask 
whether  there  are  any  special  difficulties  involved  in  re- 
cognising  the  sort  of  thing  which  we  now  know  that  we  are 
looking  for. 
This  is  not  as  simple  a  task  as  it  might  seem  since 
children  can  never  just  say  what  interests  them.  Merely 
because  they,  not  we,  feel  their  'feelings  of  interest',  it 
does  not  in  the  least  follow  that  they  will  know  best  what 
those  feelings  are.  There  is  no  specific  quality  of  feeling 
which  comes  into  experience  ready-labelled,  as  it  were,  with 
'This  is  a  feeling  of  interest.  '  It  is  true,  of  course, 
that  all  feelings,  thoughts  and  indeed,  'experiences'  in 
general,  are  in  a  sense  'private'  to  the  person  who  has  them.  13 
But  it  does  not  follow  that  because  I  am  the  only  person  who 
can  (logically  speaking)  'feels  .  my  feelings  orlthink'  my 
thoughts,  therefore  no  one  else  can  know  as  well  as  I  do 
(or  better)  what  their  significance  may  be.  It  is  certainly 
a  fundamental  error  of  theory,  then,  to  suppose  that  children 
can  simply  tell  their  teachers  what  their  interests  are. 
Can  teachers  then  just  look  and  see  whether  or  not  a 
child  is  interested  in  what  he  is  doing  or  proposes  doing? 
in  a  sense,  "yes;  but  only  in  a  vastly  oversimplified  sense. 
Children  can  'show'  an  interest;  even  if  they  cannot  communi- 
cate  it  verbally  or  by  the  sort  of  gestures  or  expressions 
which  'show'  pleasure  or  pain.  But  even  the  interpretation 
of  expressions  of  pleasures  and  pain  can  raise  difficulties. I 
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A  doctor,  for  instance,  would  require  some  verbal  confirma- 
tion  of  what  our  behaviour  'shows'.  Where  such  verbal  en- 
dorsement  can  be  extremely  tricky  indeed.  But  even  where 
the  aid  of  words  is  available  judgements  have  still  to  be 
made  as  to  their  truth  and  accuracy.  An  interest,  like  a 
pain  or  a  pleasure,  can  be  a  readily  'concealed'  or  'feigned' 
as  it  can  be'shown'. 
It  should  be  plain  from  our  analysis  that  recognizing 
whether  or  not  a  child  is  'showing  an  interest'  will  never 
be  a  simple  matter.  Not  only  is  he  usually  unable  (and  often 
unwilling)  to  give  us  reliable  verbal  guidance,  the  experience 
of  'being  interested'  is  itself  so  much  more  complex  than  the 
experience,  say,  of  pain  and  pleasure,  that  difficulties 
are  bound  to  arise. 
Kinds  of  behaviour  may  include  such  things  as  noticing, 
paying  attention,  persisting  in  one's  efforts  in  an  absorbed 
or  undistracted  way.  But  none  of  these  kinds  of  behaviour 
are  sufficient  to  'show'  interest  for  sure.  The  problem, 
from  our  point  of  view  is  that  there  is  no  further  sort  of 
behaviour  or  event  which  conceivably  could  'show'  it  in  any 
other  kind  of  way.  As  White  writes: 
14 
"...  concealing  your  interest  does  not  mean 
keeping  any  activities  hidden  in  the  way  that 
concealing  the  fact  that  you  are  attending 
does.  Nor  does  it  mean  that  you  keep  any  re- 
sults  to  yourself,  as  must  the  man  who  tries 
to  pretend  that  he  has  not  noticed  anything.  " 
In  the  same  breadth,  'showing'  your  interest  does  not 
mean  revealing  or  displaying  \any  particular  and  unmistakable 
sort  of  sign  by  which  your  interest  must  certainly  be  detected. 212 
Children  do  not  'show'  their  interests  as  a  sufferer  shows 
his  pain,  or  even  as  an  attentive  listerner  shows  his  atten- 
tion.  Exactly  the  same  observable  circumstances  may  be  in- 
teresting  to  one  child,  tedious  to  another.  And  exactly 
the  same  observable  behaviour  may  be  engaged  in  by  a  child 
who  is  bored,  Nor  is  there  any  'internal'  or  'private'  and 
'unobservable'  kind  of  'behaviour'  going  on  in  one  child 
but  not  in  the  other,  which  if  disclosed  or  discovered, 
would  provide  an  infallable  mode  of  distinguishing  between 
the  two. 
We  shall  return  to  the  connection  between  interest  and 
values.  For  the  moment  we  are  concerned  to  stress  that  cer- 
tain  theoretical  assumptions  which  are  widespread  -  that 
children's  interests  are  plain  to  see,  that  all  children 
have  much  the  same  interests  anyway  (at  appropriate  ages 
and  stages),  and  that  if  there  is  any  doubt  about  a  parti- 
cular  child's  interests  we  need  merely  to  instruct  him  to 
consult  his  'feelings'  and  report  back  upon  what  he  finds:,  - 
must  be  entirely  false. 
To  say  that  the  child  knows  best  what  interests  him, 
or  that  the  teacher,  the  parent,  the  developmental  psycholo- 
gist  or  anyone  else  knows  best,  is  just  not  true.  It  is 
only  extremely  misleading.  Therefore  to  lead  student  teachers 
to  believe  that  a  good  teacher  is  one  who  'considers  child- 
ren's  interests'  puts  both  students  and  children  in  an  im- 
possible  situation.  Implicit  in  a  child's  interests  is  all 213 
that  is  most  personal  and  unique  about  him.  To  claim  to 
have  discovered  this  after  a  few  weeks  in  a  crowded  class- 
room  is  absurd.  In  practice,  of  course,  most  Students 
quickly  and  sensibly  abandon  the  attempt  -  and,  with  it, 
most  of  their  'theory'.  But  could  it  be  claimed  that  ex- 
perienced  teachers  have  found  what  most  often  interests 
children  and  that  educational  practice  should  be  based  on 
this?  On  our  analysis  this  is  also  not  certain. 
A  child's  behaviour  may  mask  his  interests  as  readily 
as  it  reveals  them.  He  may  feign  interest  to  please  us, 
conceal  interest  in  order  to  deceive  us,  and  of  course  he 
is  as  likely  to  try  to  please  and  to  deceive  himself,  at 
times,  as  to  do  so  to  others.  If  children  have  no  confidence 
either  in  others  or  in  themselves,  then  to  show  an  unfeigned 
interest  will  seem  to  them  like  courting  disaster.  Even 
in  circumstances  of  mutual  respect  and  trust,  however, 
interests,  like  anything  else  which  we  can  'see'  or  be  'shown', 
require  interpretation.  By  themselves  the  logical  difficul- 
ties  implicit,  as  Wittgenstein15  has  shown  in  the  very  notions 
of  'identification'  and'  recognition'  should  caution  us  against 
diagnosing  people's  interests  in  a  facile  way,  even  if  the 
psychological  difficulties  of  the  task  apparently  do  not. 
3.  DEVELOPING  AND  SUSTAINING  INTEREST 
Interest,  for  many  teachers,  is  nothing  more  than  moti- 
vational  aid.  It  is  regarded  as  a  means  of  inducing  child- 
ren  to  undettake  tasks  which  to  the  children  themselves  are 
tedious  but  from  the  teacher's  point  of  view  such  tasks  re- 214 
present  some  desirable  good  or  norm  of  schooling.  Perhaps 
the  best  that  can  be  said  is  that  there  is  nothing  educative 
in  this  at  all,  although  it  may  be  an  efficient  way  of  getting 
children  'schooled'.  What  is  worrying  or  disturbing,  how- 
ever,  from  the  point  of  view  of  an  interest  -  based  rather 
than  a  needs-based  educational  philosophy,  is  to  hear  it 
alleged  that  by  hooking  children's  interests  to  tedious  tasks 
so  that  they  will  have  to  get  the  tasks  accomplished  before 
they  can  return  to  the  pursuits  of  their  interests,  the 
teacher  is  'making'  the  tasks  interesting  or  'making'  the 
children  interested  in  the'tasks. 
Such  an  attempt'can  only  amount  to  trivializing  children's 
interests  by  treating  them  merely  as  a  means  to  ends.  More 
so,  it  aims  at  devaluing  the  tasks  themselves,  by  implicitly 
admitting  to  the  children  that  they  are  the  sorts  of  tasks 
which  in  fact  any  sensible  person  would  only  undertake  for 
a  fee,  This  sort  of  strategy  is  what  Dewey  had  in  mind. 
Thus  he  wrote: 
16 
"When  things  have  to  be  made  interesting,  it  is 
because  interest  itself  is  wanting.  Moreover, 
the  phrase  is  a  misnomer.  The  thing,  the  object 
is  no  more  interesting  than  it  was  before.  The 
appeal  is  simply  made  to  the  child's  love  of 
something  else.  " 
A  teacher  can  make  use  of  a  child's  interest  in,  for 
example,  pleasing  his  parents  in  order  to  get  the  child  to 
an  instrumental  task  but  this  is  not  'making  him  interested' 
in  pleasing  his  parents.  It  is  not  originating  in  him  an 
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undertake  work  for  its  own  sake. 
Sears  and  Hilgard17  in  an  essay  on  motivational  aids 
to  learning,  express  clearly,  the  reduction  of  learning  to 
performance  which  is  implied  in  the  strategy  of  treating 
interest  as  a  motivational  aid  and  of  which  4 
we  have  already  given  account.  When  children  are  put  in  a 
situation  in  which  they  need  to  learn  in  order  to  promote 
their  interest  in  pleasing  parents,  then;  'learning'  becomes 
increasingly  a  matter  merely  of  carrying  on  a  performance 
of  the  required  nature.  Sears  and  Hilgardis  therefore  wrote: 
"For  purposes  such  as  those  of  instruction,  the  distinction 
between  learning  and  performance  becomes  somewhat  less  im- 
portant,  since  what  keeps  the  pupil  performing  is  also  like- 
ly  to  keep  him  learning.  Since  the  teacher  has  the  situa- 
tion  firmly  in  control,  though  his  strategy  of  controlling 
the  child's  access  to  what  he  finds  interestings  (such  as 
pleasing  his  parents),  the  pupil  has  to  keep  performing 
work  assigned  in  class  -  and  performing  work  assigned  in 
class  will  mean  keeping  busy  on  any  set  of  tasks  which  to 
the  teacher  equate  with  'desirable  learning'. 
It  seems  to  me  that  arbitrary  connection  of  pre-selected 
subject-matter  with  children's  existing  interests  is  more 
likely  to  kill  the  existing  interests  than  to  create  new 
ones.  Sometimes,  no  doubt,  a  new  interest-doesappear  during 
the  course  of  this  treatment,  in  the  same  sort  of  way  that 
occasionally  a  child  may  acquireza  taste  for  his  medicine, 
after  being  many  times  induced  to  swallow  it  by  the  offer  of 216 
a  sweet.  But,  even  if  a  pupil  does  eventually  grow  inte- 
rested  in  a  subject  originally  studied  for  the  sake  of  an. 
entirely  different  interest,  no  credit  for  this  can  lie  with 
a  teacher  whose  only  reason  for  'stimulating  interests'  was 
r 
in  order  to  make  use  of  them  as  motivational  aids.  Such  a 
teacher  has  not  even  been  trying  to  get  the  child  interested 
in  the  subject,  but  merely  to  engage  repeatedly  in  the  per- 
formance  of  'taking'  it.  To  try  deliberately  to  bring  a 
new  interest  into  being,  therefore,  has  nothing  in  common 
with  using  psychological  pleasures  to  induce  children  to 
undertake  performances.  According  to  White  interest  is  19 
not  explicable  by  attention,  Nor  can  it  be  explained  in 
terms  of  motives  or  reasons.  Being  or  becoming  interested, 
or  showing  an  interest,  is  not  something  we  intentionally 
do.,  it  is  something  we  cannot  here  and  now  help.  To  explain 
a  continuing  interest  is  to  discover  the  sources  of  prone- 
ness,  '  It  can  be  deduced  from  this  that  nothing  which  mere- 
ly  sets  out  to  obligate,  or  tempt,  or  make  children  want  or 
wish  to  become  interested,  can  'make'  them  do  so.  In  the 
same  vien,  we  can  make  children  pay  attention  to  their  sums 
and  try  to  do  all  the  things  which  they  believe  will  enable 
them  to  do  get  them  right,  But  we  cannot  in  the  same  way 
make  them  interested  in  getting  them  right.  White  puts 
the  point  as  follows:  20 
"Attention  may  be  demanded;  interest  has  to  be 
aroused,  It  is  unfair  to  blame  someone  for  not 
serving  an  interest.  ...  Trying  to  get  interested 
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sorry  for  someone;  neither  is  a  matter  of 
trying  to  do  it.  " 
So  we  cannot  get  children  interested  in  something  by 
getting  them  do  anything.  We  have  to  teach  them  the  inte- 
rest  of  it.  Its  interest  is  something  to  be  learned,  in  a 
sense  quite  different  from  that  in  which  'learning'  is 
'performing',  and  more  like  that  in  which  it  means  'seeing 
the  point'  or  'getting  to  understand'.  Getting  to  under- 
stand  what  logically  speaking  makes  a  sum  'right'  is  quite 
different  from  just  trying  to  get  the  sum  right.  'Getting 
to  understand',  like  'becoming  inclined',  is  not  a  matter 
in  'trying  to  do',  nor  a  matter  of  being  'made'  psychologi- 
cally  to  do,  anything  at  all.  You  cannot  make  a  person 
acquire  an  interest  in  cricket  or  poets,  but  you  can  try  to 
teach  a  person  the  distinctive  point  of  these  things. 
So  far  as  it  can  be  seen,  the  only  way  of  engendering 
interest  in  anything  is  through  helping  the  child  to  see 
something  of  its  significance.  'Stimulating'  behaviour  by 
teachers  in  classrooms  (e.  g.  blowing  soap  across  the  room, 
setting  fire  to  newspapers,  starting  a  'green  corner'  or  an 
'interest  table',  playing  electronic  sound  -  effects  records) 
may  'make'  children  excited,  astonished,  apprehensive,  be- 
wildered,  indifferent  and  so  on,  but  unless  there  is  some- 
thing  of  intelligible  interest  in  what  the  teacher  is  doing 
nothing  of  interest  is  likely  to  develop,  The  most  that  a 
teacher  can  do,  I  think,  is  to  try  to  communicate  his  view 
of  what  is  interesting  and  arouses  interest,  but  it  only 
does  so  if  one  can  somehow  show  to  others  what  it  is  that 
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We  must  notice,  finally  in  this  section  that  neither 
arousing  dispositional  interest  nor  engendering  an  occur- 
rent  one  is  the  samething  as  'sustaining'  an  interest  once 
it  exists.  it  is  entirely  catastrophic  to  the  whole  enter- 
prise  of  'learning  through  interest'  to  suggest  that  once 
children  are  interested  there  is  nothing  much  for  the  tea- 
cher  to  do  but  stand  back  and  let  them  get  on  with  it.  On 
this  unfortunate  theory,  teachers  should  'keep  in  the  back- 
ground'  and  just  allow  interests  to  be  followed.  We  do  not 
expect  a  child  of  two  to  be  able  to  pursue  his  interests 
entirely  without  some  form  of  assistance.  The  question  there- 
fore  is,  why,  then,  should  we  assume  that  a  child  of  five, 
ten  or  fifteen,  or  for  that  matter  an  adult  of  fifty,  whose 
interests  by  this  time  are  correspondingly  more  complex, 
will  be  capable  to  pursue  them  without  help? 
We  shall  look  at  the  ideological  reasons  for  this 
assumption  later,  but  for  the  present  it  is  the  sheer  im- 
practicability  of  the  idea  which  we  have  to  stress.  An  in- 
terest  is  an  inclination  to  pay  attention  to  something  and 
to  enter  into  appropriate  active  relationships  with  it.  A 
child,  and  often  an  adult,  cannot  simply  see  what  to  do  in 
the  furtherance  of  his  interest,  as  though  its  cognitive  and 
practical  implications  were  somehow  written  on  it  like  the 
instructions  On  a  puncture  outfit.  He  has  to  learn  what 
these  implications  may  be,  and  the  function,  of  teachers  is 
to  help  him  to  do  so,  if  they  want  him  to  'learn  through I  i 
j 
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interest'.  The  point  (on  this  view)  of  his  going  to  school 
is  that  he  should  there  be  able  to  receive  some  expert  help. 
It  is  entirely  pointless,  therefore,  to  send  him  off  to  school 
and  then  leave  him  there,  while  teachers  and  others,  drop 
off  a  few  stores  now  and  then  to  sustain  his  intellectual 
and  other  'basic  needs'.  Every  child  wishes  that  he  knew 
how  to  do  'properly'  what  he  is  interested  in  doing  -  since 
the  inclination  to  try  to  do  just  this  is  what  'being  inte- 
rested'  means.  For  his  interest  to  be  sustained,  theg,  he 
must  make  progress  in  learning  how  to  pursue  his  interest 
and,  in  doing  so,  learn  ultimately  more  of  what  is  involved 
in  that  interest  itself. 
The  child  needs,  along  with  expert  help  in  learning, 
some  sort  of  enabling  environment  which  contains  resources 
to  pursue  his  interest  with.  With  variety  of  content  and 
flexibility  of  access  in  this  respect,  he  might  be  better 
off  at  home  or  in  the  streets,  : Moreover  the  environment 
must  of  course  be  socially,  as  well  as  materially,  helpful. 
How  forty  to  fifty  children  could  ever  really  be  expected  to 
'learn  through  interest'  while  kept  in  one  room,  for  example, 
is  beyond  my  imagination.  Such  a  setting,  for  five  hours  a 
day,  would  impoverish  the  interests  of  one  child,  let  alone 
of  forty.  To  this  situation  add  the  doctrine-which  stipu- 
lates  in  effect  that  the  teacher  has  no  responsibility  for 
sustaining  interest  anyway,  or  that  he  is  to  do  little  more 
than  stop  fights  and  give  out  supplies,  and  one  begins  to 
understand  why  in  practice  so-called  'learning  through  inte- 220 
rest'  may  become  an  aimless  free-for-all  in  which  children's 
interests  grow  increasingly  trivial,  destructive  or  concealed 
strategically. 
4.  ARE  ALL  INTERESTS  DESIRABLE? 
Hitherto,  it  has  become  clear  that  leaving  children  to 
their  own  devices  is  unlikely  to  help  them  to  sustain  and 
develop  their  interests.  It  is  also  plain  that  of  the  inte- 
rests  which  children  would  like  to  follow,  many  are  wifely 
imprudent,  many  trivial  and  many  ill-chosen  on  moral  grounds; 
and  that  in  any  case  they  cannot  all  be  followed  instantly. 
Some  selection,  then,  must  be  made.  It  is  the  problem  of 
finding  educationally  good  grounds  for  such  selection  with 
which  we  are  concerned  in  this  section. 
(i) 
A  child's  interest  will  always  constitute  'a  good  rea- 
son'  for  his  engaging  in  the  activities  which  he  sees  as 
relevant  to  it.  However,  on  other  grounds,  unconnected  with 
that  interest,  there  may  be  better  reasons  for  his  not  en- 
gaging  in  such  activities  at  all,  or  at  least  not  doing  so 
for  the  time  being  or  in  the  present  circumstances.  Hence 
to  say  that  it  is  good  for  children  to  be  able  to  'follow 
their  interest.  ',  is  true  if  by  this  we  mean  that  engaging 
in  interesting  activity  is  always  something  for  which  the 
presence  of  the  interest  constitutes'  a  good  reason  I. 
But  it  is  not  true  if  by  it  is  meant  that  the  presence  of 
interest  is  always  the  best  reason  for  action  (other  things 221 
considered),  or  that  the  things  which  children  are  interested 
in  are  always  the  best  possible  things  for  them  to  do. 
We  shall  try  to  put  the  point  about  'interests'  and 
'reasons'  in  another  way.  The  word  'need'  whenever  used  in 
referring  to  a  reason  for  action,  it  is  implied  also  that 
reasons  can  be  given  for  the  need}-  Not  only  does  the  'need' 
point  to  a  reason  for  the  action;  beyond  the  action  there 
exist  also  reasons  for  the  need.  For  example,  if  I  say 
that  I  am  reading  a  certain  book  because  I  'need'  to  check 
my  recollection  of  a  particular  point  in  its  argument,  it 
is  implied  (by  my  use  of  the  word  'need')  that  reasons  exist, 
in  turn,  for  my  need  to  check  my  recollection.  Indeed,  if 
you  question  me  further,  I  might  explain,  for  example,  that 
I  have  a  poor  memory  and  therefore  always  'need'  to  check 
back  to  the  original  source  in  order  to  be  sure  of  a  point. 
In  this  way,  with  you  questioning  and  me  answering,  a  depen- 
dent  chain  of  'needs'  may  be  revealed,  or  in  other  words  a 
chain  of  'reasons  for,  my  action  in  reading  the  book.  Beyond 
my  reason  would  lie  a  range  of  further  reasons  extrinsic  to 
that  activity.  Beyond  the  activity  of  reading  the  book  would 
be  a  logically  interminable  sequence  of  activities,  the  per- 
formance  of  each  one  a  possible  pre-requisite  to  the  perfor- 
mance  of  the  next.  'hedds'  are  'reasons  for  action'  then, 
only  because  someone  (and  not  necessarily  the  person  in  need) 
can  point  to  extrinsic  reasons  for  the  needs.  By  contrast, 
although  'interests'  are  'reasons  for  action'  too,  this  is 
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to  be  for  those  interests.  By  pointing  out  extrinsic  reasons 
for  an  interest  such  as  for  example  the  circumstances  in 
which  it  first  arose,  one  would  not  be  doing  anything  to 
justify  its  pursuit.  To  give  good  'reasons  for  action'  in 
pursuing  it,  the  most  that  one  could  do  would  be  to  try  to 
explain  to  the  questioner  the  intrinsic  reasons  for  its 
interest  or  to  bring  home  to  him  exactly  what  it  was  which 
one  was  finding  interesting  in  it.. 
It  follows  then,  that  'interest',  by  contrast  with 
'need'  is  always  'good  reason'  for  action;  and  if  all  that 
we  are  concerned  with  is  the  possible  value  or  good  intrin- 
sic  to  an  action,  then  the  child  should  'follow  his  interest' 
and  we  should  help  him.  But  if  we  are  concerned  also  (as 
we  almost  always  are)  with  values  extrinsic  to  that  action, 
then  we  must  weigh  up  whether  there  are.  not  also  other  and 
better  reasons  for  putting  a  stop  to  it,  at  least  for  the 
time  being.  For  example,  if  the  child's  interest  is  morally 
obnoxious  then,  on  moral  grounds  there  are  better  reasons 
for  stopping  it. 
Thus,  'needs'  presuppose  values;  'interests'  do  not. 
There  is  always  value  'in'  my  interest,  even  though  what  I 
value  may  turn  out  to  be  utterly  worthless  in  terms  of  any- 
thing  else  than  its  interest,  and  even  though  the  pursuit  of 
it  may  be  positively  detrimental  to  the  achievement  of  other 
goals.  In  the  second  part  of  this  section  I  shall  argue  that 
the  educative  task  of  teachers  is  to  help  children  to  under- 
stand  more  fully  and  to  practise  more  effectively  some  of 223 
the  things  which  they  find  interesting,  and  thus  to  get  a 
measure  of  the  value  intrinsic  to  them. 
(ii) 
The  view  of  education  we  have  been  describing  here  has 
often  been  labelled  'child-centred  education'.  But  this 
does  not  mean  that  a  teacher  should  stand  back  and  just  allow 
children  to  pursue  whatever  interests  come  into  their  heads. 
The  point  of  calling  education  'child-centred'  lies  in  em- 
phasising  that  even  when  the  person  who  is  being  educated 
is  a  child  and  even,  therefore,  when  his  interests  often 
seem  'childish!  or  silly  or  undesirable  from  the  view  of  his 
adult  teachers,  nevertheless  his  education  can  only  proceed 
through  the  pursuit  of  his  interests,  since  it  is  these  and 
only  these  which  for  him  are  of  intrinsic  value.  However, 
ridiculous  a  child's  interests  may  seem,  there  is  nothing 
else  in  terms  of  which  he  can  become  more  'educated'.  He 
can  be  'schooled*'  to  adopt  adult  values,  but  only  at  the  ex- 
pense  of  learning  his  own  values. 
A  person's  interests,  dispositional  and  occurrent,  re- 
present  his  capacity  to  find  intrinsic  value  in  the  circums- 
tance  of  living,  and  his  inclination  to  pursue  or  seek  such 
value  in  terms  of  feeling  and  understanding  and  of  activity 
which  seems  appropriate  to  its  practical  point.  Such  a  per- 
son's  'education'  consists  in  whatever  helps  him  to  develop 
this  capacity  for  valuing  and  this  inclination  to  pursue  what 
is  valued.  Thus  whatever  enables  him  to  appreciate  and  under- 
stand  his  interest  more  fully,  and  to  pursue  it  more  actively 224 
and  effectively  is  'educative'.  ßut  this  does  not  imply 
that  it  is  incumbent  upon  teachers  to  offer  assitance  in  the 
pursuit  of  anything  and  evexhing  which  catches  the  interest 
of  a  particular  child.  Still  less  does  it  mean  that  they 
should  stand  aside,  or  merely  'follow'  the  child  down 
'divergent  paths'.  There  is  a  difference  between  helping  a 
child  to  follow  an  interest  for  himself,  and  abandoning  him 
to  get  on  with  it  by  himself. 
In  pursuing  an  interest  no  one  can  ever  say  in  advance 
exactly  how  it  is  going  to  turn  out.  In  it,  one  is  nottrying 
to  approximate  a  norm  of  action,  or  in  other  words  to  do  what 
the  majority  of  people  might  agree  that  one  'needs'  to  do. 
It  is  not  a  matter  of  trying  to  conform  to  proven  a  consensual 
standards  or  norms  of  value.  It  is  more  like  trying  to  find 
out  more  about  what  it  is  which  gives  value  to  norms.  In 
principleýý.,  this  is  a  risky  business.  In  gaining  what  is  of 
value  in  an  interest,  we  might  lose  other  values  which  pre- 
viously  we  had  achieved  in  other  directions,  or  jeopardize 
the  future  achievement  of  further  values  in  store.  Just  as 
each  new  understanding  which  we  gain  restructures  our  entire 
conceptual  grasp  of  world  in  which  we  live,  so  each  new  value 
which  we  find  or  seek,  in  pursuing  an  interest,  brings  about 
a  shift  -  and  sometimes  a  radical  shift  -  in  our  entire  cur- 
rent  scale  of  values.  Such  changes,  although  pursued  for 
their  interest,  are  by  no  means  always  in  our  interest,  let 
alone  in  the  interest  of  anyone  else.  Children,  therefore, 
and  perhaps  especially  children  educationally  speaking,  need 225 
constantly  the  kind  of  confidence  to  proceed  which  comes 
from  receiving  effective  help.  This  effective  help  is  the 
educative  function  of  teachers. 
By  contrast,  then,  with  the  kind  of  manipulative  changing 
of  behaviour  which  we  have  already  described,  'teaching'  of 
an  educative  kind  consists  in  helping  children  to  structure 
their  experience  and  activity  in  ways  which  enable  them  to 
see  more  of  its  intrinsic  point  and  value.  I  am  trying  to 
suggest  that  children  benefit  'educationally'  by  learning 
how  to  pursue  their  interests  both  more  effectively  and  in  an 
increasingly  selective  and  discriminating  way,  and  that  'edu- 
cational'teaching'  therefore  is  whatever  intentionally  serves 
to  bring  about  this  end.  It  does  not  mean  that  anything  and 
everything  which  a  particular  person  values  is  bound  to  prove 
valuable  or  to  be  most  worth  pursuing  here  and  now.  A  child's 
interests  are  already  selective,  Through  them  he  begins  to 
discriminate  intelligible  and  possibly  valuable  features  of  the 
world.  Trying  to  pursue  an  interest  means  always,  then, 
trying  to  see  those  features  more  amd  more  clearly  and  in 
doing  so,  trying  out  (as  it  were)  their  possible  value,  The 
child's  educational  need  is  to  be  sustained  and  helped  through 
these  trials,  so  that  his  interests  neither  become  fixed  in 
some  stereotyped  form  through  his  inability  to  see  how  to 
develop  them  further,  But  neither  on  educational  grounds 
nor  on  any  other  grounds  does  the  child  'need'  to  pursue  all 
his  interests.  Indeed,  it  is  only  on  educational  grounds  that 226 
he  'needs'  to  pursue  any  of  them.  There  is  room,  then,  for 
prudence,  practicality,  morality,  etc.  to  be  considered, 
when  the  selection  is  being  made,  ""  to  which  of  the  interests 
should  be  accommodated  in  school, 
if  these  'other  grounds'  however  are  being  considered 
both  by  children  and  by  teachers  to  the  exclusion  of  inte- 
rests  then  school  becomes  a  place  where  no  education  can 
possibly  be  going  on  at  all.  If  one  were  always  to  be 
prudent,  it  would  be  unwise  ever  to  pursue  an  interest  for 
its  own  sake,  because  of  the  unavoidable  risks  involved, NOTES  AND  REFERENCES 
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1.  DISCIPLINE  AND  CLASS  CONTROL 
The  notions  of  discipline  and  control  are  often  confused, 
All  philosophers  would  probably  agree  that  the  term  discipline 
always  denotes  a  state  of  order,  and  most  would  say  that  in 
an  educational  context  discipline  is  order  which  facilitates 
approved  and  often  planned  learning.  Some  writers  would 
argue  however  that  not  all  such  order  is  properly  called  dis- 
cipline.  Key  issues  are  the  source  of  the  order  (Is  it  im- 
posed  by  the  learner  himself  or  by  someone  else?  )  and  the 
reasons  for  which  it  is  imposed.  Thus  Hughes  and  Hughes1 
maintain  that  the  source  or  origin  of  control  is  the  import- 
ant  factor  in  distinguishing  discipline  from  other  states  of 
order. 
"It  is  regrettable  that  the  word  "discipline"'  is 
often  used  as  if  it  were  a  synonym  for  "order", 
and  it  will  help  to  clarify  our  thinking  if  we 
use  it  in  a  more  limited  sensed  Discipline,  we 
suggest  is  a  term  that  should  be  reserved  to 
describe  a  state  of  mind;  order,  on  the  other 
hand,  is  a  state  of  affairs.  At  the  extremes, 
order  is  of  two  kinds,  somewhat  similar  in  out- 
ward  appearance  but  radically  different  in  origin. 
It  may  be  a  state  of  affairs  imposed  on  unwilling 
pupils  by  external  authority,  or  it  may  be  a 
state  of  affairs  -  the  result  of  pupils  willingly 
submitting  themselves  to  certain  good  influences. 
This  willing  submission  to  outside  influence  is 
the  very  essence  of  discipline.....  " 
"...  it  is  clear  then  that  discipline  is  a  state 
of  mind,  the  acquirement  of  which  needs  the  active 
co-operation  of  the  pupil  himself.  True  discipline 
is  always  in  the  last  resort  self-discipline.....  " 
Most  other  wiiters,  and  probably  most  teachers,  would 
take  a  less  restricted  view  and  define  discipline  in  schools 
as  all  order  which  facilitates  either  planned  learning,  or 231 
unplanned  learning  which  in  retrospect  is  judged  to  be  de- 
sirable.  Most  would  wish  to  distinguish  however  between 
order  which  is  externally  imposed  by  teachers  on  pupils,  and 
that  which  derives  from  the  pupils  themselves  for  whatever 
reasons  -  whether  because  they  perceive  it  as  necessary  in 
order  to  get  something  they  value  such  as  tot  grade  or  the 
teachers  approval,  or  because  they  want  to  avoid  punishment, 
or  have  internalised  certain  norms  of  behaviour,  or  are 
spontaneously  interested  in  the  task  in  hand.  All  these 
reasons  could  according  to  this  less  restricted  view  of  the 
term  be  operative  in  situations  properly  described  as 
disciplined.  2 
But  this  interpretation  of  discipline  confuses  discipline 
with  control  in  that  Stenhouse  includes  discussion  of  tech- 
niques  of  pupil  management  in  his  teatment  of-discipline 
in  schools. 
On  the  topic  of  discipline  John  S.  Brubacher  states: 
"A  special  instance  of  the  social  and  moral  infra-F 
structure  of  the  school  that  deserves  separate 
mention  is  discipline.  Whether  one's  educational 
philosophy  call,  %  for  much  or  little  freedom, 
certain  optimum  social  conditions  must  obtain 
in  the3school  if  effective  learning  is  to  take 
place,  11 
Then  he  goes  on  to  equate  discipline  with  law  and  order 
and  maintains  that  Law  and.  order  are  as  necessary  for  the 
carrying  on  of  instruction  as  they  are  for  the  ordinary  pur- 
suits  of  everyday  life  outside  school. 
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But  why  equate  dis- 
cipline  with  law  and  order?  Surely  such  a  view  sounds  odd 
and  misguided  in  educational  contexts. 232 
George  Partridge  and  Felix  Pe'caut  make  discipline  a 
condition  precedent  to  instruction  in  schools.  They  writes 
"There  must  be  a  certain  amount  of  order  and 
quiet  before  instruction  can  begin.  Indeed 
maintaining  order  and  giving  instruction  are 
almost  two  different  functions  of  the  teacher. 
Under  such  conditions  codes  of  discipline 
usually  state  the  rules.  In  these,  prompt 
obedience  to  the  will  of  the  teacher  is  the 
first  and  great  commandment. 
5 
On  this  view  the  teacher  may  give  reasons  for  his  request, 
but  he  need  not.  Children  should  obey  simply  because  the 
teacher  in  loco  parentis  wills  it.  And  it  is  claimed  that  in 
doing  so,  the  children  are  really  obedient  to  the  moral  law 
itself. 
Another  approach  makes  discipline  coincident  to  interest- 
ing  instruction.  Here  the  teacher,  whose  enthusiasifor  his 
field  of  specialisation  should  be  so  contagious  that  it 
spreads  to  his  pupils,  need  not  bother  about  discipline  as  a 
separate  concern.  Children  will  be  so  engrossed  in  the  curri- 
culum  that  their  interest  will  afford  a  self-discipline  (as 
opposed  to  externally  imposed  control).  According  to  this 
theory,  there  is  such  a  moral  and  spiritual  unity-between 
pupil  and  teacher  that  the  docility  of  the  former  as  a  con- 
6 
dition  precedent  to  instruction  never  arises. 
Still-yet,  another  method  goes  even  beyond  utilising 
interest  to  transfer  the  locus  of  authority  for  maintaining 
discipline  from  the  teacher  alone  to  the  class  as  a  whole. 
Here  rule  by  the  one  gives  way  to  rule  by  the  many.  '  Social 
order  in  the  school  becomes  a  function  of  a  group  purpose. 233 
If  children  are  comparatively  engaged  with  the  teacher,  in 
a  joint  project,  pursuit  of  the  common  end  will  enforce  its 
own  order. 
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we  can  see  at  a  glance  that  discussions  about  discipline 
and  order  can  lead  to  different  interpretations.  To  escape 
misinterpretation  we  need  to  make  clear  the  view  of  discipline 
to  which  we  subscribe. 
It  is  agreed  that  both  discipline  and  control  are  forms 
of  order,  but  the  order  in  each  cgce  is  of  a  logically  diffe- 
rent  kind.  In  the  former  case,  the  order  in  a  'disciplined 
activity  is  achieved  by  virtue  of  reasons  implicit  in,  or 
for  the  sake  of  values  intrinsictD  the  activity  itself. 
In  the  latter  case,  the  order  of  a  'controlled'  activity  or 
sequence  of  events  is  achieved  for  reasons  unconnected  with, 
or  of  values  extrinsic  to,  the  activity.  Thus  a  'control' 
is  a  way  of  ordering  things  which  is  considered  necessary  for 
getting  something  done.  By  contrast,  'a  discipline'  is  the 
form  of  logical  and  evaluative  order  which  must  be  learned 
if  one  is  to  understand  what  is  involved  in  doing  something. 
Both  control  and  discipline  involve  compulsion,  but  in  the  former 
the  compulsion  is  not  in  the  first  instance  a  logical  or  a 
moral  one.  It  is  not  achieved  through  the  force  of  a  logical 
or  of  a  moral  imperative.  The  force  is  physical,  as  when  we 
arrange  for  things  to  be  physically  manipulated  in  certain 
ways  (the  'controls',  of  an  aircraft),  or  psychological,  as 
when  we  employ  psychological  sanctions  to  ensure  that  people 
or  animals  behave  in  certain  ways  (e.  g.  police  'control'  of 234 
traffic,  military  'control',  the  'control'  of  the  lion-tamer 
over  his  troop).  In  discipline  on  the  other  hand,  the  com- 
pulsion  involved  has  nothing  to  do  with  the  physical  and 
psychological  force  which  backs-orders  or  instructions  in  the 
sense  of  commands.  When  instruction  entres  into  the  achieve- 
ment  of  discipline,  it  is  'instruction'  in  the  sense  of  tea- 
ching,  not  in  the  sense  of  giving  orders.  When  we  'order' 
or'instruct'  someone  to  do  something,  as  in  giving  commands, 
we  are  not  teaching  him  what  to  do.  We  are  just  telling  him. 
When  we  exercise  'control'  over  people,  therefore,  we 
are  not  'disciplining'  them.  The  question  'who  is  in  command 
here?  '  or  'who  is  in  control  here?  '  means  'who  is  responsible 
for  getting  things  done  in  this  situation?  "  It  does  not 
mean  'who  is  getting  the  people  here  into  a  disciplined 
frame  of  mind?  '  'Control'  over  people  is  a  way  of  delibera- 
tely  putting  them  in  an  order  designed  or  intended  to  accom- 
plish  some  purpose  to  the  achievement  of  which  (in  that  order) 
they  are  merely  a  means.  Thus  it  seems  to  me  that  the  de- 
vices  which  Oskar  Spiel 
8 
mentions  in  his  book  'Discipline 
without  Punishments  have  nothing  to  do  with  discipline  at  all. 
Then  there  is  also  the  question  of  instructing'a  waiter-to 
fetch  us  dinner;  following  instructions  printed  on  a  route- 
guide.  This  form  of  order  (in  serving  dinner  or  following 
route-guide  to  get  to  another  part  of  the  country)  is  not 
achieved  merely  by  submission  or  obedience  to  orders  in  the 
sense  of  commands,  but  by  trying  to  see  what  the  point  of 
the  order  is.  It  is  a  matter  of  discipline.  In  other  words 235 
a  matter  of  trying  to  learn  what  is  involved  in  doing  what 
is  being  ordered. 
Similarly,  when  we  talk  of  a  teacher  'controlling'  his 
class,  or  his  class  'controlling'  him,  although  a  form  of 
order  is  present  in  both  cases,  in  neither  case  are  we 
talking  about  'discipline'.  In  so  far  as  relationship  be- 
tween  teacher  and  class  is  simply  one  of  means  to  ends,  in 
which  each  tries  merely  to  get  the  other  to  do  something  , 
then  each  purpose  is  accomplished  at  the  moment  when,  will- 
ingly  or  unwillingly,  the  other  does  it.  It  is  quite  irre- 
levant  whether  or  not  the  children  (or  the  teacher)  can  see 
the  intrinsic  point  of  what  they  are  being  ordered  to  do, 
so  long  as  they  do  it.  When  the  teacher  commands  the  class, 
for  example,  to  sit  down,  stop  talking,  be  quiet,  pay  atten- 
tion,  listen  carefully  and  so  on,  there  is  no  clue  in  his 
commands  as  to  what  the  point  of  obeying  them  could  conceive- 
ly  be.  If  all  that  the  teacher  is  trying  to  do  (at  the 
start  of  a  lesson,  for  example)  is  to  'gain  control',  then 
he  is  almost  bound  to  fail  to  brig  the  class  to  order.  As 
I  pointed  out  earlier  George  Partridge  and  Felix  Peicaut9 
think  such  an  approach  is  discipline.  But  this  is  misleading 
because  if  the  teacher  is  to  obtain  more  than  momentary  and 
unco-ordinated  obedience,  his  children  must  be  able  to  see 
something  of  the  point  in  the  order  for  which  he  is  asking. 
As  students  on  teaching  practice  find  out  to  their  cost  when 
they  are  advised  to  get  the  class  absolutely  quiet  before 
they  start  teaching,  if  one  merely  orders  quiet,  one  may 
wait  for  ever.  It  is  impossible  to  get  thirty  or  forty  child- 236 
ren  simultaneously  quiet  for  more  than  a  moment  or  so  unless 
they  can  see  some  point  or  value  in  the  constraint.  'Getting 
the  class  quiet'  is  a  matter  of  discipline,  not  merely  of 
'gaining  control'.  It  is  not  something  to  be  done  before, 
but  rather  it  is  part  of,  'starting  to  teach. 
it  is  a  mistake,  it  seems  to  me  to  contrast  discipline 
not  with  control,  as  we  are  trying  to  do,  but  with  order 
(as  in,  for  example,  Harold  Entwistle's10  Child  -  Centred 
Education)  since  discipline  is  itself,  a  form  of  order. 
Similarly,  it  merely  confuses  the  issue,  it  seems  to  me,  to 
speak  of  control  metaphorically  as  'external'  discipline, 
since,  the  whole  point  of  the  term  'discipline'  as  we  are  using 
it,  is  that  the  orderliness  charahteristic  of  it  is  'internal' 
to  the  activity  or  relationship  in  question.  A  discipline 
relationship  between  teacher  and  class  is  one  in  which  both 
parties  to  the  relationship  (the  teacher  as  well  as  the  class) 
submit  to  the  educative  order  of  the  task  in  hand.  The  'dis- 
cipline'  is  not  something  which  one  party  to  the  relationship 
possesses  over  or  manages  to  impose  upon  the  other.  Unless 
the  person  being  disciplined,  as  well  as  the  one  doing  the 
disciplining,  can  see  at  least  something  of  the  valuable 
point  of  the  proposed  order,  then  he  will  not  submit  to  it 
for  its  sake  (for  its  intrinsic  value)  but  only,  if  at  all, 
for  the  sake  of  values  'external'  to  it.  In  this  case,  to  say 
that  he  is  being  'externally'  disciplined  sounds  like  a  con- 
tradiction  in  terms.  It  would  be  clearer  to  say  that  his 
behaviour  was  being  controlled  by  considerations  external  to 237 
the  logic  of  the  task  in  hand.  Thus,  if  a  child  tried  to 
get  his  sums  right  only  because  he  valued  the  gold  star  which 
his  teacher  would  then  give  him,  I  would  not  call  the  rala- 
tionship  between  teacher  and  child  a  'disciplined'  one.  Ins- 
tead  I  would  say  that  the  teacher  was  'controlling'  the  child, 
and  that  the  child  was  'controlling'  himself,  through  the 
desire  for  gold  stars.  By  contrast,  if  the  child  had  under- 
stood  something  of  what  'right'  means,  and  had  seen,  there- 
fore,  that  there  is  no  point  or  value  in  (or  intrinsic  to) 
the  activity  of  'doing  sums'  unless  one  is  trying  to  get  them 
'right',  then  I  would  call  his  effort  to  get  his  sums  right 
a  'disciplined'  one, 
Discipline,  then,  is  educative  order.  The  word  'disci- 
pline'  refers  always  to  the  kind  of  order  involved  in  trying 
1o  reach  appropriate  standards  or  follow  appropriate  rules 
for  engaging  in  a  valued  activity.  The  valued  activity  may 
be  a  very  personal  one;  it  might  involve  the  learning,  even, 
of  an  entire  way  of  life  (as  in  'discipleship').  It  may  be 
a  highly  intellectual  activity  (as  in  the  'discipline'  of 
different  forms  of  thought  such  as  history  and  mathematics), 
or  a  practical  or  an  aesthetic  or  a  moral  one,  The  point  in 
each  case,  however,  is  that  any  valued  activity,  so  long  as 
it  is  distinguishably  one  activity  and  not  another  (and  so 
long,  therefore,  as  there  are  discoverable  rules  and  standards 
proper  to  it),  must  be  engaged  in  a  more  or  less  disciplined 
way  if  it  is  to  retain  its  interest.  The  sense  of  the  word 
'must  here  is  not  the  commanding  or  manipulating  sense  which 238 
has  its  proper  place  within  a  system  of  control.  It  is  the 
logical  or  moral  sense  which  belongs  in  the  setting  of 
educative  teaching  and  learning. 
Unlike  control  (whether  'self-control'  or  'external  con- 
trol')  discipline  does  not  involve  the  setting  up  of  some 
previously  non-existent  order,  or  the  gaining  of  regulative 
powers  over  something  previously  regulated  differently  or  not 
at  all.  It  involves  getting  to  understand  more  of  the  sort 
of  order  which  is  already  more  or  less  explicit  in  what  one 
is  trying  to  do.  One  does  not  'set  up'  the  disciplines  in- 
volved  in  something  like  mathematics,  as  one  'sets  up'  a 
system  of  control.  The  features  of  mathematics  in  virtue 
of  which  we  call  it  a  'disciplined'  study  are  already,  as  it 
were,  'there'.  They  are  not  'there'  or  in  existence  in  the 
sense,  however,  in  which  the  hinder  in  a  game  of  hide-and- 
seek  is  'there'  -  'ready'  to  be  'discovered'.  They  are  'there' 
more  in  the  sense  in  which  America  was  'there'  for  Christopher 
Columbus  -  little  more  than  a  direction  in  which  to  travel, 
towards  a  form  or  shape  of  things  only  partly  understood. 
If  one  is  interested  in  the  study  of  mathematics,  having  some 
inkling  of  what  it  is  about,  one  is  then  concerned  to  become 
further  instructed  in  it  and  hence  to  discover  more  of  those 
special  features  in  virtue  of  which  it  is  the  sort  of  study 
which  it  is.  Receiving  such  'instruction'  does  not  consist 
in  obeying  commands  which  contain  no  clue  as  to  the  point  of 
the  order  being  asked  for.  It  consists  in  trying  to  under- 
stand  the  informative  directives  with  which  the  teacher  helps 239 
his  pupils  to  see  more  explicitly  the  'form'  or  order  of  the 
mathematical  task  or  situation  which  they  find  interesting. 
One  does  not  set  out  to  'get'  discipline  over  other 
people  or  over  oneself,  though  one  may  try  to  gain  control 
in  this  way.  A  disciplined  social  group  does'not  behave  in 
a  disciplined  way  because  someone  in  particular  is  in  con- 
trol  over  it  or  has  responsibility  for  it,  but  because  its 
members  are  themselves  concerned  to  discover  increasingly  the 
features  in  virtue  of  which  it  is  the  particular  and  distinc- 
tive  group  in  which  its  members  are  interested.  If  they 
share  no  interest,  they  cannot  become  more  disciplined  group. 
Their  'discipline'  is  the  educative  order  in  virtue  of  which 
there  continues  to  be  some  distinctive  and  intelligible  point 
in  their  existence  as  a  group. 
What  I  have  argued  so  far  is  that  discipline  must  be 
self-imposed  order,  but  the  reasons  for  which  the  order  is 
imposed  are  also  crucial.  Order  is  properly  called  disciplined 
only  if  pupils  impose  it  on  their  own  behaviour  because  they 
are  interested  in  a  particular  activity  and  value  it  for 
its  own  sake.  Order  imposed  for  reasons  external  to  the 
ý 
task  in  hand  is  more  appropriately  called  control  -  self  con- 
trol  if  imposed  by  the  agent,  external  control  if  imposed 
by  others, 
Elsewhere  in  this  thesis  I  have  tried  to  explain  that 
one  criterion  of  a  child's  interestedness  in  something  will 
depend  upon  his  willingness  to  seek  various  forms  of  order 
in  its  pursuit.  The  child  can  achieve  this  by  trying  to 
engage  in  his  interest  in  a  disciplined  way  rather  than  just 240 
doing  things  impulsively.  Ultimately,  then,  what  makes,,  the 
.,  reasons  for  his  activity  intelligible  is  his  interest.  To 
understand  his  reasons  for  acting  in  a  particular  way  we 
must  be  able  to  share  in  his  interest.  But  there  are  tryin 
moments  when  the  child  is  no  longer  able  to  offer  reasons 
for  his  actions..  At  this  point  the  teacher  Is  most  likely 
to  abandon  his  responsibility  to  share  and  help  the  child  in 
his  interest.  In  other  words,  it  is  when  the  teacher,  too, 
seems  to  be  missing  the  point  of  the  child's  interest  that 
the  educative  order  of  the  situation  is  liable  to  break  down 
and  therefore  some  form  of  control  is  substituted. 
But  if  we  are  sure  either  that  there  is  harm  in  what  the 
child  is  doing  or  that  no  prOgress  is  possible  in  it  in  the 
present  circumstances,  then  obviously  we  are  right  to  put 
a  stop  to  it.  But  on  what  grounds  should  we  be  sure?  If 
our  only  reason  for  calling  it  'harmful'  is  that  it  seems 
imprudent  by  current  general  norms  of  health  or  harm,  rather 
than  by  our  particular  judgement  as  to  its  possible  health 
or  harm,  and  if  our  only  reason  for  seeing  no.  -'future'  in  it 
is  that  it  does  not  happen  to  belong  to  what  is  currently  on 
the  list  of  things  generally  considered  worthwhile  for  child- 
ren  to  be  initiated  Into,  then  to  stop  the  activity  would 
be  mistaken. 
more  often  than  not,  a  confusion  can  arise  between  those 
occasions  on  which  children  have  to  be  controlled,  with  those 
in  which  both  children  and  teachers  are  learning  to  think 
about  something  In  a  more  disciplined  way.  As  we  have  al- 
ready  pointed  out,  the  control  of  children  could  never  be 241 
something  which  helps  initiate  them  into  thinking  in  a  dis- 
ciplined  way.  What  interests  children  is  not  something 
which  we  can  control  "externally"  (or  which  they  can  control 
"internally")*  On  the  contrary,  It  is  because  they  find 
some  things  interesting  that  we  can  control  them  at  all  (by 
controlling  the  conditions  under  which  we  permit  them  to 
pursue  those  interests).  Our  educative  task,  then,  as  dis- 
tinct  from  but  not  Necessarily  opposed  to  our  prudential 
task  in  controlling  and  schooling  them,  is  to  help  them  to 
elaborate  and  differentiate  the  disciplined  character  of  the 
thinking  which  they  are  already  engaged  in,  in  pursuit  of 
what  they  find  interesting. 
One  might  be  concerned  with  pupils'  activities  on  other 
grounds,  such  as  whether  they  were  dangerous,  for  example, 
or  involved  harm  to  others  -  and  on  these  grounds  one  would 
have  to  exercise  some  control  over  the  activities  and  the 
pupils.  It  would  be  absurd,  for  example,  to  let  a  child 
dash  across  a  busy  street  in  front  of  traffic  merely  on  the 
educative  ground  that  he  was  extremely  Interested  in  something 
happening  on  the  other  side  of  the  road.  Nevertheless,  in 
advance  of  knowing  what  activities  were  interesting  to  pupils, 
one  could  never  rule  out  any  activity  at  all  on  the  grounds 
that  it  was  inherently  uneducative,  nor  could  one  have  any 
educational  ground  for  declaring  that  there  are  some  things 
rather  than  others  which  all  pupils,  regardless  of  their 
interest  must  study.  The  view  of  education  being  presented 
here  is  not  in  complete  accord  with  the  notion  of  education 242 
as  the  passing  on  of  what  is  worthwhile.  It  is  this  notion 
of  worthwhileness  with  which  the  next  section  is  concerned. 
2.  REGARD  FOR  WORTHWHILE  COMMITMENTS 
School  (academic)  subjects,  among  other  things  (art, 
beauty,  love  etc.  )  are  often  said  to  be  pursued  for  their  own 
sake.  There  are  a  range  of  studies,  it  is  claimed,  which 
are  valuable  in  themselves,  and  must  be  pursued  as  ends  in 
themselves,  rather  than  as  a  means  to  ends,  outside  them- 
selves.  They  are,  furthermore,  somehow  corrupted,  and  lose 
their  integrity,  if  they  are-conceived  as  a  means  to  some 
other  end,  however  valuable  it  may  be.  The  notion  that  there 
are  intrinsically 
worthwhile  activities,  the  value  of  which 
cannot  be  guaged  by,  nor  thought  to  originate  in  considera- 
tions  external  to  the  activity,  itself,  is  not  one  that 
squares  with  any  of  those  main  theories  which  actually  pro- 
vide  justifications  for  answers  to  questions  of  the  form 
"What  ought  i  to  do?  "  The  intuitionist  could  answer  such 
questions  about  academic  pursuits  as  glibly  as  he  has  ans- 
wered  all.  previous  questions  as  to  the  value  of  certain  courses 
of  action  over  others,  with  claims.  to  intuitive  knowledge  of 
much  activities  were  intrinsically  worthwhile.  The  emotivist 
and  the  prescriptivist  theories  attribute  meanings  to  moral 
terms  such  that  a  justification  of  such  answers  is  not 
called  for  in  general  terms.  If  an  activity  is  to  be  justi- 
fied  on  a  utilitarian  or  on  a  religious  basis,  then  it  will 
be  judged  as  being  instrumental  to  the  attainment  of  some 
value  more  central  to  the  scheme  of  justification  in  question, 243 
i.  e.,  maximizing  happiness  for  the  greatest  number,  attain- 
ing  salvation  or  knowledge  of  God.  A  more  sophisticated 
naturalistic  justification  would  still  have  to  relate  the 
pursuit  of  these  activities  to  some  factual  considerations 
(about  human  nature)  external  to  the  activities  themselves 
and  would  have  to  contend  with  the  great  difficulty(,  that  these 
activities  are  characteristically  carried  on  in  their  'high- 
est'  form  by  a  very  small  and  extraordinary  section  of  man- 
kind,  so  it  would  be  hard  to  see  how  the  justification  of 
their  pursuit  could  lie  in  a  general  account  of  human  nature. 
Not  only  is  the  subject  matter  of  these  activities 
held  to  have  intrinsic  value,  but  it  is  also  held  to  govern 
very  closely  how  these  activities  should  be  carried  on:  a 
certain  reference  or  respect  is  demanded,  i.  e.  in  the  plea 
'Art  for  arts  sakes,  in  the  defence,  of  scholastic  methods 
and  procedure,  and  in  the  view  that  the  natural  science 
when  properly  carried  on,  represent  the  untrammelled  pursuit 
of  truth,  (often  with  a  conspicuous  neglect  of  the  evils 
which  it  may  be  instrumental  in  promoting.  If  such  views 
are  to  be  sanctioned,  then  the  justification  of  claims  that 
some  activities,  rather  than  others,  have  intrinsic  value 
should  be  forthcoming. 
R.  S.  Peters11  and  A.  P.  Griffiths12  are  prominent  supporters 
of  this  view  in  present  day  educational  philosophy,  and  the 
argument  Professor  R.  S.  Peters,  in  particular,  has  produced 
to  support  the  notion  that  there  are  intrinsically  worth- 
while  activities,  is  on  his  own  admission,  central  to  the 244 
overall  philosophical  view  of  education  that  he  has  presented. 
'TRANSCEDENTAL  ARGUMENTS':  The  sort  of  argument  by 
Peters  to  show  that  'curriculum  activities'  are  intrinsi- 
cally  worthwhile  bears  a  close  resemblance  to  the  argument 
he  employes'  to  establish  the  principle  of  justice. 
13 
The 
general  strategy  of  this  form  of  argument  is  to  show  that 
certain  presuppositions,  which  must  underlie  any  serious 
enquiry  of  the  type  in  question,  will,  on  close  examination 
reveal  that  the  questioner  is  already  committed  to  a  certain 
answer  to  the  question.  Peters'  argument  for  the  principle 
of  justice  is  better  understood  than  his  argument  for  the 
intrinsic  value  of  certain  activities  but  while  we  could 
sketch  the  former  argument  to  illustrate  what  it  seems  to 
me  to  constitute  its  success,  I  will  rather  devote  attention 
for  the  argument  in  respect  of  the  intrinsic  value  of  parti- 
cular  curriculum  activities. 
It  is,  Peters14  says,  because  some  activities  rather 
than  others  best  exemplify  or  most  explicitly  embody  disci- 
plined,  inquiry,  that  we  should  place  these  activities 
compulsorily  at  the  centre  of  the  school  curriculum  for  all. 
The  very  fact  that  we  are  concerned  to  give  good  reasons 
for  a  curriculum  is  itself  the  best  possible  reason  for 
getting  pupils  going  on  those  theoretical  pursuits  such  as 
science  and  history  in  which  the  different  forms  of  disciplined 
thought  can  be  seen  (by  us,  at  least)  in  their  most  highly 
developed  state. 
Whenever  a  teacher  or  a  pupil  starts  to  think  seriously 
about  what  he  is  doing  (as  he  must  start  to  think,  if  he  is 245 
going  to  engage  in  it  in  a  disciplined,  educationally  worth- 
while  way),  then,  argues,  Peters,  he  is  bound  to  find  him- 
self  involved  in  the  sorts  of  intellectural  pursuit  of  which 
ultimately  (as  we,  at  least,  can  see)  the  curriculum  of  a 
university  is  largely  constructed.  Thus,  he  says: 
"It  would  be  irrational  for  a  person  who  seriously 
asks  himself  the  question  'why  do  this  rather  than 
that?  '  to  close  his  mind  arbitrarily  to  any  form 
of  inquiry  which  might  throw  on  the  question  which 
he  is  asking.  "15 
Therefore,  he  argues,  if  the  curriculum  of  any  child's  school- 
ing  is  to  be  educationally  justifiable,  it  must  include  in- 
tellectual  pursuits  which  we  can  see  as  best  exemplifying 
the  giving  of  good  reasons  for  anything,  even  if  at  first 
the  children  themselves,  understandably  cannot  see  them 
in  this  way. 
If  the  kind  of  compulsion  which  is  being  envisaged  here 
is  logical,  or  in  other  words  if  all  that  is  being  said  is 
that  any  serious  thought  is  logically  bound  to  take  more  or 
less  orderly  or  intelligible  forms,  then  it  cannot  be  said 
that  the  conflict  between  what  is  being  said  and  the  princi- 
ple  of  'learning  through  interest'  is  a  fundamental  one. 
Unfortunately,  however,  the  argument  can  also  be  interpreted16 
as  meaning  that  all  pupils  must  compulsorily  be  made  to  under- 
take  studies  such  as  science  and  mathematics  seriously  -  and 
the  compulsion  intended  here  is  psychological  and  perhaps, 
if  necessary  physical.  This  compulsion,  it  is  argued,  has  a 
prudential  function,  as  a  prerequisite  for  the  pupils'  even- 
tual  attainment  of  a  worthwhile  way  of  life.  In  no  other 
way,  the  argument  runs,  could  we  be  sure  that  all  pupils 246 
would  have  the  opportunity  to  develop.  the  capacity  (eventually) 
,, 
for,  making  rational  choices  about,  what  they.  should.,  do  when 
; 
(eventually)  the  compulsion  is  lifted.  -  Not,  before.  ithis 
,  point  (i.  e.  eventually)  would  it  be  rational=to  free,  them 
from  external  compulsion. 
These  points  are  clearly  made  out  by  J.  P..  White  as 
follow 
17 
"...  Clearly 
, 
these,,  are  many 
,. 
justifiable  .  constraints; 
no  one  would  deny,  for  instance,  the  young  children 
must  be,,  taught￿vto 
{read  and  write,  _,, 
to.  keep  themselves 
clean,  to  be  king  to  other  people  and  not  to  hurt 
them. 
Consideration  both  of  the  child's  and  others'  inte- 
,  O?  '-rests  warrants  'interference`  `i'n  these`  areas.  'What 
of  the  secondary  school  child?  He  is  constrained 
toý  attend°  classes  in  anything  'from  'English  to 
woodwork,  plus  compulsory  games  as  well.  Very 
often  he  has  choices  between  activities,  '  but  'they'  ., 
are  choices  within  a  compulsory  framework;  he  can 
rarely  'choose  to  do  anything.  How  much  of  this 
constraint  is  justified? 
Much  of  it  plainly  is.  "Every  child  must  acquire 
sufficient,  understanding.  of.  the 
, 
concep,  ts_.  and  then- 
rie's-of''science  and  mathematics  to  enable  him 
rationally  to_  choose-whether  or,  not  he  wishes  to_  ;, 
pursue  them  further,  either  for  their  own  sake  or 
for  vocational  reasons.  r 
lie,  must  acquire,  a  histo-,., 
rically  and  philosophically  based  understanding 
ofdomestic,  and  world  politics,.:  He,  must  acquire, 
such  understanding  as  he  is  emotionally  capable 
of  in  literature,  music, 
ýand.  µ  plastic  arts.,  ;.  -, 
Most  2..  important,  'perhaps  'his  moral  awareness  must  be 
developed,  both  theoretically,,  through  the  moral 
issues  raised  in  the  'disciplines.....  and'practi- 
cally, 
_, 
through.  classroom  situations,  a.  and  in.  other 
ways.  ti 
He  continues: 
,.  r,  .  "If  he  is  deprived  of  these  forms  of  understanding 
he,  will,  be  cut  offrnot,  only  from.  all-sorts  of  voca- 
tional-and  hedonistic  possibilities,  not  only  from 
all  kinds  of  social  service,  but  also  from  that 
ancient  and  too  often  neglected  end  of  education  - 
self-knowledge.  If  he  is  not  compelled  to  acquire 
these  at  school,  the  chances  are  that  he  will  not 
pick  them  up  otherwise;  so  constraint  is  fully 
justified.  " 247 
Obviously  one  aspect  of  the  problem  here  is  to  find  a 
rational  way  of  deciding  what  is  meant  by  eventually",  or 
in  other  words  of  deciding  when  it  would  be  rational  for 
the  external  compulsion  to  be  withdrawn.  Plato,  for  example, 
seem  to  think  that  it  would  not  be  before  the  age  of  about 
fifty,  or  so  that  people  (and  then  only  a  very  few  people) 
would  be  able  to  make  rational  choices  and  therefore,  would 
be  fit  to  graduate  from  the  ranks  of  the  compelled  to  join, 
the  rank  of  the  compellers.  This,  of  course,  was  just  Plato's 
opinion.  There  is  no  rational  way  of  knowing  whether  or  not 
a  person  has  become  capable  of  rational  choice.  One  could 
never  be  sure  on  rational  grounds  alone  that  one's  criteria 
for  judging  rationality  were  themselves  rational  and  were 
being  compelled. 
Further  than  this,  however,  from  what  we  have  already 
said  it  should  be  plain  that  there  is  something  very  odd  about 
the  whole  idea  of  proposing  to  use  physical  and  psychological 
sanctions  to,  'make'  pupils  undertake  certain  studies  serious- 
ly,  just  as  there  would  be  about  trying  to  'make'  them  inte- 
rested  in  something  by  such  methods.  One  can  compel  some- 
one's  obedience  to  a  system  of  social  control,  but  no  one 
can  be  psychologically  or  physically  'made'  to  submit  to  the 
logical  and  moral  imepratives  of  disciplined  thinking.  It 
would  be  like  standing  over  someone  with  a  stick  or  a  threat 
of  imprisonment  and  saying  'Will  you  or  will  you  not  admit 
that  3  and  3  make  61'  or  'Will  you  or  will  you  not  admit  that 248 
one  should  pursue  truth!  ',  and  continuing  in  this  way  until 
(eventually)  he  was  'forced'  to  admit  it.  It  may  be  an 
empirical  question  whether  or  not,  and  in  what  precise  circums- 
tances,  anyone  subjected  to  such  treatment  ever  does  subse- 
quently  become  interested  in  or  start  to  think  seriously 
about  the  matters  which  hat  first  been,  as  it  were,  forced- 
fed.  But  at  least  it  should  be  clear  that  force-feeding, 
in  itself,  does  nothing  to  help  the  pupils  even  to  start  to 
understand  or  see  the  intrinsic  point  of  the  subject  matter. 
I  cannot  see  anything  rational  about  trying  to  force  someone 
to  study  seriously  the  things  which  I  take  seriously  and  see 
as  best  exemplifying  rationality  but  which  he  as  yet  does 
not.  On  the  face  of  it,  indeed,  I  would  think  that  such 
treatment  would  be  at  least  as  likely  to  close  his  mind  to 
those  things  as  to  open  it.  To  offer  the  learner  some  ex- 
trinsic  reward  for  studying  or  to  threaten  him  with  a  penalty 
for  not  studying  might,  indeed,  be  the  very  thing  most  likely 
to  convince  him  that  there  was  no  intrinsically  good  reason 
for  such  studies,  and  that  the  real  reason  for  undertaking 
them  must  therefore  lie  in  their  contingent  utility  for  get- 
ting  pleasures  and  avoiding  pains. 
Moreover,  there  is  no  educational  need  to  treat  pupils 
in  this  way,  however  necessary  it  may  seem  at  times  on  grounds 
of  prudence.  What  has  been  shown  by  Professor  Peters19  is 
that  a  more  or  less  disciplined  understanding  of  whatever  a 
pupil  is  engaged  in  is  an  essential  part  of  what  we  mean  by 249 
the  educativeness  of  the  situation.  His  argument  is  not  that 
children  need  to  be  forced  to  'study  science',  for  example, 
because  then  they  will  get  to  think  rationally.  Rather,  it 
seems  to  me,  he  is  saying  that  'studying  science'  is  one  of 
the  things  which  we  mean  by  'thinking  rationally'.  It  would 
follow,  the9.,  that  to  the  extent  that  a  child  was  engaged  in 
any  activity  in  a  way  which  involved  trying  to  think  about 
it  rationally,  he  would  thereby  unavoidably  be  engaged  in 
thinking  about  it  'scientifically'.  If  this  were  so,  then 
the  issue  turns  on  how  narrowly  or  widely  one  limits  or  de- 
fines  the  activities  which  one  is  prepared  to  count  as  being 
bona  fide  examples  of  'thinking  scientifically',  'historically' 
'mathematically',  'aesthetically',  'morally',  and  so  on. 
Differences  of  definition  in  this  case,  however,  would  be 
stipulative,  not  a  matter  of  differences  of 
fundamental  prin- 
ciple.  An  infant  school  and  a  university  teacher  might  have 
differences,  for  example,  about  what  they  were  prepared  to 
call  '  art  '.  Both,  however,  could  still  agree  as  to  the 
seriousness,  and  therefore  the  more  or  less  disciplined,  ra- 
tional  and  educative  character  of  their  pupils'  thinking. 
What  has  so  far  been  established  is  that  a  child  does 
not  have  to  be  made  to  wait  until  he  has  studied  certain 
school  subjects  as  defined,  say,  by  university  teachers, 
before  he  can  be  adjudged  to  be  (more  or  less)  rational.  If 
he  is  seriously  studying  the  doing  of  anything,  then  he  is 
engaged  already  in  trying  to  be  more  rational  about  it.  If 250 
his  teacher,  in  separating  out  the  logically  distinct  forms 
of  thought  which  the  child  is  actually  developing  in  this 
way,  finds  it  helpful  to  use,  or  to  avoid,  labels  such  as 
'science',  'history',  and  so  on,  this  does  not  affect  the 
basic  issue  of  principle  which  is  involved,  nor  should  it  be 
allowed  in  any  further  way  to  put  limits  on  what  the  child 
must  do  if  he  is  to  succeed  in  his  activity.  If  a  child  is 
interested  to  find  out  more  about  how  his  family,  for  example 
or  his  neighbourhood  or  school  or  anything  else,  got  to  ",  be 
the  way  it  is,  whether  or  not  one  calls  this  'studying  his- 
tory'  is  not  the  vital  issue;  and  to  try  to  compel  him  to 
undertake  such  inquiries  because  one  considers  it  vital  for 
him  to  'do  his,  tbry',  would  be  pointless.  What  is  of  funda- 
mental  inportanbe  educationally  is  whether  or  not  his  inqui- 
ries  (whatever  they  are)  are  being  engaged  in  for  their  in- 
trinsic  interest.  What  makes  his  curriculum  educationally 
worthwhile  is  not  the  presence  on"  it  of  any  particular  school 
subject,  but  the  presence  in  it  of  serious  thought  about 
whatever  he  is  doing. 
'Serious  thought'  means  thought  for  which  one  is  prepared 
to  give  one's  reasons,  up  to  the  point  at  which  there  are  no 
more  reasons  which  one  can  give.  At  this  point  one  can  and 
should  be  willing  to  be  instructed,  but,  educationally  speak- 
ing,  no  one  can  or  should  try  to  psychologically  or  physically 
make  one  receive  that  instruction.  To  see  the  point  of  an 
instruction  one  has  to  be  trying  to  do  so;  One  cannot  be 251 
'made'  to  see  its  point  by  being  instructed  to  do  so.  The 
only  way  in  which  cane  could  interpret  such  unilluminating 
instruction  ('Do  it  or  else!  ')  would  be  a  series  of  commands 
to  be  obeyed. 
An  educational  situation,  therefore,  is  only  to  be  re- 
garded  as  an  'educational'  situation  when  what  is  held  to  be 
'educational'  value  in  it  is  what  is  Currently  held  to  be 
of  value  by  the  person  avowedly  being  'educated'.  The  spe- 
cifically  'educational'  feature  of  the  situation,  then, 
would  arise  from  its  subject-matter  being  at  all  times  that 
which  the  person  being  educated  took  or  found  to  be  of  value, 
its  methods  being  those  which  allowed  and  assisted  the  person 
to  continue  in  this  way,  and  its  aim  being  to  maximise  the 
possibilities  of  his  so  continuing.  Any  other  subject-matter, 
methods  and  aims  might  be  accounted  more  desirable  (even  for 
the  person  being  educated),  in  the  sense  of  being  judged 
more  likely  to  turn  out  well  by  persons  other  than  the  person 
being  educated,  but  they  would  not  be  of  'educational'  value 
in  the  sense  described.  They  might  make  available  for  the 
person  being  educated  all  manner  of  'goods'  such  as  health, 
character,  taste  in  the  arts,  citizenship  Vocational  success 
and  soon  -  they  might  in  a  word  'do  him  good'  (or  at  least 
it  would  be  his  own  fault'  if  they  did  not)  -  but  he  would 
not  necessarily  be  better  educated  for  having  them.  At  the 
most,  these  non-educational  'goods'  might  be  desirable  as  a 
matter  of  prudence  -  they  might  be  'in  his  interest',  or  'to 252 
his  advantage'  -  but  they  would  not  necessarily  lead,  him  to 
develop  a  more  'educated'  sense  of  values  which  life  for  him 
might  have  in  store, 
".....  Initiation  is  a  continuum  not  an  achievement; 
being  a  person  is  a  complex  web  of  more  and  less, 
not  a  single  dimension;  children  are  more  or  less 
skilled  in  or  competent  at  a  variety  of  things  and 
in  a  variety  of  ways;  there  is  no  sharp  distinction 
between  understanding  and  participating;  there  is 
no  clear  dividing  line  between  those  areas  where  a 
human  being  must  understand  and  those  where  it  does 
not  matter  in  the  slightest  whether  he  does  or  does 
not;  there  can  be  no  way  of  packaging  subjects  into 
those  which  must  perforce  be  taught  and  those  which 
can  be  picked  up".  20 
3.  THE  PROBLEM  OF  DISCIPLINE  APPROPRIATE  TO  EDUCATION 
I  have  been  trying  to  argue  that  whereas  'instructing' 
in  the  sense  of  commanding  or  'giving  orders'  which  are  backed 
by  Psychological  and  physical  sanctions  can  hardly  be  claimed 
to  have  any  place  in  educative  teaching,  instructing  in  the 
sense  of  'informing'  is  an  integral  part  of  such  teaching. 
To  restrict  instruction,  as  many  teachers  do,  to  certain 
'compulsory'  subjects  or  the  so-called  'basic  skills'  while 
depriving  children  of  educative  instruction  in  other  areas  is 
not  only  misguided  but  mistaken.  A  case  in  point  is  the 
statement  which  J.  P.  White  makes  in  his  article  entitled 
'Learn  As  You  Will'.  He  writes: 
21 
"Our  education  system  needs  to  be  rationalisedo 
The  compulsory  element  in  it  needs  strengthen- 
ing  -  to  ensure  that  all  children  and  not  only 
the  more  able  of  them  gain  a  thorough  understand- 
ing  of  the  'basic  disciplines'.  " 
This  deprivation  is  usually  called  'leaving  children  free  to 253 
discover',  and,  apart  from  'discovery  learning'  in  mathematics 
and  science,  the  areas  in  which  children  are  commonly  left 
to  flounder  about  by  themselves  in  this  way  are  those  of  the 
so-called  'practical'  and  'creative'  activities  or  'topics'. 
Where  instruction  is  unilluninating,  naturally  enough  it 
must  seem  to  the  child  to  be  no  more  than  a  stream  of  arbi- 
trary  constraints.  On  the  other  hand,  when  children  do  find 
instruction  informative,  their  being  given  it  does  not  some- 
how  make  them  less  'free'  or  in  some  sense  imply  that  they 
have  been  prevented  from  'discovering'  its  significance  (as 
opposed  to  by)  themselves.  Logically  speaking,  one  could 
never  (discover'  something  which  was  totally  'unstructur'ed' 
in_  choate,  formless  -  for  in  a  formless  experiential  flux 
there  would  be  nothing  'there',  so  to  speak,  to  'discover'. 
Apart  from  that,  however,  when  pupils  do  grasp  the  illumina- 
ting  point  of  instruction  it  makes  perfectly  good  sense  to  say 
they  have  thereby  been  helped  to  'discover'  or  'find'  its  re- 
levance  or  connection  with  whatever  it  is  which  they  are  try- 
ing  to  do.  One  of  the  main  values  in  having  a  good  teacher, 
I  would  have  thought,  is  from  the  child's  point  of  view  that 
with  his  instructive  help  and  guide  interesting  activities 
and  experiences  do  not  remain  in  a  relatively  formless, 
incoherent,  unstructured  state. 
The  relative  merits  of  'instruction'  and  'discovery 
learning'  discussed  by  some  writers22  as  alternative  methods 
are  immaterial  since  the  point  I  am  making  here  is  rightly 
interpreted  by  Downey  and  Kelly: 
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"...  There  is  no  doubt  that  discovery  is  logically 
possible.  for  everyone,  if  we  realize  that  we  mean 
by  this  only  that  an  individual  finds  out  something 
that  is  new  to  him:  it  does  not  have  to  be  taken 
as  implying  that  one  has  discovered  something 
new  to  human  knowledge...  " 
Elsewhere  they  continue: 
24 
"The  arguments  that  it  is  impracticable  and 
inefficient  are  also  based  on  an  extreme 
view  of  what  learning  by  discovery  is  to  be 
taken  to  mean. 
...  If  learning  by  discovery  is  to  have  any 
value,  there  is  need  for  a  good  deal  of  care- 
ful  preparation  by  the  teacher  and  of  judi- 
cious  interference  in  the  process.  " 
Despite  the  above  passages  what  is  of  main  importance  is  the 
dependence  of  both  'instruction'  and  'discovery  learning' 
if  they  are  to  be  educative  or  in  other  words  to  help  child- 
ren  to  make  any  progress  in  the  pursuit  of  their  interests, 
on  the  selection  of  appropriate  subject-matter  for  study  in 
school.  If  the  teacher  is  preoccupied,  above  all  else, 
with  getting  the  children  to  study  certain  'subjects'  whether 
they  find  them  interesting  or  not,  then,  where  there  is  no 
interest  there  will  be  no  'illuminating  point'  in  his  instruc- 
tions,  since  there  will  be  nothing  in  the  pupils,  experience 
for  those  instructions  to  connect  with.  Similarly,  if  he 
abandons  explicit  instructions  in  favour  of  discovery  mate- 
rials  intended  to  get  the  children  going  on  those  subjects 
by  themselves,  the  children  in  this  case  will  still  not  have 
the  faintest  idea  what  it  is  that  they  are  supposed  to  be 
'discovering'.  To  quote  Downey  and  Kelly  once  more; 255 
"There  is  no  doubt  that  if  we  were  to  leave 
children  completely  alone  to  find  out  every- 
thing  for  themselves  this  would  be  a  long 
and  wasteful  process  and  one  from  which  they 
would  be  to  get  little  of  value.  "125 
In  neither  case  then  can  the  situation  become  an  educational 
one.  The  children's  'practical  activities'  remain  on  the 
undeveloped  level  of  more  or  less  fledting  and  pointless 
amusements-  or  diversions.  Little  serious  thought  goes  into 
them,  because  no  effective  help  is  being  given  about  how  to 
think  about  them,  in  a  more  disciplined  and  effective  way. 
Where  there  is  no  intrinsic  connection  between  the  teacher's 
preoccupations  and  the  children's  interests,  probably  the 
most  that  the  latter  will  'discover'  is  that  school  is  a 
place  where  it  pays  you  to  look  as  though  you're  seriously 
busy,  regardless  of  whether  you  yourself  can  see  the  point 
of  what  you're  doing  or  not.  Meanwhile  the  teacher  expends 
his  efforts  in  securing  obedience  to  his  instructions,  or 
attention  to  his  'discovery  materials',  generating  theore- 
tical  pursuits  whose  practical  point  may  be  clear  enough  to 
him,  but  could  never  be  clear  to  the  children  except  in  some 
more  or  less  remote  or  eventual  future. 
In  'The  Logical  and  Psychological  Aspects  of  Teaching 
A  Subject'  as  well  as  in  'The  Logic  of  the  Curriculum'  Pro- 
fessor  Paul  H.  Hirst26  refers  to  the  content  of  the  particular 
'fields  of  knowledge'  as  embodied  in  'school  subjects'  laying 
emphasis  on  the  practical  grounds  of  its  interest  to  the 
people  engaged  in  teaching  it.  In  Hirst's  view  these  prac- 
tical  grounds  are  seldom  the  pupils'  ones.  More  often  they 256 
relate,  for  example,  to  particular  academic  traditions  and 
to  the  examination  requirements  by  means  of  which  teachers 
test  knowledge  of  those  traditions.  What  is  being  suggested 
is  that  in  many  cases  the  teacher's  overprotective  attitude 
towards  or  preoccupation  with  his  own  'discipline'  and  his 
concern  with  getting  pupils  to  pursue  it  in  the  way,  event- 
ually,  in  which  he  would  like  (or  would  have  liked)  to  pur- 
sue  it  himself,  is  educationally  speaking  misplaced.  To 
the  extent  that  a  child  is  'thinking  seriously'  at  all, 
rather  than  acting  merely  on  impulse  or  from  liking  or  for 
immediate  gratification  or  to  please  or  placate  (or  annoy 
his  teacher,  then  it  seems  to  me  that  it  is  logically  unavoid- 
able  that  his  thinking  will  come  increasingly  to  take  con- 
ceptually  distinct  "forms"  increasingly  explicit  in  disci- 
plined  ways  of  thinking  or  'forms  of  thought',  are  somehow 
paradigmatically  embodied  in  'school  subjects'  or  in'fieldds 
of  knowledge'  as  these  are  found  in  school  curriculum.  We 
cannot  forecast  or  preselect  what  particular  children  will 
think  seriously  about  with  any  reliability  until  we  ourselves 
are  taking  an  interest  in  and  'thinking  seriously'  about  the 
practical  pursuits  of  those  children.  This  is  something 
which  teachers  scarcely  ever  do,  since  the  main  part  of  their 
effort  goes  into  devising  !  methods'  and  'materials'  for  get- 
ting  the  children,  theoretically  at  least,  to  engage  in  their 
favoured  pursuits. 
It  is  questionable,  then,  whether  we  have  good  grounds v 
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for  saying  that  there  are  some  activities  such  as,  science 
or  history  about  which  one  can  'think  seriously'  and  other 
activities  such  as  cooking  or  needlework  about  which  one  can- 
not  realy  'think'  in  an  e1ucationally  worthwhile  way  at  all. 
The  'seriousness'  of  any  activity  -  whether  (for  economic,, 
or  other:  -  reasons)  we  call  it  'work  or  play'27  is  shown  by 
one's  willingness  to  try  to  give  reasons  for  the  way  in  which 
one  is  engaging  in  it,  or  in  other  words  by  the  extent  to 
which  one  can  show  that  one  is  thinking  about  it  in  a  more 
or  less  disciplined  way.  Wilson28  in  reviewing  Dearden's 
Philosophy  of  Primary  Education  in  Education  for  Primary 
Teaching  cites  the  moral  seriousness  of  a  game  (any  game) 
as  something  to  be  played  !  properly'  rather  than  just  splayed 
about'  (or  fooled  around)  with  to  be  a  far  better  guarantee 
that  children  will  be  likely  to  exert  themselves  in  'serious' 
thought  about  it,  thafl  that  provided  by  the  vocational  or 
economic  or  other  'good'  reasons  with  which  teachers  socften 
try  to  persuade  children  to  'work'. 
Practical  considerations  can  still  be  given  priority  in 
curricula  planning,  without  thus  endangering  in  any  way  the 
disciplined  character  of  pupils'  thinking.  But  the  chief 
practical  consideration  for  the  teacher,  in  my  view,  should 
not  be  respect  for  his  own  characteristic  style  of  thinking  - 
nor  that  of  the  academic  tradition  in  which  he  finds  himself 
as  working  -  but  for  the  pupils.  The  pupil's  thinking,  too, 
has  a  tradition,  and  unless  the  teacher  begins  his  instruc- 
tive  communication  with  the  pupil  in  a  language  and  in  rela- 258 
tion  to  experiences  and  activities  which  already  the  pupil 
understands  something  of  the  point  of,  then  no  conceptual 
development  and  no  development  of  interest  will  result 
29 
directly  from  the  encounter.  Bernstein  writes: 
"if  the  culture  of  the  teacher  is  to  become 
part  of  the  consciousness  of  the  child,  then 
the  culture  of  the  child  must  first  be  in  the 
consciousness  of  the  teacher.  This  may  mean 
that  the  teacher  must  be  able  to  understand 
the,  child's  dialect,  rather  than  deliberately 
attempting  to  change  it.  " 
Thus,  the  culture  of  the  teacher  too  must  change,  at  least 
until  it  reaches  a  state  in  which  he  is  prepared  to  admit 
the  child  has  a  'culture',  or  in  other  words  is  something 
more  than  a  mere  barbarian  at  culture's  gates. 
As  we  have  already  indicated  to  'think  seriously'  is  to 
ask  oneself  and  others  just  what  it  is  which  one  is  trying 
to  do  and  whether,  therefore,  it  is  being  done  appropriately. 
One's  capacity  for  'thinking  seriously'  in  this-sense,  de- 
pends  not  on  any  purportedly  'serious'  quality  peculiar  to 
some  activities  and  pursuits  rather  than  to  others,  but  on 
the  quality  of  one's  interest  in  it  for  its  own  sake.  Di- 
fferent  people  can  be  involved  in  entirely  different  ways 
in  what  is  seemingly  the  same  pursuit  (e.  g.  'studying' 
mathematics).  Whether  children  are  thinking  seriously  about 
what  they  are  doing  will  depend  far  less  upon  its;  theoreti- 
cal  or  intellectual  character,  than  on  whether  or  not  they 
are  finding  any  point  in  thinking  seriously  about  anything 
at  all.  If  their  occurrent  interests  are  never  'seriously' 
considered  by  adults,  if  all  questions  of  value  except  trivial 259 
ones  are  settled  for  them  by  others,  and  if  they  are  never 
encouraged  and  helped  to  think  things  out  for  themselves 
as  though  their  teachers'  as  well  as  their  own  values  were 
sometimes  at  stake,  then  being  promoted  or  stimulated  to 
engage  in  theoretical  or  'thoughtful'  pursuits  will  not  in 
any  sense  be  equivalent  to  engaging  in  'serious  thought'. 
To  compel  children  'externally'  is  needed  to  the  same, 
extent  that  children  do  need  controlling  and  looking  after, 
or  do  need  adjusting  to  the  most  inflexible  aspects  of  our 
social  and  physical  worlds  Where  such  adjustment  and  con- 
trol  cannot  be  clearly  shown  to  be  necessary  on  grounds  of 
prudence  in  an  individual  case,  there  is  no  room  for  someone 
to  help  children  to  learn  to'do  things  in  an  increasingly 
flexible  and  thoughful  way.  The  only  kind  of  compulsion 
appropriate  to  education,  then,  as  opposed  to  schooling,  is 
not  that  of  control  and  command  but  that  of  discipline  and 
instruction.  Separating  thought  from  activity  -  doing  up 
'thoughtfulness'  in  separate  parcels  of  'theoretical  activity' 
labelled  'science',  1nathematics',  'history'  and  the  rest  - 
does  not  help  children  to  become  more  thoughtful;  and  it 
more  or  less  dooms  the  material  in  the  other  parcels  (label- 
led  'practical  activity'  'creative  expression'  and  so  on) 
to  being  engaged  in  a  thoroughly  thoughtless  way. 
Peters30  arguments  concerning  'Activities  and  Their 
Justification'  and'rhe  Casefor  Curriculum  Activities'  set 
out  in  chapter  5  of  'Ethics  and  Education'  do  not  seem  to 260 
entail  on  educational  grounds  alone,  that  we  should  rule  out 
some  activities  from  the  curriculum  and  rub  others  in.  To 
order  someone  to  study  something  seriously  does  not  help  him 
to  settle  the  question  as  to  what  he  should  do.  What  it 
does  is  to  merely  settle  it  for  him,  making  it  at  the  same 
time  increasingly  pointless  for  him  to  think  about  any  acti- 
vities  seriously  at  all.  The  teacher  has  already  done  the 
thinking  and  the  child  is  merely  required  to  obey  or  other- 
wise. 
Thus  it  is  becoming  evident  that  much  of  what  has  been 
written  about  discipline  in  schools31  is  not  really  about 
'discipline'  but  about  'control'.  The  values  of  school 
activities  are  seen  almost  entirely  in  terms  of  values  lying 
beyond  and  outside  the  school.  In  school,  therefore,  since 
there  is  little  or  no  intrinsic  point  in  what  they  are  ex- 
pected  to  do  and  thus  little  discipline  in  the  tasks  them- 
selves,  children  stand  increasingly  in  need  of  external 
pressures  and  controls.  In  this  way,  teaching  becomes  in- 
creasingly  a  matter  of  pupil  management  while  discipline 
and  education  become  'internalized'  control  and  schooling 
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1.  UTILITARIAN  THEORY  ASSESSED  WITHIN  AN  EDUCATIONAL  CONTEXT 
The  utilitarian  view  of  punishment,  as  we  have  seen,  is 
well  summed  up  in  the  words  of  Jeremy  Bentham: 
1 
"All  punishment  is  mischief,  all  punishment 
in  itself  is  evil;  upon  the  principle  of 
utility,  if  it  ought  at  all  to  be  admitted, 
it  ought  only  to  be  admitted  in  so  far  as 
it  promises  to  exclude  some  greater  evil.  " 
In  other  words,  punishment  involves  pain  and  pain  for  the 
utilitarian  is  always  bad  and  can  only  be  justified  if  it 
can  be  shown  to  lead  to  pleasure,  happiness  or  the  avoidance 
of  greater  pain  in  the  future.  Only  consequences,  therefore 
can  justify  punishment.  Thus  Fred  Feldman2  writes: 
?  As  with  all  forms  of  utilitarian  justification, 
this  justification  of  punishment  is  totally  for- 
ward-looking.  That  is,  the  justification  of 
punishment  in  any  given  case  depends  entirely 
upon  what  will  happen  as  a  result  of  the  act  of 
punishment,  as  compared  with  what  would  happen 
as  a  result  of  not  punishing.  The  utilitarian 
justification  of  punishment  pays  attention  only 
to  the  consequences  of  punishment  and  the  con- 
sequences  of  nonpunishment.  " 
The  difficulties  of  this  viewpoint  have  already  been 
pointed  out  but  we  need  once  more  to  expose  them  before 
examining  whether  or  not  the  theory  has  any  significance  for 
punishment  in  education.  The  main  difficulties  stem  from 
the  fact  that  while  utilitarianism  may  offer  us  useful 
suggestions  as  to  the  most  efficient  methods  of  social  con- 
trol,  it  is  not  strictly  a  theory  of  punishment  as  we  have 
defined  it.  For  if  the  only  criterion  we  are  to  take  account 
of  in  dealing  with  offenders  is  a  consideration  of  the  likely 
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we  will  be  led  to  take  action  that  will  involve  no  unplea- 
santness  for  the  offender  at  all,  or  even  action  which  is 
taken  not  against  the  offender  himself  but  against  some  other 
person.  Action  taken  against  the  mother  of  a  juvenile  offen- 
der,  for  example,  may  be  more  effective  in  curbing  his  be- 
haviour  than  action  taken  against  the  offender  himself.  If 
a  calculation  of  likely  consequences  is  all  that  need  con- 
cern  us  then  punishment  as  such  will  not  always  necessarily 
be  the  best  solution. 
Educationists  have  felt  that  deliberate  acts  of  nasti- 
ness  should  be  no  part  of  education  and  that  it  is  better 
to  have  the  freedom  in  which  to  decide  what  it  best  for  the 
individual  child  in  each  situation.  However,  it  is  sometimes 
helpful  to  make  certain  distinctions  within  the'kinds  of 
situation  in  which  questions  of  the  rights  and  wrongs  of 
punishment  arise.  A  distinction  might  be  made,  for  example, 
between  those  offences  which  are  committed  against  moral  rules 
where  we  must  be  aware  of  the  morally  educative  dimensions 
of  any  action  we  take,  and  those  where  the-rule  broken  has 
no  real  moral  import,  if  there  are  such  rules,  and  where  it 
might  as  a  result  be  possible  to  take  appropriate  action 
without  the  same  kind  of  moral  compulsion.  Also,  for  an 
act  of  punishment  to  have  the  kind  of  morally  educative  effect 
that  is  wanted  the  child  must  be  capable  of  understanding 
the  reasons  for  it  and  appreciating  its  point;  otherwise, 
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DETERRENCE  AND  EDUCATION 
flow  far  can  a  deterrence  theory  be  used  to  justify 
punishment  in  an  educational  context?  Unfortunately,  there 
is  a  tendency  in  education  to  link  punishment  with  discipline 
and  discipline  with  control.  Punishment  is  therefore  usually 
identified  with  the  apparatus  of  control.  It  will  be  argued 
elsewhere  in  this  thesis  that  this  is  to  take  a  very  limited 
view  of  punishment  for  punishment  is  part  of  our  education. 
Meanwhile,  we  should  point  out  that  efficient  teaching  cannot 
proceed  without  general  conditions  of  order  and  children 
being  what  they  are,  sometimes  seem  determined  to  disrupt 
proceedings.  If  penalties  are  attached  to  the  breach  of 
authorised  rules,  to  deter  possible  offenders  as  well  as  to 
deal  with  actual  ones,  such  measures  may  only  be  regarded  as 
"punishments"  in  so  far  as  they  have  intrinsic  importance. 
That  is  to  say  the  offender  must  see  the  'punishment'  as  ha- 
ving  a  point  or  value.  Extrinsic  controls  are  more  clearly 
described  as  "penalties".  There  is  also  the  question  of 
whether  or  not  children  are  in  f.  ct  deterred  from  breaking 
rules  by  having  unpleasantness  inflicted  upon  them.  Most 
children  appear  to  conform  to  rules  for  reasons  other  than 
the  threat  of  sanctions.  The  point  here  is  that  under  no 
circumstances  could  victimization  in  schools  be  justified,  so 
that  although  sanctions  may  serve  to  deter  children  from 
breaking  rules  and  generally  misbehaving,  unpleasantness  may 
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not,  and  would  not  ever,  be  morally  acceptable  as  the  sole 
justification  for  imposing  penalties  or  punishment  in  schools. 
REFORM  AND  EDUCATION 
We  now  turn  to  the  notion  of  'reform'  and  that  of  edu- 
cation.  As  Professor  R.  S.  Peters3  points  out: 
"It  is  often  argued  that  when  one  is  dealing 
with  children  a  much  stronger  case  can  be 
made  for  reform  as  a  reason  for  punishment 
than  at  the  adult  level.  Many  adolescents 
live  in  a  world  of  fantasy  and,  it  is  argued, 
that  the  'sharp  shack'  involved  in  punishment 
may  bring  them  to  their  sense  and  help  to 
establish  them  in  socially  more  desirable 
forms  of  conduct.  There  is  also  the  point 
that  in  a  school  situation,  the  fact  that 
education  is  the  main  business  of  the  school 
lends  weight  to  considerations  connected  with 
reform.  For  'education'  is  like  'reform'  in 
that  'reform'  implies  some  change  for  the  better.  " 
Peters  disagrees  with  the  view  that  in  schools  a  strong 
case  can  be  made  for  reform  as  a  justification  for  punishment. 
He  argues  that,  although  education  is  like  reform  in  that  it 
implies  some  change  for  the  better,  it  differs  from  reform 
in  that  it  does  not  convey  the  same  suggestion  of  bringing 
a  person  upto_a  standard  from  which  he  has  lapsed.  In  Peters' 
opinion  ""-fi-punishment  in  a  school  is  at  best  a  necessary 
nuisance.  It  is  necessary  as  a  deterrent,  but  its  positive 
educative  value  is  dubious.  "4  Elsewhere5  he  suggests  that 
the  only  good  reason  for  employing  punishment  is  to  function 
as  a  deterrent  and  maintain  conditions  of  order. 
It  therefore  looks  as  if  Peters  is  committed  to  the  view 
that  there  is  little  or  no  case  for  the-justification  of I 
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punishment  in  education  in  the  sphere  of  moral  improvement. 
But  this  seems  odd  considering  that  most  people  see  punish- 
ing':  children  for  wrongdoing  as  being  vaguely  connected  with 
moral  education.  Perhaps  what  he  really  has  in  mind  is  the 
distinction  he  draws  between  "education"  and  "reform"'O  To 
put  it  another  way;  while  moral  improvement  is  part  of  what 
we  mean  when  we  talk  about  moral  edudation,  reform,  because 
it  is  to  do  with  bringing  a  person  back  up  to  a  standard  from 
which  he  has  lapsed,  is  not  what  we  normally  have  in  mind 
in  talk  about  moral  education.  Here  the  idea  of  moral  de- 
velopment  would  be  upermost  in  our  thoughts. 
Furthermore,  although  the  interpretation  of  reform  as 
the  notion  of  changing  beliefs  and  attitudes  by  non-rational 
means,  i.  e.,  by  punishment  can  be  rejected  as  being  tanta- 
mount  to  indoctrination,  it  might  reasonably  be  pointed  out 
that  we  certainly  do  influence  children  by  other  than  rational 
means.  Such  means  being  defended  on  the  ground  that  they  can 
help  stamp  in  desirable  habits,  which  will  later  make  a 
solid  foundation  for  a  rational  moral  code.  Indeed  Peters6 
devotes  two  whole  papers  to  developing  precisely  this  point. 
What  he  maintains  is  that  rules  have  often  to  be  learnt  be- 
fore  they  can  be  properly  understood;  which,  of  course,  is 
the  familiar  paradox  of  moral  education  Aristotle  first  ex- 
pounded  in  Book  II  of  his  "Nicomachean  Ethics". 
Whether  or  not  punishment  is  the  most  effective  way  of 
"stamping  in"  these  desirable  moral  habits  is  not  a  philoso- 
phical  question.  The  work  done  by  Psychologists?  in  this 
area  has  so  far  produced  little  evidence  that  punishment,  in 270 
a  manipulative  situation,  leads  to  moral  learning.  It  will 
be  argued  later  that  this  is  only  to  be  expected  where  the 
role  of  punishment  in  moral  development  is  entirely  mis- 
understood.  Such  an  account  misses  the  whole  point  of  the 
difference  between  a  manipulative  situation  and  an  educa- 
tive  one. 
Surely,  education  requires  us  to  respect  every  indivi- 
dual  as  a  person,  as  a  moral  being,  to  regard  him  as  res- 
ponsbile  for  his  actions  and  as  entitled  to  punishment  if  he 
committs  an  offence;  that  we  cannot  without  doing  violence 
to  the  notion  of  education  justify  reforming  him,  moulding 
him,  shaping  him  or  in  any  other  way  treating  him  like  a 
thing  rather  than  a  person;  that  the  only  way  to  lead  him 
to  understanding  and  ultimately  to  autonomy  is  to  enable 
him  to  learn  the  moral  lessons  that  are  implicit  in  the  acts 
of  punishment. 
2.  LOCATING  THE  RELEVANCE  OF  PUNISHMENT 
In  the  preceding  sections  we  have  tried  to  argue  that 
it  could  never  be  justifiable  to  compel  children  to  go  to 
school,  if  all  that  we  mean  by  this  is  that  children  stand 
in  some  sort  of  personal  or  social  need  of  submitting  to 
the  control  of  adults.  It  seems  then  that,  only  to  the 
extent  that  school  is  educative,  or  to  the  extent  that  it 
helps  children  to  engage  in  intrinsically  valued  pursuits, 
can  we  reasonably  say  that  it  is  right  that  they  should  be 
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We  have  also  argued  that  discipline  is  a  kind  of  com- 
pulsion  to  which  it  is  right  that  one  should  have  to  submit. 
We  must  now  make  out  a  parallel  case  for  saying  that  punish- 
ment  is  the  infliction  of  a  kind  of  pain  which  it  is  right 
that  one  should  have  to  suffer.  Our  reason  for  making  this 
assertion  is  not  for  breaking  the  rules  of  a  particular  sys- 
tem  of  control,  but  for  moral  wrongdoinglor  in  other  words 
for  faults  of  discipline.  Unfortunately,  in  many  schools, 
where  headteachers  control  staff  without  giving  them  any  ge- 
nuine  share  in  the  process  of  decision-making,  and  where 
teachers  control  children  in  the  same  way,  'punishment'  (and 
'reward')  is  usually  identified  with  the  apparatus  of  control. 
Unfortunately,  too,  in  most  theoretical  discourse  as  well  as 
in  practice,  the  matter  of  punishment  and  reward,  like  that 
of  discipline,  has  commonly  been  treated  as  though  it  were 
part  and  parcel  of  the  business  of  control.  This  is  true 
both  in  philosophical  writings,  in  which  punishment  has 
usually  been  viewed  as  an  adjunct  of  legal  control,  and  in 
psychology,  in  which  it  has  often  been  treated  as  part  of  the 
mechanism  of  conditioning  and  related  kinds  of  psychological 
control,  However,  in  schools  and  other  institutions  in  which 
by  contrast  there  is  some  mutual  agreement  on  the  intrinsic 
value  of  attempting  to  live  and  work  together  in  an  orderly 
way,  the  form  of  order  therein  envisaged  is  a  moral,  not 
merely  a  social  one.  Accordingly  its  development  is  a  matter 
of  discipline,  rather  than  control.  In  this  section  therefore 
it  will  be  my  argument  that  in  such  situations  punishment 272 
and  reward  are  educative,  rather  than  mere  inducements  to 
toe  a  particular  line  of  action. 
Almost  any  current  text  in  educational  psychology  will 
illustrate  to  the  reader  the  conflation  of  discipline  with 
control,  and  the  complementary  treatment  of  punishment  and 
reward  as  though  they  were  agencies  of  psychological  mani- 
pulation  rather  than  features  logically  implicit  in  the 
notion  of  'discipline'  itself.  Thus,  Ausubel,  for  example, 
writes: 
a 
"By  discipline  is  meant  the  imposition  of 
external  standards  and  controls  on  individual 
conduct...  When  external  controls  are  inter- 
nalized  we  can  speak  of  self-discipline;  it 
is  clear,  nonetheless,  that  the  original  source 
of  the  controls,  as  well  as  much  of  their  later 
reinforcement,  are  extrinsic  to  the  individual.  " 
Ausubel  describes  'punishment'  as  'aversive  motivation'which 
helps  the  child  to  realize  what  these  external  controls  are 
and  which  thereafter  induces  him  to  'internalize'  them,  or 
in  other  words  which  teaches  him  to  control  himself  rather 
than  to  go  on  encouraging  others  to  do  this  for  him. 
9 
But 
we  are  not  told  why  the  'internalization'  of  external  con- 
trols  should  be  called  'self-discipline'  instead  of  'self- 
cpntrol'.  Neither  are  we  given  reasons  why  discipline  should 
be  located  in  sourdes  lying  exclusively  outside  the  indivi- 
dual  or  the  child.  In  Ausubel's  account  the  morally  distinc- 
tive  feature  of  discipline  (namely,  that  it  is  a  form  of 
order  which  is  sought  for  its  intrinsic  point)  and  of  punish- 
ment  and  reward  (namely,  that  they  are  the  pains  and  pleasures 
which  one  deserves,  rather  than  which  it  is  namely  expedient 273 
for  one  to  avoid  or  to  seek)  play  no  part. 
Other  psychologists  notably,  Sears  and  Hilgard10  writing 
on  the  Role  of  Motivation  of  Learning  describe  reward  and 
punishment  as  'techniques  of  control$. 
11  Sears  and  Hilgard 
claim  furthermore  that  the  employment  of  these  techniques  is 
part  of'the,  teacher's  responsibility  for  maintaining  disci- 
pline  in  the  classroom'.  Pleasure  and  pain  'reinforce'  learned 
behaviour,  and  reward  and  punishment  are  simply  the  deliberate- 
ly  administered  positive  or  negative  'reinforcements#  with 
which  the  teacher  secures  whatever  kinds  of-behaviour  he  thinks 
desirable  in  the  classroo. 
12  Unfortunately,  in  Sears  and  Hil- 
gard  account,  too,  no  reason  is  provided  for  equating  disci- 
pline  with  control  or  rewards  and  punishments  with  'reinforce- 
ment'. 
Just  as  'learning  through  interestt  rather  than  through 
extrinsic  controls  has  often  been  misinterpreted  as  meaning 
that  such  learning  needs  no  discipline,  so  punishments  and 
rewards  have  often  been  construed  as  though  they  were  matters 
which  had  to  be  explained  as  extrinsic  'reinforcements'  and 
which  therefore  could  never  be  intrinsic  to  the  task  of  learn- 
ing.  Teachers  have  been  prepared  to  "reward"  children,  though 
not  to  'punish'  them.  And  a  great  many  teachers  have  felt 
guilty  about  punishing  their  children  for  wrongdoing,  and  even 
at  times  about  rewarding  them  for  doing  right,  because  they 
have  been  led  to  believe  that  such  treatment  is  merely  a  kind 
of  external  manipulation  or  control  which  'in'theory'  should 
not  be  necessary  when  children  are  'learning  through  interest' 
or  in  other  words  are  'intrisically  motivated. 2  74 
But  all  learning  takes  place  in  a  social  context.  The  pleasure 
of  successful  learning  is  as  much  social  as  intellectual  in 
origin,  as  in  the  pain  of  failure.  When  children  are  'learn- 
ing  through  interest',  theg,  as  much  as  at  any  other  time, 
it  is  absurd  to  try  to  keep  them  in  some  sort  of  social  va- 
cuum  empty  of  both  punishment  and  reward,  or  to  place  them  in 
the  kind  of  stäcially  sterilizing  situation  in  which,  while 
behaviour  which  deserves  to  succeed  is  applauded,  whatever 
is  deserving  of  failure  is  merely  ignored. 
Some  psychologists  have  had  second  thoughts  and  are  now 
of  the  opinion  that  it  may  actually  make  some  children  happier 
to  get  'punished'  now  and  again,  since  maybe  this  satisfies 
their  'basic  needs'  for  security.  In  'Educational  Psychology' 
Ausubel13  writes: 
"Without  the  guidance  provided  by  unambiguous 
external  controls  they  tend  to  feel  bewildered 
and  apprehensive.  Too  great  a  burden  is  placed 
on  their  own  limited  capacity  for  self-control.  " 
Ausubel  claims,  then,  that  it  is  the  helpful  function  of 
'punishment'  to  make  the  external  controls  'unambiguous'  to 
the  child,  to  help: 
"Structure  a  problem  meaningfully,  furnishing 
direction  to  activity  -  and  information  about 
progress,  toward  oal  -  in  terms  of  what  is  to 
be  avoided..... 
A4 
But  this  argument  misses  the  whole  point  of  the  difference 
between  a  manipulative  situation  and  an  educative  one.  Both 
situations  -  the  critic  might  argue  -  are  to  some  degree 
orderly  and  rule-governed,  and  in  both  situations,  naturally 275 
enogh,  individuals  become  'bewildered  and  apprehensive'  if 
the  rules  remain  ambiguous  and  vague.  But  the  point  however 
is  that  in  the  former  situation  the  only  guidance  about  the 
rules  derives  from  the  pains  and  pleasures  arbitratily  asso- 
ciated  with  their  infringement,  or  non-infringement.  In  the 
latter  situation,  by  contrast,  both  the  pains  and  the  plea- 
sures  stem  in  part  from  seeing  the  point  or  rightness  of 
the  rules.  In  a  manipulative  situation  the  rules  are  only 
'right'  in  the  sense  that  you  get  hurt  if  you  break  them.  In 
an  educative  situation,  however,  it  is  because  the  rules  are 
right  that  it  hurts  to  break  them.  The  former  situation, 
again,  is  'manipulative,  in  the  sense  that  there  is  nothing 
worth  learning  in  it  except  that  you  will  get  hurt  if  you 
break  its  rules.  'Direction  to  Activity'  as  Ausubel15  calls 
it  stems  entirely  from  considerations  extrinsic  to  the  situa- 
tion  itself.  In  the  'educAtive'  situation,  however,  there 
exists  the  possibility  of  learning  something  of  intrinsic 
point  or  rightness  of  the  rules  (both  rational  and  moral) 
which  thus  far  appear  to  define  it.  Manipulative  rules  have 
no  intrinsic  point  in  the  situation  which  they  govern.  This 
is  why  it  is  correct  to  call  them  'external'  controls.  The 
'internalization'  of  these  controls,  so  that  the  individual 
now  begins  to  manipulate  or  control  himself  without  needing 
too  often  the  active  intervention  of  others,  makes  no  diffe- 
rence  to  the  logical  status  of  the  manipulative  rules.  If 
they  had  no  intrinsic  point  at  the  time  when  they  were  being 276 
imposed  on  the  individual  by  others,  they  cannot  somehow 
acquire  intrinsic  point  merely  because  the  individual  has 
now  been  induced  to  impose  them  on  himself.  They  are  the 
same  rules  and  can  have  no  more  intrinsic  point  than  they 
had  previously. 
I  have  so  far  argued  that  educational  psychologists  in  the 
main  have  misinterpreted  the  logical  status  of  'reward  and 
punishment',  and  that  this  misinterpretation  is  linked  with 
their  tendency  to  see  learning  in  terms  of  conditioning, 
discipline  in  terms  of  control,  and  education  in  terms  of 
schooling.  In  a  parallel,  way,  then,  they  view  reward  and 
punishment  in  terms  of  'reinforcement'.  The  newer  trend  in 
psychology  as  we  saw  in  the  quotation  from  Ausubel  still 
makes  no  difference  to  the  principle  which  is  involved. 
Because  whether  one  only  'rewards'  children,  or  'punishes' 
them  one's  action.,  is  still  manipulative  and  its  pain  or 
pleasure  to  the  child  is  also  a  'reinforcement'  rather  than 
moral  desert  unless  the  rules  in  question  are  seen  to  have 
an  intrinsic  point. 
3.  PENALTIES  AND  PUNISHMENTS  DISTINGUISHED 
It  has  already  been  suggested  that  both  discipline  and 
control  are  forms  of  order,  the  difference  between  them  lying 
in  the  kinds  of  value  inherent  in  the  structuring  of  situa- 
tions  which  they  seem  to  make  possible.  Educative  order  or 
Discipline  is  seen  as  being  of  intrinsic  value  by  those  en- 
gaged  tog©ther  on  any  task  in  which  they  share  an  interest. 277 
Manipulative  or  control  or  command,  on  the  other  hand,  is  not 
seen  as  being  of  any  value  in  itself,  but  just  as  a  more  or 
less  efficient  means  to  a  goal  valued  by  the  controller  alone. 
A  controlled  situation,  on  this  interpretation,  therefore, 
is  regulated  by  concern  for  values  other  than  those  impligit 
in  the  situation  itself.  To  argue,  then,  that  social  control 
is  the  first  step,  as  it  were,  towards  an  educative  order 
or  discipline  seems  as  misguided  as  to  say  that  extrinsic 
motivation  is  the  first  step  towards  intrinsic  motivation  or 
that  schooling  is  the  first  step  towards  education.  In  each 
of  these  examples  two  logically  different  kinds  of  commitment 
are  involved.  One  of  them  cannot  somehow  'turn  into'  or  be 
'a  hecessary  first  step'towards  the  other. 
The  point  I  have  been  trying  to  emphasize  is  logical, 
not  empirical.  It  is  a  matter  of  interpretation,  not  merely 
of  'fact'.  On  this  interpretation  of  'education',  educational 
situations  must  themselves  be  seen  as  orderly  situations. 
'The  first  step'  in  one's  education,  having  seen  value  to  lie 
in  a  certain  direction,  is  to  try  to  take  that  direction 
because  of  its  value  -  not  for  reasons  of  some  additional  penal- 
ties  or  advantages  which  one  either  wishes  to  prevent  or  to  gain. 
At  this  juncture  we  must  digress  to  draw  a  distinction 
between  penalties  and  punishments.  There  is  no  one  agreed 
conception  of  penalties.  One  view  is  that  there  are  some 
penalties  the  imposition  of  which  is  an  intrinsic  part  of  a 
rule-governed  activity  such  as:  a  free  kick  given  against  one 
in  a  game  of  football  or  'penalty  points'  in  a  car  rally. 2  78 
People  who  incur  these  penalties  are  not  thought  to  have  done 
anything  morally  wrong.  It  may  even  be  correct  tactics  to 
risk  incurring  such  penalties.  The  penalties  are  undesirable 
to  people  participating  in  the  game  in  the  normal  way  and  in 
normal  circumstances.  For  example,  a  footballer  whose  aim 
is  to  win  will  not  normally  want  to  have  a  'free-kick'  given 
against  him  (but  he  may  sometimes).  People  who  are  not 
taking  part  in  the  activity  or  who  are  doing  so  with  non-stand- 
ard  aims  (e.  g.  those  who  want  to  lose  a  football  match)  will 
not  find  penalties  undesirable. 
The  other  kind  of  penalties  are  not  intrinsic  to  any 
kind  of  a  rule  governed  activity  and  are  not  thought  to 
carry  any  moral  censure  either;  egg:  fees  for  overdue  libra- 
ry  books.  These  penalties  differ  from  the  other  type  because 
they  are  not  an  intrinsic  part  of  a  rule-governed  activity. 
One  could,  for  example,  know  exactly  what  it  was  to  borrow 
a  library  book  without  knowing  about  fees  or  fines,  whereas 
one  couldn't  know  exactly  what  it  is  to  play  football  without 
knowing  about  'free-kicks'.  Penalties  of  this  kind  would  be 
undesirable  to  most  people  and  not  just  to  those  taking  part 
in  an  activity  with  standard  aims. 
I  make  these  distinctions  not  because  penalties  may  or 
may  not  be  an  intrinsic  part  of  a  rule-governed  activity  but 
because  whereas  penalties  do  not  generally  carry  any  moral 
censure  punishments  do.  Penalizing,  therefore,  although 
appropriate  to  social  control,  it  not  part  of  becoming  more 279 
disciplined  and  should  not,  indeed,  be  interpreted  as  'punish- 
ment'  at  all. 
Punishing  and  penalizing,  then,  should  not  be  confused 
with  each  other.  Their  logical  characteristics  are  quite 
different.  There  is  no  reason  for  saying  that  a  person  should 
refrain  from  repeating  an  offence,  if  all  that  is  going  to 
happen  to  him  is  that  he  will  be  penalized.  Provided  that  that 
person  is  willing,  and  capable  of  paying  the  penalty,  nothing 
can  stop  him  from  breaking  the  rule  over  and  over  again.  A 
motorist,  for  instance,  may  calculate  that  the  gain  of  park- 
ing  on  yellow  lines  outweighs  the  advantage  of  paying  the 
fine  when  he  is  caught.  It  may  thus  make  sense  for  him  to 
continue  to  commit  the  offence,  so  long  as  he  is  not  caught 
so  often.  His  excuse  will  normally  be  that  there  is  no  rea- 
son  why  he  should  not  repeat  the  offence,  so  long  as  he  is 
perfectly  willing  and  able  to  pay  up  when  caught.  He  is  not 
being  'punished',  therefore,  by  having  to  pay  the  penalty, 
nor  is  making  him  pay  the  penalty  a  way  of  'disciplining'  him. 
Penalization  is  a  mode  not  of  discipline  but  of  social  control. 
It  is  not  the  pain  of  punishment  which  makes  it  'punish.. 
ment',  any  more  than  it  is  the  pleasure  of  a  reward  which 
is  sufficient  to  make  it  a  'reward'.  When  we  inflict  pain 
on  someone  in  a  way  which  he  regards  as  unjust  or  undeserved, 
he  will  see  this  not  as  'punishment'  but  as  spite,  retaliation 
or  revenge.  But  even  if  he  sees  the  pain  as  a  just  one,  un- 
less  it  is  given  for  something  which  he  regards  as  wrong 280 
(rather  than  just  illegal  or  against  authorized  rules)  he 
will  construe  it  as  a  penalty,  not  as.  punishment.  Similarly 
to  give  pleasure  to  some;.  one,  if  he  had  no  notion  that  he 
deserved  such  a  thing,  will  seem  to  him  like  flattery, 
currying,  favour  or  offering  a  bribe,  not  like  a  'reward'. 
Thus  both  reward  and  punishment  need  justification.  But 
again,  even  when  he  feels  that  there  is  an  acceptable  reason 
or  justification  for  the  pleasure  in  terms  of  custom  or  pre- 
cedent  (as  on  his  birthday,  for  example)  he  will  construe 
it  not  as  a  'reward'  but  as  a  gift  .  Only  when  deliberate 
pleasure  -  giving  is  for  moral  desert,  it  it  properly  speak- 
ing  a  'reward'.  Other  sorts  of  deliberate  pleasure-giving 
fall  under  categories  such  as:  'prize'  or  'gift',  or  on 
occasion  'bribe'  or  'inducement'  and  'flattery'. 
In  the  same  vein,  although  to  'reward'  someone  gives 
pleasure  both  to  him  and  to  you,  the  question  of  there  being 
an  advantage  in  it  for  either  of  you  need  not  arise.  Similar- 
ly,  to  'punish'  someone  is  painful  both  for  him  and  for  you, 
but  not  in  terms  of  some  advantage  which  either  of  you  have 
thereby  lost. 
On  the  other  hand,  to  'award'  either  a  penalty  or  a  goal 
is  to  give  something  of  a  disadvantage  or  advantage  to  the 
participants  in''the  game;  and  any-pleasure  or  gain  which  the 
players,  feel.  because  of  it, 
- 
derives  from  the  advan- 
tage  or  gain  which  has  thus  been  given  or  taken  away.  Reward 
and  punishment,  however,  unlike  gains  and  penalties,  are 
given  and  received  only  when  people  feel  to  some  extent  con- 281 
cerned  morally  in  their  own  case.  Just  as  discipline  involves 
a  willingness  and  concern  to  correct  one's'mistakes  and  seek 
the  truth  for  oneself,  so  punishment  involves  one's  own 
willingness  and  concern  to  see  faults  and  suffer  their 
correction. 
4,  PUNISHMENT:  A  ROLE  TO  PLAY  IN  EDUCATION? 
Philosophical  literature  on  punishment  is,  undoubtedly, 
enormous.  A  learned  journal  hardly  goes  by  without  additions 
to  the  already  great  spread  of  words  upon  topics  such  as: 
blame,  remorse,  forgiieness,  attonement,  guilt,  expiation, 
mercy,  'retribution,  detterrence,  reform,  treatment,  repara- 
tion  and  many  other  notions  relating  to  the  general  theme. 
Thus  Jeffrie  G.  Murphy  writes: 
16 
"The  topic  of  punishment  fascinates  men,  learned 
and  unlearned  alike,  to  a  degree  that  is  rare 
for  any  topic  that  may  even  in  part  be  called 
"philosophical".  The  fiction  of  crime  and  punish- 
ment.....  is  perenriäliypopular;  and  public  debate 
on  punitive  topics...  'the  abolition  of  the  death 
penalty,  preventive  detention  etc.,  is  closely 
followed  by  the  media..... 
The  intense  interest,  then,  is  perhaps  perplexing 
and  many  fanciful  explanations  for  it  have  been 
given.....  " 
James  F.  Doyle17  also  comments  as  follows: 
"The  question  of  punishment  and  its  justification 
has  been  a  major  preoccupation  in  recent  philoso- 
phy  of  law,......  " 
Similar,  ICýomments  can  be  found  in  a  great  number  of  books  and 
journals.  However  apart  from  its  sheer  bulk,  the  most 
striking  feature  of  the  literature  is  that  all  of  it  is  con- 
cerned  with  the  legal  notion  of  punishment.  Professor  H.  L.  A. 
Hart,  for  example,  explicitly  lists  among  the  five  elements 282 
in  terms  of  which  he  defines  'the  standard  or  central  use  of 
punishment',  that: 
(ii)  It  must  be  for  an  offence  against  legal  rules... 
(v)  it  must  be  imposed  and  administered  by  an 
authority  constituted  by  a  legal  system18 
against  which  the  offence  is  committed. 
Elsewhere  he  continues: 
"in  calling  this  the  standard  or  central  case 
of  punishment  I  shall  relegate  to  the  position 
of  sub-standard  or  secondary  cases  the  follow- 
ing  among  many  other  possibilities: 
(a)  Punishments  for  breaches  of  legal  rules 
imposed  or  administered  otherwise  than 
by  officials  (decentralized  sanctions). 
(b)  Punishments  for  breaches  of  non-legal 
rules  or  orders  (punishments  in  a 
family  or  school).  1119 
This  Implies  that,  for  example,  offences  against  moral  as 
opposed  to  legal  rules,  or  against  parental  injunctions 
cannot  be  punished  or  can  be  punished  only  in  a  secondary 
sense  of  'punishment'.  Hart  himself  does  indeed  describe 
the  latter  of'these  cases  as  'sub-standard  or  secondary'. 
But  how  can  we  hope  to  understand  the  place  of  punishment 
in  education  if  in  the  very  definition  of  it  the  educational 
case  is  regarded  as  sub-standard?  Even  in  the  few  papers 
in  which  punishment  is  considered  in  other  contexts  than 
the  legal  one,  the  distinctive  meaning  of  punishment  in 
family  and  school  situations  is  seldom  carried  very  far,  20 
McPherson,  Perhaps,  has  taken  it  further.  He  writes: 
21 
We  do  talk  of  parents  punishing  their  children, 
and  we  do  talk  of  self-punishment,  To  say  or 
imply  at  the  outset  that  these  uses  are  at  best 
secondary,  or  sub-standard  is,  even  when  a  dis- 
claimer  is  made,  to  depreciate  any  contribution 
that  they  may  be  able  to  make  to  the  clarifica- 
tion  of  the  concept  of  punishment. 283 
McPherson  points  out  later  that: 
"Punishment  can  turn  up  in  any  human  relation- 
ship.  Lovers  punish  each  other;  parents  pu-  22 
nish  their  children;  the  state  punishes  criminaLs.  " 
In  the  above  quotation  it  is  in  the  state's  treatment  of 
criminals,  that  'punishment'  comes  closest,  to  being  nothing 
but  an  adjunct  of  social  control,  in  the  sense  of  being 
little  more  than  the  imposition  of  a  set  of  graduated  pen- 
alties  for  breaking  rules  devised  not  for  persons  in  parti- 
cular  but  for  people  or  society  in  general  (or  'in  the  gene- 
ral  interest'). 
Attempting  to  offer  an  explanation  of  the  meaning  of 
'punishment'  by  looking  at  it  as  exemplified  in  a  court  of 
law  and  its  associated  penal  institutions,  is  like  trying 
to  paint  a  picture  of  something  which  one  has  seen  only 
through  the  wrong  end  of  a  telescope;  the  vital  details 
are  blurred  or  missing  although.  All  those  features  of 
punishment  which  are  clearest  and  which  count  for  most  in 
a  personal  or  human  relationship  are  at  their  most  obscure 
and  their  least  valued  in  law.  This  is  so,  because  the  law 
is  designed  for  'the  general  public'  not  for  individuals  or 
particular  persons.  Indeed,  it  would  be  unthinkable  to  enact 
laws  with  any  particular  person  in  mind.  The  consequence 
of  this  is  that  all  the  things  which  one  would  regard  as 
most  important  in  human  relationships,  and  hence  in  punish- 
ment  and  reward  are  scarcely  taken  into  account  in  law. 
Thus  fairness  which  is  important  in  education  is  obscure 
in  law.  In  law  what  some  see  as  'extenuating  circumstances' 284 
is  sometimes  interpreted  as  'letting  the  blighter  off'  or 
'going  soft'.  Forgiveness  plays  no  part  in  law  since  the 
guilty  must  pay  their  penalty,  regardless  of  whether  or  not 
being  found  guilty  has  been  adequate  suffering.  Remorse  is 
also  obscure:  the  offender  is  free  only  when  the  has  paid 
his  penalty.  It  is  irrelevant  whether  or  not  the  offender 
is  yet  conscious  of  having  done  wrong. 
It  is  inconceivable  then  to  look  at  the  processes  of 
the  law  solely  for  the  paradigm  cases  of  punishment  as  the 
law  is  not  concerned  (logically)  to  make  a  distinction  between 
penalizing  and  punishment.  More  so,  legal  distinctions 
are  even  not  adequate.  According  to  exponents  such  as 
Geldart23  civil  law  is  not  even  concerned  with  punishment, 
but  only  with  the  restitution  of  social  order.  In  other 
words,  civil  law  on  Geldart's  interpretation  is  concerned 
with  the  maintenance  of  the  status  quo  through  social  control. 
Criminal  law,  on  the  other  hand,  which  it  is  said  to  be  con- 
cerned  with  'punishment,  turns  out  instead  to  be  particularly 
concerned  merely  with  the  control  of  a  special  class  of 
social  rule-breaking  namely,  the  one  which  is  'a  matter  of 
public  concern'.  In  both  Civil  and  Criminal  law  on  this  in- 
terpretation  the  law  ;  functions  as  an  agency  for  the  pre- 
servation  of  a  particular  social  order.  But  it  seems  to 
me  that  such  an  interpretation  of  punishment  is  misguided 
because  primarily  (at  least)  punishment  is  a  moral  matter. 
Thus  punishment  in  a  legal  setting  is  quite  different 
from  punishment  in  an  educational  situation.  It  is  emphasized, 285 
once  again,  that  punishment,  is  part  of  our  education. 
According  to  R.  S.  Peters, 
24  it  helps  to  initiate  us  into 
the  moral  dimension  of  life.  Extrinsic  controls,  by  contrast 
(but  not  necessarily  in  opposition  to  this)  which  are  usua- 
lly  in  psychological  and  legal  contexts  misinterpreted  as 
punishments  must  be  described  more  clearly  as  'penalties', 
not  as  'punishment'.  The  different  senses  in  which  penal- 
ties  differ  from  punishments  have  already  been  discussed. 
What  should  concern  us  in  this  section  is  to  establish  that  in 
educational  situations  we  are  concerned  with  punishments, 
not  penalties.  Only  a  moral  agent  is  capable  of  punishing 
and  of  being  punished.  One  is  penalised  for  infringing  the 
authorized  rules  of  any  social  practice  in  which  one  engages, 
but  one  is  punished  by  breaking  specially  moral  rules.  A 
rule  breaker  is  liable  for  a  penalty  whether  or  not  he  can 
see  good  reason  for  the  rules,  but  a  wrongdoer  is  liable  for 
punishment  because  he  can  see  good  reason  for  the  rules  (and 
has  nevertheless  broken  them).  Penalties  are  awarded  'dis- 
interestedly'  -  hence,  the  law  is  no  respecter  of  persons; 
but  punishments  are  as  variable  as-the  strength  of  interest 
of  the  persons  concerned.  One  is  'Oünished  by  someone  with 
whom  one  claims  to  share  an  interest  but  towards  whom(-  one 
has  failed  to  behave  in  a  way  appropriate  to  the  interest 
which  you  share.  One  important  characteristic  of  punishment 
is  that  it  always  implies  moral  blame  whereas  penalty  does 
not.  A  penalty  is  a  disadvantage  in  respect  of  the  pursuit 
of  personal  goals.  A  punishment  is  more  likdy  a  timely 
reminder  of  what  one's  personal  goals  are. 286 
In  educational  situations  any  reference  to  penalties 
must  be  regarded  as  'last  resort'.  It  is  only  when  children 
are  not  'learning  through  interest'  that  teachers  might  be 
inclined  to  fall  back  on  extrinsic  controls,  namely  psycho- 
logical  and  physical  manipulation.  When  children  are  learn- 
ing,  they  are  learning  about  the  moralzlue,  as  well  as 
other  values  of  their  interest.  From  the  outset  of  such 
situations,  reward  and  punishment,  then,  must  be  an  essen- 
tial  ingredient  of  what  goes  ono  Educational  situations 
are  intrinsically  rewarding,  and  therefore  intrinsically 
punishing  too.  They  could  not  be  one  if  they  were  not  also 
on  occasion  the  other.  Teachers  who  claim  to  be  deliberate 
agents  in  the  education  of  others,  must  face  up  with  the 
fact  that  on  occasions  what  they  do  deliberately  will  hurt, 
just  as  on  other  occasions  it  will  please.  Exactly  what  it  will 
take  to  'show'  a  child  for  sure  that  he  is  failing  education- 
ally,  is  an  empirical  matter  which  will  vary  from  child  to 
child.  It  will  depend  partly,  for  example,  on  what  sort  of 
language  he  is  thus  far  capable  of  understanding  -  words, 
gestures  or  deeds.  But  whatever  language  is  employed,  it 
will  have  force,  as  well  as  meaning.  It  will  perform  a  func- 
tion,  as  well  as  'say  something'.  With  highly  articulate 
children  reward  and  punishment  may  often  be  accomplished  by 
'doing  things  with  words';  with  others  -  for  example  with 
very  young  children  -  it  will  be  a  matter,  at  least  to  begin 
with,  of  saying  things  with  deeds.  In  either  case,  however, 
the  force  of  what  we  say  or  do  in  punishing  hurts,  while  the 
meaning  educates.  To  a  university  student,  for  example, 287 
the  force  of  a  criticism  can  be  painful,  it's  meaning 
educative.  To  very  young  children,  the  meaning  of  a  smack 
can  be  educative,  while  its  force  hurts.  But  this  is  not 
to  suggest  that  any  general  rules  can  replace  the  judgement 
which  achieves  value  in  each  particular  case.  The  art  of 
education,  whether  undertaken  by  parent,  teacher  or  anyone 
else,  lies  in  understanding  the  language  and  appreciating 
the  sensitivity  of  the  person  whose  interest  one  shares 
and  therefore  in  whose  interest  one  is  concerned. 
However,  when  the  hurts  we  inflict  upon  children  and 
others  are  calculated  by  standards  imposed  for  purposes 
extrinsic  to  those  of  the  situation  in  which  they  occur, 
we  are  dealing  with  penalties,  not  punishments,  and  not  with 
discipline  or  educative  order  but  of  control.  But  while 
some  (the  minimum)  control  is  plainly  unavoidable  on  pru- 
dential  grounds,  our  educative  concern  lies  with  matters  of 
Discipline  and  not  with  matters  of  control. 
It  is  emphasized  finally  therefore  that  discipline 
(as  distinct  from  control)  involves  taking  part  in  rule- 
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1.  THE  RIGHT  TO  PUNISH:  GUIDING  AND  LIMITING  PRINCIPLES 
Most  of  what  we  shall  discuss  in  this  section  may  not 
often  find  its  way  into  philosophical  discussions  of  punish- 
ment.  These  discussions  deal  with  large  and  significant 
questions  of  whether  or  not  we  ever  have  the  right  to 
punish,  and  if  we  do,  under  what  conditions,  to  what  degree, 
and  in  what  manner,  Herbert  Morris  writes  that: 
"There  is  a  tradition  .....  the  adherents  of 
which  have  urged  that  justice  requires  a 
person  be  punished  if  he  is  guilty1"" 
lie  continues: 
....  these  philosophers  have  expressed  themselves 
in  terms  of  the  criminal's  right  to  beepunished. 
Reaction  to  the  claim  that  there  is  such  a  right 
has  been  astonishment  combined,  perhaps,  with  a 
touch  of  contempt  for  the  perversity  of  the 
suggestion,  A  strange  right  that  no  one  would 
ever  wish  to  claim.....  "2 
Morris  based  his  argument  on  four  propositions  concerning 
right  that  will  certainly  strike  some  as  not  only  false  but 
preposterous.  First,  he  says,  that  we  have  a  right  to 
punish;  second,  that  this  right  derives  from  a  fundamental 
human  right  to  býý  treated  as  a  person;  third,  that  this  fun- 
damental  right  is  a  natural,  inalianable,  and  absolute  right; 
and,  fourth,  that  the  denial  of  this  right  implies  the  denial 
of  all  moral  rights  and  duties. 
3 
Indeed  Morris  admits-:  that 
showing  the  truth  of  one,  let  alone  all,  of  these  queion- 
able  claims  is  not  easy. 
Morris'  approach  sounds  promissing  bUt  in  this  section 
I  shall  adopt  a  complet6iy  different  approach  in  settling 
the  question  that  we  have  a  right  to  punish.  My  main  con- 
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cern  shall  be  directed  to  the  guiding  and  limiting  principles. 
To  begin  with,  the  question  is  often  put  whether  or  not  we 
ever  have  the  right  to  punish,  and  if  we  do,  under  what  con- 
ditions,  to  what  degree  and  in  what  manner?  What,  in  prin- 
ciple,  would  constitute  an  adequate  defence  of  the  institu- 
tion  of  legal  punishment.  Before  attempting  an  answer  we 
must  raise  a  prior  question:  What  kind  of  undertaking  is  a 
"defense"  or  "justification'of  an  institution  or  practice? 
Legal  punishment  can  be  referred  to  both  as  a  practice  and 
as  an  institution.  "Practice"  is  the  wider  term,  and  in- 
cludes  everything  we  would  call  an  instütion.  To  have  a 
practice  is  to  have  a  set  or  standard  way  of  dealing  with 
a  recurrent  situation. 
4 
Not,  how  do  we  go  about  it?  But 
what  is  it  we  are  going  about? 
We  are  offering  reasons  for  the  conclusion  that  punish- 
ment  should  be  ,  retained  not  abolished.  In  doing  so,  we  are 
thinking  of  the  practice  of  punishment  not  as  a  rib  of  the 
universe,  but  as  a  device  which  serve  certain  purposes  well 
or  ill.  it  is  not  a  device  in  the  sense  that  it  is  a'dodge" 
or  "dadget"  which  can  be  used  today  and  abandoned  tomorrow. 
But  it  is  something  which  has  been  devised  -  not  all  at  once 
or  consciously,  perhaps;  but  it  is  an  invention  of  man.  It 
is  an  arrangement  which  we  find  already  present  in  the  cul- 
ture  of  which  we  become  bearers;  but  our  culture  could  have 
been  otherwise.  There  are  cultures  in  which  there  is  no 
legal  punishment.  To  justify  legal  punishment  is  then,  to 
show  that  there  are  better  reasons  for  retaining  than  for 
abandoning  it. 
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Strictly  speaking,  if  we  subscribe  to  the  principle 
that  the  burden  of  proof  is  on  anyone  who  would  institute  a 
change;  all  that  we  have  to  argue  in  favour  of  the  practice 
of  legal  punishment  is  to  show  that  no  adequate  grounds  for 
changing  it  have  been  so  far  put  öfmrward.  It  will  not  be 
convincing  to  say  that  punishment  is  something  which  is 
already  in  existence  and  that  an  attempt  to  change  it  always 
creates  difficulties.  Surely,  a  case  can  be  made  out  for  it 
which  would  warrant  instituting  legal  punishment  if  it  were 
not  already  the  practice, 
How,  then,  should  we  go  about  offering  a  justification 
of  a  legal  punishment?  What,  in  principle,  would  constitute 
an  adequate  general  defence  or  justification  of  punishment 
or  of  any  social  practice.  To  justify  a  practice  is  to 
show  two  things:  that  under  the  circumstances,  a  practice  is 
necessary,  called  for,  or  would  be  useful;  and  that  of  the 
alternatives  available  and  acceptable  the  practice  in  ques- 
tion  would  likely  be  the  most  effective.  We  will  refer  to 
the  reason  why  some  practice  must  be  instituted  as  the 
"guiding--principle"  of  justification;  and  to  the  considera- 
tions  by  reference  to  which  the  practice  is  rejected  as 
unacceptable  even  though  it  seems  the  best  of  the  available 
alternatives,  in  the  light  of  the  guiding  principle,  as  the 
"limiting  principles"  of  justification.  It  is  with  respect 
to  the  guiding  principle-that  a  proposed  practice  can  be 
more  or  less  effective;  but  it  may  be  rejected,  even  though 
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These  are  general  formal  conditions  of  the  justification 
of  a  practice.  It  is  a  necessary  condition  of  an  adequate 
justification  of  a  practice  that  of  the  available  alternatives 
it  most  efficiently  serves  the  purpose  for  which  a  practice  is 
needed;  it  is  a  necessary  condition  that  the  practice  not  be 
ruled  out  b3  a  limiting  principle;  and  it  is  a  necessary  and 
sufficient  condition  that  the  practice  serve  the  purpose  as  well 
as  possible  within  the  bounds  set  by'the  limiting  principles. 
The  general  view  of  justification  of  punishment  presented  here 
is  perhaps  closer  to  Ross'  than  any  other  traditional  view.  The 
distinctions  made  here,  however,  give  us  certain  advantages  over 
Ross'  account.  Ross  speaks  of  the  balance  between  the  prima 
facie  duty  of  "injuring  wrong-doers  only  to  the  extent  that  they 
have  injured  others",  and  the  prima  facie  duty  of  "promoting 
the  general  interest",  5 
In  the  first  place,  our  account  avoids 
the  implication  that  we  simply  balance  these  considerations  one 
against  the  other  like  weights  on  a  scale.  It  is  not  a  question 
of  choosing  either  justice  or  utility  or  a  balance  between  them, 
but  of  finding  the  most  useful  social  device  consistent  with 
the  demand  of  justice.  Secondly  (though  Ross  might  well  not 
agree  that  this  is  an  advantage)  the  emphasis  is  more  on  stand- 
ing  on,  or  holding  a  principle,  than  on  knowing  that  something 
is  true.  Third,  our  account  is  not  open,  as  Ross'  is,  to  the 
kind  of  objection  raised  by  J.  S.  Mill  (in  Hamilton) 
6 
to  the 
effect  that  we  cannot  very  well  balance  the  maxims  of  justice, 
against  those  of  utility,  since  what  one  maxim  of  justice  de- 
mands  may  be  incompatible  with  what  another  maxim  of  justice 
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which  I  believe  are  real,  need  not  concern  us;  since  if  the 
practice  in  question  conflicts  with  any  maxim  which  we  ad- 
here  to,  then  it  is  ruled  out;  and  we  must  look  around  for 
one  which  is  acceptable.  But,  like  Ross,  we  are  able  to 
avoid  the  charge,  that,  by  setting  in  motion  an  utilitarian 
engine  of  justification  uncurbed,  we  are  likely  to  justify 
too  much.  Thus  this  schema  is  at  least  useful  in  approach- 
ing  the  problem  of  the  justification  of  a  specific  practice. 
It  forces  us  to  distinguish  between  the  questions  whether  a 
practice  is  necessary;  whether  the  practice  in  question  best 
fills  the  need;  and  if;  even  so,  it  must  be  rejected. 
But  the  question  facing  us,  and  with  which  we  wish  to 
come  to  grips  in  this  section,  concerns  the  right  to  punish. 
It  requests  a  specifically  moral  justification.  Like  an 
economic  or  aesthetic  justification  of  a  practice,  a  moral 
justification  will-  have  guiding  and  limiting  principles. 
But  whatever  principles  we  accept  must  be  shown  to  be  morally 
defensible.  This  may  seem  to  present  insuperable  difficulties, 
for  there  are  apparently  irreconcilable  differences  over  the 
ultimate  principles  of  morality.  Hence  what  is  morally 
defensible  to  one  school  will  not  be  so  to  another.  For  exam- 
ple,  utilitarians,  self-realizationalists  might  fail  to  agree 
on  the  moral  defensibility  of  the  guiding  and  limiting  prin- 
ciples  by  which  punishment  must  be  morally  assessed  as  a 
practice.  But  this  may  not  necessarily  be  so.  What  is  mo- 
rally  defensible  from  one  point  of  view  need  not  h'  indefen- 
sible  from  another.  And  it  may  be  that  the  schema  we  use I 
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will  point  up  the'  conplementarity  rather  than  the  incompa- 
tibility  of  the  leading  moral  views.  The  retributivist  can 
argue  with  real  plausibility,  that  particular  decisions  con- 
cerning  punishments  should  not  be  made  on  the  ground  that 
some  supposedly  good  purpose  would  be  served  by  punishing. 
and  he  can  also  argue  (perhaps  less  plausibly)  that  all  penal 
laws  should  be  passed  solely  on  the  ground  that  justice 
demands  them, 
But  it  it  really  plausible  to  argue  that  justice  demands 
a  practice?  Is  it  not  more  plausible  to  argue  that  when  a 
practice  can  be  shown  to  be  necessary  on  utilitarian  grounds, 
it  should  meet  the  demands  of  justice?  Does  justice  demand,  - 
the  institution  or  practice  of  law,  or  marriage,  or  private 
property  or  representative  government?  To  answer  in  the 
affirmative  is  to  imply  that  there  are  burdens  and  privileges 
existing  prior  to  an  institution  or  practice,  which  the  prac- 
tice  should  be  invented  and  adopted  to  protect.  But  then 
the  question-  is  how  we  can  know  what  these  burdens  and  pri- 
vileges  are,  prior  to  any  practice  within  which  theyoperate. 
To  say  that  the  institution  should  be  invented  and  adopted 
to  protect  these  burdens  and  privileges  is  like  saying  that 
basketball  should  be  invented  so  that  fouls  and  points  for 
goals  can  be  recognized  and  penalized  or  rewarded.  But, 
outside  of  basketball  there  are  no  fouls  and  points  for  goals. 
What  would  it  mean  to  say  that  there  are  burdens  and  privi- 
leges  which  persons  have,  to  protect  which  if  is  essential 
that  we  adopt,  for  example,  the  practice  of  marriage? 
This  might  seem  more  plausible  with  respect  to  punish- 
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justice  demands  that  there  should  be  an  institution  which 
accords  punishment  to  ill  desert?  The  ill  desert  must  then 
be  supposed  to  exist  independently  of  any  practice  in  terms 
of  which  it  can  be  defined.  The  crucial  point  here  is  that 
it  is  impossible  to  account  for  the  existence  of  desert  in 
the  absence  of  a  practice  in  terms  of  which  desert  can  be 
assigned.  What  may  lead  us  to  think  that  desert  can  exist 
independently  of  a  given  punishment  -  practice  is  that  de- 
sert  is  a  concept  in  not  one  but  seferal  practices:  legal 
punishment  being  merely  the  most  clearly  articulated  of  them. 
But  if  we  stop  to  think  of  it  we  would  realize  that  we  could 
not  speak,  for  example,  of  what  Johnson  deserves  for  pouring 
ink  on  the  oriental  rug  were  it  not  for  some  prior  under- 
standing  of-  a  practice.  According  to  this  practice,  those 
persons  playing  the  role  of  parent  are  given  the  discretion 
or  authority,  if  you  like,  to  assign  penalties  not  only  for 
certain  kinds  of  acts  in  advance,  but  also  for  acts  adjudged 
"bad"  or  "naughty"  after  the  fact:  like  pouring  ink  on  rugs 
or  putting  glue  in  the  seats.  Punishment  of  such  acts  is 
justified,  even  though  there  is  no  rule  promulgated  in  ad- 
vance  against  them.  But  There  do  parents  derive  their  moral 
authority  to  identify  and  punish  such  acts?  Surely,  not 
from  some  table  beyond  the  table  of  rules.  Then  we  would 
.  simply  have  to  ask  for  the  credentials  of  that  table,  and  of 
any  table  from  which  it  was  derived  etc.  It  is  not  that  the 
ill  desert  exist  prior  to  the  role  of  parent,  but  that  parents 
are  persons  who  are  given  discretion,  according  to  a  practice, 
to  make  decisions  concerning  ill  desert. 298 
It  might  seem  that,  nevertheless,  there  is  ill  desert 
independent  of  the  practices  of  punishment,  becuase  the 
decisions  of  parents  or  judges  are  not  merely  arbitrary: 
decisions  concerning,  desert  are  not  right  simply  by  virtue 
of  being  made  by  the  proper  authorities,  but  by  virtue  of 
being  made  in  accordance  with  standards  which  the  authorities 
should  observe.  We  can  criticize  the  authority's  decisions 
on  rational  grounds.  But  the  analogous  point  holds  for 
fouls  in  basketball,  or  balls  and  strikes  in  baseball.  Here 
too  we  can  criticise  the  decision  of  the  umpire  by  reference 
to  the  criteria  by  which  he  should  be  governed.  But  it  does 
not  follow  that  there  could  be  balls  and  strikes  were  there 
no  game  of  baseball.  The  assertion  that  a  person  deserves 
severe  punishment  is  significant  if  and  only  if  there  is  some 
practice  accoeding  to  which  some  authority  could,  by  discover- 
able  criteria,  rightly  award  severe  punishment.  To  say  that 
justice  is  a  limiting  principle  of  possible  practices  of 
punishment  is  not  to  say  that  practices  should  somehow  meet 
the  requirement  that  some  abstract,  extra-practice  "desert" 
should  be  given  its  due.  It  is  but  to  say  that  the  practice 
must,  in  virtue  of  its  arrangements,  give  everyone  concerned 
a  fair  deal. 
2.  FACTUAL  AND  MORAL  ASSUMPTIONS 
We  shall  now  turn  to  the  question  what  the  circumstances 
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legal  punishment,  or  an  alternative.  Here  we  will  list  cer- 
tain  very  general  assumptionsoof  fact  which,  taken  together 
give  rise  to  the  problem.  -  To  the  extent  that  these  assump- 
tions  of  fact  are  shaky,  the  justification  of  punishment 
totters;  for  the  problem  of  punishment  and  its  competing  prac- 
tices  are  designed  to  meet  alters  or  disappears.  The  assump- 
tions  of  fact  in  question  fall  naturally  into  three  diffe- 
rent  categories:  assumptions  concerning  human  nature,  human 
society,  and  nature  or  "supernature". 
Concerning  human  nature,  we  assume  that  human  beings 
are  non-ant-like  in  that  they  do  not  order  their  affairs 
by  instinct,  or  in  other  words,  without  rules.  We  assume 
also  that  whatever  rules  or  regulations  men  set  for  themselves 
there  will  be  tension  between  the  rules  and  the  private  inte- 
rests,  desires,  or  passions  of  persons  falling  under  these 
rules:  that  there  will  not  be  automatic  submission. 
Concerning  human  society  we  assume  that  it  is  necessary 
to  set  some  rules  if  men  wish  to  survive,  simply  because 
human  beings,  being  without  enough  instinctual  equipment, 
are  incapable  of  carrying  on  common  activities  necessary  for 
their  survival  unless  they  are  shown,  told,  taught  how  to 
conduct  themselves,  what  to  do,  and  what  to  refrain  from 
doing.  And  we  assume  that  it  is  desirable  to  set  other  rules 
if  the  common  life  is  to  inhance  the  well-being  (however  that 
is  defined)  and  reduce  the  misery  and  unhappiness  (easier 
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concerning  nature  or  "supernature",  we  assume  that  no 
natural  or  supernatural  forces  either  compel  action  in 
accordance  with  the  rules,  or  counter  each  violation  with 
retribution.  Lightning  does  not,  as  a  matter  of  course, 
strike  down  either  the  man  whose  hand  is  raised  with  murderous 
intention  or  the  murderer  whose  intention  has  been  fulfilled. 
iflightningg  pestilence,  or  tornado  operated  in  either  of 
these  ways,  social  arrangements  to  ensure  compliance  with 
with  rules  would  be  redundant. 
To  these  fadtual  assurpptions  we  must  now  add  a  moral 
one.  We  assume  that  survival  in  conditions  not  merely  mise- 
rable,  and  with  some  hope  of  happiness,  is  a  value  worthy 
of  protection.  We  shall  assume,  indeed,  that  to  interfere 
with  these  modest  prospects  and  possibilities  is  morally 
wrong;  and  that  each  community  (call  it  society  if  you  wish) 
has  a  collective  moral  right  to  prevent  such  interference. 
Granting,  then,  that  men  wish  to  survive,  and  to  de- 
crease  their  misery  and  enhance  their  well-being  there  must 
be  rules;  and  some  social  arrangement  must  be  found  which 
will  counter  the  tendency  to  violate  rules.  Two  points 
should  be  noted  here.  The  arrangement  in  question  is  not 
required  to  be  one  which  equqlly  discourages  the  violation  of 
all  rules;  some  rules  are  more  imprtant  for  survival  and 
the  well  being  of  society  than  others;  and  the  effectiveness 
needed  in  the  prevention  of  some  rule-violations  is  not  de- 
manded  for  the  prevention  of  all  rules  violations.  And, 
whatever  practice  may  be  instituted,  its  application  in  the 
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extent  that  the  rule  and/or  rule-set  is  justified.  The  latter 
point  must  be  expanded. 
Legislators?  may  be  in  a  position  to  enact  any  rules 
they  choose.  In  enacting  rules,  they  may  or  may  not  have 
sufficiently  in  mind  the  survival  or  well-being  of  the  citi- 
zens.  Their  laws  may  be  designed  to  enhance  their  own  well- 
being.  The  state  may  be  administered  like  the  legislator's 
private  plantation,  the  citizen  regarded  as  Serfs  -  and  it 
may  be  badly  administered  even  on  these  terms.  Can  any  prac- 
tice  designed  to  encourage  compliance  with  the  rules  of  such 
a  legislature  be  justified?  The  alternative  practices  in 
question  are  not  designed  to  encourage  compliancd  with  any 
particular  set  of  rules,  but  are  rather  devices  to  encourage 
compliance,  with  rules.  To  show  that  there  may  be  bad  rules 
is  not  to  show  that  the  practices  are  bad  practices.  The 
practices  are  needed  to  counter  the  tendency  to  violate  rules 
which  for  our  survival  and  well-being  we  must  have;  but  this) 
unfortunately,  does  not  prevent  their  being  used  to  enforce 
rules  which  may  even  go  against  the  ends  of  survival  and 
well-being.  To  reject  them  on  this  account  is  like  rejecting 
hammers  because  they  may  be  used  by  murderers,  or  representa- 
tive  government  because  we  disapprove  of  the  candidate  from 
Glasgow  central  constituency. 
There  is  a  limit  beyond  which  this  argument  should  not 
be  pressed.  For  various  counter  examples  can  be  given. 
Should  we  not  reject  the  practice  of  carrying  hand-guns,  e.  g., 
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provide  a  light  gun,  capable  of  being  carried  on  long  trips, 
which  can  be  used  for  small  game  and,  in  wild  country,  for 
self-defense?  Should  we  not  have  rejected  duelling,  even 
though  it  may  orLginally  have  been  a  desirable  substitute  for 
simple  unorganized  mayhem?  But  the  analogous  argument  in  the 
present  discussion  would  have  to  show  that  the  conditions 
whiCh  gave  rise  to  the  demand  for  a  practice  designed  to 
encourage  compliance  with  rules  are  now  so  changed  that  prac- 
tices  originally  meeting  that  need  are  now  needed  and  are 
used  for  unjustifiable  ends.  While  this  does  not  now  seem 
a  plausible  pair  of  contentions,  it  should  be  conceded.  '  that 
they  could  be,  under  circumstances  now  hard  to  foresee.  If 
the  great  majority  of  human  beings  were  in  some  way  trans- 
formed  so  that  the  tension  between  rules  and  personal  inte- 
rests,  passions,  and  desires  disappeared;  then  the  circums- 
tances  which  gave  rise  to  the  need  for  a  practice  would  have 
disappeared.  And  it  could  be  that,  under  those  circumstances, 
the  practices  originally  designed  to  encourage  compliance 
with  rules,  and  now  no  longer  necessary,  were  being  used 
instead  merely  as  instruments  of  oppression. 
3.  EFFECTIVENESS,  HUMANITY  AND  JUSTICE 
We  begin  this  section  with  the  following  question-.: 
should  punishment  be  preferred  to  other  possible  practices? 
Before  attempting  to  assess  the  relative  merits  and  demerits 
of  punishment  and  its  competitors,  we  must  discuss  the  grounds 
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of  comparison.  These,  as  we  have  noted,  concern  effective- 
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punishment  may  not  be  the  most  effective  possible 
method  for  discouraging  crime.  Probably  the  most  effective 
way  to  discourage  or  abolish  crime  is  to  annihilate  the 
human  'race.  Or  if  this  seems  a  little  extrerr  ,  no  doubt  we 
could  go  a  long  way  towards  the  elimination  of  crime  by  the 
use  of  drugs:  the  tranquilization  of  the  human  race.  These 
possibilities  are  mentioned  to  point  out  the  absurdity  of 
arguing  solely  on  grounds  of  effectiveness  in  the  reduction 
of  crime.  Even  though  the  procedures  mentioned  would  work 
to  eliminate  crime,  they  would  not  be  acceptable.  What  then 
are  the  boundaries  of  acceptability?  To  what  limiting  princi- 
ples  may  we  appeal  in  rejecting  an  effective  practice?  How 
many  limiting  principles  are  there?  This  is  like  asking 
how  many  ways  there  are  for  an  effective  practice  to  go  awry. 
Limiting  principles  reject  the  proposed  practice,.  because  it 
can  be  seen  in  advance  that  once  this  device  is  set  in  motion 
there  are  ways  in  which  it  would  operate  which  we  could  never 
accept.  But  because  the  need  for  a  practice  is  sometimes 
very  great,  the  grounds  on  which  a  candidate  may  be  ruled 
out,  as  unacceptable  are  naturally  very  much  curtailed. 
Justice  and  humanity  in  that  order,  seem  to  be  the  limiting 
principles  which  bind  with  the  greatest  stringency;  but  for 
less  important  practice  -  choices,  many  more  limiting  prin- 
ciples  can  find  their  way  in. 
We  have  mentioned,  above,  not  only  justice  but  also 
humanity.  By  denominating  humanity  a  limiting  principle, 
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effective  practice  is  that  it  is  inhumane.  It  is  apparently 
usually  assumed  in  theoretical  writing  that  any  practice 
which  is  inhumane  is  by  the  same  token  unjust,  since  humani- 
ty  as  a  separate  limiting  principle  is  not  discussed.  Yet 
it  is  not  absurd  to  suppose  that  a  given  practice  could  be 
just  but  inhumane:  that  it  might  violate  none  of  the  maxims 
of  justice  and  still  demand  treatment  of  individuals  which 
I 
we  would  agree  is  cruel  or  degrading.  " The  "solution"  of 
the  problem  of  crime  by  annihilation  or  drugging  could  be 
not  only  effective,  but  just  -  in  that  it  did  not  violate 
any  of  the  maxims  of  justice  by  discriminating  between  per- 
sons:  drugging  or  annihilating  everyone  impartially.  This 
possibility  gives  rise  to  the  maxim  that  justice  should  be 
"tempered  with  mercy"  -  and  to  a  certain  confusion  attending 
this  maxim.  For  justice  is  not  inherently  opposed  to  mercy: 
, 
What  is  just  may  be  humane  enough,  but  it  need  not  be  humane 
at  all. 
How  is  it  to  be  decided  whether  a  proposed  practice  is 
inhumane?  It  will  not  do  to  speak  forcefully  of  setting  up 
cardinal  or  ordinal  scales  on  which  there  is  a  zero  mark 
between  minus-inhumane  degrees  and  positive-...  humane  ones. 
The  question  would  then  be  how  we  know  where  to  place  any 
practice  on  the  scale.  Is  it  possible  to  find  a  purely  for- 
mal  criterion  of  inhumanity  in  a  practice?  It  may  be,  but 
if  so  it  would  have  to  be  developed  in  conjunction  with  a 
criterion  of  the  justice  of  a  practice,  to  which  problem 
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What  is  it  for  a  practice  to  be  just?  Doyle8  argues 
that  any  system  of  criminal  law  which  meets  generally 
acknowledged  requirements  of  justice  would  adhere  to  the 
principle  of  the  absolute  equality  of  worth  of  all  members 
of  the  legal  community,  as  persons.  This  entails  that 
legal  demands  on  personal  conduct  be  imposed  and  enforced 
impartially  and  without  sacrifice  of  personal  dignityo  That 
just  law  may  impose  no  arbitrary  restraint  would  be  generally 
conceded.  Nor  can  there  be  any  doubt  that  just  law  may  up- 
hold  and  enforce  the  discharge  of  obligations  which  have 
been  duly  and  deliberately  undertaken.  He  continues: 
9 
.....  one  important  requirement  of  law  as  a  system  of  just 
demands  is  that  these  demands  be,  in  some  meaningful  sense, 
self-imposed.  Here  self-imposition  of  legal  obligations  is 
considered  to  be  amore  deliberate  and  self-conscious  pro- 
cess  than  mere  acquiesencein,  or  consent  to,  these  obligationso 
This  principle  implies  that  everyone  who  is  bound  by  the  law 
ought  to  have  meaningful  access,  at  the  same  time,  to  parti- 
cipation  in  those  institutions  by  which  the  law  is  legislated, 
adjudicated,  and  enforced.  Such  interpretation  however  takes 
a  minimal  view  of  the  concept  of  law. 
The  definition  of  and  test  for  justice  in  a  practice 
are  topics  which  lead  way  beyond  the  scope  of  the  present 
discussion.  What  we  want  to  offer  here  is  merely  an  approach 
which  seems  to  me  promising.  One  might  agree  that  justice 
is  a  limiting  principle  even  though  one  disagreed  that  it 
could  be  defined  as  it  is  defined  here.  Much  of  what  shall 
be  said  here  has  been  suggested  by  John  Rawls. 
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article  and  book  offer  a  more  complete  discussions  However, 
it  will  be  evident  that  I  do  not  adopt  Rawls'  device  of 
positing  that  the  uncommitted  individual  we  must  picture  is 
completely  self-interested.  He  is  but.  a  construct,  and  we 
can  do  with  him  what  we  please,  but  to  require  that  he  be 
merely  self-interested  is  to  risk  misleading  comparison 
with  Hobbes,  and  to  make  him  more  artificial  than  is  nece- 
ssary  for  my  purpose.  His  recognition  that  a  practice  is 
nedded  may  be  based  in  part  on  altruism:  a  regard  for  the 
well-being  (even  remote)  of  others.  But  he  would  not  like- 
ly  join  that  society  which  would  give  him,  or  anyone  a 
fair  deal. 
To  answer  the  question  as  to  what  it  is  for  a  practice 
to  be  just,  we  shall  take  it  that  a  practice  is  just  if, 
knowing  that  it  is  necessary  that  there  should  be  a  practice 
and  that  this  one  would  be  effective,  each  of  us  would  be 
willing  to  accept  the  practice  not  knowing  in  advance  what 
role  we  would  play.  The  assessment  of  the  justice  of  a 
practice  involves  the  conception  of  a  particular  view  of  the 
practice.  It  Ls,  the  view  taken  of  it  by  a  person  who  rea- 
lizes  that  a  practice  is  necessary,  and  that  this  one  will 
fulfil  the  need;  who  also  realizes  that  in  any  practice  there 
are  going  to  be  burdens  and  privileges;  and  who  must  decide 
whether  these  privileges  and  burdens  are  fairly  apportioned 
in  view  of  what  the  practice  is  designed  to  accomplish. 
The  test  of  fairness  of  apportionment  of  burdens  and  privi- 
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be  willing  to  commit  himself  to  it  not  knowing  which  role 
he  might  have  to  play;  not  from  benevolence  or  self-sacri- 
fice  but  because  he,  along  with  everyone  else,  needs 
the  practice. 
Our  hypothetical  uncommitted  person  might  be  unwilling 
to  commit  himself  to  a  proposed  practice  for  fear  of  dis- 
crimination,  not  only  within,  but  in  assignment  to  the  roles 
of  the  practice;  and  these  two  types  of  discrimination  are 
worth  distinguishing  here.  I  might  be  able  to  predict  now 
that  I  would  (because  of  my  tribe,  say)  be  more  likely  than 
other  persons  to  be  assigned  a  given  burdened  role  in  a 
proposed  practice  (criminal,  defendant).  Or  the  role  itself 
(slave)  might  be  such  that  whoever  has  to  play  it  is  the 
victim  of  discrimination,  no  matter  how  effective  the  prac- 
tice  may  seem  for  no  matter  what  good  purposes.  Slavery, 
then,  may  doubly  discriminate:  in  its  choice  of  persons  to 
play  a  burdened  role,  and  in  its  allocation  of  burdens  and 
privileges  between  roles.  It  is  discrimination  in  the  second 
sense  that  the  justice  of  practice  is,  strictly  speaking, 
concerned.  But",  by  thinking  whether  a  person  situated  as 
described  could  agree  to  the  practice;  we  will  not  lose 
sight  of  the  first  form  of  discrimination  either. 
We  may  now  return  to  the  question  of  the  criterion  of 
humanity.  More  accurately,  what  is  wanted  is  a  criterion 
or  criteria  by  reference  to  which  it  can  be  determined  whe- 
ther  a  practice  is  humane.  Duelling  may  be  a  useful  example. 
It  is  one  of  the  several  alternative  practices  by  which 
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course,  is  over-simplified.  The  quarrels  in  question  arose 
out  of  supposed  insults  which,  according  to  the  code  of 
honour,  could  only  be  expunged  by  duelling;  so  that  it  was 
the  code  of  honour  as  a  whole  which  had  to  give  way,  not  duel- 
ling  alone.  A  practice  was  needed.  Whether  it  was  a  just 
practice  may  be  questioned.  That  it  was  inhumaneto  cause 
a  man  to  lose  his  life  as  the  price  of  losing  and  argument, 
seems  clear  -  to  us,  here,  now.  Why,  on  what  ground,  would 
we  call  it  inhumane?  It  was  not  inhumane  in  that  it  resulted 
in  the  loss  of  life.  Lives  were  lost  in  the  transportation 
of  freight  from  harbour  to  harbour;  and  the  practice  of 
exchanging  goods  was  not  on  that  account  inhumane.  Duelling 
was  inhumane  because  it  resulted  in  unnecessary  mutilation, 
suffering,  degradation,  and  loss  of  life:  unnecessary  because 
there  were  available  equally  efficient  and  just  ways  of 
settling  quarrels. 
There  is  another  in  which  ap  dctice  can  impose  unne- 
cessary,  and  thus  inhumane,  degradation,  suffering  or  death: 
it  can  be,  unlike  duelling,  a  practice  which  serves  no 
necessary  purpose  at  all.  It  is  hard  to  think  of  examples, 
partly  because  when  a  practice  becomes  a  part  of  the  way  of 
life  of  a  people  it  begins  to  play  roles  not  originally 
envisaged  for  it,  even  if  it  ceases  to  be  needed  for  the 
original  purposes.  But  unless  we  are  willing  to  subscribe 
to  the  thesis,  so  far  as  practices  are  concerned,  that  what- 
ever  is  right,  there  will  be  ritual  and  other  practices 
which  because  of  the  degradation  and  suffering  they  cause 309 
individuals  falling  under  them  are  inhumane  and  hence  no 
longer  acceptable. 
If  the  criterion  of  inhumanity  in  a  practice  is  to  be 
that  suffering,  misery,  death  or  degradation  are  imposed 
unnecessarily;  then  what5ls  a  test  by  which  we  can  know  that 
a  given  practice,  we  can  ask  whether  a  person,  acknowledging 
that  this  practice  would  be  efficient  in  fulfilling  that 
need,  acknowledging  that  the  practice  in  question  fairly 
distributes  the  burdens  and  privileges  it  creates,  would 
nevertheless  not  want  to  commit  himself  to  the  practice  on 
the  ground  that  there  are  other  equally  efficient  and  fair 
practices  which  do  not  (as  this  one  does)  impose  suffering, 
misery,  degradation  or  death. 
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4.  ALTERNATIVES  TO  PUNISHMENT 
We  may  now  turn  to  the  justification  of  legal  punishment. 
We  have  tried  to  show  that  a  practice  is  needed,  and  we:  have 
tried  to  specify  criteria  of  comparison  between  punishment 
and  alternative  practices.  What  alternative  practices  are 
available,  and  how  do  they  compare  to  punishment  in  the 
light  of  these  criteria? 
Vie  will  not  here  attempt  to  cover  all  the  kinds  of 
practice  which  would  be  used  to  encourage  compliance  with 
rules,  but  will  limit  ourselves  to  those  which  presuppose 
a  system  of  law.  We  are  thus  taking  it  for  granted  that  it 
is  not  only  advantageous  to  have  rules  but  to  have  legal 
rules.  Our  only  excuse  for  such  a  leap  is  that  to  do  more 
than  sketch,  as  we  have  done,  the  general  justification  of II 
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rules,  is  to  embark  on  a  question,  the  justification  of  law, 
which  is  not  meant  to  be  tackled  withing  the  scope  of  this 
enquiry. 
There  is  in  principle  no  limit  to  the  devices  which 
human  imagination  could  create  for  encouraging  compliance 
with  legal  rules.  We  have  already  noted  (and  rejected) 
"treatment",  for  example.  Another  example  which  we  should 
reject  is  an  adoption  of  a  practice  which  would  make  judges 
or  legislators  mere  social  engineers  or  mere  balancers  of 
scales  of  justice.  In  this  instance  the  utilitarian  would 
presumably  hold  that  the  judge's  business  within  the  defined 
limits  of  his  discretion  is,  roughly,  to  sentence  in  such 
a  way  that  the  best  results  possible  in  the  circumstances 
will  be  produced.  The  judge  becomes  on  this  view  a  sort  of 
"social  engineer",  who,  working  with  the  tools  given  hin)by 
the  legislators,  accomplishes  as  much  good  as  he  can  in  the 
particular  case  with  which  he  has  to  degl.  He  is  limited 
so  far  as  his  equipment  goes  to  terms  in  jail  and  fines; 
but  he  can  clearly  do  a  better  or  a  worse  job  of  rehabilita- 
tion  or  deterrence  in  the  circumstances.  He  should  make 
full  use  of  the  aid  and  advice  of  psychiatrists  and  social 
workers  so  that  he  can  take  full  advantage  within  his  limita- 
tions  of  the  opportunity  before  him  to  maximize  the  social 
good.  The  retributivist,  on  the  other  hand,  would  think 
of  the  judge  not  as  a  queer  sort  of  social  worker  but  as 
the  stern  balancer  of  the  scales  of  justice.  On  this  view 
it  is  the  business  of  the  judge  to  see  to  it  that  the  pri- 
soner  gets  no  more  or  no  less  than  is  due  him  because  of 311 
the  seriousness  of  the  crime.  Here  to  think  of  the  judge 
as  a  social  engineer  is  impertinent  and  even  dangerous. 
It  is  impertinent  because  the  working  of  justice  would  be 
intethired  with  by  a  kind  of  amoral  opportunism:  a  taking 
advantage  of  the  immediate  situation  to  promote  good  in 
any  way  possible  within  the  rules.  It  is  dangerous  because 
justice  in  this  society  is  imperiled  if  each  convicted 
criminal  is  considered  simply  as  a  pawn  to  be  used  in  the 
great  enterprise  of  social  improvement.  There  will  have 
been  substituted  for  the  attempt  to  do  what  is  absolutely 
right  by  the  criminal,  the  attempt  to  do  with  the  criminal 
whatever  will  serve  the  interest  of  the  whole.  Thus  as  we 
have  already  indicated  we  cannot  find  a  clear  picture  of 
either  the  Social  Engineer  or  the  Stern  Balancer,  hence 
practices  which  would  make  judges  or  legislators  mere  social 
engineers  or  mere  balancer  of  scales  of  justice  must  be 
rejected. 
There  are  at  least  four  remaining  general  sorts  of 
practice  which  should  be  mentioned:  First,  practices  which 
punish  failure  to  comply  with  the  law  by  informal  means 
rather  than  formal  procedure  of  legal  punishment  involving 
legislators,  judges,  and  jailers.  Varieties  of  social  sua- 
sion  other  than  punishment  have  been  described  for  us  by 
cultural  anthropologists;  and  while  there  will  be  no  subs- 
titutes  in  preliterate  tribes,  it  is  conceivable  that  social 
suasion  could  be  relied  upon  to  enforce  statutes.  For  exam- 
ple,  it  might  be  the  practice  that  if  a  man  commits  incest 312 
he  is  disgraced  in  public  by  anyone  knowing  of  the  deed;  or 
if  he  fails  to  suppost  his  in-l:  aws  his  wife  will  leave  him. 
Secondly,  practices  according  to  which  cömpliance  with  the 
law  is  rewarded.  Thirdly,  practices  according  to  which  men 
are  conditioned  (e.  g.  drugs)  to  obey  the  law.  Fourthly, 
practices  according  to  which  men  are  persuaded  to  abide  by 
the  law.  Of  these,  all  are  really  consistent  with  legal 
punishment.  And  "adequate"  is  to  be  understood  in  terms  of 
the  driteria  already  mentioned. 
Social  suasion  is  perhaps  the  strongest  candidate  of 
the  four.  What  is  envisaged  is  the  possibility  that  crimi- 
nal  statutes  should  be  enacted  with  no  penalty  attached; 
that  courts  of  law  should  decide  guilt  not  sentence;  that, 
instead,  suitable  publicity  should  be  given  the  crime  and 
the  criminal  returned  to  the  community.  The  assumption  is 
that  the  public  opinion  of  the  home  and  immediate  community 
would  prove  a  stronger  deterrent  and  reformative  agent  than 
the  formal  and  more  impersonal  workings  of  a  penal  system. 
This  is  a  topic  as  large  as  the  varieties  of  social 
suasion  and  the  experience  of  the  human  race  in  their  appli- 
cation.  It  is  eminently  worthy  of  research  by  social  scien- 
tists,  and,  so  far,  little  developed.  The  practice  of  leav- 
ing  the  punishment  to  the  community  has  in  its  favour  the 
point  that  for  any  individual  the  most  meaningful  punishment 
is  that  which  is  inflicted  by  those  closest  to  him.  It  is 
the  opinion  of  his  peers  that  he  values  far  more  than  the 
opinion  of  some  vast  and  faceless  "general  public"  represen- 
ted  by  the  sentencing  judge.  It  is  a  point  in  its  favour, 
also,  that  it  makes  for  no  discontinuity  between  the  legal 
and  moral  community  in  the  way  that  legal  punishment  does, 313 
in  setting  off  some  offences  as  subject  to  the  sway  of  jails 
and  jailers  while  other  offences,  morally  as  henious,  are 
not  so  subject. 
There  are,  on  the  other  hand,  serious  disadvantages  In 
social  suasion  as  compared  to  legal  punishment.  These  turn 
largely  around  in  the  concept  of  "community".  In  the  first 
place,  there  can  be  not  only  deviant  persons,  but  deviant 
communities;  and  where  this  Is  so  we  cannot  rely  upon  the 
opinion  of  peers  to  enforce  laws  which  are  for  the  public 
good.  The  deviant  community  may  not  regard  laws  necessary 
for  the  well-being  of  the  larger  community  as  incumbent  upon 
it.  Perhaps  the  term  "deviant"  should  not  be  overstressed. 
It  has  inevitable 
connotations  of  criminality;  and  while 
we  wish  to  include 
gangs  and  mobs  in  these  remarks,  we  wish 
also  to  include 
any  community  in-so-far  as  it  pursues  its 
own  (supposed)  interests  to  the  exclusion  of  the  interests 
of  the  larger  community,  in  survival,  avoidance  of  suffering 
and  enhancement  of  well-being.  If  we  leave  the  sanctions 
of  laws  designed  to  further  these  ends  of  the  larger  commu- 
nity  up  to  any  smaller  community,  the  system  may  not  be 
viable,  since  with  respect  to  the  purposes  of  the  laws  in 
question,  the  smaller  community  may  be  deviant.  And  to  rely 
on  the  social  pressure  of  the  larger  community  is  to  weaken 
the  claim  of  social  suasion  to  operate  with  the  force  of 
the  judgement  of  peers  -  since  the  most  effective  peer-judge 
ment  comes  from  the  most  immediate  communities. 
Secondly,  were  the  sanctions  left  up  to  the  community, 
the  same  crime  would  be  punished  in  many  different  ways 314 
rather  than  in  the  one  way  set  by  legal  penalty;  but  this 
would  be  unjst.  It  might  be  answered  that  the  crime  would 
still  be  punished  in  accordance  with  its  seriousness,  since 
in  communities  where  it  is  a  henious  offence  it  would  be 
punished  severely,  but  where  it  is  only  a  minor  offence  it 
would  be  punished  lightly.  But  this  answer  only  begs  the 
question,  raised  in  the  previous  paragraph,  whether  the 
smaller  community  may  not  be  deviant  in  regarding  as  minor, 
e.  g.,  what  would  be  inimical  to  the  well-being  of  the  larger 
group. 
Bearing  in  mind  these  reasons  for  rejecting  social 
suasion  as  a  substitute  for  punishment,  we  may  without  con- 
tradiction  acknowledge  its  importande  for  legal  punishment. 
The  force  of  the  threat  contained  in  the  penal.  clause  of  a 
criminal  law  is  great  not  merely  because  the  person  contem- 
plating  crime  fears  the  pain  or  suffering  the  penalty  would 
impose  if  inflicted.  Perhaps  it  is  not  even  mainly  this; 
for  he  also  greatly  fears  the  judgement  of  his  peers  sym- 
bolized  by  this  official  pronouncement  of  guilt  and  sentence. 
In  fact,  distinctions  are  made  in  everyday  life  and  in  legal 
debate  between  those  penalties  (e.  g.  fines)  which  do  not 
necessarily  carry  this  disapprobation  with  them,  and  those 
(imprisonment,  execution)  which  do.  Jerome  Hall12  quotes 
Justice  Brandeis  as  saying,  "It  is  ...  imprisonment  in  a 
penitentiary  which  now  renders  a  crime  infamous,  "  But  it 
is  a  necessary  condition  of  this  disapprobation,  or  infamy, 
that  the  criminal  has  been  sentenced  to  a  penitentiary;  so 315 
the  disapprobation  is  not  here  to  be  considered  a  substitute 
for  punishment. 
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Let  us  turn  to  the  practice  of  rewarding  rather  than 
punishing  crime.  It  is  not  clear  how  such  a  practice  would 
operate.  Would  there  be  a  reward  for  each  person  who  goes 
through  a  year  successfully  without  breaking  a  law?  A 
reward  for  each  person  who,  though  severely  tempered  in  a 
given  circumstances,  refrains  from  violating  the  law?  Such 
practices  are  indeed  conceivable,  but  would  be  subject  to 
grave  objections.  Those  laws  which  it  is  most  important  to 
enforce  are  often  those  there  is  the  greatest  temptation 
to  violate..  How  could  we  prevent  by  means  of  rewards  those 
crimes  which  in  their  nature  are  extremely  profitable,  such 
as  embezzlement,  or  forgery?  And  would  the  prospect  of  re- 
ward  deter  a  man  about  to  commit  a  crime  of  violence?  More 
importantly,  would  it  be  morally  defensible  to  reward  a 
person  abiding  by  (presumably  necessary  and  just)  laws?  ' 
There  is  a  sense  of  the  word  "reward"  in  which  it  is 
used  synonymously  with  "positive  reinforcement".  In  this 
sens¢,  reward  provides  indespensable  support  for  legal  punish- 
ment.  For  here  reward  is  indistinguishable  from  social, 
suasion,  the  reinforcement  in  question  consisting  in  the 
repeated  approval  of  one's  abiding  by  the  law  under  tempta- 
tion  to  violate  it. 
Concerning  the  possibility  of  substituting  of  persuasion 
for  punishment,  we  would  follow  Aristotle  in  his  assessment 
of  human  nature  when  he  says: 
"...  Pfost  people  obey  necessity  rather  than 
argument,  and  punishments  rather,  than  the 
sense  of  what  is  ttoble.  "14 316 
This  should  be  immediately  qualified  (as  Aristotle  qualified 
it)  by  our  assertion  that  we  would  much  prefer  to  time  per- 
suasion  rather  than  punishment,  since  punishment  is  a  prac- 
tice  forced  on  us  by  the  "human  condition"  rather  than 
chosen  as  something  possitively  desirable  on  its  own  account. 
It  sould  also  be  said  that  persuasion  may  have  a  kind  of 
pyramiding  effect  with  respect  to  building  respect  for  rules. 
That  is,  to  the  extent  that  we  risk  persuasion  rather  than 
punishment,  we  help  develop  people  amenable  to  persuasion 
and  not  needing  fear  of  puAishment  as  a  motive  for  abidl  g"; 
by  the  rules.  Unlike  some  other  alternatives,  then,  the 
side-effects  of  persuasion  as  a  practice  are  good:  better 
than  the  side-effects  of  punishment. 
The  cause  of  persuasion  is  one  open  to  the  advocate  of 
punishment,  Aristotle's  assessment  of  human  nature  being 
granted  as  a  generalization,  but  not  taken  to  imply  that 
any  given  person  may  not  change  in  his  amenability  to  per- 
suasion.  Persuasion  as  a  means  of  encouraging  compliance 
with  the  laws  should  be  the  subject  of  public  discussion, 
that  only  demonstrably  necessary  or  desirable  legal  rules 
be  enacted,  and  that  some  attempt  be  made  to  render  the 
body  of  law  intelligible.  If  persuasion  must  be  rejected, 
it  is  not  as  an  adjunct  but  as  a  substitute  for  punishment. 
And  it  is  not  by  virtue  of  its  running  afoul  of  limiting 
principles  that  we  must  reject  it  as  a  substitute  for  punish- 
ment,  but  as  failing  to  measure  up  to  the  demands  of  the 
guiding  principle. 317 
The  achievement  of  law-abiding  colomunity  by  the  use  of 
drugs  or  conditioning  seems  in  principle  perfectly  possible 
but  the  side-effects  of  such  procedures  we  would  not,  on 
grounds  of  humanity,  be  willing  to  accept.  We  would  not 
accept  them  because  they  are  unnecessarily  degrading:  unne- 
cessarily,  because  law-abidingness  can  be  attained  at  lower 
cost  in  human  degradation.  Thus,  as  opposed  to  persuasion 
we  would  accept  conditioning  so  far  as  the  guiding  principle 
is  concerned,  but  reject  it  for  violating  the  limiting 
principles. 
The  case  for  punishment  so  far  is  that,  granting  certain 
very  general  assumptions  of  fact,  the  disvalue  of  misery, 
and  the  consequent  need  for  rules,  a  practice  is  neededto 
encourage  compliance  with  rules.  And  of  the  alternative 
practices  some  (i.  e.  rewarding,  persuading)  fail  to  measure 
up  to  the  guiding  principle  as  well  as  punishment,  and  others 
(i.  e.  conditioning,  social  suasion)  are  ruled  out  on  the 
ground  that  they  conflict  with  justice  or  humanity.  The 
critic  may  say  that  this  argument  is  deficient  in  two  respects. 
First,  it  is  not  conclusive  since  there  may  be  alternatives 
not  taken  into  account  which  would  compete  more  successfully 
with  punishment.  If  this  is  the  case,  then  it  is  open  to 
the  opponents  of  punishments  to  propose  these  alternatives. 
and  compare  them  to  punishment  by  the  criteria  of  efficiency 
and  acceptability.  Secondly,  it  says  only,  so  far,  that 
punishment  is  the  least  undesirable  of  the  alternatives. 318 
The  answer  to  this  second  charge  is  that  this  was  precisely 
what  the  section  was  meant  to  argue. 
5.  EFFECTIVENESS  AND  ACCEPTABILITY  OF  PUNISHMENT 
There  is  much  to  be  said  for  the  thesis  that  punishment 
is  just  that:  not  anything  we  would  want  to  have  in  the  best 
of  all  possible  worlds,  but  something  we  must  accept  for 
lack  of  something  better  in  the  world  in  which  we  live. 
Yet  it  may  be  well  to  note  how  it  measures  up  to  the  crite- 
ria  of  efficiency  in  encouraging  compliance  with  rules,  of 
justice,  and  of  humanity.  But  4before  turning  to  these, 
we  should  note  that  there  are  some  very  general  assumptions 
of  fact,  beyond  those  which  give  rise  to  the  need  for  a 
practice,  upon  which  any  justification  of  the  practice  of 
punishment  must  rest.  I 
The  first  of  these  assumptions  is  that  men  are  capable 
of  calculating  their  own  interest;  and  that  in  general  they 
wills  Obviously  the  efficacy  of  the  threat  contained  in  a 
criminal  law  rests  on  this  assumption.  If  a  man  is  unable 
or  unwilling  to  look  ahead  to  the  probable  consequences  for 
him  of  a  bank  robbery  then  of  course  the  possibility  of  a 
prisbnr.  sentence  is  no  deterrent. 
Elsewhere  in  this  thesis  we  are  told  that  "The  indiffe- 
rence  of  the  criminal  to  the  penalty  that  is  ahead  of  him, 
even  if  this  penalty  is  death,  is  more  the  rule  than  the 
exception.  "15  Bentham,  on  the  other  hand,  argues:  { 319 
"When  matters  of  importance  as  pain  and  pleasure 
are  at  stake,  and  these  in  the  highest  degree 
(the  only  matters  in  short  that  can  be  of  import- 
ance)  who  is  there  that  does  not  calculate?  Men 
calculate,  some  with  less  exactness,  indeed,  some 
with  more;  but  all  men  calculate.  I  would  not 
say,  that  even  a  mad  man  does  not  calculate.  '116 
The  case  seems  to  me  to  be  overstated  on  both  sides.  Bentham 
does  not  need  to  claim  that  everybody  calculates.  Even  if 
the  percentage  of  people  who  calculate  is  relatively  small 
punishment  would  so  far  be  worthwhile;  for  by  the  threat 
of  punishment  crime  could  be  reduced.  And  as  we  have 
already  noted  more  moderate  psychiatrists  do  not  accept  such 
conclusions  as  Zilboorg's.  Robert  Waelder,  for  example, 
tells  us"that  the  claim  of  a  "very  small  but  articulate 
number  of  psychiatrists"  that  punishment  does  not  deter  is 
"a  radical  contention  in  view  of  everybody's  daily  experience 
in  office  and  shop.  "17 
The  second  assumption  is  that,  in  general,  men  are 
able  to  govern  present  impulses  by  the  thought  of  future 
consequences.  If  they  were  not  the  threat  of  punishment 
would  be  uselesso  This,  so  fars  it  applies  to  criminals 
is  also  challenged  by  some  of  the  more  extreme  psychiatrists. 
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Third,  it  is  assumed  that  it  is  possible  to  find  "evils" 
which  are  more  or  less  universally  dreaded.  If  there  were 
no  general  desire  to  avoid  fines  or  jail,  then  these'bvils" 
would  not  be  eligible  as  punishment.  But  unless  the  legis- 
lator  can  find  some  "evil"  which  qualifies,  the  institution 
of  punishment  fails;  or  is  modified  to  allow  judges  complete 
discretion  in  the  choice  of  punishment.  Whether  this  would 
still  be  punishment  and  this  "judge"  a  judge  are  open  ques- 
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abuse  of  power.  There  are  advocates  of  the  "individuali- 
zation  of  punishment"  who  would  be  willing  to  take  the  risk 
for  the  supposed  gain  in  reformatory  effectiveness,  But 
what  is  gained  here  may  well  be  lost  on  the  side  of  dete- 
rrence  of  would-be  offenders,  who  could  never  know  what  the 
penalty  is,  for  the  crime  they  contemplate. 
To  turn  to  assumptions  concerning  human  society,  we 
assume,  first,  that  there  is  a  virtual  monopoly  of  coercive 
power  in  the  state.  Suppose  that  each  man  had  an  Ii-bomb 
which  he  threatens  to  explöde  if  molested..  Then  force 
could  be  used  on  a  man  only  by  his  consent,  and  legal  punish- 
ment  would  break  down.  Secondly,,  we  assume  that  the  culture 
is  such  that  it  is  possible  for  people  to  grasp  what  it  is 
to  be  an  official  in  a  legal  system.  If  not,  sentencing 
and  the  execution  of  sentences  will  be  understood  as  moves 
made  by  particular  persons  against  particular  persons;  and 
deterrence  will  give  way  to  cycles  of  retaliation.  This 
may  help  explain  why  for  anyone,  who  refused  on  principle 
to  allow  the  distinction  between  what  is  permissible  for 
an  official  of  a  system  and  for  an  indi)idual  falling  under 
the  system,  punishment  was  a  moral  nightmare. 
To  the  extent  that  any  of  these  assumptions,  or  the 
assumptions  on  which  the  need  for  a  practice  is  predicated, 
are  false,  the  case  for  a  legal  punishment  breaks  down. 
We  shall  not  argue  for-them;  bpt  simply  assume-their  truth. 
Assuming  them  true,  it  seems  a  priori  likely  that  punishment 
would  be  effective  in  encouraging  compliance  with  legal  rules. 321 
More  than  this:  the  experience  of  centuries  of  civilization 
constitutes  evidence  that  it  is  effective.  But  flot  very 
conclusive  evidence.  We  do  not  know  to  what  extent  social 
suasion,  and  intellectual  conviction  have  been  responsible 
for  the  tendency  of  the  masses  to  abide  by  the  law.  We  do 
not  have  controlled  social  experiments  in  which  punishment 
is  compared  in  point  of  efficacy  to  treatment,  ar  social 
suasion,  or  persuasion.  In  those  chaotic  revolutionary 
situations  in  which  the  recent  history  of  the  human  race 
abounds,  we  would  hardly  have  dared  rely  on  less  than  the 
strong  medicine  of  legal  punishment.  Yet  perhaps  in  more 
orderly  times,  less  drastic  practices  can  be  encouraged. 
Under  the  heading  of  the  effectiveness  of  punishment  as 
a  practice  we  should  note  (what  has  sometimes  been  recognized) 
that  punishment  is  at  least  more  ingenious  than  its  alter- 
natives  in  that  it  works  like  a  pricing  system  in  reverse. 
Whereas  the  storekeeper  tries  to  price  his  wares  in  such  a 
way  that  there  will  be  as  many  purchasers  as  possible;  the 
legislator  tries  (or  should  try)  to  "price"  crimes  in  such 
a  way  that  there  will  be  as  few  takers-of-the-risk  of  crimi- 
nal  behaviour  as  possible.  And  as  we  realize  from  our 
survey"of  Bentham  -  it  is  more,  subtle  than  this.  It  is 
not  merely  that  we  want  few,  but  that  we  want  less  takers 
of  the  worst  crimes.  So  on  these  we  put  the  highest  price 
and  our  "pricing"  can  -  on  the  practice  of  punishment  -  be 
carefully  adjusted  to  the  disvalue  of  the  crimes:  just  4s 
(inversely)  the  storekeeper  can  progressively  encourage  the 
taking  of  his  wares  by  lowering  the  price. I 
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What  must  be  borne  in  mind  is  that  if  the  evidence  for 
the  effectiveness  of  punishment  in  encouraging  compliance 
with  legal  rules  is  less  than  satisfactory,  the  evidence 
for  the  comparatively  untried  alternatives  is  even  less 
satisfactory.  But  the  burden  of  proof  is  on  him  who  would 
make  a  change,  on  the  principle  that  wo,  should  change  only 
where  there  is  a  likely  advantage  in  doing  so.  And  this 
principle  seems  worth  defending,  since  changes,  in  deep- 
rooted  practices  especially  inevitably  involve  difficult 
re-adjustments,  and  sometimes  involve  consequences  not 
forseen. 
What  is  also  required  in  justification  is  that  punish- 
ment  should  be  shown  as  acceptable,  i.  e.,  as  not  violaäng 
the  limiting  principles  of  justice  and  humanity.  Is  the 
practice  of  punishment,  as  such,  unjust  or  inhumane?  To 
say  that  it  is,  is  to  say  that  a  person  so  far  uncommitted 
to  a  society,  recognizing  the  need  in  any  society  for.  an 
effective  practice  to  encourage  compliance  with  rules, 
recognising  that  there  must  be  burdens  and  privileges  under 
whatever  practice  is  chosen,  would  be  willing  to  enter  that 
society  and  fall  under  that  practice,  even  though  he  does 
not  know  in  advance  and  from  this  uncommitted  standpoint 
what  role  he  might  have  to  play  and  what  burdens  or  privile- 
ges  would  fall  to  his  lot.  To  say  that  he  would  not  commit 
himself  to  the  society  on  the  ground  that  he  might  through 
no  fault  of  his  own  fall  into  a  role  which  is  at  a  disadvan- 
tage  in  the  distributioncf  burdens  and  privileges,  ,  receiving, 323 
compared,  -,  to  other  roles,  most  of  the  burdens  and  none  of 
the  privileges,  is  to  say  that  the  practice  is-unjust.  To 
say  that  he  would  not  commit  himself  to  the  society  on  the 
ground  that  the  burdens  which  must  be  carried  by  the  players 
of  some  roles  (even  though  they  may  be  fairly  distributed) 
are  at  the  same  time  very  heavy  and  not  necessary  for  the 
attainment  of  the  purposes  of  the  practice,  is  to  say  that 
the  practice  is  inhumane. 
Is  the  practice  of  punishment  unjust?  There  is  a 
heavily  burdened  role,  criminal,  into  which  any  of  us  might 
fall:  but  not,  we  may  assume,  without  fault.  The  proper 
answerý:  to  the  person  who  refuses  to  commit  himself  to  the 
society  containing  this  practice,  on  the  ground  that  he 
might  fall  into  the  unfavoured  role  of  criminal,  is  that  once 
he  commits  himself  to  society  and  practice,  whether  he  then 
plays  or  avoids  the  role  of  criminal  is  still  open.  He  can 
have  the  advantages  of  the  practice,  and  at  the  same  time 
avoid  the  burdens  of  the  unfavoured  role.  And  should  he 
fall  into  the  role  of  criminal,  there  is  nothing  inherent 
in  the  practice  which  would  make  the  burden  borne  by  one 
category  of  criminal  out  of  proportion  to  that  borne  by 
others,  granted  the  need  to  distinguish  between  more  and  less 
dangerous  crimes. 
Is  it  inhumane?  Since,  as  practice,  it  does  not  speci- 
fy  the  burdens  to  be  borne,  but  only  that  they  shall  be 
adequate  to  the  purpose  of  discouraging  crime,  the  practice 324 
does  not  as  such  demand  that  there  should  be  burdens  not 
warranted,  by  its  purpose.  It  does  not  follow  from  the 
fact  that  there  may  be  "cruel  and  unusual"  punishments  that 
the  practice  of  punishment  is  therefore  inhumane.  Contrast 
the  practice  whereby  the  rulers  administer  drugs  to  the 
population  at  large  which  ensure  that  whatever  laws  enacted 
will  not  be  violated.  This  could  work  only  if  the  critical 
faculties  were  so  deadened  that  the  individual  could  no 
longer  distinguish  between  good  and  bad  laws,  and  between 
occasions  on  which  even  good  laws  should  and  should  not  be 
violated.  But,  since  there  are  alternative  ways  of  encoura- 
ging  compliance  with  the  laws,  which  do  not  involve  these 
consequences,  they  are  unnecessary,  and  the  practice  is 
inhumane. 
Morally  speaking,  if  our  very  general  assumptions  of 
fact  be  granted,  and  our  judgement  that  widespread  misery 
is  a  disvälue,  then  rules  are  necessary,  and  some  way  must 
be  found  to  make  them  effective.  But  if  the  best  and  most 
acceptable  way  is  the  practice  of  legal  punishment,  then 
those  persons  who  find  themselves  playing  the  roles  of 
judge  and  jailer  have  the  moral  right  to  sentence  and  carry 
out  sentences.  They  have  this  right  as  officials  of  a  prac- 
tice  which  is,  by  hypothesis,  for  the  good  of  everyone  alike. NOTES  AND  REFERENCES 
CHAPTER  EIGHT 
1.  Murphy,  J.  G.,  'Persons  and  Punishment'  by  Herbert 
Morris  in  Punishment  and  Rehabilitation,  Wadsworth 
Publishing  Co.,  Inc.,  Belmont,  California,  1973,  pp.  40-41. 
2.  Ibid.,  p.  41. 
3.  Ibid. 
4.  But  sometimes  an  advantage  of  referring  to  the  institu- 
tion,  rather  than  to  the  practice  of  punishment  is  that 
then  we.,  might  not  confuse  two  different  sorts  of  thing 
we  mean  by  practice.  Here,  however,  we  will  settle  on 
the  wider  term  "practice"  since  we  wish  to  compare 
punishment  with  possible  alternatives  which  would 
qualify  as  practices  but  not  as  institutions. 
5.  Ross,  W.  D.,  "Punishment"  in  The  Right  and  the  Good, 
Oxford,  1930,  Ch.  11,  Appendix  II. 
6.  See  Mill,  J.  S.,  An  Examination  of  the  Philosophy  of 
Sir  William  Hamilton,  London,  1865. 
7.  The  term  "legislators"  is  used  here  in  a  broad  sense. 
Indeed  the  legislator  is  seen  as  in  a  quandary.  Ne  is 
responsible  for  the  removal  of  crime,  and  is  therefore 
tempted  to  use  legal  penalties  strictly  as  a  tool  for 
this  purpose,  without  allowing  any  consideration  of 
justice  to  the  individuals  punished  to  enter  into  his 
calculations.  But  at  the  same  time  he  recognises  that 
he  really  ought  to  be  guided  by  principles  of  justice 
as  a  legislative  standard  is  opposed  to  taking  expe- 
diency  as  the  standard.  The  legislator's  choice  becomes 
one  of  doing  what  is  moral  and  difficult  or  immoral 
and  expedient. 
325 326 
8.  Doyle,  J.  F.,  "Justice  and  Legal  Punishment"  in  Philo- 
sophy  Vol.  42,  July  1967,  p.  59. 
9.  Ibid. 
10.  Rawls,  J.,  "Justice  as  Fairness"  in  Philosophical 
Review,  1958,  pp.  164-194.  See  also  Rawls'  A  Thgory 
of  Justice,  Oxford,  1972. 
11.  The  discussion  here  is,  admittedly,  barely  opened. 
How,  by  what  test,  do  we  decide  that  degradation,  mise- 
ry,  or  death  are  unnecessary?  And,  even  more  difficult 
what  is  to  count  as  misery,  suffering,  and  (most  diffi- 
cult)  degradation?  But  even  though  the  theoretical 
explanation  of  our  test  for  humanity  of  a  practice  may 
be  difficult,  still  the  test  can  be  used  prior  to  ex- 
planation;  for  by  and  large  (leaving  the  question  of  how) 
we  do  agree  on  what  is  unnecessary,  and  on  whether 
suffering,  misery,  and  degradation  (to  say  nothing  of 
death)  are  imposed.  Or,  if  we  do  not  agree,  we  know 
how  to  go  about  discussing  the  point.  Explication  could 
only  start  from  the  considerations  we  take  as  relevant 
in  such  discussion. 
12.  Hall,  J.,  General  Principles  of  Criminal  Law,  2nd  Edition, 
Indianapolis,  New  York,  1960,  p.  327. 
13.  The  question,  much  discussed,  whether  or  not  a  given 
piece  of  legislation  is  punitive  in  intent,  is  likely 
to  turn  bn  the  question  not  merely  what  suffering  it 
imposes  but  also  on  the  way  in  which  the  suffering  it 
imposed  will  generally  be  regarded.  A  suggested  test 327 
for  legislation  punitive  in  intent  is  to  determine 
Whether  the  legislative  concern  underlying  the  statute 
was  to  regulate  'the  activity  or  status  from  which  the 
individual  is  barred'.  or  whether  the  statute  is 
evidently  'aimed  at  the  person  or  class  or  persons 
disqualified.  ' 
14.  Aristotle,  Ethica  ricomachea,  1180a,  3-13. 
15.  Zilboorg,  G.,  The  P  ychology  of  the  Criminal  Act  and 
Punishment,  New  York,  1954,  p.  32. 
16.  Bentham,  J.,  Proles  of  Morals  and  Legislation, 
XIV,  28. 
17.  Waelder,  R.,  "psychiatry  and  the  Problem  of  Criminal 
Responsibility,  "  in  University  of  Pennsylvania  Law 
Review,  1952,  p.  383. 
18.  Cf.,  e.  g.  Karpman's  definition  of  Criminal  Behaviour, 
p.  102. CHAPTER  NINE 
TREATMENT  vs.  PUNISHMENT 
1.  RESPONSIBILITY/LADY  WOOTTON'S  ARGUMENT 
2.  '  DETERMINISM 
3.  REMEDIAL  TREATMENT  IN  PLACE  OF  PUNISHMENT. 1.  RESPONSIBILITY/LADY  VJOOTON'S  ARGUMENT 
In  Social  Science  and  Social  Pathology  and  elsewhere) 
Lady  Wootton  puts  forward  arguments  which  she  maintains  under- 
mine  the  case  for  'retributive  punishment'.  I  shall  examine 
some  of  these  arguments  with  a  view  to  determining  whether 
any  of  them  are  dicidable  against  the  theory  at  any  point 
and  if  so  whether  the  retributive  theory  can  be  modified  so 
as  to  take  account  of  these  criticisms. 
One  of  the  functions  of  the  law  according  to  retributi- 
vism'is  to  see  that  wickedness  is  punished.  The  question 
immediately  arises,  where  do  we  find  wickedness?  The  retri- 
butivist  answer  (legally  speaking)  will  be  that  it  is  to  be 
found  in  the  state  of  mind  present  in  the  offender  at  the 
time  of  the  commission  of  the  offence.  To  decide  on  the 
question  of  responsibility  it  is  not  sufficient  to  enquire 
into  the  question  of  what  was  done  but  necessary  also  to 
enquire  into  the  way  in  which  the  offence  came  about.  The 
end  of  such  an  enquiry  will  be  a  decision  as  to  whether  the 
offender  is  culpable  or  not,  and  since,  there  are  admitted 
to  be  degrees  of  culpability,  to  what  extent  the  offender 
is  culpable.  Only  when  these  questions  have  been  answered 
can  the  offence  be  regarded  as  punishable  or  non-punishable, 
and  if  the  former  is  the  case  the  appropriat,  ý  punishment 
settled  on. 
A  person  can  only  be  culpable  when  he  is  a  responsible 
agent.  Thus  the  retributivist  is  obliged  to  take  seriously 
any  arguments  which  seem  to  show  that  responsibility  and  its 
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degrees  are  not  decidable  matters.  Lady  Wootton  attempts 
to  show  that  questions  of  responsibility  are  fraught  with 
such  epistemological  difficulties  that  we  would  be  well 
advised  to  give  up  the  search  for  answers  to  these  questions 
and  do  away  with  the  notion  of  responsibility  as  it  affects 
the  law  and  punishment. 
If  a  person  is  insane  at  the  time  when  he  commits  an, 
offence  we  say  that  he  should  be  relieved  of  responsibility 
for  that  offence.  He  is  not  culpable  and  not  to  be  punished. 
"Para  passu"  if  there  is  nothing  wrong  with  hin  he  is  left  with 
full  responsibility  for  his  offence.  There  do  seem  however 
to  be  cases  which  we  would  be  unwilling  to  assign  to  the 
former  category-  yet  where  we  think  that  the  offender  may 
not  be  responsible  for  his  offence.  What  is  required  is 
some  test  or  set  of  tests  which  will  enable  us  to  deal  with 
these  cases  in  a  just  fashions  Lady  Wootton's  central  claim 
is  simply  that  no  such  test  is  forthcoming. 
Many  such  tests  have  been  put  forward  by  psychiatrists 
at  various  times  but  nonvof  these  are  acceptable  because 
they  are  not  "objective".  What  does  Lady  Wootton  mean  by 
"objective"  in  the  context?  It  Is  a  difficult  question  to 
answer  with  any  finality.  We  can  say  however  what  an"'  objec- 
tive  'sciencef  or  'discipline'  is  not  and  may  be  this  is  all  it 
needs  to  be  said  on  the  matter.  Unfortunately  the  discipline 
which  Lady  Wootton  advances  as  being  one  which  does  employ 
objective  criteria  has  just  those  features  which  are  supposed 
to  disqualify  in  respect  of  objectivity. 331 
An  objective  criterion  is  a  criterion  the  existence 
of  which  is  independent  of  matters  of  tastes,  matters  of 
value,  and  cultural  norms.  That  is,  if  in  describing  or 
designating  a  condition  reference  must  be  made  explicitly 
or  implicitly  to  the  tastes,  values  or  norms  of  any  group 
then  neither  the  condition  nor  the  criterion  are  objective. 
A  paradigm  of  such  objectivity  might  be  found,  it  can  be 
surmised,  in  classical  particle  mechanics  -  the  State  des- 
cription  for  an  example  of  a  dynamic  system  designating  an 
objective  condition.  The  criteria  employed  in  determining 
whether  the  example  is  matched  by  the  description  will  then 
be  those  of  physical  science.  However,  the  example  Lady 
Wootton  chooses  to  consider  is  drawn  from  medicine.  She 
speaks  of  the  criteria  of  physical  health  and  ill-health  as 
objective  and  the  conditions  which  the  criteria  refer  to  as 
objective  also. 
A  doctor  investigates  conditions  of  the  body  and  there 
is  no  question  but  that  these  conditions  are  objective. 
One  either  has  a  gallstone  or  one  does  not;  one  has  a  condi- 
tion  known  as  leukemia  or  one  does  not.  If  asked  what  phy- 
sical  conditions  a  male  aged  twenty  would  hare  to  manifest 
before  he  would  say  that  he  were  healthy  a  doctor  could  make 
up  a  list  of  conditions  to  which  the  male  organism  would 
have  to  approximate  to  the  healthy.  Will  the  conditions 
be  the  same  for  all  places  on  the  globe's  surface?  Clearly 
they  will  not  be.  The  body  which  will  be  healthy  in  London 
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be  healthy  in  Kinshasha  depending  upon  the  differing  strains 
imposed  upon  the  body  in  the  environment.  Our  doctor  would, 
however,  given  the  requisite  geographical  information,  be 
able  to  produce  sets  of  conditions  of  the  body  which  would 
be  healthy  conditions  in  the  various  environments.  The 
criterion  of  health  would  remain  identical  for  each  place, 
only  the  conditions  of  the  body  would  vary.  But  how  do  we 
hit  upon  our  criterion  in  the  first  place?  If  asked  what 
good  health  was  would  it  not  be  relevant  though  possibly 
uninformative  to  say  a  condition  of  the  body  which  leads  to 
satisfactory  living?  If  asked  to  specify  further  we  would 
begin  to  mention  certain  kinds  of  ends  which  are  thought 
worthwhile,  certain  kind  of  demands  -  moral  and  social  - 
which  are  made  upon  us  and  which  for  the  most  part  are 
accepted.  That  is,  in  order  fully  to  specify  what  we  meant 
by  physical  good  health  we  should  need  to  mention  matters 
which  Lady  Wootton  would  not  regard  as  objective.  Any  defi- 
nition  of  physical  health  or  ill-health  that  is  adequate 
will  refer  implicitly  or  explicitly  to  the  above  notions. 
Had  we  the  space  we  would  pursue  a  parallel  line  of 
thought  with  respect  to  the  concept  of  disease,  A  diseased 
condition  of  the  body  is  not  simply  a  condition  of  the  body 
though  many  conditions  of  the  body  are  universally  regarded 
as  diseased  condition.  Cancer  is  a  disease  but  it  is  one 
because  it  is  a  condition  of  the  body  that  is  not  wanted, 
one  that'is  not  consonant  with  comfort,  happiness  and  long 
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these  things  it  is  a  truism  to  say  cancer  is  a  disease  but 
the  important  point  is  that  it  is  not  a  tautology. 
What  is  the  view  that  Lady  Wodton  examines  and  rejects? 
It  may  be  summarised  in  the  four  following  propositions: 
statements  about  the  mental  health  or  ill-health  of  a  person 
are  not  expressions  of  taste  or  value  judgements  but  report 
on  objective  conditions;  it  is  impossible  to  diagnose  the 
presence  of  the,  conditions  by  the  use  of  criteria  which 
make  no  reference  to  anti-social  behaviour;  the  presense  of 
such  conditions  excuse  anti-social  behaviour. 
Lady  Wootton  holds  that  there  cannot  be  an  objective 
criterion  of  mental  health  and  ill-health  because  any  such 
definition  implies  a  reference  to  a  culture.  A  particular 
condition  which  is  regarded  as  one  of  ill-health  in  one 
society  may  not  be  so  regarded  in  another.  There  are  two 
preliminary  comments  to  make  on  this  matter.  Firstly, 
though  there  may  be  some-cases  which  may  be  classified 
differently  in  different  cultures  these  may  be  surely  border- 
line  cases  and  do  not  require  us  to  adopt  a  relativistic 
view  of  mental  conditions.  Schizophrenia  will  be  classified 
as  an  abnormal  condition  in  any  culture,  the  reason  being 
that  there  are  many  ends  universally  pursued. 
Secondly,  in  connection  with  what  has  been  said  above 
if  Lady  Wootton  wishes  to  maintain  the  relativity  of  mental 
health  and  ill-health  then  she  must  be  prepared  to  admit 
the  same  for  physical 
_health 
and  ill=he'alth.  But  Lady  'Wootton 
does  not  want  to  allow  this;  indeed  her  case  partly  depends 334 
upon  this  contrast  being  adknowledged.  She  wishes  to  draw 
a  distinction  between  the  two  cases,  claiming  that  with 
physidal  health  and  ill-health  there  is  an  objective  crite- 
rion.  But  logically  the  two  cases  are  on  a  par.  There  can 
be  boederline  instances  of  physical  health  and  ill-health 
as  there  are  with  mental  health  and  ill-health,  Both  make 
implicit  reference  to  human  purposes  and  since  over  a  great 
area  these  are  universal  so  criteria  can  be  the  objective. 
Lady  Wootton  argues  that  the  notion  of  mental  disorder 
cannot  be  defined  in  objective  terms,  and  so  advocates  the 
abolition  of  the  concept  of  responsibility  from  the  province 
of  the  law.  Her  advocacy  of  this  course  of  action  is  supp- 
orted  in  part  by  a  critical  examination  of  four  criteria 
for  distinguishing  responsible  from  non-responsible  behaviour. 
I  would  agree  that  three  of  the  criteria  offered  are  open  to 
serious  objection  and  shall  not  concern  myself  with  them. 
The  fourth  criterion  is  "behaviour  is  non-responsible  where 
there  is  present  a  psychiatric  syndrome  independent  of  anti- 
social  behaviour's.  This  criterion  supplemented  in  a  way 
which  I  shall  later  suggest,  I  think  may  prove  to  be  accept- 
able.  Lady  Wootton  has  four  reasons  for  rejecting  this 
criterion.  She  claims  that: 
1.  It  leaves  untouched  the  problem  of  the  psycho- 
path,  for  he  shows  no  signs  of  abnormality 
other  than  his  resistance  to  social  norms. 
The  criterion  would  therefore  leave  the  psycho- 
path  with  full  responsibility  for  his  conduct. 
2.  The  presence  of  a  psychiatric  syndrome  does 
neat  of  itself  necessarily  explain  disregard 
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3.  The  presence  of  a  psychiatric  syndrome 
does  not  necessarily  excuse  disregard 
of  the  social  norms. 
4.  The  definition  of  a  psychiatric  syndrome 
implies  a  reference  to  a  special  context 
and  through  this  an  acceptance  of  values 
of  the  society. 
I  shall  deal  with  these  criticisms  in  order. 
The  suggested  criterion,  so  it  is  said,  leaves  the 
psychopath  with  full  responsibility  for  his  behaviour.  One 
might  deny  that  in  so  doing  it  creates  a  difficulty  for  the 
criterion,  but  rather  agree  that  it  does  allow  him  to  be 
just  responsible  and  that  it  is  correct  in  so  doing.  It 
could  be  said  that  he  is  wicked  and  that  a  reluctance  to 
hold  him  responsible  only  reflects  our  own  optimistic  be- 
liefs  about  the  nature  of  man.  it  could  be  said  that  there 
is  no  contradiction  in  claiming  that  a  man  is  wicked,  even 
consistently  wicked,  and  claiming  at  the  same  time  that  he 
is  responsible  for  his  behaviour. 
It  will  always  be  reasonable  to  raise  a  query  about 
a  person's  responsibility  when  his  behaviour  appears  point- 
less  or  unreasonable,  but  such  behaviour  does  not  constitute 
proof  of  the  presence  of  mental  disorder.  Indeed  we  should 
take  particular  care  when  using  such  behaviour  as  evidence 
towards  that  conclusion,  for  we  may  not  merely  be  describ- 
ing  what  somebody  does,  but  in  addition  interpreting,  or 
rather  finding  ourselves  unable  to  interpret,  what  he  does. 
Such  interpretations  will  be  made  with  the  aid  of  those 
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action  is  pointless  where  more  accurate  judgement  would  be 
that  we  cannot  see  the  point  of  it,  or  that  some  behaviour 
is  peculiar  when  we  should  restrict  ourselves  to  saying 
that  it  is  not  the  kind  of  thing  we  would  even  wish  to  do. 
Examples  of  such  judgements  readily  spring  to  mind  in  con- 
temporary  discussions  of  so-called  aberrant  sexual  behaviour. 
Speaking  with  reference  to  psychopaths  among  others,  Dr. 
Robert  Weedier  has  said: 
"Whether  or  not  a  psychiatrist  is  willing  to 
classify  any  one  of  these  conditions  as 
diseases  of  the  mind  depends  more  on  his 
philosophy  than  on  any  factual  question  that2 
can  be  settled  by  observation  or  reasoning.  " 
Dr.  Manfred  Guttmacher  has  written: 
"There  is  certain  to  be  professional  dis- 
agreement  as  to  whether  some  of  these  cases 
should  be  classified  as  psychotic  .....  or 
Psychopatic....  The  training  and  orientation 
of  the  psychiatrist  is  likely  to  be  the  deci- 
sive  factor.  If  his  orientation  is  psycho- 
analytic,  he  will  be  more  likely  to  consider 
cases  with  severe  character  disorders  as 
suffering  from  a  mental  disease.  "3 
The  upshot  of  this  brief  discussion  is  that  it  still  has 
to  be  shown  that  psychopaths  are  the  subject  of  mental  dis- 
orders,  the  presence  of  character  disorders  does  not  esta- 
blish  that  they  are.  If  this  is  true  psychopaths  can  hard- 
ly  constitute  a  difficulty  for  our  criterion. 
Psychopaths  as  defined  at  present  do  not  constitute  an 
example  of  mental  disorder.  Suppose,  however,  we  were  to 
allow  two  kinds  of  evidence  as  admissible  for  diagnosing  the 
presence  of  mental  disorder.  Then  in  the  case  of  the  psy- 
chopath  we  would  have  a  conflict  of  evidence.  We  might 337 
therefore  decide  to  consider  psychopathy  a  borderline  case. 
Even  then  psychopathy  would  not  invalidate  our  criterion, 
for  all  categories  organising  mental  phenomenä  like  those 
for  physical  phenomena  will  have  borderline  instances,  which 
are  impossible  to  assign  with  finality  to  any  one  category, 
but  the  classification  is  not  invalidatedon  that  score. 
A  final  point  which  may  eventually  resolve  the  worries 
which  some  psychiatrists  have  over  psychopathy  is  that  there 
is  some  reason  to  believe  that  even  on  our  criterion,  some 
personalities  at  present  described  as  psychopathic  will  no 
longer  be  assigned  to  the  class  of  responsible  beings.  There 
is  evidence  emerging  that  some  so-called  psychopaths  are 
abnormal  in  a  clear  medical  sense,  e.  g.,  one  piece  of  work 
has  indicated  that  certain  brainwave  patterns  which  are 
charadteristic  of  children  and  epileptics  are  shared  by 
psychopaths.  This  would  not  show  that  they  were  not  respon- 
sible,  but  it  is  the  kind  of  evidence  which  is  relevant, 
and  may  eventually  allow  us  to  dispose  of  this  pseudo-psy- 
chiatric  category. 
Lady  Woottonts  second  criticism  (i.  e.  that  the  presenm 
of  a  psychiatric  syndrome  does  not  necessarily  explain 
disregard  of  social  norms)  is  to  the  effect  that  even  if  the 
criterion  expresses  a  necessary  condition  for  determining 
whether  responsibility  exists  or  not  it  does  not  express  a 
sufficient  condition.  But  it  is  not  a  matter  of  sufficient 
and  necessary  condition.  The  point  is  that  although  certain 
kinds  of  evidence  (e.  g.,,  brain-waves)  may  show  that  there 
is  a  mental  disturbance  they  do  not  prove  that  behaviour  is 338 
not  responsible  unless  there  are  grounds  for  saying  that  the 
mental  disturbance  caused  the  offender  to  act  otherwise 
than  he  would  have  done  if  he  were  not  disturbed.  It  would 
also  have  to  be  established  that  there  exists  a  causal  re- 
lationship  between  the  syndrome  and  the  behaviour.  Such 
requirements  have  been  recommended  as  a  legal  test  of  res- 
ponsibility  since  the  time  of  Durham  versus  United  States 
(1863)  when  it  was  agreed  that  "an  accused  is  not  criminally 
responsible  if  his  unlawful  act  was  the  product  of  mental 
disease  or  defect",  and  a  similar  rule  has  been  recommended 
in  the  Model  Penal  Code.  The  Royal  Commission  on  Capital 
Punishment  offered  a  rather  different  rule  when  it  said 
that  what  was  to  be  asked  was  whether  the  guilty  person 
suffers  from  mental  disorder  "to  such  a  degree  that  he  ought 
not  to  be  held  responsible".  The  Royal  Commission  did  not 
call  for  a  causal  connection,  and  in  this  it  was  mistaken, 
for  there  may  well  be  cases  in  which  the  offender  is  suffering 
from  mental  disorder  but  where  there  is  no  reason  to  think 
that  that  disorder  has  anything  to  do  with  the  crime.  On  this 
matter  the  commission  reported  that  "there  must  always  be 
some  likelihood  that  the  abnormality  has  played  some  part 
in  the  examination  of  the  crime;  and  generally  speaking  the 
graver  the  abnormality  and  the  more  serious  the  crime,  the 
more  probable  it  must  be  that  there  is  causal  connection 
between  theme"4  We  may  add  that  whether  there  are  such  causal 
connections  is  a  matter  which  is  open  to  scientific  experimen- 
tation.  Our  knowledge  of  the  existence  of  the  purported 
causal  connections  in  particular  cases  will  depend  upon  the 339 
prior  ascertainment  of  important  correlations.  Thus,  in 
answer  to  Lady  Wootton  we  may  say  that  though  the  presence 
of  a  psychiatric  syndrome  does  not  of  itself  explain  a  piece 
of  anti-social  behaviour,  its.  presence  in  conjunction  with 
laws  connecting  that  type  of  syndrome  with  that  type  of 
behaviour  will  explain  in  a  scientific  way  a  piece  of  anti- 
social  behaviour. 
Lady  Wootton's  third  criticism  of  the  criterion  is  that 
even  supposing  the  presence  of  syndromes  does  explain,  they 
do  not  excuse  such  behaviour.  She  writes: 
"f....  explanation  is  not  the  same  as  exculpation... 
Undoubtedly  people  who  suffer  from  disturbances 
of  mental  part-functions  have  to  carry  on  the 
burden  of  these  disturbances  on  top  of  whatever 
happens  to  be  their  share  of  the  ordinary  trouble 
and  difficulties  of  human  life.  But  so  also  do 
those  who  suffer  from  migraine  and  weak  digestions. 
How  can  we  be  sure  that  it  is  legitimate  in  the  one 
sense,  but  not  in  the  other,  to  leap  to  the  conclu- 
sion  that,  for  those  who  suffered  from  these  dis- 
abilities,  that  standard  of  social  expectation 
ought  to  be  lowered?  Why  is  dishonesty  excused 
as  well  as  explained  by  depression  but  not  by 
indigestion?  " 
Lady  Wootton's  query  is  briefly  why  we  are  justified  (if  we 
are)  in  relieving  a  person  partially  or  wholly  of  responsi- 
bility,  when  we  can  offer  a  scientific  explanation  of  his 
behaviour  which  includes  a  reference  to  a  mental  element, 
but  not  when  it  includes  a  reference  to  a  physical  condition. 
I  think  Lady  Wootton  has  not  stated  the  supposed  opposition 
clearly  enough.  When  so  stated  the  difficulty  disappears. 
The  first  general  point  to  make  is  that  when  a  scientific 
explanation  is  available  for  an  action  then  it  is  thereby 
implied  that  the  action  is  not  one  for  which  that  person 340 
may  be  helºi  responsible,  whatever  that  action  may  be,  and 
whatever  the  type  of  scientific  explanation  offered.  Con- 
sider  for  example  the  following  case:  A  pedestrian  is 
crossing  a  road.  Suddenly  a  car  comes  around  the  corner. 
The  pedestrian  jumps  in  the  direction  of  the  pavement.  In 
so  doing  . 
he  knocks  down  somebody  on  the  pavement.  Should 
the  pedestrian  be  held  responsible?  Without  filling  in  the 
details  we  can  say,  probably  not.  The  reason  why  we  should 
answer  in  this  way  is  that  a  scientific  explanation,  given 
in  this  case  partly  in  terms  of  experimental  psychology  is 
available  if  required.  But  if  we  consider  the  examples 
Lady  Wootton  gives,  migraine  and  weak  digestion,  there  is  no 
reason  to  suppose  that  they  can  form  part'  of  a  scientific 
explanation  of  anti-social  bheaviour,  because  there  is  no 
reason  to  think  that  they  will  figure  as  elements  in  appro- 
priate  scientific  laws.  It  may  not  be  true  in  general  that 
!  tout  comprendre  c'est  tout  pardonner.  "  But  where  an  expla- 
nation  is  scientific  it  does  exgäl'pate  from  blame.  The 
problem  is  one  of  finding  explanations  which  are  saiontifi- 
cally  satisfactory.  The  reason  why  this  should  be  so  is 
that  scientific  explanations  are  logically  complete.  Once 
again,  if  accepted,  they  need  no  supplementation.  Some 
explanations  of  actions  are  incomplete  in  this  sense;  they 
need  to  be  supplemented  by  statements  about  motives  and 
intentions.  Such  explanations  will  not  relieve  one  of 
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A  final  objection  which  Lady  Wootton  makes  to  the  cri- 
terion  would  be  to  the  notion  of  a  psychiatric  syndrome. 
A  psychiatric  syndrome  is  defined  in  terms  of  the  notion 
of  mental  disorder,  mental  disease  or  mental  ill-health. 
Lady  Wootton  claims  that  these  terms  do  not  designate  an 
"objective  reality"  but  each  contains  implicit  reference  to 
value  judgements.  She  is  at  some  pains  to  examine  definitions 
which  have  been  offered  by  psychiatrists  for  these  terms, 
and  it  must  be  admitted  that  the  examples  she  chooses  are 
deficient  in  this  respect. 
7 
This  fact  does  not  however 
oblige  us  to  reject  the  notions  of  mental  ill-healthy  mental 
disorder  etc.  as  referring  to  no  objective  reality.  One 
course  which  we  must  follow  would  be  to  examine  the  pro- 
ffered  definitions  to  discover  which  mental  conditions  they 
all  agree  in  accepting'or  discarding.  Such  definitions 
might  then  be  tested  against  definitions  which  others  in- 
cluding  anthropologists  might  be  able  to  elicit  from  alien 
societies.  Such  a  procedure  would,  I  think,  result  in  a 
definition  of  mental  ill-health  which  could  be  offered  to 
all  societies  and  would  not  involve  implicit  reference  to  a 
particular  culture. 
2.  DETERMINISM 
In  this  section  I  shall  concern  myself  with  the  issue 
of  the  relevance  or  irrelevance  of  determinism  to  the  Retri- 
butive  Theory  of  Punishment.  It  is  important  to  try  to 
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at  least  one  of  the  alternative  theories  of  punishment, 
namely  the  Deterrent  Theory,  would  not  be  impeached  should 
determinism  be  true;  the  truth  or  falsehood  of  determinism 
is  logically  independent  of  this  theory  of  punishment. 
Whether  the  same  can  be  said  on  behalf  of  the  Reformative 
Theory  is  less  certain,  and  I  shall  take  up  that  question 
later  in  this  section.  Finally,  I  shall  tentatively  offer 
two  lines  of  argument  which  are  intended  to  lend  some  support 
to  the  contention  that  in  a  morally  important  sense  we  do 
have  freedom. 
Anyone  who  is  prepared  to  advocate  a  Retributive  Theory 
of  Punishment  will  make  use  of,  in  formulating  his  theory, 
terms  selected  from  among  the  following:  "innocent",  "guilty", 
"morally  culpablett,  "responsible".  "desdrt".  These  terms 
he  may  say  are  to  be  used  and  understood  as  they  are  normally 
used  and  understood  in  moral  contexts.  They  will  then  carry 
with  them  the  implications  they  normally  have  in  such  con- 
texts.  I  shall  take  it  that  the  retributivist  does  intend 
to  take  these  terms  to  be  taken  in  their  ordinary  significa- 
tion.  If  this  is  so  it  would  seem  to  follow  that  the  logical 
relation  which  the  Retributive  Theory  bears  to  the  Determinist 
thesis  is  to  be  settled  by  an  examination  of  their  implications. 
It  would  be  possible  we  may  suppose  for  a  retributivist  to 
introduce  novel  definitions  for  these  terms,  but  none  to  my 
knowledge  has  thought  the  theory  required  it  and  I  shall 
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It  should  be  pointed  out  before  continuing  that  not  the 
whole  of  the  retributive  theory  is  relevant  to  the  question 
under  discussion.  C.  D.  Broad  has  the  following  to  say  about 
Retributive  punishment': 
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"The  fundamental  question  in  connection  with 
retributive  punishment  is  whether  a  combina- 
tion  of  two  evils,  viz.  wrongdoing  and  pain, 
can  be  a  more  desirable  state  of  affairs  than 
one  of  these  evils,  viz.  wrongdoing  without 
the  other.  The  general  answer  is  that  there 
is  no  logical  imposibility  in  this  because 
the  value  of  a  whole  depends  largely  on  the 
relations  between  its  constituents  as  well  as 
on  the  nature  of  the  constituents  themselves, 
And  the  contention  of  the  believer  in  retri- 
butive  punishment  is  that  there  is  a  certain 
appropriateness  of  pain  to  wrongdoing,  which... 
makes  the  whole  state  of  affairs  less  bad  than 
it  would  be  if  the  wrongdoing  were  punished.  " 
He  argues  that  a  determinist  will  hold  certain  states  of 
affairs  to  be  more  valuable  than  others,  and  there  is  no 
reason  to  believe  in  principle  why  he  should  not  hold  the 
above  state  of  affairs  valuable.  The  only  hesitation  one 
might  express  would  be  over  the  term  "wrongdoing".  But 
there  is  no  reason  why  a  determinist  should  not  admit  the 
possibility  of  wrongdoing.  Wrong  actions  are  simply  those 
actions  which  have  bad  consequences.  Providing  the  cause 
of  the  consequences  was  an  action  we  are  not  obliged  to 
enquire  whether  it  was  determined  or  not  to  decide  that 
it  is  an  example  of  wrongdoing. 
Nevertheless,  one's  initial  temptation  is  to  say  that 
determinism  if  true  would  undermine  retributivism.  Sidgwick 
thought  that  the  retributive  theory  did  presuppose  freedom 
of  the  will,  though  he  believed  it  would  have  no  practical 
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rejecting  the  retributive  theory  of  punishment: 
"It  must  be  admitted,  I  think,  that  the  common 
retributive  view  of  punishment,  and  the  ordinary 
notions  of  'merit',  'demerit'  and  'responsibility' 
also  involve  the  assumption  of  Free  ,  dill;  if  the 
wrong  act  and  the  bad  qualities  of  character  mani- 
fested  in  it  are  conceived  as  the  necessary  effects 
of  causes  antecedent  or  external  to  the  existence 
of  the  agent-  th,  e  moral  responsibility  -  in  the 
ordinary  sense  -  for  the  mischief  caused  by  them 
can  no  longer  rest  on  him.  "9 
The  quotations  from  Sidgwick  and  E3orad  settle  for  me  the 
point  at  which  determinism  may  bear  on  the  Retry=».  butive  Theory,  - 
where  the  terms  "desert',  "merit",  and  "responsibility"  enter. 
Thus  as  stated  before  it  would  seem  that  the  question  could 
be  answered  by  an  examination  of  the  logical  implications  of 
;;  ￿ 
these  terms.  A  Utilitarian  may  claim  to  be  able  to  find  de- 
finitions  for  these  terms  which  successfully  bypass  the  issue 
of  determinism.  However,  it  is  doubtful  whether  any  of  these 
definitions  so  far  offered  do  reflect  the  whole  meaning  of 
these  terms  as  actually  used.  If  they  did  our  problem  would 
be  solved  for  us,  but  in  fact  they  amount  to  partial  redefi- 
nitions  of  a  term,  more  restrictive  in  meaning  than  the  ori- 
ginal  term,  and  this  cannot  provide  a  certain  guide  with  which 
to  solve  our  problem.  Should  we  not  instead  of  adopting  some 
preferred  definition  attempt  a  theory  of  free  investigation 
of  these  terms  in  actual  use  and  try  to  discover  whether  they 
do  as,  -usually  used  imply  some  belief  in  free-will?  I  am 
highly  doubtful  whether  by  noticing  how-such  terms  are  used 
we  would  get  a  clear  indication  as  to  whether  or  not  they 
did  presuppose  freedom  of  the  will.  This  would  not  be  surprising 
since  these  terms  form  part  of  our  daily  discourse  and  are 
then  used  in  practical  determinations.  We  shall  however  re- 
turn  to  this  question  shortly  when  discussing  a  solution 345 
which  has  been  offered  to  the  problem  of  determinism. 
It  may  be  thought  that  should  we  find  historical  instances 
of  dogmas  which  have  accepted  both  determinism  and  the  retri- 
butive  theory,  then  we  should  have  shown  that  they  were  com- 
patible  with  each  other.  Sidney  Hook  writes: 
"It  is  argued  by  Professor  Edwards  that  'hard' 
determinism,  which  according  to  him  entails  the 
belief  that  no  one  is  morally  responsible  be- 
cause  no  one  ultimately  shapes  his  own  character, 
leads  to  the  abandonment  of  retributive  punish- 
ment...  But  historically  it  is  not  so.  From 
Augustine  to  Calvin  to  Booth  the  torment  of  eter- 
nal  damnation  is  assigned  and  approved  of  inde- 
pendently  -  by  a  moral  responsibility.  "10 
And  in  the  same  volume  another  writer  refers  to  "Calvinistic 
fatalism".  If  however  we  make  even  a  brief  excursion  into 
Calvinist  theology  it  is  very  doubtful  whether  the  facts 
support  the  claim.  Calvinism  does  allow  a  measure  of  free- 
dom  into  this  system,  sufficient  to  avoid  any  possible  con- 
flict  which  might  have  arisen  between  predestination  and 
the  retributive  theory.  Predestination  comes  into  Calvinism 
with  the  doctrine  of  the  Divine  Plan,  but 
"It  is  a  miscomception,  first,  if  it  is  supposed 
that  this  inclusion  by  Calvinism  of  all  acts  and 
events  in  the  sphere  of  the  Divine  Purpose  is 
tantamount  to  the  doing  away  with,  or  denial  of, 
the  reality  of  the  operation  of  secondary  causes 
-  especially  of  human  freedom,  The  contrary  is 
the  case.  The  operation  of  secondary  causes  is 
constantly  presupposed.  "11 
When  we  turn  to  the  words  of  Calvin  Himself  we  read: 
"God  ..  did  ..  freely  and  unchangeably  ordain 
whatsoever  comes  to  pass;  yet  so  as  thereby 
neither  is  God  the  author  of  sin,  nor  is  vio- 
lence  offered  to  the  will  of  the  creatures, 
nor  is  the  liberty  or  contingency  of  second 
causes  taken  away  but  rather  established.  "12 346 
and  elsewhere, 
"God  hath  embued  the  will  of  man  with  that 
natural  liberty,  that  it  is  neither  forced 
nor  by  any  absolute  necessity  of  nature 
determined,  to  good  or  evil.  "13 
It  is  not  my  wish  to  engage  here  in  the  exegesis  of  Calvinism, 
but  merely  to  suggest  that  a  short  appeal  to  a  supposed 
historical  precedent  will  not  solve  our  problem  for  us.  it 
might  for  all  I  know  turn  out  that  Calvin  did  accept  both 
doctrines,  but  even  were  we  satisfied  on  that  point,  since 
we  know  that  dogmas  are  able  to  embrace  contradictory  pro- 
positions  at  the  same  time,  we  could  not  then  let  the  issue 
rest.  There  is  no  hope  for  it  but  to  raise  the  questions  - 
What  is  Determinism?  What  is  Free  Will?  are  they  compatible 
or  do  they  exclude  each  other?  I  shall  deal  with  these 
questions  and  try  to  relate  the  discussion  to  the  retributive 
theory  by  declining  in  turn  with  two  separate  theses,  which 
we  may  call  immitating  Paul  Edwards  Soft  Determinism  and 
Hard  Determinism. 
State  shortly,  soft  Determinism  limiting  its  consideration 
to  action  says  that  determined  actions  are  simply  those  which 
are  constrained  in  some  way;  "constrained"  may  be  understood 
widely  so  as  to  include  both  physical  or  psychological  com- 
pulsion,  and  may  be  roughly  categorised  as  that  class  of 
actions  considered  involuntary  by  Aristotle  in  the  Nichoma- 
cheen  Ethics  Book  Three.  It  is  claimed,  truly.  -,  that  not  all 
our  action  falls  into  this  category,  but  that  there  is  a  class 
of  human  actions  which  are  subject  to  no  such  constraints. 
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of  these  actions  that  they  are  free,  and  that  when  we  say 
of  an  action  that  it  is  free  we  mean  just  that.  To  quote 
Locke: 
"From  the  use  of  the  word  "freewill"  no  liberty 
can  be  inferred  of  the  will,  desire,  inclination 
but  the  liberty  of  the  man,  which  consiste.  th'. 
in  his,  that  he  finds  no  stop  in  doing  what  he 
has  the  will,  desire  or  inclination,  to  do.  "14 
If  then  possessing  freedom  of  the  will  is  tantamount  to  being 
able  to  perform  free  actions  on  some  occasions,  it  follows 
that  such  freedom  is  not  incompatible  with  determinism  -  some 
of  our  actions  are  determined  but  equally  some  are  not.  If 
this  is  what  determinism  is,  then  its  truth  could  not  be  a 
bar  to  the  acceptability  of  the  Retributive  Theory  of  Punish- 
ment,  because  there  is  no  opposition  between  them.  The  re- 
tributivist  may  restrict  the  application  of  his  theory  to 
those  persons  whose  acts  were  morally  wrong  and  free  in  the 
above-mentioned  sense. 
However,  when  we  turn  to  the  Hard  Determinist  then  the 
issues  are  far  less  clear.  Let  us  first  consider  what  it 
says  with  respect  to  every  action,  and  thus  also  to  the 
class  of  actions  which  by  the  criterion  of  Soft  Determinism 
are  free  actions.  It  is  said,  firstly,  that  every  human 
action  can  in  principle  be  scientifically  explained;  that 
is  that  every  human  action  can  be  regarded  as  the  logical 
consequence  of  a  set  of  initial  conditions  plus  the  applica- 
tion  of  a  set  of  scientific.  laws.  Secondly,  though  the 
initial  conditions  forming  part  of  the  explanation  may  in 
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whose  action  is  being  explained,  there  are  always  explanations 
available  for  these  further  actions.  Sooner  or  later  an  ex- 
planation  will  be  forthcoming  which  does  not  invoke  amongst 
its  initial  conditions  former  actions  of  the-agent.  It  may 
be  that  such  an  explanation  will  include  among  its  initial 
conditions  actions  of  other  agents,  but  it  is  claimed  that 
it  need  make  no  reference  to  the  agent  whose  actions  are  to 
be  explained,  and  "ipso  facto",  not  to  his  freedom  either. 
If  this  is  the  case  the  supposed  additional  factor  of  free- 
dom  of  the  will  which  is  supposed  to  distinguish  free  actions 
from  determined  actions,  is  always  rendered  redundant,  for 
to  explain  a  man's  action  we  had  to  ask  questions  about  it. 
The  claim  may  be  given  to  a  stronger  form  to  the  effect 
that  any  man's  actions'can  be  explained  (if  we  are  prepared 
to  enquire  far  enough  back)  in  terms  of  scientific  laws  to- 
gether  with  initial  conditions  which  make  no  reference  to 
human  actions  at  all.  However,  this  formulation  involves  the 
possibility  of  a  reductionist  programme,  and  for  our  purposes 
it  is  needless  to  enquire  into  this  stronger  formulation, 
for  even  the  moderate  thesis  may  if  true  undermine  the  be- 
lief  that  men  act  freely  on  some  occasions.  The  belief  is 
thought  to  be  undermined  because  acting  freely  is  supposed 
to  require  the  possibility  of  acting  to  some  extent  indepen- 
dently  of  initial  conditions  and  scientific  laws,  and  not 
merely  not  being  compelled,  constrained  or  acting  involun- 
tarily.  Here  i  think  we  see  what  isthemajor  objection  to 
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hard  determinist  thesis  -  it  is  difficult  to  comprehend  just 
what  is  being  opposed  to  determinism,  just  what  is  being 
counter-claimed.  The  thesis  of  Hard  Determinism  may  itself 
be  vague  in  detail,  it  may  be  more  of  a  programme  than  an 
established  truth,  it  may  indeed  be  difficult  to  see  how  we 
might  establish  its  truth  if  true,  but  it  is  reasonably 
clear  in  outline.  But  what  is  supposed  to  constitute  free- 
dom  on  this  level  is  never  made  at  all  clear.  We  are  told, 
for  example,  by  C.  A.  Campbell15  that  we  have  an  apprehension 
or  intuition  that  our  will  is  free,  but  it  is  hard  to  see 
in  what  this  awareness  consists  except  the  awareness  that  we 
are  not  constrained  or  performing  involuntary  actions.  The 
apprehension  of  such  freedom  is  quite  compatible  with  Hard 
Determinism. 
What  may  be  in  the  minds  of  those  who  claim  for  us  this 
undetailed  freedom  is  the  following:  On  many  occasions  before 
we  do  anything  it  is  possible  for  us  to  rehearse  inwardly 
alternative  an  mutually  exclusive  actions,  each  of  which 
may  be  thought  opposite  to  the  situation  presented  to  us. 
It  may  be  agreed  that  the  courses  of  action  which  we  can  re- 
flect  about  are  set  for  us.  Still  it  will  be  claimed  that 
there  is  a  sense  in  which  we  can  act  freely,  range  over  the 
class  of  actions  which  are  possible  and  relevant  to  the 
circumstances,  and  that  our  choice  from  any  of  these  may  be 
a  free  one,  not  because  it  has  no  cause,  or  cannot  be  covered 
by  a  scientific  law,  but  because  a  reason  can  be  given  for 
doing  it,  which  would  be  a  reason  for  doing  it,  whatever 350 
kind  of  world  we  inhabited.  Can  an  answer  of  this  kind 
(however  obscure)  save  the  freedom  of  the  will?  It  may  be 
retorted  that  reasons  are  certainly  efficacious,  but  some 
reasons  are  rational  and  some  irrational,  but  that  they  all 
have  a  causal  ancestry,  and  that  the  differences  between 
rational  and  irrational  choices  can  be  accounted  for  simply 
by  citing  different  causes.  On  this  account  to  say  that  a 
certain  choice  is  a  rational  choice  is  to  say  that  it  has 
a  certain  kind  of  cause. 
I  shall  briefly  follow  up  the  line  of  thought  above 
with  a  view  to  highlighting  one  of  the  consequences  of  accep- 
ting  strict  Determinism,  a  consequence  which  is  self-defeating. 
I  will  suggest  that  there  is  one  belief  we  hold  which  is  not 
open  to  reappraisal,  and  that  the  account  Strict  Determinism 
gives  of  it  is  such  as  to  give  us  good  reason  for  rejecting 
Strict  Determinism,  In  short  it  seems  to  me  that  while 
making  use  of  rational  arguments  as  traditionally  understood 
and  accepting  them  in  this  way  the  determinist  leads  us  to  a 
conclusion  the  upshot  of  which  is  to  prove  to  us  the  impossi- 
bility  of  rational  argument  as  normally  understood. 
To  show  this  let  us  consider  the  example  of  non-moral 
rational  discussion.  Such  discussion  tautologically  takes 
place  via  the  medium  of  statements  between  which  logical 
relations  hold  or  do  not  hold.  Restricting  ourselves  even 
further  to  deductive  reasoning  we  may  say  that  an  argument 
used  in  a  discussion  is  valid  when  the  rdation  of  implication 
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to  hold.  In  a  rational  discussion  an  argument  may  be  rejected 
not  only  by  challenging  the  validity  of  the  inferences  but 
also  the  truth  of  the  premises.  Now  in  order  that  the  dis- 
cussion  be  resolvable  there  must  be  agreement  as  to  which 
rules  of  inferences  are  to  be  allowed  and  how  the  truth 
of  disputed  premises  is  to  be  determined.  Let  us  suppose 
that  in  a  rational  discussion  one  party  succeeded  in  gaining 
the  assent  of  the  other  party.  Then  to  the  extent  that  the 
former  is  a  rational  agent  we  should  say  that  he  was  con- 
vinced  because  the  conclusion  was  logically  entailed  by  the 
premises.  If  questioned  as  to  why  he  accepted  the  conclusion, 
the  party  would  likewise  say  that  he  had  been  provided  with 
sufficient  reasons  for  so  doing,  that  given  the  premise  and 
the  agent  he  was  logically  compelled  to  accept  the  conclusion. 
But  the  determinist  gives  an  alternative  account  of  what  has 
happened,  and  it  is  one  which  undermines  the  above  account. 
Given  the  state  of'the  agent  and  his  environment  at  that  time 
we  shall  be  told  that  the  stages  of  the  argument  can  be  re- 
garded  as  causal  conditions,  sufficient  to  make  the  other 
party  give  his  consent  to  this  conclusion.  We  have"two 
accounts,  one  given  in  terms  of  logical  necessitation,  the 
other  in  terms  of  causal  necessitation.  And  now  it  maybe 
asked  how  are  we  going  to  distinguish  between  the  agreement 
reached  via  rational  arguments  from  that  reached  in  other 
ways.  -Kyp  notism  and  propaganda  may  both  function  as  ,  men- 
tal  causes  which  can  lead  to  such  agreement.  Should  our 
agent  discover  that  the  agreement  had  been  reached  via  such 352 
a  course  he  would  wish  to  reconsider  the  agent  independently 
of  that  particular  cause,  and  he  is  surely  right  to  do  so  for 
we  attach  no  value  to  agreement  so  reached.  We  should  re- 
gard  any  triumph  reached  in  this  way  as  worthless  for  we 
would  have  succeeded  only  in  using  the  correct  psychological 
cues.  A  question  for  the  determinist  is  why  should  we  pre- 
fer  one  kind  of  cause  to  another  in  this  case2  The  deter- 
minist  or  libertarian  could  say  that  there  is  a  distinction 
to  be  drawn  between  reasons  and  causes,  that  the  provision 
of  cases  for  agreement  would  not  make  it  a  person's  own  de- 
cision,  and  indeed  if  we  know  that  this  was  the  way  in  which 
agreement  had  been  reached  we  would  not  attribute  this 
opinion  to  the  agent  however  vigorously  he  maintained  it. 
The  question  of  the  freedom  of  the  will  is  sometimes 
posed  by  asking  can  we  ever  do  other  than  we  in  fact  do. 
But  here  we  see  Determinism  eroding  at  the  possibility  of 
freedom  of  thought.  Can  we  ever  think  other  than  we  do  think? 
If  the  human  enterprise  is  rendered  sterile  by  determinism 
in  action,  it  is  rendered  meaningless  by  determinism  of 
thought. 
We  actively  distinguish  between  reason  and  causes,  acting 
through  reason  and  acting  as  the  result  of  sufficient  causal 
factors.  We  may  be  inclined  to  think  that  the  lder  are  not 
strictly  speaking  actions  at  all,  if  we  think  reasons  are 
always  relevant  to  actions.  The  distinction  is  between  cate- 
gories,  but  it  is  one  which  determinism  obliterates. 
I  have  been  at  pains  not  to  reject  Hard  Determinism 353 
but  to  stress  the  repercussions  which  it  has  for  ordinary 
views  of  men  and  thought.  This  does  not  mean  that  it  is  not 
true  but  we  are  entitled  to  wait  until  we  are  offered  some 
cogent  proof  of  its  truth  before  accepting.  Little  so  far 
has  been  forthcoming.  It  is  highly  doubtful  whether  it 
ever  could  be. 
Turning  back  to  our  original  question  we  asked  what 
relation  does  the  doctrine  of  Hard  Determinism  bear  to  the 
Retributive  Theory  of  Punishment.  I  do  not  think  we  can  go 
so  far  as  to  s4y  that  they  are  incompatible  in  a  strictly 
logical  sense;  so  that  should  someone  maintain  both  doctrines 
we  could  not  convict  him  of  inconsistency.  What  I  would 
stress  however  would  be  the  pointlessness  of  holding  these 
in  conjunction.  There  may  be  some  intrinsic  value  in  a 
world  where  benefits  and  punishments  are  apportioned  according 
to  desert,  and  where  freedoin  of  the  will  is  a  fact  (whatever 
that  may  mean).  But  in  a  world  which  isstrict1y  determined, 
why  should  the  benefits  or  punishments  be  attached  to  just 
those  persons  who  form  no  more  than  the  last  link  in  a 
causal  chain.  Their  actions  are  contradictory  to  the  wrong- 
doing  but  so  are  many  other  causal  events,  and  many  other 
persons,  so  why  let  the  merits  and  punishments  lie  just 
where  the  last  link  in  the  causal  chain  is  to  be  found? 
Surely,  such  a  state  of  affairs  would  be  quite  arbitrary, 
and  by  being  so  would  offend  against  the  principle  which 
defenders  of  the  retributive  theory  are  so  concerned  to  point 
to  as  one  of  the  strengths  of  the  theory  -  its  justice. 3.  REMEDIAL  TREATMENT  IN  PLACE  OF  JUDICIAL  PUNISHMENT 
This  section  attempts  to  extend  and  re..  inforce  the  argu- 
ments  in  the  sections  on  responsibility  and  determinism. 
The  concern  throughout  is  with  the  vexed  question  of  the 
substitution  of  treatment  for  'retributive  punishment'. 
Contemporary  psychiatrists  and  criminologists 
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contend 
that  crime  is  not  something  imputable  to  the  criminal,  but, 
rather,  to  the  criminal's  abnormal  condition:  a  condition 
brought  on  not  by  him,  but  by  the  circumstances  of  his 
life;  To  punish  him  is,  therefore,  unjust;  what  is  needed 
is  treatment.  We.  are  told  that  the  insistence  upon  punish- 
ment  is  a  symptom  of  a  pathological  condition  on  the  part  of 
those  who  insist  upon  it. 
"Our  anxiety  can  be  quieted  down  only  in  one  of 
two  ways:  In  our  sudden  unconscious  denial  of 
any  similarity  with  the  criminal  we  can  hurl  our- 
selves  upon  him  with  all  the  power  of  our  aggressive, 
punitive,  destructive  hastility;  or  we  can  assume 
the  criminal  to  be  a  mentally  sick  man  and  can 
then  assume  a  more  tolerant  or  chnj,  table  attitude 
towards  the  doer  if  not  the  deed.  " 
In  'Crime  and  The  Mind',  ývalter  Bromberg18  insists,  that: 
"A  criminal  act  results  when  an  impulse  contrary  to  the  ex- 
pressed  restrictions  of  civilised  life  cannot  be  withstood". 
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On  this  theory  every  crime  results  from  the  inability  to 
abide  by  the  law.  Criminal  behaviour,  according  to  Benjamin 
Karpman`0,  is  an  unconsciously  traditional  psychic  reaction 
over  which  (the  criminals)  have  no  conscious  control.  -  Else- 
where,  he  states:  "We  have  to  treat  them  as  psychically  sick 
people  which  in  every  respect  they  are.  It  is  no  more  rea- 
sonable  to  push  these  individuals  ....  than  it  is  to  push 
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an  individual  for  breathing  through  his  mouth  because  of 
enlarged  adenoids,  when  a  simple  operation  will  do  the  trick,  ￿21 
We  are  told  in  a  standard  work  on  Criminology, 
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"It  seems 
not  too  much  to  expect  society  gradually  to  accept  the  thesis 
that  the  criminal  also  is  socially  ill  and  needs  diagnosis 
and  some  sort  of  treatment  other  than  punishment.  "  The 
authors  argue  further  that,  "Most  real  criminals  are  so 
warped  by  their  inherited  defects  or  undesirable  life  habits, 
that  their  crimes  are  as  natural  an  expression  for  them  as 
law  abiding  conduct  is-for  the  rest  of  us.,, 
23 
Surely,  if  it 
is  correct  that  all  criminals  are  sick,  then  radical  propo- 
sals  about  punishment  follow.  One  of  the  most  explicit  of 
these  proposals  was  put  forward  by  Carl  Menninger. 
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In  his 
proposal  Menninger  declares  that  crime  is  only  one  type  of 
"adaptation  failure"  with  which  the  science  of  psychiatry 
is  concerned,  and  that  crime  is,  or  can  be,  as  an  object  of 
science,  "studied,  interpreted  and  controlled";  that  science 
can  change  had  behaviour,  foresee  it,  and  enable  society  to 
provide  for  it,  and  "detect  and  endeavour  to  prevent  the 
development  of  potential  criminality.  "  Therefore,  legal  pro- 
cedure  and  legislation  must  provide  for  psychiatric  examina- 
tion  of  all  offenders  with  latitude  and  authority  in  the 
recommendations  made  to  the  court  as  to  the  disposition  and 
treatment  of  the  prisoner.,  Menninger  goes  on: 
"This  also  entails  certain  radical  changes  in  penal 
practice  indlucing  (a)  substitution  of  the  idea 
of  treatment,  painful  or  otherwise,  for  the  idea 
of  retributive  punishment.  (b)  The  release  of 
prisoners  upon  discharge  or  parole  only  after 
complete  and  competent  psychiatric  examination 356 
with  findings  favourable  for  successful  rehabi- 
litation,  to  which  end  the  desirability  of  re- 
sident  psychiatrists  in  all  penal  institutions 
is  obvious,  (c)  the  permanent  legal  detention 
of  the  incurably  inadequate,  incompetent  and 
anti-social,  irrespective  of  the  particular 
offence  committed,  (d)  the  use  of  this  "perma- 
nently  custodial  group"  for  the  advantage  of 
the  State  -  to  earn'  their  keep..  " 
Many  lawyers  (not  unnaturally)  were  alarmed  at  such  a 
proposal  especially  when  part  (c)  of  the  proposal  is  given 
serious  consideration.  The  question  arises  how  the  rights 
of  the  criminal  are  protected  if,  at  the  will  of  a  psychia- 
trist  or  Board  of  psychiatrists,  he  can  be  held  in  prison 
after  the  expiratiUn  c:  f  his  term  because  that  indiltidual 
or  Board  finds  that  he  is  not  "rehabilitated".  If  a  man 
is  to  be  permanently  detained  because  he  is  "anti-social", 
it  would  seem  that  we  would  need  a  very  clear  definition  of 
the  word  "anti-social":  but  it  seems  to  me  that  no  such 
definition  has  to  date  been  worked  out. 
Lawyers  have  hastened  to  remind  the  psychiatric  oppo- 
nents  that  there  are  more  purposes  to  the  criminal  law  than 
the  rehabilitation  of  those  who  violate  it. 
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"The  social  aspects  to  punishment  have,  for  the 
most  part,  been  ignored  by  their  critics;  their 
medical  orientation  serves  to  pre-occupy  them 
with  the  criminal  qua  patient.  They  forget  that 
he  is  first  a  social  unit  and  that  although  he 
may  ultimately  be  handed  over  to  the  doctor, 
demands  of  society  ought  first  to  be  met.  He 
does  not  have  cancer  or  flu  or  dyspepsia;  he  has 
committed  a  crime,  has  injured  someone,  has 
damaged  society  according  to  its  own  definition. 
Because  of  this  and  irrespective  of  any  moral 
taint,  the  criminal  is  obliged  and  must  answer 
to  society.  "25 
One  of  the  best  replies  to  the  psychiatrists  is  to  be 
found  in  Hall's  Principles  of  Criminal  Law. 
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Hall  challenges 
the  right  of  the  psychiatrist  opponents  of  punishment  to 357 
speak  for  science,  or  even  for  psychiatry;  he  underlines 
the  lack  of  clear  definition  in  psychiatric  terminology  and 
the  resultant  impossibility  of  substituting 
_; 
it  for  legal 
terms;  he  emphasizes  the  questionability  of  Freudian  theories- 
of  human  nature;  and  insists  that  a  more  adequate  theory 
is  embodied  in  the  law. 
The  relevant  discussion  centres  mainly  on  the  psychia- 
trist  -  proposed  Rule  of  "Irresistible  Impulse"  as  a  subs- 
titute  for  the  generally  accepted  "M'Naghton  Rules".  Since 
the  net  result  of  the  substitution  would  almost  surely  be 
a  radical  extension  of  the  area  of  human  action  for  which 
the  agent  cannot  be  held  legally  responsible,,  a  brief  survey 
of  this  dispute  may  be  of  interest  before  we  turn  to  the  un- 
derlying  philosophical  issues* 
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The  M'Naghton  Rules  were  occasioned  by  the  case  of  the 
Queen  v.  M'Naghton,  1843.  in  this  case,  M'Naghton  having 
been  acquitted  of  a  sensational  murder  on  the  ground  of  in- 
sanity,  a  series,  of  questions  concerning  the  defence  of 
insanity  were  put  to  the  Lord  Justices.  After  considerable 
debate,  they  produced  the  answers  which  are  still  the  most 
important  part  of  the  law  on  insanity  in  relation  to  criminal 
responsibility.  The  central  assertion  of  the  rules  is  that 
"To  establish  a  defence  on  the  ground  of  insanity, 
it  must  be  clearly  proved  that,  at  the  time  of 
the  committing  of  the  act,  the  party  accused  was 
labouring  under  such  a  defect  of  reason,  from 
disease  of  the  mind,  as  not  to  know  the  nature 
and  quality  of  the  act  he  was  doing;  or,  if 
he  did  know  it,  that  he  did  not  know  he  was 
doing  what  was  wrong.  " 358 
But  many  psychiatrists  and  other  interested  parties 
object  to  this  rule  mainly  to  the  effect  that  many  criminals 
are  impulsive:  that  is,  many,  if  not  most  of  those  who  are 
really  insane  know  that  what  they  are  doing  is  wrong,  but 
cannot  refrain  from  doing  the  act  anyway.  Further  there  are 
many  insane  persons  who  do  criminal  acts  because  they  know 
that  they  are  wrong  and  because  they  want  to  expiate  a  sense 
of  guilt  by  drawing  a  resultant  punishment  upon  themselves. 
Such,  persons,  it  is  argued,  should  instead  of  punishment  be 
treated  for  mental  disorder. 
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The  test,  it  is  suggested 
should  not  be  "...  whether  the  individual  be  conscious  of 
right  or  wrong  -  not  whether  he  has  a  knowledge  of  the  con- 
sequences  of  his  act  -  but  whether  he  can  properly  control 
his  action.  "29  The  difficulty  with  such  a  criterion  is  that 
it  is  not  clear  how  we  are  to  distinguish  inability  to  resist 
an  impulse  from  simple  failure  to  resist  it.  Was  the  impulse 
irresistible  or  simply  not  resisted?  Clear  answers  to  this 
difficulty  have  not  been  forthcoming.  If  the  question  of 
insanity  turns  on  the  commission  of  the  very  deed  which  the 
criminal  has  done,  how  are  we  to  prevent  the  distinction 
from  exonerating  as  insane  whatever  is  done  on  "impulse?  " 
It  will  not  do  either  to  say  that  the  commission  of  the  like 
acts  in  the  past  indicates  "irrestible  impulse",  for  this 
may  just  as  well  indicate  habit  and  it  seems  odd  to  try  to 
get  a  man  off  of  a  murder  charge  on  the  sole  ground  that  he 
has  committed  a  number  of  murders  in  the  past. 
Because  the  rule  of  "irresistible  impulse"  is  on  his 
view  untenable,  Hall  finds  himself  inclined  to  accept  the 359 
M'Naghton  Rules  as  interpreted  by  enlightened  judges,  as 
the  best  criterion  of  insanity  offered  to  date.  Desirable 
reforms  in  this  rule  are,  he  feels,  delayed  because  the  pro- 
posed  reforms  have  so  far  been  coupled  with  a  theory(of 
'YirresiJtible  impulse")  which  attacks  the  very  foundations 
of  criminal  responsibility. 
In  ray  view,  two  issues  must  be  distinguished.  in  the 
"treatment  vs.  Punishment"  argument.  The  first  is  the 
prudential  issue:  whether  crime  would  be  more  diminished  by 
treatment  than  by  punishment.  Second,  is  the  moral  issue: 
whether  if  (as  contended)  the  criminal  is  not  responsible 
for  his  crime.  Sweeping  claims  have  been  maize  for  the 
superior  efficacy  of  treatment  in  the  reduction  of  crime. 
The  evaluation  of  these  claims  would  require  careful  analysis 
of  experimental  data.  It  may  be  doubted  whether  there  is 
enough  data  upon  which'to  found  any  firm  conclusions  Cer- 
tainly,  theoretical  difficulties  will  be  apparent  in  dis- 
tinguishing  between  treatment  and  punishment.  This  is  not 
to  suggest  that  the  practical  questions  will  be  ignored. 
They  will  also  be  looked  at  in  the  latter  part  of  this  chapter. 
What  leads  many  people  to  favour  treatment  over  punish- 
ment  is  not  prudential  but  a  moral  belief;  that  punishment 
is  no  longer  justified  since  whereas  we  had  assumed  criminals 
responsible  for  their  crimes,  we  have  now  discovered  that 
the.  assumption  is  at  best  shaky,  and  at  worse  false. 
The  first  point  that  should  be  noted  is  how  far  the  pur- 
ported  discovery  about  the  responsibility  of  criminals  spreads. 360 
Criminals  are  distinguished  from  other  human  beings  by  their 
having  committed  a  crime;  and  it  is  at  least  in  principle 
possible  to  enact  laws  in  such  fashion,  that  descriptively 
speaking,  any  deed  whatever  is  prohibited,  and  thus  made 
criminal.  So  to  say  that  no  criminals  are  responsible  for 
their  crimes  (or  most  are  not)  is  to'say,  whether  the  impli- 
cation  is  drawn  out  or  not,  that  no  one  (or  few  people) 
are  responsible  for  their  actions.  And  this  implication 
may  be  accepted  or  even  welcomed.  It  may  be  well  to  pause 
over  it. 
While  we  may  not  be  clear  on  the  use  which  is  being 
given  to  "responsible"  in  "No  one  is  responsible  for  crime"; 
there  is  one  point  about  this  use  on  which  we  are  clear; 
it  does  not  correspond  to  any  of  the  ordinary  uses  of  the-,  Word. 
In  the  ordinary  uses  there  is  a  tacit  reference  to  such 
recognised  heads  of  exception  as  mistake,  accident,  infan- 
cy,  insanity,  when  it  is  claimed  either  that  a  person  is 
not  responsible  for  a  given  deed  or  is  not  responsible  in 
general  (dispositionally).  But  if  the  every  same  reason 
serves  to  exonerate  everyone  from  responsibility,  then  this 
reason  is  no  longer  a  head  of  exception.  Therefore,  though 
in  the  ordinary  acceptance  of  the  term  it  follows  from  "A, 
is  not  responsible"  that  "A  ought  not  to  be  punished";  the 
implication  cannot  be  assumed  to  hold  where  "responsible"  is 
given  a  totally  different  use.  We  cannot  even  assume  that 
the  first  statement  is  a  reason  for  the  second,  because  we  do 361 
not  know  the  rules  which  govern  the  "discussion  game"  which 
is  apparently  here  being  initiated:  in  fact  we  do  not  know 
whether  there  are  any  rules  and  therefore  whether  there  is 
a  "game"  at  all.  We  can  only  speculate  about  the  circumstances 
in  which  the  indicated  "game"  might  arise,  and  how  it  might 
be  conducted. 
If  we  are  to  understand  the  contention  that  psychiatry 
and  sociology  have  discovered  that  criminals  are  not  res- 
ponsible,  or  that  few  of  them  are  responsible,  we  must  know 
more  about  what  it  means  to  say  of  a  person  that  he  is  or  is 
not  responsible,  Ascriptions  of  responsibility  are,  in  fact, 
like  justifications  of  punishment,  a  varied  and  extensive 
lot.  We  have  ho  more  ricght  to  assume  that  there  is  one 
abstract  general  responsibility  -  ascription  than  we  have  to 
assume  that  there  is  one  such  punishment  justification. 
In  the  first  place,  we  speak  of  persons  as'being,  in 
general,  responsible  (that  is,  as  being  the  sort  of  person 
to  whom  responsibilities  can  be  entrusted  without  worry). 
Secondly,  we  speak  of  a  person's  being  responsible  for  some- 
thing  -  in  a  variety  of  ways.  He  can  be  responsible  for  the 
performance  of  certain  tasks  (watering  the  horses),  all  of 
the  tasks  in  a  given  area  of  common  endeavour  (for  the  live- 
stock),  or  -  in  a  connected  way  -  for  the  performance  of  his 
subordinates.  These  are  prospective  or  a  temporal  ascriptions 
of  responsibility.  But  there  are  also  restrospective  as- 
criptions. 362 
We  can  say  that  A  is  responsible  for  something  that  has 
happened  (B's  death).  To  say  this  is  to  pack  together  some 
or  all  of  a  number  of  articles  in  a  single  suitcase.  It 
may  be  to  say  that: 
1.  A  caused  the  event  to  occur  (was,  in  legal  jargon, 
the  "real",  "leading",  or  "proximate"  cause  -  not 
merely  a  causal  condition,  like  the  operation  of  the 
laws  of  gravity). 
2.  That  A  is  at  fault  for  what  occured  (he  placed 
the  harnmtr  near  the  edge  of  the  platform  and  it  fell  off; 
flung  it  in  the  air  as  a  joke;  he  aimed  and  threw  it). 
3.  That  A  is  answerable  for  what  happened  (he  is  sub- 
ject  to  blame,  and/or  to  execution,  imprisonment,  the 
payment  of  indemnity). 
A  can  be  held  legally  responsible  for  what 
(a)  he  did  not  cause  or 
(b)  he  is  not  at  fault  for  causing. 
(a)  He  can  be  made  answerable  for  the  acts  of  his 
servants  or  employees,  the  misbehaviour  of  his  dogs, 
the  mistakes  of  his  accountant. 
(b)  It  may  well  be  that  A  would  not  be  held  to  be  at 
fault  for  any  of  the  above-mentioned  acts  which  he  did 
not  cause,  but  in  addition  he  may  be  held  answerable 
for  what  he  did  indeed  cause,  but  was  not  at  fault  for 
causing.  Thus,  e.  g.  A  sold  the  drug  which,  misused  by 
C  in  violation  of  A's  instructions,  killed  B;  or  A 
puts  up  the  road  sign  which  caused  B  to  take  the  highway 363 
on  which,  because  a  bridge  collapsed,  a  is  killed;  or 
A  ordered  B  to  come  down  from  an  icy  structure,  and  on 
the  way  B  slipped  and  was  killed. 
A  ,  may  be  held  legally  answerable  for  what  he  did  or 
did  not  cause,  and  for  which  he  is  or  is  not  at  fault. 
Therefore  to  determine  whether  A  is  answerable  for  B's  death, 
it  is  enough  to  determine  that  he  caused  it  and/or  is  at 
fault  for  it.  It  is  the  retributivist  position  that  fault 
is  both  necessary  and  sufficient  ground  for  answerability. 
There  does  not  seem  to  be  any  single  utilitarian  position. 
If  there  is  utilitarian  value  in  strict  liability,  and  if  strict 
liability  can  be  interpreted  so  strictly  that  there  is  no 
fault  left, 
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then  fault  is  not  -  on  utilitarian  grounds  - 
a  necessary  condition  of  answerability.  In  any  case,  it  is 
not  sufficient. 
The  argument  against  the  institution  of  legal  punishment 
based  on  the  premise  that  no  one  is  (or  very  few  people  are) 
responsible  for  crime,  needs,  then,  a  great  deal  more  deve- 
lopment  than  it  has  received.  What  is  meant  by  saying  that 
no  one  is  (or  few  are)  responsible  for  crime?  It  cannot  be 
meant  that  people  are  not  responsible  in  the  causal  sense  of 
a 
that  word.  Nor  can  it  be  meant  that  they  are  not  answerable: 
it  is  surely  not  being  denied  that  people-are  in  fact  held 
responsible  (liable)  for  certain  events.  It  must  be  in  the 
sense  of  the  imputation  of  fault.  The  contention  is,  then, 
that  no  one  is  (or  few  are)  at  fault  for  the  violation  of 
criminal  laws.  But  if  this  is  what  is  meant,  is  the  discovery 364 
in  question  properly  regarded  as  a  scientific  discovery? 
It  is  hard,  in  the  first  place,  to  know  how  far  the  discovery 
extends.  As  noted  above,  in  principle  any  kind  of  deed 
could  be  prohibited  or  required  by  law.  So,  in  principle, 
it  would  follow  that  no  one  is  (or  few  are)  at  fault  for  the 
commission  of  any  deed  whatever.  Secondly,  it  is  generally 
conceded  that  the  question  whether  or  not  a  person  is  at 
fault  is  a  moral  rather  than  a  scientific  question  (whatever 
may  be  the  grounds  on  which  such  a  distinction  is  made). 
Even  supposing  we  should  grant  that  it  has  been 
"discovered"  that  no  one  is  (or  few  are)  responsible  (meaning 
at  fault)  for  his  crime,  then  it  does  not  follow  immediately 
that  no  one  should  be  punished.  For  what  must  now  be  shown 
is  that  only  those  persons  who  are  at  fault  should  be  punished. 
This  is  a  premise  which  retributivists  would  accept;  but 
utilitarians  might  not  accept.  It  has  been  generally  over- 
looked,  I  think,  that  the  attack  on  the  institution  of  legal 
punishment  under  discussion  hereby  assumes  a  basic  premise 
of  the  retributivistic  justification  of  that  institution, 
even  thotgh  it  is  the  retributivist  view  of  punishment 
(assumed  incorrectly  to  provide  its  only  support)  which  is 
at  the  same  time  attacked.  But  since  no  clear  sense  has 
been  given  to  the  "discovery"  in  question,  it  is  not  clear 
what  we  are  conceding,  even  for  the  sake  of  argument. 
We  have  tried  to  show,  so  far,  that: 
(a)  the  scientific  status  of  the  "discovery"  that  all  (or 
most)  men  -are  not  responsible  for  their  crimes  is 365 
questionable  and 
(b)  the  assumption  that  there  shall  be  answerability  only 
where  the  act  is  caused  by  the  agent  and/or  is  his 
fault,  is  also  questionable.. 
Perhaps  these  difficulties  are  surmountable.  Suppose 
that  the  "treatment"  advocate  recognises  and  accepts  his 
agreement  with  the  retributivists  that  fault  is  a  necessary 
(if  not  sufficient)  condition  of  answerability.  We  have  pointed 
out  the  debatability  of  this  assumption,  and  the  absence  of 
its  defence  in  the  "treatment"  position.  But  it  co_  uid  be 
recognised  and  defended.  Suppose  he  also  retreats  from  his 
position  that  the  narrowing  of  the  area  of  responsibility  is 
a  "scientific  discovery".  What  Would  remain?  Much  which  is 
worthy  of  careful  attention. 
The  advocate  of  "treatment"  would  then  frankly  admit  that 
his  position  is  primarily  a  moral  one,  and  not  something  which 
he  knows  on  scientific  grounds  to  be  correct.  What  he  does 
still  claim  to  know  scientifically  is  that  all  or  most  crime 
is  committed  by  persons  in  some  way  deficient.  His  moral 
contention  is  that  this  deficiency  constitutes  an  excuse  for. 
the  commission  of  the  crime;  the  crime  is  not  therefore  that 
fault  of  the  person  committing  it;  and  punishment  would  there- 
fore  be  unjust. 
There  must  then  be  offered  affirmative  grounds  for  the 
substitution  of  treatment  for  punishment  in  most  or  all  cases. 
What  would  have  to  be  shown  is  that  the  deficiencies  in  ques- 
tion  are  such  as  are  likely  to  respond  to  treatment,  and  that 
the  appropriate  treatment  is  known  and  could  be  made  available. 366 
Finally,  it  would  have  to  be  shown  that,  granting  the  treat- 
ment  is  available,  the  principle  that  all  or  most  criminals 
should  be  treated  can  be  defended  against  charges  of  in- 
justice  likely  to  arise. 
it  will  be  advisable  at  this  stage  to  list  some  of  the 
difficulties  which  this  more  dandid  and  carefully  stated 
"treatment"  position  would  have  to  meet. 
What  are  the  deficiencies  suffered  by  all  or  moat 
criminals? 
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2.  Since,  in  principle,  any  description  of  deed  can  be 
prohibited  or  enjoined  by  law,  and  crime  consists  in 
violation  of  law;  is  it  contended  that  the  deficiency 
in  question  is  shared  by  everyone?  If  so,  in  what 
sense  is  it  a  deficiency? 
3.  Would  a  "deficiency"  shared  by  everyone,  or  almost 
everyone,  constitute  an  excuse? 
Pv;  istake  of  fact,  accident,  coercion,  duress,  provocation, 
insanity;  and  infancy  are  excuses  which  are  accepted  in 
criminal  law  as  excluding  or  reducing  liability  to  punishment. 
If  infancy,  for  example,  is  extended  to  include  all  but  senile 
persons  (as  senility  is  presently  understood),  would  it  then 
be  an  excuse?  To  say,  Yes  is  to  abolish  punishment.  But 
is  the  decision  to  abolish  punishment  to  be  made  on  this 
ground  alone?  And  what  would  it  mean  to  treat  all  or  most 
people  as  if  they  were  infants  -  or  insane,  not  only  in  the 
courts  but  in  every  day  life?  And  if  the  distinction  is  not 
extended  to  every  day  life,  what  happens  to  the  contention  that 367 
the  deficiency  in  question  excuses  by  showing  that  the  per- 
son  in  question  was  not  at  fault.  Is  treatment  necessarily 
more  just  in  execution  than  punishment?  Suppose  that  Menning- 
errs  proposals  had  been  accepted.  Would  there  be  no  ground 
for  complaints  of  injustice  on  the  part  of  criminals  res- 
trained  against  their  wills  for  (sometimes  unpleasant)  treat- 
ment  until`  the  (sometimes  difficult  to  define)  deficiency 
in  question  is  removed?  Would  it  be  possible  in  such  cases 
to  distinguish  between  treatment  and  punishment? 
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The  practical  question  whether  we  are  to  go  over  entirely 
to  such  a  system,  as  has  been  suggested,  or  whether  to  extend 
such  an  approach  to  law-breakers  much  further  than  it  is  at 
present  thought  appropriate  by  the  officers  of  the  law  itself, 
as  many  have  urgently  demanded,  is  a  decision  that  must  be 
based  not  so  much  on  the  availability  or  non-availability  of 
certain  scientific  facts  about  individuals  -  though  some 
facts  will,  of  course,  always  be  relevant  to  such  a  decision 
-  but  on  the  willingness  to  be  swayed  by  certain  values 
rather  than  others:. 
The  essential  fact  about  treatment  is  that  a  man  is 
passive  under  it,  and,  in  so  far  as  the  treatment  we  are 
considering  is  made  mandatory,  as  it  must  be  if  it  is  to 
replace  punishment,  the  patient  has  no  choice  about  whether 
or  not  to  submit  to  it.  The  one  who  is  thus  treated  is  in 
the  power  of  his  'healer',  who  is  supposed  to  know  what  is 368 
best  for  his  patient  and  has  the  authority  to  see  that  his 
prescriptions  are  carried  out.  The  law-breaker  under  treat- 
ment  is  thus  in  much  the  same  position  as  a  young  child  in 
the  hands  of  its  parents.  In  so  far  as  the  reason  for  his 
treatment  is  that  he  is  not  responsible  for  the  law-breaking 
he  brought  about  he  must  also  be  regarded,  in  significant 
respects,  as  a  helpless  patient  and  therefore  in  many  cases 
deprived  even  of  the  freedoms  usually  granted  to  quite  young 
children.  There  is  thus,  as  many  have  pointed  out, 
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some- 
thing  essentially  degrading  about  compulsory  treatment(even 
if  the  person  himself  voluntarily  submits  to  it);  to  be 
handed  over  or  to  surrender  oneself  so  fundamentally  to  the 
will  of  another,  however  kindly  one  is  treated,  amounts  to 
a  kind  öf  suspension  of  a  man's  essential  humanity,  his  human 
dignity,  and  is  ther6fore  a  prima  facie  moral  evil,, 
On  the  other  hand  the  driving  force  behind  attempts  to 
substitute  treatment  for  punishment  is  basically  humanitarian. 
There  can  be  no  doubt  that  many  criminals,  especially  'reci- 
divists',  exhibit  a  kind  of  helplessness  in  the  face  of  temp- 
tation;  born  and  brought  up  as  many  of  them  are  in  squalid 
and  loveless  homes,  surrounded  by  poverty,  unemployment  and 
ill-heilth,  poorly  educated  and  subjected  at  an  early  age  to 
criminal  tendencies  -  is  it  any  wonder,  we  may  feel,  that 
3 
they  take  to  crime? 
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wouldn't  we  do  the  same?  There  seems 
something  inevitable  about  the  biographies  of  such  helpless 
people.  How  could  they  possibly  help  doing  what  they  did? 
Wouldn't  it  be  kinder,  we  feel  -  as  well  as  better  for  society 
-  to  'help<  them  in  some  way,  rather  than  punish  them  yet  again! 369 
If  they  are  no  longer  amenable  to  ordinary  education,  is0t 
there  something  we  can  do  to  them  to  make  them  forsake 
crime  and  become  happy  and  useful  citizens? 
If  some  criminals  seem  the  feckless  victims  of  their 
environment  and  upbringing,  others  seem  to  be  at  the  mercy 
of  powers  and  forces  in  themselves  which  they  cannot  control. 
Some  people  are  assailed  with  overwhelming  desires  to  steal 
from  shops,  articles  they  cannot  possibly  want  or  need; 
others  feel  they  will  burst  unless  they  smash  something  or 
someone  for  no  reason  at  all;  others  are  overpowered  by  un- 
controllable  sexual'urges  to  rape  and  murder.  Such  law- 
breakers  bemoan  their  fate,  wish  they  were  different,  but 
can,  it  seems,  do  nothing  about  it.  They  feel  quite  unable 
to  shake  off  their  insatiable  longings  or  insistent  desires, 
which  demand  fulfilment  in  the  most  direct  way  possible. 
How  can  people  cope  with  the  strength  of  such  feelings,  we 
ask?  If  they  seem  unamenable  to  punishment  are  we  not  bound 
to  try  and  treat  them?  We  look  back  with  horror  at  the 
swagery  of  the  early  ninteenth  century  penal  code  and  fall 
over  backwards  to  try  to  understand  and  sympathise  with  such 
helpless  victims  of  themselves  or  their  chemistry. 
The  driving  force  of  such  proppsals  is,  as  I  said,  un- 
doubtedly  humanitarian.  Yet  linked  with  it  is  a  failure  or 
a  refusal  to  face  the  existence  of  moral  evil,  This  seems 
to  be  one  of  the  most  serious  problems  of  morals  and  for 
moral  philosophy  in  a  secular  age.  Christianity  could  'explain' 
evil  to  some  extent,  particularly  before  the  devil  was  demy- 
thologised.  Securely  encased  in  the  armour  of  faith  a  man 3  70 
might  shudderin(7ly  contemplate  the  evil  in  himself  (whose 
'prisoner'  he  frequently  felt  himself  to  be)  and  In  others 
and  recognise  it  for  what  it  was.  But  in  our  present  naked- 
ness  it  seems  to  be  too  much  for  us.  Only  when  we  are  forced 
to  confront  it  can  we  really  take  it  in.  Pamela  Hansford 
Johnson's  admittedly  highly  journalistic  book  'On  Iniquity'34 
is  an  instructive  lesson  in  this  respect.  Many  people  be- 
lieved  that  Ian  Brady  and  Myra  Hindley,  the  perpetrators  of 
the  unbelievably  horrifying  'MOORS'  murders,  simply  must  be 
mad.  How  could  they  otherwise  have  come  to  do  such  unspeak- 
ably  appalling  thing?  Miss  Hansford  Johnson  was  asked  to 
attend  much  of  the  trial  of  these  two  and  write  up  her  impre- 
ssion  afterwards.  She  thus  had  the  opportunity  of  observing 
them  over  many  successive,  days.  In  spite  of  the  fact  that 
she,  and  many  others,  had  expected  to  find  them  mad,  she 
could  not,  when  faced  with  the  reality,  see  them  as  such. 
Nor  could  the  other  attendant  journalists  she  spoke  to,  or 
the  police  who  had  to  guard  them  during  the  trial,  or  even 
those  who  conducted  their  defence.  The  predominant  expe- 
rience  of  all  those  who  came  into  contact  with  them  was  a  sort 
of  'spiritual  evil'  emanating  from  them,  especially  the  woman. 
But  what  is  significant  here  is  that  only  when  actually  con- 
fronted  with  the  two  could  Miss  Hansford  Johnson  and  her 
colleagues  accept  this.  She  herself  admits'-that  she  had  once 
thought  that  all  murderers  'must'  be  mad,  and  many  people 
would  include  other  types  of  serious  crimes.  Yet  this  is 
an  age  when  she  witnessed  Belsen  and  all  the  other  iniquities 371 
connected  with  the  Nazi  and  other  totalitarian  (and  also 
democratic)  regimes.  It  is  obviously  completely  irrespon- 
sible  to  write  off  all  exterminators  and  torturers  and  their 
'superiors'  as  made  or  insane.  Moral  evil  exists  -  and, 
what  is  perhaps  even  more  important  in  the  present  argument 
-  it  exists  in  the  squalid  and  sordid  crime  of  the  petty 
criminal,  not  only  the  spectacular  abominations  of  the 
dictator. 
We  must  next  recognise  that  concepts  of  mental  health, 
of  sanity  and  insanity,  are  themselves  inescapably  normative. 
It  would  be  absurd,  of  course,  to  maintain  that  'madness'  is 
merely  a  social  fiction,  a  device  for  putting  threatening 
deviants  out  of  action,  even  though  it  can  be,  and  in  some 
countries  is,  exploited  for  such  ends.  That  is,  madness 
also  'exiists',  however  hard  it  may  be  to  define  -  though 
it  is  clearly  conceptually  connected  with  some  lack  of  res- 
ponsibility  for  one's  own  actions.  On  the  other  hand  there 
is  no  hard  and  fast  line  betwoen  the  sane  and  the  insane; 
many  men  judged  to  be  in  some  way  or  other  insane  in  contem- 
porary  Britain  would  neither  have  been  so  adjudged  here  in 
Victorian  times  nor  would  be  today  in  many  other  countries 
of  the  world.  There  is  an  indeterminately  large  zone  where 
judgements  are  bound  to  be  disputed.  However,  it  is  often 
said  that  it  is  new  'discoveries'  that  account  for  the  change 
in  this  country.  Such  talk  suggests  that,  thanks  to  better 
diagnosis,  we  are  now  better  at  finding  out  who  is  insane 
(or  psychotic,  or  neurotic  or  both).  Certainly  new  behavioural 372 
'syndromes'  may  be  isolated  and  named,  which  are  associated 
with  an  apparent  lack  of  ability  to  cope  in  one  way  or  another. 
But  what  is  in  fact  happening  is  that  we  are  simply  adding 
more  of  the  'disputed'  territory  to  the  empire  of  inaanityo 
And  the  practical  effect  of  such  action  is  the  benevolently 
inspired  refusal  to  hold  people  accountable  for  the  plight 
whatever  it  is,  that  they  have  got  into. 
Now,  as  I  have  already  made  quite  clear,  it  cannot  be 
denied  that  some  people  are  insane  and,  to  a  very  great 
extent,  not  responsible  for  much  of  what  they  do.  And  yet 
it  is  also  as  certain  as  most  things  can  be  that  some  people 
are  not  insane,  that  some  people  are  responsible  for  what 
they  do.  For  example,  I  cannot  possibly  deny  that  I  myself 
at  least,  am  responsible  to  a  very  great  extent  for  what  I 
do  and  have  done;  and  I  would  be  absolutely  astonished  if 
the  reader  did  not  also  say  the  same  about  himself.  On  the 
other  hand,  there  are  circumstances  in  which  even  the  agent 
himself  comes  to  deny  his  responsibility.  Since  this  pheno- 
menon  is  so  important  today  we  must  examine  it  fairly  closely 
by  means  of  an  example. 
Suppose  that  a  man  becomes  convinced  that  his  marriage 
has  irretrievably  broken  down.  He  leaves  his  wife  and  family 
and  goes  to  live  with  another  woman.  When  the  first  rapture 
of  his  new  freedom  becomes  muted  and  he  begins  to  take-  g6rious 
stock  of  himself  and  his  position  he  will,  if  he  has  not 
already  done  so,  feel  the  need  to  justify  his  action.  He 
knows  that  he  has  committed  at  least  a  prima{  facie  moral 373 
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hood,  the  perhaps  still  unresolved  problems  of  his  adolescence 
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and  the  lack  of  understanding  of  his  wife.  His  whole  past  will 
be  spread  out,  stage  by  stage,  every  step  seeming  to  lead 
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inevitably  and  inexorably  to  the  sudden  and  irreparable 
cracking-up  of  his  marriage.  If  he  has  complete  freedom  to 
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master  of  his  fate,  now  a  powerless  victim  of  circumstances. 
But  perhaps  as  time  goes  on  he  becomes  more  and  more  disen- 
chanted  with  his  new  position.  He  feels  more  and  more  guilt, 
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which,  maybe,  he  projects  outwards  in'the  form  of  hostility  to. 
wards  those  who  surround  him.  Gradually,  though,  and  often  at  a 
less  fully  conscious  level  the  conviction'.  ows  on  him  that  he 
has  made  a  terrible  mistake.  Now  when  his  new  friends  tell  him 
that  his  guilt  is  irrational,  that  to  return  to  his  wife  would 
destroy  him  once  more,  that  he  had  to  leavevher,  their  words 
gradually  take  on  a  hollow  ring;  they  seem  false,  and,  though 
they  still  tempt  him,  he  feels  he  has  the  power  to  see  through 
them.  Soon  he  is  convinced  of  his  own  wrong.  He  goes  back  to 
his  wife,  who  is  still  patiently  waiting,  and  they  gradually 
take  up  their  life  together  again.  He  now  sees  things  totally 
differently.  How,  could  he  have  shirked  responsibility  for'what 
happened'?  His'past  is  still  what  is  was,  though  now  he  will 
place  the  emphasis  differently;  but  how  could  he  have  been  so 
naive,  so  craven,  as  to  imagine  himself  its  prisoner?  What  if 
he  suffered  in  childhood,  if  his  wife  'did  not  understand  him'? 
He  has  a  duty  to  his  family  as  well  as  his  wife.  How  could  he 
have  so  juggled  with  their  lives?  He  will  take  responsibility 
henceforward  for  his  actions.  He  sees  that  he  cannot  shuffle 
it  off.  Perhaps  he  now  also  realises  for  the  first  time  the 
incredible  seriousness  and  significance  of  moral  choice,  and 
with  this  realisation  goes  a  new  understanding  of  human  dignity 
and  worth.  Not  that  he  can  wholly  :  welcome  this  new  dignity. 
There  is  a  certain  coldness  and  austerity  about  refusing  to 
surrender  responsibility  for  one's  actions;  in  contrast  to  the 
warmth  and  snugness  of  the  'we  are  all  fellow  victimes  of  life' 
syndrome  it  may  have  a  definite  unattractiveness.  Nevertheless, 
from  his  new  perspective,  he  could  not  possibly  see  his  actions 
as  inevitable  or  not  his  fault.  This, I 
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at  any  rate,  could  never  be  more  than  the  expression  of  a 
passing  mood.  He  has  now  seen  too  much. 
What  must  be  stressed  above  all  is  the  strange  double  - 
sidedness  of  the  idea  of  responsibility.  A  house  looked  at 
from  outside  i5  still  recognisably  the  same  structure  from 
within,  even  though  the  front  and  the  interior  are  structured 
differently.  We  have  to  adjust,  to  think  hard,  to  go  back 
and  have  another  look,  but  in  the  end  we  feel  satisfied 
that  we  are  dealing  with  one  and  the  same  object.  Responsi- 
bility  is  not  like  this.  From  outside  it  seems  to  be  a  sort 
of  capacity  or  power  -a  psychological  phenomenon.  We  look 
for  the  presence  or  absence  of  certain  features.  Does  this 
man  know  the  difference  between  right  and  wrong?  Did  he 
know  what  he  was  doing  when  he  did  it,  and  that  it  was  wrong? 
Were  there  features  of  his  past  life  that  would  make  it 
extremely  likely  that  he  would  do  such  things?  Are  there 
features  of  his  brain  or  bodily  chemistry  that  would  make  it 
difficult  for  him  tD  control  himself?  From  inside,  however 
-  and,  of  course,  the  fact  that  we  can  never  be  both  inside 
and  outside  the  same  'house'  is  what  causes  all  the  trouble 
-  things  look  quite  different.  From  here  responsibility  looks 
more  like  a  decision,  a  deliberate  act  of  the  will.  We  do 
not  scan  an  object  for  features  but  ask;  "am  I  going  to  accept 
responsibility  for  this"?,  am  I  going  to  allow  myself  to  be 
treated  as  a  mere  victim  of  circumstances  or  am  I  going  to 
assert  my  "human  freedom"?  In  so  far  as  we  then  strain  from 
inside  to  take  the  outside  position  we  seem  already  to  have 
lost  our  first  essential  insight,  which  can  come  to  seem  the 376 
relic  of  a  bygone  age.  Yet  something  may  happen,  it  may  seem, 
to  bring  us  to  ourselves.  The  original  inner  view  may  come 
to  seem  by  far  the  most  authentic,  the  attempt  to  take  the 
outer,  the  frentic  footling  of  'other  -  directed'  man. 
On  the  other  hand,  if  we  look  at  the  outer  approach 
again  we  see  that  it  dons,  after  all,  have.  a  link  with  what 
might  appear  to  be  the  more  genuine  inner  one.  For  the 
'inner'  question:  'am  I  going  to  accept  responsibility?,  if 
it  is  a  serious  question,  must  surely  be  sometimes  answered 
'no'.  If  it  is  a  question  of  whether  I  am  going  to  take 
responsibility  for  catching  a  bout  of  'flu'  which  lays  me  up 
for  a  day  or  two,  there  is  clearly  something  pointless  about 
answering  'Yes'.  Such  a  man  has  ignored  the  facts  about 
'flu'.  From  the  outside,  too,  a  man's  concern  (for  example' 
a  judge's)  will  be  in  whether  he  ought  to  ascribe  responsi- 
bility  to  the  man,  whether  he  ought  to  hold  him  responsible 
-  and,  of  course,  he  cannot  do  this  without  facts.  Trio 
crucial  question  obviously  is  'which  facts?  '  Some  facts  are 
certainly  relevant.  A.  traditional  list  of  excuses  gives  a 
fair  example.  We  are  under  pressure  today  to  make  more  and 
more  facts  relevant.  Yet  from  the  'inside'  this  may  appear 
increasingly  absurd  and,  indeed,  menacing,  since  it  threatens 
the  individual's  autonomy  and  '.  dignity  as  a  person  (though 
it  also  offers  him  a  rather  insecure  asylum  from  his  own 
guilt). 
Let  me  try  to  put  this  difficult  issue  as  starkly  as  I 
can.  Fundamentally,  I  think  it  is  an  issue  between  what  we 377 
may  call  'rationalists'  and  'intuitionists'.  Rationalists 
argue  like  this:  'We  know  that  not  everyone  is  responsible 
for  what  they  do.  Some  facts  are  admitted  by  all  as  obliging 
us  not  to  hole  someone  responsible  for  a  particular  action. 
More  and  more  facts  are  being  accepted  as  relevant  to  such 
an  issue.  How  then,  in  view  of  the  difficulty  of  saying 
precisely  what  responsibility  is,  can  it  be  denied  that 
ultimately  we  shall  discover  that  fewer  and  fewer  people 
ought  to  be  held  responsible,  and  ultimately  that  no  one 
should?  '  The  rationalist,,  of  course,  has  the  advantage  of 
being  able  to  appeal  to  scientific,  that  is,  publicly  'avail- 
able'  and  inspectable  facts.  The  'intuitionist'  must  counter 
thus:  'Irrational  though  this  may  seem,  the  process  of 
discovering  such  relevant  facts  must  stop  somewhere.  After 
all,  millions  and  millions  of  years  ago  nobody  (presumably) 
was  responsible  for  his  actions  in  the  sense  that  he  could 
legitimately  be  held  to  account  for  them,  since  there  were 
no  persons.  Persons  must  have  'emerged'  from  non-personal 
beings  and  'responsibility'  must  have  emerged  with  them. 
This  must  have  been  a  gradual  process  and  one  which  is  admi- 
ttedly,  very  hard  to  understand.  But  responsibility  does 
exist.  I:,  am  responsible  for  what  I  do.  And  it  is  an  emi- 
nently  responsible  assumption  that  most  other  people  I  meet 
are  also.  The  intuitionist's  trump  card,  his  certain  know- 
ledge  of  responsibility  in  his  own  case  (which  is  certainly 
compatible  with  his  inability  to  give  a  complete  analysis 
of  it),  is,  unfortunately  for  him,  private  and,  though 378 
'empirical',  'unscientific'.  He  has  to  rely  on  the  honesty 
and  commonsense  of  other  philosophers  in  acknowledging  their 
own  responsibility  also. 
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we  must  also  add  this  to  the  intuitionist's  case.  It 
is  good  that  people  should  accept  responsibility  for  what 
they  do.  The  readiness  to  do  so  is  part  of  what  we  mean 
when  we  talk  of  human  dignity.  Also  although  we  may  not  be 
able  to  say  exactly  what  we  mean  when  we  talk  of  'accepting 
responsibility',  we  all  know  in  a  rough  and  ready  way  what 
it  is.  Among  other  things,  certainly  we  mean  that  we  can  be 
appropriately  blamed  or  punished  for  what  we  do  wrong,  and 
praised  or  rewarded  or  thanked  for  what  we  do  that  is  good, 
or  at  any  rate  especially  good.  But  we  can  only  accept 
responsibility  for  what  we  do  and  not  relapse  into  the  con- 
dition  of  passive  victims  of  events  if  we  live  in  a  climate 
that  is  conducive  to  such  a  way  of  looking  at  things  (see 
the  example  above).  Indeed,  unless  children  were  educated 
in  such  an  atmosphere,  it  is  doubtful  if  they  ever  would 
be  able  to  regard  things  like  this.  They  have  to  be  treated 
as  responsible,  or  to  be  treated  as  a  little  more  responsible 
than  they  actually  are,  in  order  that  they  should  be  able 
to  advance  as  far  as  they  can  towards  full  responsibility. 
It  is  thus  essential  for  a  society  which  values  human  dignity 
(and  what  society  can  not,  at  least  to  some  extent?  )  to  en- 
courage  everyone  to  take  responsibility,  even  when  we  may 
sometimes  feel  in  the  given  case  a  great  reluctance  to  blame 3  79 
or  condemn,  Life  itself  seems  sometimes  unfair  to  people. 
But,  as  we  have  seen,  certain  expectations  must  be  held 
and  met  if  society  is  to  hold  together;  one  of  the  ma'jog 
things  we  must  assume  of  each  other  is  that,  except  in  cer- 
tain  well-known  sorts  of  cases,  people  are  responsible  for 
their  behaviour. 
On  the  other  hand  we  have  the  humanitarian  claim.  In 
feeling  sorry  for  certain  vccu,  3ed  or  convicted  persons  we 
respond  to  a  claim  that  is  genuinely  moral.  many  people  in 
such  a  position  are  entitled  to.  öur  compassion  and  sympathy. 
And  in  a  'Welfare  State',  where  people  rightly  come  to  ex- 
pect  that  some  of  the  burden  of  living  will  be  lifted  from 
their  shoulders,  it  becomes,  perhaps,  increasingly  hard 
to  bear  the  burden  of  responsibility  too.  In  its  wholly 
admirable  concern  to  lay  the  foundations  generally  necessary 
for  human  dignity  (though  human  dignity  can  and--does'  exist 
elsewhere  without  this  help)  by  trying  to  ensure  that  every- 
one  is  fed,  housed,  tended  in  sickness  and  old  age  etc.,  a 
society  such  as  this  perhaps  inevitably  draws  attention  away 
from  human  dignity  onto  these  desirable  but  still  lowly 
foundations  for  it.  It  is  thus  made  considerably  harder 
for  those  who  find  it  extremely  difficult  to  avoid  tempta- 
tion,  or  to  exercise  self-control,  to  do  so,  and  correspond- 
ingly  easier  to  convince  others  -  and,  indeed,  oneself  -  that 
one  could  not  help  doing  what  one  did;  the  way  is  thus  open 
for  construing  many  cases  of  moral  weakness,  or  even  cunningly 
disguised  viciousness,  in  cases,  of  'diminished  responsibility', 380 
or  insanity.  But  it  is  necessary  to  face  what  one  is  doing 
in  thus  exonerating  people.  One  is  making  it  much  more 
difficult  for  them,  and  indirectly,  everyone,  ever  to  accept 
full  responsibility  for  their  actions,  or  certain  of  their 
actions,  in  future.  And  thus  it  is,  perhaps,  a  short-term 
humanitarianism  after  all,  or  rather  a  humanitarianism 
that  is  inspired  by  certain  (more  material)  values  than  by 
others  (which  are  more  directly  moral  and  spiritual). 
However,  we  should  not  forget,  in  addition',  that  the 
humanitarianism  or  benevolence  which  is  tending  to  incline 
public  opinion  in  the  direction  of  enlarging  the  area  where 
responsibility  is  thought  to  be  diminished  is  also  inspired 
by  compassion  or  concern  for  society  in  abstracto.  Now 
that  the  death  penalty  is  abolished,  society  is  faced  with 
the  problems  of  what  to  do  with  obviously  dangerous  criminals 
whom  no  longer  prison  sentence  (short  of  a  near-life  or  actual 
life  term)  is  statistically  likely  to  reform.  There  is  a 
great  temptation  to  treat  such  men,  instead  of  punishing 
them,  to  protect  society,  that  is,  to  deal  with  them  in  such 
a  way  that  their  putative  status  of  autonomous,  if  immoral, 
human  beings  is  disregarded.  Certainly  society  needs  to  be 
protected.  But  from  what?  Surely  not  only  from  being  raped, 
assaulted  or  killed,  dreadful  as  these  things  are,  in  the 
persons  of  its  members.  Society  also  needs  to  be  protected 
from  its  own  dissolution  and  decay.  For  the  tendency  to 
treat  rather  than  punish  is  necessarily  bound  up  with  tenden- 
cy  to  diminish  the  sense  of  responsibility  of:  all  the  mem- 
bers  of  society,  without  which  society  cannot  long  exist. 
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If  we  take  'the  protection  of  society'  as  a  legitimate  mason 381 
for  treating  rather  than  punishing,  we  do,  just  as  in  the 
matter  of  the  'welfare'  of  the  individual,  try  to  promote 
an  end  by  means  of  a  kind  of  action,  which,  if  used  beyond 
a  certain  limit,  must  be  counter-productive. 
The  question  of  'treatment'  as  an  alternative  to  'punish- 
ment'  is  thus  intimately  linked  with  the  question  of  'res- 
ponsibility',  which  is  in  turn  essentially  bound  up  with  a 
major  moral  -'political  question:  'what  sort  of  people  and 
what  sort  of  society  do  we  wish  to  be?  '  'To  throw  out  the 
institution  of  punishment  altogether  and  substitute  treatment 
wholesale  would,  I  have  tried  to  show,  amount  to  a  complete 
rejection  of  the  values  of  human  dignity,  and  this  would 
bring  about  a  relapse  into  barbarism  and  chaos.  But,  much 
more  to  the  point,  so  would  a  progressive  extension  of  the 
use  of  treatment.  There  is  probably  no  point  at  which  psy- 
chologists)qua  psychologists,  will  be  prepared  to  say  "beyond 
this  point  everyone  is  responsible  for  his  actions".  All 
they  can  do  is  to  help  draw  various  lines,  which  are  alter- 
native  possible  sticking  points.  It  is  then  a  politico  - 
moral  matter  to  decide  how  far  we  should  attend  to  the  claims 
of  human  dignity  and  retributive  justice.  The  decision  is 
extremely  difficult,  but  it  seems  to  me  that  'treatment' 
detracts  from  the  dignity  of  the  human  being.  If  we  'treat' 
a  man  we  are  regarding  him  as  incapable  of  rule  awareness. NOTES  AND  REFERENCES 
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JUS`LICrý  II:  ;  ilUCf,  'I'TOi:. 1.  A  REFORMULATED  VIEW  OF  PUNISHMENT  IN  LAW 
We  begin  this  final  chapter  with  a  quotation  by  Nietzsche: 
"Punishment,  as  rendering  the  criminal  harmless 
and  incapable  of  further  injury  -  Punishment,  as 
compensation  for  the  injury  sustained  by  the  in- 
jured  party.  Punishment,  as  an  isolation  of  that 
which  disturbs  the  equilibrium,  so  as  to  prevent 
the  further  spreading  of  that  disturbance.  -  Pu- 
nishment  as  a  means  of  inspiring  fear  of  those 
who  determine  and  execute  the  punishment.  -  Pu- 
nishment  as  a  kind  of  compensation  for  advantages 
which  the  wrong-doer  has  up  to  that  time  enjoyed 
(for  example,  when  he  is  utilized  as  a  slave  in 
the  mines).  Punishment,  as  the  elimination  of  an 
element  of  decay  (sometimes  of  a  whole  branch,  as 
according  to  the  Chinese  laws,  consequently  as  a 
means  to  the  purification  of  the  race,  or  the 
preservation  of  a  social  type).  -  Punishment  as  a 
festival,  as  the  violent  oppression  and  humilia- 
tion  of  an  enemy  that  has  at  least  been  subdued. 
-  Punishment  as  a  mnemonic,  whether  for  him  who 
suffers  the  punishment  -  the  so-called,  "correction", 
or  for  the  witnesses  of  its  administration.  Punish- 
ment,  as  the  paymeht  of  a  fee  stipulated  by  the 
power  which  protects  the  evil-doer  from  the  excesses 
of  revenge.  Punishment  as  a  compromise  with  the 
natural  phenomenon  of  revenge,  in  so  far  as  reven- 
ge  is  still  maintained  and  claimed  as  a  privilege 
by  the  stronger  races.  Punishment  as  a  declaration 
and  measure  of  war  against  an  enemy  of  peace,  of 
law,  of  order,  of  authority,  who  is  fought  by  so- 
ciety  with  the  weapons  which  war  provides,  as  a 
spirit  dangerous  to  the  community,  as  a  breaker  of 
the  contract  on  which  the  community  is  based,  as 
a  rebel,  as  a  traitor,  and  a  breaker  of  the  peace.  " 
In  the  above  passage  Nietzsche  attempts  to  provide  an  ironic 
summary  of  the  multitudinous  functions  assigned  to  punishment 
at  one  time  or  another.  Debates  on  the  theories  of  punish- 
ment  tend  to  be  confused  by  the  way  associated  images  of 
dire  penalties  swim  into  the  minds  of  some  of  the  debators. 
Dark  shadows  of  hangings,  electrocutions,  firing  squads 
assorted  floggings  of  children,  and  sundry  mutilations  take 
over  the  field  and  help  win  the  day  for  anti-punishment 
sentiment. 
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act  instead  of  the  'trusting'  bolinf  that  oooei  rr  cm.  W' 
it.  For  it  must  not  be!  forgottc,  n  that  punisi'im  n  i-  ',  ýý.,,  ca1v 
ý,.  Causlnr 
iýll  to  'il]{  r;  -r"  It  d  C'Cinit,,  '1;!  co  I'1:  ýý, 
t 
, gr-,,  in  to  SU'ýý:  i  t  to  L-h  -ý  c?  rý;  aný;.,  ý  or  .  -oraý  th 
ý'.  ýa.  ý  '  ,"  ln,  tl 
to  contr,:  rýirt  ý,  -  c}-u,  rish,  'd  in'--icht  --Im- 
c71111ot  f  ul  iiviný  I+-  is  11výnl>liný 
1ii  nit:  -  . 
d,  I-  O'"  -,  . 
Our 
ý:..  -r  ýr  ý.  ýi, 
ýýss  in  ý3,  nothýýr  ;  c»;,  (:  j  V  ,  ý, 
rn  ý  C'  ý 
on-,  wc-.  do  not  find  this  oa',  ý,,  1  >  vc,  ca',  '.  ]  r-,, 
rt'  to  t°  ;  ti.  {:  o 
r,  _,  c  rý,  i)i,  in  iýr;,  c.  t  y, 
.; 
zr>tion  thý. 
'1  /  'ý'ý.  Y,  i 
ý 
i,  ""  )f?  ,  1L  'L 
'fý  Ci:  ýTJ  _i  ýil  ý 
t;; 394 
th^ 
dock  bý3,  rOrt  Uz.  ý  tllOrOU,:  j})il/  ('"";  "'rV°:  t., 
-: 
s-  ntý.  nc:  t!  lc  y'  h,  )v.  s  JUL  :; 
1jý  a"rl  ý7ivt'Tl.  '"°ni: 
may  accompany  our  confrontation  "with  moral  ^vil  ýr,  inju:,  tic 
olý  all  dc.  C,  rf'es  of  s4^riousnF  ss. 
Thoucjh  wý  may  yct  w(-ý11  bc°  incline-ca  to  <1n:;  vr,  ýr  ih-n  <wt^ 
jud(-.;  lTt-c)t  is  challenqed  cis  though  ".  )-u,,  u-so  h-  c3-^s"ýrw's  it' 
vý,  -ýr^  an  indep,  -.  ndont  rFýc,  son  for  pianishin-;,  to 
to  desert  in  such  contnxts  i9  in  th,  lonc7  run  to  (?  c)  lii:  tl,  - 
more  than  draw  attention  to  tht"  výýlufýs  on  f  eels  an'  :ý  "l. 
compell--,  ýd  to  r<_,  sponcz  to  or  help  to  ju:.  ti  fy,  t11e  pr  c,  t-ic  ý 
-  whatever  they  may  b"., 
9 
There  is  t?  iu:,  a  t,  ýnt'cnc,  / 
in  truth  perhaps  unanal)ýsable  idea 
0 
to  be  fill  ýc.  "'It!,  on,,  1:  3 
fý,.  voured  justiFic,:  töry  contcnt  -  thou(jh  Lwiny  is  .,  ur  "1"ý 
right  when  h, 
--,  says11  that  thý-:  rn.  =,  _ýninr~  of  i:  ý  (Oz  r'tl  'L  Li 
if  referreýnc--,  to  cons,  Akjuencr,  s  is  introduce-ý6  into  ýa  ",  iý. 
Atkinson's  'utilitari.,  n'  dcse%rt  seems  d  conf.  r.  lclict:  i 
-ln 
in 
t  , 4rrrs  o 
12 
It  i!  ^  r`fýýs  to  be!  punishýd  l,  on  the!  oiý}i=^"r  1a.  ýn:  1,  ý_io,  _.  s, 
not  rn:  aýýn  t;:  ýr:  s  ,  mo  as  "taking  eve-rythina  into  consic:  ',  r-,  ti.,  ) 
nF°c,  . ý:  ><aý  ily  hL-  ouc;  ht  to  bý  punish-.  d".  That  is,  it  is  not 
final  jtac'<-;  em:  =nt  of  fittinqne^ss,  or  of  what  aur,  lit  ii-r-  tncl 
now  to  b,.  _"  dono_..  ',  Je  can,  for  cxanplc',  c,  '.  rt-,  in 
ruthlý  ss  prop"_,  rty-dcivc-loplýr  whose,  unscrupu7.  ouL: 
"  iI  i.  i 
i)ýýii1ý" 
,:  > 
rv3thods  arcý  just  beyond  thr:  rt.  -tcIn  c>F  Lheý  1,;,,  j2 
dfýs(,  rv-s  to  punishod".  ,  J,  car)  n  on 
th.,  ý  nt  1i- 
ruinýtid  hif7,  busin_ss  riv-,  1  out 2,9J 
that  in  another  s,  nse  hc-  did  not,  sincc  };.,  ý.  <<.  as  not  w.;  rn-]  of 
thr,  >  likr-ly  consý:  e-_u,  mcr:  s  of  his  ztction,  th-rt!  no 
consist^'ncy  in  his  'puni-,  hm,  "nt'.  App-,  ls  to  in 
the  c;  c-ný,  ral  sphcr,  -ý  of  tntributiv-  re-sponsc-  to  in  jýary,  in- 
justice  and  crime  seem  thus  to  hf￿  capp(>als  to  soma-  asp_ct  of 
justice  that  h,  --,  s  an  important  h,,  <<r_inc7  on  th-  just.  l.  r.  L  tio 
or  ot  hý-r  w  i.  ý  c-,  of  what  is  do  n_  -. 
.  'ti 
!' 
,  1_ý  ý'.  ).  UýL'  LI';  'y  t:  i", 
ý.  _ 
L:, 
.  ý»  mi_t1ý  ý_">  i_'ý.  rl  ý_:  '  ,,  "  ZJ  ý'  j  'f= 
I 
((1a1  thu:.  >  sot(citil!  Iý'3  r1t''_jin  n'"1  11k-  j_r,  i  co: 
and  thorouc-Yhly  just  that  h_ 
cl  lirns  will.  'or  th  'k-" 
pointin:,  to 
L:  int  ino  r  j,, 
did  not  ot-',, 
f  ý, 
ý 
i 
....,  '.  i., 
)r-  - 
ý  sý:  rv  hi:, 
Jr  to 
L  1'. 
,I. 
r- r  1-1 
'i  0  1!  l.  W 
lfliltil:  ý  Ill"l  nt,  1ý:.  Cl("  itl 
11.  y  (jui_lty  r.  iin(-:.  It 
1, 
ý:  ö 
t:  fliU:;  t:  L<',,  (;  ý  ',  ýi.  Lion.  The  qu^'stJ.  on  dI)c)ut  U;  U1"":  i  1'1'  I. 
) 
r'.  trihutiv 
_wtt,  'rs  r1te.  `  cýncarn-cl,  i: 
_ 
,  c<="'y  to  UP.  C,  U'  :  ',  tinn  bout  t';  d`Ll::  n<1s  of  U.,  hia 
. 
unly  i:  .:  ii,,  Y;  ;  _tt1ýd 
dos  t11-  qu-.;  t  inn  o7  mor__,  I  noi_It. 
r'_.  l.  -_V,  _lnt-.  Thus  of 
n  just  i?  '"'ý`t7  s-nt4.  --nc-'C7 
LJ 
,  term  of 
r--ý,.:  son  for  ti]  nI  c)V  L- 
,.  ]i:  ý.  i'..  Gv,  "  Lt:  1.  '" 
l  Vorious  claims  or  jU.  ftl', 
_  Jtr. 
Wlr  Jr  '!  '; 
; 
ti-,  Mon  to 
_,. 
'  Gic}rC1l  &L  t  Of  IKF 
th  .  att,  ntiC:  r  on  himi  ýthar  t?.  3n  wn  LI;  brought 
C1  ýCiLIt. 
Thus  'ý.  &. 
., 
`a.  'V_;.  i  iL'  hn  "itl,,  rý-  j'"t'  .  ä':. 
.  :A.. 39(-) 
about  it  which  tjusticr"  dt>rýancis  it'  do,  -.:.,  nc,  t  hcIv-, 
appeal  to  jtasl:  icc°  includes  an  implicit  r,  -f,  -,  _r, 
to 
o  of  affairs  xrcucýht  about  by  the  state  th-  man  (whi-ch  could 
equally  vrýýll  h-ive  bc-:  c.  n  brou(jht  ahout  by  an  irrrhecil-,  or 
an  act  of  God  );  the  appýal  to  dc-s_ýrt,  on  the  otlýrý,  r  i 
draws  attention  primarily  (  thouch  not  ,  ýxý  lusi.  vf  l;  )  to  t-I, 
moral  evil  in  the  rnan':;  mind,. 
The  fact,  how(,  výýr,  r6"m,  Lýin;  ý  th,.  t 
not  absolv^  us  from  h,  zvin,!  to  cornf'I-nt  t;  ).  - 
rent  '  '):,  u'_'ýýi.  t.,  t:  lon"  ;  1nr'  C1f>?  Y  l; 
ltC?  Li1J_`,  "'`hach 
!  1:  '.,  1I  L()  I:  I1.  ý  i"  ,  1! 
- 
'flieht'  iroýýý  'Rý-ýtri?  7ýx;,  ivi.  sýn'  in  Liýýý  lýa:.,  L  cý  ntur,  ý 
i]  fltý 
half.  Not  only  this;  to  t+),.  :  >oý  ý.  r.  hi- 
o'Sor,,  have  profe  ,  s6c.  }  to  b  coin,  >1:  ýý:  °1  s,,,  -  in  rLri- 
butivism  any  kind  of  justification  at  all,  or  to  thE°  int-r- 
pretation  of  retributivism  in  tcrms  of  extrinsic  pG+.  'F,,  o:  >￿ 
it  is,  of  course,  obvious  that  if  one's  notion  cl  +tl.  - 
f.  ic<ition  is  confined  to  tho  production  of 
rý-  ýsons  On"  will  comý  to  such  a  conclusion.  '1'h-  only 
to  rrsist  thr-,  m  is  to  insist  on  a  far  more,  faithful  moral 
pheno:  nrn®logy  utilitarian-inspired  school  of  thought 
provided  as  with.  hivý"  to  rý"co(;  nis:  _ 
th,  ýt  th:,  ý",:  c-t.;  r;. 
rnori  lity  ro  si,  ný,  ýIy  'criv^ýn';  it  i,  ý  not  cr:.  t±r  of  t.  r:  /  iir,  ' 
to  ir￿posL  on  t  whý  ýaoul.,  f  lit  it  to  c()nt  in. 
oi=  th  :  tr'_ilit,,  riý,  r;  -  cnn.,  u  _nti 
ii`,  ý  ý  +"lr: 
317:  'C1i11i',  ý  C;  1ý  r  11ý  til_  nl"li'ý"'r  s)ý  ý:  ýý  ný]I11  ýýil'1-  ný: 
innoc:  nto  Ir:  ^r  i+.  V 
f_  son  ;  tror.  oý  ý  to 
_ ýcý 
on  thc=^  ide,  ý  by  utilit,  -ir:  i_  ýn  or  t;  i7.  o-  I 
. soph-rs  it  c,  -'n  sur.  <llv  not  I-D,  -  rac:  niý-,  c+  thrrt,  on  occaSion,  st.  cýlý 
an  action  mi(jht  '  just,, 
_fi,  -id'  on  utilit,  arian  c-roun.  '{,, 
ad,,;,,  itte--,  d1y  not  j,  utilit-,.  ri-n,  cýýr#.  ý,:.  nll  tý7ota"}ýt  ýo. 
c>tzt,  s  ui  t:  _  cat_  (-oric.  ýiiv  ti;  t.  t  in  :  ýr;  týý.,  t 
20.:  ':.  2 
,  ýrir.,  _  facia  1itý,  f.  o  rýsrýct  thý,  z:  'ir;  hts  of  lil  ivu  ý1.. 
ov_arride-,  n  by  it  s  prii;  ýý,  fý_Ici-.  riutý,  ý  o,  nnýu1  t.  in,. 
r1  '  puni  shin,:  '  an  innocent  man  "'th.  at  th,  °  ý￿￿hol:,  n.  ý  ti--Al 
not". 
13 
Tcd  fiond,  ýýrioh,  too,  whos-  util,  lt;  7!  r_  iclnism  i,.  n1oýri  ý? 
- 
ýýy  t.  h-  introc'uction  of  cin  inc:,  -p,!  nü.  nL  principl  ý  ýu 
can  anvisaac-  circumst,  nces  in  which  -  'victimi::  at_ion' 
'punishment  of  the  innoc  ^ntl  man  -  would  be  th  --  'r  at  ýd  fib  to 
do  under  the  circumst  inces.  It  :;  oems  to  rn,  n,  on  the  contr:,  r;  ' 
that  there  must  be  something  wrong  with  a  theory  which 
lead  to  such  a  conclusion.  One  might  well  almost  put  i'_ 
strongly  as  this  -  that  if  there  is  anything;  it  all  of 
one  can  be  certain  it  is  that  punishine.  i  the  in,  aaocý,  ntt  is 
always  wrong,  One  does  not  have  in  makin￿  t}ii  i;  )11  I  is 
deni  71,  also  have  to  deny  that  many 
'qon  d  cl7nsT  ''u  nc  n 
mic,  ht  he  ý:  chiov.  ýd  ýy  it.  Song,  mad  d  ct,:  ztur  I,  iabt  he  thor 
induced  to  spare  i  v.  hole,  society  from  Stoi:  iic  (.  1-; i-. ruction 
and  indeed,  if  knowlredae  of  the  ri￿ttot'  WQ-M'  coiiFin  CIA  to  thhl.. 
officials  reesponsibl.:  for  th  ,  deeception,  hundr-",  ýs  of  nd:, 
perhaps 
mi 
_ 
ions,  of  p°''ep  Inioht  ),  col;  ;'!  uaLl  1'  s'vH,  reo 
CIS'  :  th  or 
hý  t  __bl  ,  Llý_ 
_rlt")c? 
j  ui  torIOC  at  o  Lh'  'cisi  ý.  ' 39(3 
of  thr--ir  happinnss.  verth-le#ss  th-  olici,  l  ;  -,  Ar  fion  i'  A- 
for  the  injustice  would  if  they  ware  rnordlly  'alive'  n,  'v---r 
shake  off  th,  -.  conviction  that  thy  had  don:  -  vwr.  onr  in  th  "i  r 
condemnation  o,  '  the  innocent  min.  As  we,  havr,  z1r{-,  icly,  dis- 
cussed  the  problems  involvine  tha  punishing  (of  th  -  in-inoc-11L 
c>1s  whe=re  in  this  work  that  matter  will  not  `),  3  pur  Ui. 
ý;  je-  must  now  turn  to  what  has  been  c,  -.  l.  1  -di 
tion  of  issues'  thesiss.  This  th"or',  ',  in  it-s  v,  'riciuý, 
i-'r'ms 
is  an  attempt  to  combine  what  area  usually  rý'.  e  ri'.  ý  s  th.  a 
'strengths'  of  the  utilitarian  and  r,:  atributivirt 
to  punishm  nt,  whil,  '  ignori_nca  th  'jr  e  akn.,  ss.  Th  ° 
of  r,  ýtributivisra  has  always  b,  -,.,  n  aWi  d(-tF  d  tr,  b°  Hi  t,  in 
its  insistaanc"  on  what  is  ￿on  to  `-,  h,  crir  in 
. 
1,  it  h-f'! 
always  rul,:!  d  oiitti:.  punisilrwýnt  c?  l.  h  i;  nocf  nt.  , 
ýV  'll  1]+;  ' 
- 
litarians  who  have  acc-nte-d  th.  at  solfý  r  li  ný  ý  or', 
principles  does  entail  the  l(:!  gitimaey  of  thi  ,,  - 
practict,  hýýv-  donc,  so  with  great  rcluctance, 
e;  r"°"at  many  i_nc;  rnious  aLt(7rnpts  to  show  ýioc.  ' 
ýIC.  that  th, 
_' 
c.  llculi_ýtion  woLllG 
i,  inctic?  n  such  ￿'ýL. 
`ýý. 
__. 
i.:  "  L1oL` 
than  very  o=.  sionally,  i_;:  at  ￿il.  `l'li  °  "<,  f-,  ýai;  nc--:;:;  () 
butivism  is  cl  _;  ýrly  wh,  ýt  u:.  shall  c,  -Il  it,  :ý 
_  r.  i 
V 
7 
zppart_nt  irrationrlityo  It  i:,  Lh'-r.  for  - 
to  -ývad-  th  a  a'?  surdity  ':  y  proviclinr,  i_', 
punishm-nt  ,  jith  a  ju;  ý  `i- 
Li' 
nc,  ra11  '  deýc  rr,  nc￿  º  ,n;  ýl:  c:  ý,  u  -i 
2 
_..;  t 
ý  i-ý 
,,  ý ý 
-ý  - 
tribution'  by  th-  sr  ion  th_'  A'ý  U  '!  I  L,, 
}J"_  punish-d  1:  >  a 
cUitlp1, 
_t,  ly  distinct.  ;  il  :;  '+  1iir1  1("l0;  -,  e  C 
has  to  b`.  justifiod  :  aV  app'--o1 
to  quit-  '1Yj  'L'  "!  1t  co;,.  _i., 
l"  t;  j-.  `li`  . 
'rhcý  ý-,  u  :  stion  to  raise  how;  vor,  i:;,  !  .. 
cauostions  bo  se:  parateca  for  tt-itb  puzr>o"  ...  . >>  j  u.,  tiii.  c  ,  '. 
_ior, 
: 
It  1S  not  r°`'c::  y  to  Ü1sr'flta11U].  '_  ',:  }l  '  1iýr_ý  C)t13  --'1  V.  11 
ý 
?  11rt.  In  his  ý7r_',  ]f!  J1h_`  he  SU;,  C,  ''  ti?  ("U 
iL  lt 
(m.  ti,  -ninq  1959)  discussion  is  coni-u,,,  ^<?.  ý'ýý  z-  i  :,,  ()  t' 
qf_nz_r  Z1  lack  o?  1C1Cis1VC,  1'1C*ss  rind  C1«1'1_'_,  " 
It,  tý  pit' 
b,: 
it,  -_'  and,  in  particular,  "somr'  pcsi$ 
L 
nt.  Hri  v 
ovor-sicplification  of  mul  tipl.  ý  iss,  u  :  F;  .  Ilhich  r 
consideration"0  should  not  try  '_o  r  pl  c_ 
value  or  aim  (ý  't  rrerrcR  ,  tze.  -tri?:  bution,  ^forr,  i,  c)r  týl'  :,,.,  ° 
$1 
by  "a  plurality  of  diffcr-°ýnt  vt)lu.  ýs 
anS1'1C  C  to  SO(t1t'  single  qucStlOn  CC)I1CC'Cil.  l.  li(ý  ui 
of  punishm:  2nto  What  is  nc^c^ýýýýt]  is  th  ,  i*(,,  )li;,,  _ttivrl  th"ýý 
diffýr.  (-nt  principles  (e.  ý:  ch  af  which  mýý;;  jr 
a'  justicationt)  are  rc-lcw,,  nt  at  cjiff,  r.  -ni..  ,;  oinL:;  i.,  Itzy 
morally  acceptable  account  of  punishrti,  nt.  f, 
The  answ<ýr  seems  to  be  that  ju:,  L  is  no  one  Cic,,  torý 
principl'°.  '  frOrr  which  answers 
to  U  ^ý  I_lcätl  :  ,  ý)oLlt 
distribution  and  amount  fliray  b,  o  lt  ý,  ý110 
iý  wo  can  s-  i  o,  L-  h,  t  th  x  r,.  --  "j-  c<-.  n  I11.  ',  311nr 
,  t1-iat  th  >  >.,  >su  s  n_  ca  to  >,  _  can  :  ýz  1 
(ýF1rt  1S  Cý.  Ctýý11ý11'  rlý"!  i'' 
r_'.  L 
ý_  1C,  '  ;  ýý 
I7 
to  do-riv 
.  mcr:  11ý1ý 
, 
cCc  j_ýt  Ä'ý1  r,  s  ±,;  lI  ii,  r  . 
i. 400 
from  on.:  principle.  LVen  ii:,  in  con  sir,  tt".  ncy  uwit!  ý  our  ;  -irt-- 
cipla  of  utility,  did  s  ;  r!  ction  ':  h:,  punishm,,  n!  -  -f  ,  11-1 
innocfcnt  mtin,  I;  art  fir'<"IU  S,  t  we"  should  I--  Curl  :7  on  'o 
sing,  tho  lx'ssor  of  two  evils  and  Lhi-  would  be  inxp1icoUU1- 
if  the  principle  sacrificed  to  utili  cy  trt  r_:  itsli  c}n'  ,' 
rc^e,,  uiremcnt  of  utility.  "15  ;  3ut  h:  -  CJoc°s  on  thus: 
the  moral  importance  of  thy:  restriction  of  duni.  `  }t!!  nt  1=o  La 
offender  cannot  %)t'  expiaa.;  n  rl  rt`ell'  con:  i''C1u  t:  t"'  J  to 
principle  that  th_  General  Justifyinc  Alm  is  t  tril_;  uticýr 
for  immorality  involved  in  ]:  breaking]  the, 
in  th-  Distribution  of  punishment  a  v,  alu,  '  :  suite  in'  - 
po:  "ndent  of  Retribution  as  Justifvinee  Ain.  This,  is  shown 
by  the  fact  that  ,  dc  attach  importance  to  t},  r,  r-rtrictivt. 
principle  that  only  offend-r,  should  1ý  punished  °,  v,  n 
breach  of  this  law  rnirjht  not  be  thouqht  immoral;  indf  -y 
even  where  the  laws  themselves  are  hideously  imn.  oraal 
Nazi  Germany  e.  g.  forbidding  activities  (heelping  th^  sick 
or  destitute  of  some  racial  group)  which  might  be  thought 
morally  obliciatory,  the  absence  of  the  principle  reestrictin 
punishment  1o  the  offender  would  be  a  further  s2-cial  ini- 
quity;  whereas  admission  of  this  principle  would  r°prý:.,,  r;  t 
som  residual  respect  for  justice  thoujh  in  th,  rnii.  rli:  >t_r?  - 
tion  or  morally  "bad  laws".  As  far  as  I  c<i:!  ant'''r:,  tclnd  til'. 
passage  (is  theere  a  misprint  for  'the'  in 
of  the  law"?  Otherwise  it  is  not  clr',  ar  in 
rr.,  fr>rr-d  to)￿  I  think  howc_vrýr  t`ý,;  t  it  t;  -rm;  s  is  Follc)ý-: 
its(,  lf  is  unjust  thi-it  h,  v  ,  ,  m;,  ý  J` 
lcý1Ws),  th0ý,  -_`  punisi-i'=--(') 
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(fully)  deserve  their  punishment;  their  punishment  is  (to  a 
considerable  extent)  unjust.  But  they  would  deserve  it  even 
less,  their'punishment  would  be  even  more  unjust,  if  they 
had  not  actually  broken  the  laws  in  question.  Certainly 
we  may  agree  that  different  principles  are  appealed  to  in 
the  matter  of  justifying  a  punishment  but  they  are  still 
all  principles  of  distributive  justice.  It  is  not  certain 
that  Hart  has  proved  his  case  at  all  where  retributivism 
is  called  into  play. 
The  same  problem  arises  where  he  considers  the  question 
of  the  amount  of  punishment,  paying  particular  and  detailed 
attention  to  the  matters  of  'justified'  crime,  excuses  and 
mitigation.  Where  the  latter  two  are  concerned,  he  argues 
convincingly  that  our  intuitively  acceptable  practices  cannot 
receive  their  rationale  from  a  utilitarian  'General  Aim'. 
But  his  attempt  to  show  that  retributivists  are  in  the  same 
case  amounts  to  this:  Retributionists  (in  General  Aim)  have 
not  paid  much  attention  to  the  rationale  of  this  aspect  of 
punishment;  they  have  usually  (wrongly)  assumed  that  it  has 
no  status  except  as  a  corollary  of  Retribution  in  "General 
Aim". 
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This  is  all  we  hear  about  the  retributivist  case. 
Yet  it  is  clear,  that  the  heart  of  retributivism  is  its 
response  to  the  various  demands  of  justice.  Hart  himself 
goes  on  to  argue  that  excuses  excuse,  and  pleas  of  mitiga- 
tion  mitigate,  as  a  matter  of  justice;  and  though  he  says 
that  'justified'  crime  is  not  punished  because  the  policy  or 
aims  which  in  general  justify  the  punishment  of  killing 
(e.  g.  protection  of  life)  do  not  include  cases  such  as  this, 
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it  is  absolutely  obvious  that  it  would  be,  on  balance,  unjust 
to  punish  under  such  circumstances.  Where  the  normal  or 
standard  punishment  for  an  offence  committed  under  no  special 
justifying,  excusing  or  mitigating  circumstances  is  concerned 
Hartti  states  that  "the  amount  or  severity  of  punishment  is 
primarily  to  be  determined  by  reference  to  the  General  Aim.  "18 
-  that  is,  the  public  good.  He  also  gives19  one  or  two 
examples  of  how  we  are  to  understand  this:  "A 
utilitarian  will, 
for  example,  exclude  in  principle  punishments  the  infliction 
of  which  is  held  to  cause  more  suffering  from  the  offence 
unchecked,  and  will  hold  that  if  one  kind  of  crime  causes 
greater  suffering  than  another  then  a  greater  penalty  may  be 
used  to  repress  it.  He  will  also  exclude  degrees  of  severity 
which  are  useless  in  the  sense  that  they  do  no  more  to  secure 
or  maintain  a  higher  level  of  law-observance  or  any  other 
valued  result  than  less  severe  penalties.  "  But  of  course 
the  two  principles  referred  to  in  the  first  sentence,  in  so 
far  as  I  understand  them,  almost  certainly  yield  practical  re- 
sults  which  are  also  yielded  by  the  retributivist  principle 
of  equality,  the  (symbolic)  Lex  Talionis.  This  indedd  is 
invoked,  though  not  as  such  named,  by  Professor  Hart  himself 
as  a  principle  of  justice  which  must  qualify  the  pursuit  of 
our  (that  is,  Hart's)  "General  Aim,  " 
20 
In  case  we  should 
think  that  he  is  invoking  the  Lex  Talionis  he  says  that  the 
reason  why  we  think  that  "Long  sentences  of  imprisonment" 
would  not  be  legitimately  (i.  e.  Justly)  employed  to  "stamp 
out  car  parking  offences"  even  though  they  might  achieve 403 
this  end  is  "not  because  there  is  for  each  crime  a  penalty 
"naturally"  fitted  to  its  degree  of  iniquity  (as  some  Re- 
tributionists  in  General  Aim  might  think)";  rather  "the 
guiding  principle  is  that  of  a  proportion  within  a  system 
of  penalties  between  those  imposed  for  different  offences 
where  these  have  a  distinct  place  in  a  common-sense  scale 
of  gravity.  " 
The  further  principle  of  justice  which  Hart  says  must 
be  taken  as  limiting  the  pursuit  of  a  utilitarian  General 
Aim  is  that  of  consistency.  Any  breach  of  this  would, 
Hart  rightly  says,  involved  "some  sacrifice  of  justice  to 
the  safety  of  society.  "21  If  we  look  back  now  to  that  part 
of  a  sentencing  policy  which,  Hart  claims,  is  justified  by 
the  utilitarian  general  Aim  -  the  principle  that  "degrees 
of  severity"  are  to  be  excluded  "which  are  useless  in  the 
sense  that  they  do  no  more  to  secure  of  maintain  a  higher 
level  of  law-observance  or  any  other  valued  result  than 
less  severe  penalties"  -  it  should  now  be  apparent  that  the 
two  principles  of  Justice  which  Hart  cites  as  limiting  the 
pursuit  of  utilitarian  aims  give  very  little  scope  for  the 
application  of  the  principle.  Any  great  reduction  in  the 
severity  of  the  punishment  for  a  very  serious  crime  would 
be  unjust  even  if  it  turned  out  that  the  'deterrence  rate' 
was  the  same  as  before,  as  this  would  either  be  unfair  to 
those  previously  punished  under  the  law,  or  to  those  who 
continue  to  be  punished  for  offences  of  similar  gravity  or 
else  be  a  matter  of  "confusing  common  morality  or  (of)  flout- 
ing  it  and  bringing  the  law  into  contempt.  "22 404 
The  refusal  of  Professor  Hart  to  let  the  claims  of 
justice  be  swallowed  up  by  UtLlitarian  principles  also  emerges 
most  strikingly  in  his  mention  of  three  further  principles 
which  many  people,  he  rightly  claims,  believe  in,  but  which 
may,  he  warns,  have  to  be  considered  "in  the  light  of  modern 
scepticism.  "23  First,  there  is  the  idea"that  the  suffering 
involved  in  punishment  is  a  return  for  the  harm  done  to 
others:  this  is  valued,  not  as  the  aim  of  punishment,  but 
as  the  only  fair  terms  on  which  the  General  Aim  (protection 
of  society,  maintenance  of  respect  for  law,  etc.  )  may  be 
pursued.  "  Secondly,  there  are  the  beliefs  that  a  punishment 
is  "not  merely  ...  something  useful  to  society  (General  Aim) 
but  ...  justly  extracted  from  the  criminal  as  a  return  for 
harm  done"  and  that  it  is  "a  price  justly  extracted  because 
the  criminal  had  a  fair  ppportunity  beforehand  to  avoid 
liability  to  pay.  "  Thirdly,  the  system  of  criminal  punish- 
ment  "maximizes  individual  freedom  within  the  coercive  fram- 
work  of  law.  "  Not  only  does  the  individual  have  "an  option 
between  obeying  or  paying";  the  present  system  (in  which 
the  existence  of  absolute  liability  is  only  tolerated  in 
certain  areas  of  life  which  are  themselves,  on  the  whole, 
entered  by  voluntary  choice)  gives  the  individual  the  oppor- 
tunity  freely  to  plan  his  life  in  the  knowledge  that  he  will 
not  be  inteferred  with  if  he  accomodates  himself  within 
the  law. 
One  cannot  but  wonder  why  Hart  finds  it  so  necessary  to 
refer  whenever  possible  to  the  utilitarian  "General  Aim", 405 
whose  importance  and  scope  are  so  progressively  limited 
throughout  the  essay.  One  is  indeed  left  with  the  feeling 
that  his  utilitarian  General  Aim  is  a  kind  of  shield  against 
the  apparent  absurdity  or  irrationality  which  we  cannot  help 
but  see  lying  at  the  roots  of  an  adequate  theory  of  punish- 
ment.  Indeed,  the  impression  one  gets  from  Hart's  paper, 
I  think,  is  of  the  comparative  unimportance  which  he  sees 
in  the  claims  of  utility  as  against  the  claims  of  justice. 
And  this  is  exactly  as  it  should  be.  Clearly  it  is  unques- 
tionably  right  that  the  state  should  concern  itself  with 
the  public  good.  But  this  concern  must,  if  it  is  to  be 
morally  justifiable,  only  very  occasionally  overstep  the  far 
more  urgent  and  pressing  claims  of  justice  which  themselves 
underly  the  institutionalizing  of  the  otherwise  almost  in- 
evitably  unjustly  handed  pursuit  of  the  justice  of  retribution. 
We  must  now  refer  to  the  attempt  to  'square'  retributi- 
vism  and  utilitatianism  -  that  of  John  Rawls. 
24  He  writes: 
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"Once  the  legislator  decides  to  have  laws  and  to 
assign  penalties  for  their  violation  (as  things 
are  there  must  be  both  the  law  and  the  penalty) 
an  institution  is  set  up  which  involves  a  retri- 
butive  conception  of  individual  cases,  " 
But  this  is  ridiculous  as  an  account  of  the  matter.  There  is 
a  difference  between  institutionalizing  an  ongoing  and  indeed 
'natural'  practice,  and  creating  an  institution,  like  a  game, 
along  with  a  set  of  rules  to  regulate  it.  But  the  'rules' 
of  the  institution  of  punishment  were  already  implicit  in 
the  informally  regulated  or  unregulated  practice  of  exacting 
retribution.  And,  granted  the  need  to  regulate  this  practice, 406 
to  make  it  more  just,  the  question  of  what  laws  to  have  is 
not  simply  a  matter  of  the  legislator's  free  decision  and 
calculation.  To  gain  general  acceptance  any  system  of  law 
should  'officialize'  or  'sanction'  at  least  the  content  of 
'Natural  Law'. 
The  issue  of  the  purpose  of  legislation  must  now  be 
faced.  Are  certain  actions  made  or  kept  illegal  because 
they  are  immoral,  or  are  these  things  done  to  protect  the 
public?  If  actions  have  the  status  of  crimes  purely  because 
this  protects  society  then  this  might  be  an  argument  to  su- 
pport  some  version  of  the  'separation  of  issues'  thesis 
which  would  enable  one  to  accept  the  obviously  palatable 
parts  of  retributivism  and  not  the  unpalatable.  This  issue 
has  been  well  and  thoroughly  discussed  in  what  has  been 
known  as  the  Hart-D.  vlin  controversy. 
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It  seems  to  me, 
that  Devlin's  insight  and  argument  are  in  most  respects 
superior  to  Hart's.  Devlin  shows  quite  clearly  that  the 
criminal  law  and  its  administration  in  England  presuppose 
the  general  principle  that  the  law  is  concerned  with  morals 
and  not  just  with  the  protection  of  the  public  -  though  he 
has  no  hesitation  in  accepting  the  latter  as  one  of  its  con- 
cdrns.  He  argues  firstly  that  the  law  shows  its  concern 
with  morality  in  the  matter  of  sentencing.  Though  other 
considerations  are  admitted  the  degree  of  an  offender's  moral 
guilt  is  regarded  as  a  very  important  determinant  of  the 
severity  of  the  sentence  both  "in  the  gradation  of  offences 
in  the  criminal  calendar"  and  also  "by  taking  into  account 
the  wickedness  in  the  way  the  crime  is  committed.  "27  Hart 407 
of  course,  as  we  have  seen,  admits  that  moral  considerations 
are  important  in  sentencing  but  tries  to  block  the  implications 
Devlin  sees  in  this  fact  with  the  distinction  between  the 
system  of  punishment  "whereunder  only  harmful  conduct  should 
be  punished"  and  the  quantum  of  punishment.  Devlin's  own 
reply  to  this  move,  in  agreement  with  the  position  argued 
above,  is  that  these  separate  questions  are  a  division,  made 
for  the  sake  of  convenience,  of  the  single  question  which  is 
what  justifies  the  sentence  of  punishment?  He  quite  rightly 
adds  "...  there  cannot  be  a  law  which  is  not  concerned  with 
a  man's  morals  and  yet  which  permits  him  to  be  punished  for 
his  immorality.  "28  We  may  surely  agree,  on  purely  punitive 
grounds,  that  "the  theory  that  the  law  may  not  be  used  to 
enforce  morality  as  such"  is  inconsistent  with  "the  theory 
that  punishment  under  law  may  be  adjusted  according  to  the 
moral  guilt  of  the  act  done.  "29 
Devlin's  second  argument  is  that  Hart's  theory  of  legis- 
lation  cannot  account  for  the  fact  that,  under  criminal  law 
consent  is  in  general  no  defence.  If  the  law  really  only 
existed  to  protect  the  public  then  how  could  it  be  justified 
in  punishing  a  man  who  gave  someone  else  what  he  asked  for 
(for  example,  a  lethal  injection  or  in  the  case  of  a  masochist 
a  savage  whipping)?  Hart's  answer  is  that  the  law  here  sees 
as  its  task  to  protect  the  public  in  a  paternalistic  way, 
by  preventing  adtions  which  would  be  harmful  to  people,  even 
if  desired  sub  specie  bona.  But  Devlin  here  presents  Hart 
with  a  dilemma  over  the  extent  of  such  paternalism.  A  father ;lI 
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will  not  only  be  concerned  for  the  physical,  but  also  for  the 
moral  welfare  of  his  child.  But  if  the  law  is  'paternalis- 
tic'  to  this  degree  the  principle  of  'paternalism'  becomes 
indistinguishable  from  that  of  'legal  moralism'.  in  protect- 
ing  a  man  against  corruption  you  are  willy  nilly  concerned 
with  morals.  On  the  other  hand,  if  the  state's  paternalistic 
licence  is  merely  a  matter  of  protecting  the  citizens' 
bodies,  it  is  not  clear  what  exactly  justifies  this  unless  it 
is  moral  principle:  "It  cannot  seriously  be  suggested  that, 
if  there  were  no  moral  principle  involved  (in  euthanasia), 
the  law  in  a  free  country  would  tell  a  man  when  he  was  and 
he  was  not  to  die,  obtaining  its  mandate  from  its  paternal 
interest  in  his  body  and  not  in  his  soul.  Or  that  in  eutha- 
nasia  the  crime  lies  not  in  the  moral  decision  to  seek  death 
but  purely  in  the  physical  and  no  doubt  painless  act  that 
causes  it,  "  30 
He  points  out,  too,  that  all  the  reasons  Hart 
gives  in  support  of  physical  paternalism  -  people  are  not  su- 
pposed  to  be  such  good  judges  of  their  interests  as  once 
was  thought,  their  consent  may  be  too  hasty  and  ill  considered, 
many  likely  situations  are  such  as  to  cloud  judgement,  subtle 
pressures  may  be  unknowingly  exercised,  etc.  -  apply  just  as 
strongly,  if  not  more  so,  to  questions  of  morals. 
Lord  Devlin  cites  eight  specific  crimes  which  seemed  to 
him  inconsistent  with  Hart's  thesis:  These  are  "bigamy,  cruel- 
ty  to  animals,  homosexuality,  abortion,  buggery  in  the  form 
of  bestiality,  incest,  obscenity  e.  g.  the  scale  of  pornogra- 
phy,  and  offences  connected  with  prostitution,  such  as  pimping, 409 
poacing  and  brothel-keeping  which  can  conveniently  be  cate- 
gorized  as  the  commercialization  of  vice.  "  Only  at  the 
cost  of  much  obvious  special  pleading  could  all  these,  or 
such  of  them  as  Still  remain  crimes,  as  most  of  them  do, 
be  squeezed  under  Professor  Hart's  umbrella. 
Even  if  Devlin  is  right,  as  he  surely  is,  that  the 
present  law  (at  least  of  England)  does  concern  itself  with 
morals  we  may  still  ask  whether  it  ought  to.  Certainly  if 
we  take  it  that  the  'separation  of  issues'  thesis  is  an 
artificial  contrevance  "made  for  the  sake  of  convenience", 
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the  answer  is  plainly  'Yes'.  It  would  be  quite  unjust  for 
the  law  to  punish  men  without  taking,  into  account  the  moral 
quality  of  the  intention  or  will  behind  the  act.  However 
similar  moral  considerations  also  apply  at  the  level  of 
legislation 
-  though  it  is  clear  that  there  is  far  more  scope 
for  other  considerations  here. 
It  must  now  be  stressed  that  the  'retributivist'  view 
which  is  being  defended  does  not  contain  the  idea  that  the 
law  should  punish  immorality  as  such  -  though  clearly  the 
target  of  much  anti-retributivist  argument  is  such  a.  4!  view. 
Immorality  as  such  includes  the  harbouring  and  encouragement 
of,  evil  thoughts  and  desires  and  countless  little  pinpricks 
of  evil  with  which  the  law  could  not  posibly  concern  itself. 
To  be  the  legitimate  target  of  others'  retributive  responses, 
immorality  must  be  appropriately  experienced  by  them  as  an 
'injury',  something  that  disappoints  their  justified  expec- 
tations  of  undertakings.  At  the  level  of  society,  then, 410 
where  such  legislation  is  in  question,  no  immoral  act  is 
justifiably  made  criminal  unless  it  is  grave  enough  to  be 
legitimately  experienced  as  an  injury  or  moral  outrage  by 
an  adult  and  sane  member  of  the  society. 
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Conversely  it 
would  be  quite  wrong  for  some  of  these  acts  not  to  be  made 
criminal.  They  are  too  important,  too  much  bound  up  with 
the  very  existence  of  society  to  be  simply  ignored,  or 
left  to  the  haphazard  retributory  responses  of  the  private 
citizen.  Criminal  legislation  in  a  democracy  is  bound  to 
attend  closely  to  public  opinion.  We  may  say,  then  that  the 
'immoral  material'  at  the  basis  of  the  criminal  law  is, 
arid-outht  to  be,  injustice.  It  is  injustice,  in  the  wide 
sense  that  both  legislators  and  the  judiciary  alike  hope, 
by  legislation  and  punishment  respectively,  to  deter  men 
from,  or  educate  them  in  respect  of. 
Hartmann33  sums  up  as  follows: 
"...  in  justice  the  ought-to-be  puts  forth  not  the  maxi- 
mum  of  moral  demand,  but  evidently  the  minimum.  Its  claim 
upon  a  man's  conduct  is  purely  negatives  not  to  do  injustice, 
to  commit  no  transgression,  not  to  encroach  upon  another's 
liberty,  not  to  injure  another  nor  anything  that  belongs 
to  him.  "  Thus  justice  protects  elementary  goods  which  are 
a  means  to  personal  freedom.  But  these  are  the  conditions 
of  higher  goods.  '.  "Justice,  then,  makes  room  in  the  sphere 
of  actuality  for  the  higher  values.  The  more  diversified 
moral  life  *cannot  begin,  till  the  simple  conditions  are 
supplied.  Justice  is  the  moral  tendency  to  supply  these 
conditions.  It  is  the  prerequisite  of  all  further  realiza- 411 
tions  of  value.  At  the  same  time  it  is  the  pioneer  among 
the  virtues.  Justice  is  the  minimum  of  morality  that  paves 
the  way  for  all  higher  goods.  "  "Consonant  with  its  being  a 
minimum  is  the  fact  that  the  objective  content  of  justice, 
law,  pursuits  of  being  pressed  into  fixed  formulae,  of 
being  codified,  and  even  within  certain  limits  .....  of  being 
enforced  by  a  public  power.....  " 
That  it  is  in  general  in  the  public  interest  to  punish 
injustice  (qua  a  certain  basic  type  of  immorality)  follows 
from  the  nature  of  injustice  itself.  Intrinsic  to  it  is 
its  disruption  of  society  through  the  disappointment  of 
justified  expectations,  the  refusal  to  honour  undertakings. 
But  the  enforcement  of  law  is  inevitably  attended  with  cer- 
tain  injustices  of  its  own,  one  of  the  most  important  being 
the  inevitable  intrusions-,,  on  the  privacy  of  innocent  citizens. 
Again,  the  question  of  inefficient  enforcement  of  law  because 
it  is  hard  to  enforce  also  brings  a  certain-amount  of  in- 
justice 
M  ., 
on  the  unlucky  few  who  are  caught.  There  is  also 
the  danger  that  the  law  (and  hence,  underlying  it,  immora- 
lity)  will  come  to  be  scorned  or  despised.  This  is  both 
an  intrinsic  evil,  'since  it  is  good  in  itself  that,  men  should 
respect  just  law,  and  an  extrinsic,  since  it  works  against 
the  intrinsic  deterrent  and  reformatory  effect  of  the  law' 
and  its  punishments.  It  is  also,  of  course,  obvious  that  a 
clime  may  be  too  difficult  to  detect  by  its  very  nature,  or 
may  need  more  material  resources  than  are  available  for  its 
detection.  All  these,  and  other  similar  principles,  limit 412 
the  general  principle.  that  injustice  should  be  made  criminal, 
though  there  must  always  be  a  Prima  facie  injustice  about 
such  limitations.  For  if  the  law  does  not  act,  then  the 
private  citizen  may  and,  since  he  will  not  always  avail 
himself  of  what  civil  remedies  there  may  be,  much  injustice 
may  result. 
This  is  not  to  suggest  that  everything  criminal  is 
in  itself  unjust.  The  distinction  between  mala  in  se  and 
mala  prohibita  is  fairly  clear.  And  though  the  latter  crimes 
do  not  themselves  consist  of  intrinsically  immoral  acts  they 
do,  as  Lord  Devlin  shows, 
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protect  morality  by  making  it 
more  difficult  for  people  to  get  away  with  certain  types 
of  injustice  whose  direct  legal  prohibition  would  be  too  di- 
fficult  or  too  costly  to  enforce,  or  by  preventing  people 
from  unfairly  snatching  advantages  from  other  people  at 
their  expense.  Thus  the  breach  of  a  malumprohibitum  has 
a  different  significance  from  that  of  a  malüm  in  se.  The 
latter  is  the  breach  of  a  law,  obedience  to  which  must  be 
presumed  by  all  to  be  a  good  in  itself,  whereas  the  commi- 
ssion  of  malum  prohibitum  is  the  breach  of  law  Which  may  be 
presumed  to  serve  a  morally  good  end,  but  about  whose  fitness 
as  a  means  to  this  end  there  may  be  legitimate  difference  of 
opinion  -  though  the  state  must  be  presumed  to  have  the 
right  to  decide, 
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Lord  Devlin  suggests  that  in  the  matter 
or  mala  prohibita  the  public  condemnation  which,  we  have 
shown,  as  an  essential  feature  of  punishment  is,  or  should 
be,  lacking,  and  that  the  most  potent  symbol  of  public  re- 413 
sentment  -  imprisonment  -  should  be,  along  with  trial  by 
jury,  reserved  for  mala  in  se.  Mala  prohibita  should  all  be 
dealt  with  as  summary  offences  and  only  punished  by  fine. 
Such  a  reform  would  greatly  clarify  the  distinctions  between 
genuine  crime  and  quasi-crime,  and  between  punishment  and 
penalty  respectively. 
That  there  is  a  morally  significant  distinction  between 
punishments  and  penalties  brings  us  once  more  to  the  question 
of  definition.  A  good  deal  of  attention  has  already  been 
accorded  to  the  definition  of  punishment  and  its  implications 
for  justification  of  punishment  elsewhere  in  this  thesis. 
An  additional  point  I  want  to  make  is  that  the  usual  contem- 
porary  definitions  of  'punishment'  seem  to  favour  the  retri- 
butivist  rather  than  the  utilitarian.  Punishment  seems  in- 
escapably  'giverlin  moral  experience  and  understanding  as 
by  its  very  nature  retributive.  But  what  is  this  'nature'? 
It  is  surely  not  simply  the  nature  of  usage  or  of  language, 
the  nature  of  the  word.  That  can  be  changed.  Perhaps  then 
one  can  argue  like  this:  It  is  clear  that  the  contemporary 
justificatory  emphasis  follows  the  pattern  set  by  Hart.  We 
have  a  good  end  -a  utilitarian  one  -  whose  legitimate  attain- 
ment  is  limited  by  various  'retributive'-factors,  or  at  any 
rate  by  various  considerations  of  justice.  But  the  general 
end  is  served  by  all  sorts  of  institutions.  SO,  in  order  -,;.  ý 
that  'punishment'  may  be  differentiated  from  all  the  other 
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or  welfare  of  society),  we  incorporate  into  our  definition 
factors  that  limit  our  legitimate  pursuit  of  the  end.  All 
the  elements  of  punishment  which  we  have  already  discussed 
then  reflect  basic  principles  of  retributive  justice.  But 
of  course  this  is  absurd.  The  prevention  of  crime,  which 
is,  of  course,  a  more  exact  specification  of  punishment's 
end  according  to  some  utilitarians,  bears  the  same  relation 
to  'the  welfare  or  happiness  of  society'  as  'a  high  level 
of  general  physical  health'  and  'universal  literacy'.  But 
if  we  are  devising  institutions  to  serve  these  ends  we  do 
not  incorporate  into  the  definitions  of  these  institutions 
a  lot  of  conditions  which  limit  the  ways  in  which  we  may 
legitimately  pursue  our  end,  while  omitting  all  reference 
to  the  end  itself. 
It  looks  as  though  then  that  the  real  reason  for  these 
facts  about  the  general  attitude  to  defining  punishment  is 
that  it  is  indeed,  as  I  have  argued,  an  end  in  itself. 
This  is  its  nature.  It  is  emphatically  not  (at  least  for 
beings  who  have  an  adegiate  grasp  of  the  values  of  justice 
and  injustice)  something  whose  end  we  can  alter,  or  something 
that  can  even  be  made  to  serve  additional  ends  outside  fair- 
ly  narrow  limits  without  becoming  quite  quickly  either 
unintelligible  or  something  more  like  prosecution,  victi- 
misation,  etc.  -  practices  which  have  their  negative  moral 
quality  bound  in  their  very  descriptions.  The  meaning  of 
'punishment'  is  thus  in  no  way  a  matter  for  our  decision; 
it  is  rather  something  which  we  may  come  to  have  a  deeper 
or  fuller  understanding  of.  Once  we  grasp  that  punishment 415 
has  to  do  with  the  appropriate  response  to  injustice,  that 
it  is  a  necessary  part  of  a  just  moral  and  social  life 
(where  imperfect  moral  agents  are  concerned),  we  'see'  that 
it  must  incorporate  retributive  elements.  This  is  a  fact 
of  great  importance.  But  when  philosophers  then  go  on  to 
argue  that  the  primary  pursuit  of  a  general  utilitarian 
end  is  limited  by  the  considerations  that  -  strangely 
enough  -  they  find  packed  into  the  idea  of  punishment  they 
are  surely  being  disingenuous.  Why  should  this  institution 
be  thus  limited?  If  appeal  is  then  made  to  the  other 
values  that  limit  the  pursuit'of  the  one  utilitarian  value 
-  which  we  have  usually  identified  with  benevolence,  or 
the  provision  of  welfare  -  then  the  field  is  open  for  axio- 
logical  arguments,  and  we  can  appeal  to  the  relative  posi- 
tions  of  justice  and  benevolence  in  the  heirachy  of  values. 
As  has  been  repeatedly  urged,  justice  is  more  basic,  funda- 
mental  and  urgent  than  benevolence.  It  must  be  'answered' 
first.  Indeed,  if  it  is  not,  benevolence  becomes  twisted 
and  distorted  into  something  more  like  its  contradictory. 
However,  it  is  because  most  recent  philosophers  cannot 
accept  the  irrational  'absurdity'  of  the  underlying  demand 
for  expiation  -  the  subterranean  'push'  thaLgives  the  prac- 
tice  of  punishment  its  legislative  impetus  -  that  they  have 
adopted  the  general  utilitarian  approach  as  regards  the 
"General  Justifying  Aim"  and  as  regards  some  &dpects  of 
sentencing  (thereby  giving  the  institution  a  rational  and 416 
manifest  'pull').  But  there  are,  of  course,  'utilitarian$ 
features  of  the  actual  practice  of  punishment  which  we 
normally  have  no,  or  little,  hesitation  in  approving.  We 
have  already  noted  how  the  institutionalizing  of  punishment 
(or  of  retribution)  brings  with  it  an  inevitable  tendency 
to  ignore  the  nuances  of  the  inditiidual  case.  The  attempt 
to  fix  a  precisely  equivalent  sentence  -  perhaps  an  un- 
attainable  ideal  at  the  best  of  times,  since  the  human  soul 
is  rarely  completely  transparent  -  is  thus  both  thwarted  by 
the  demands  of  'consistency'  and  by  the  personal  distance 
obtaining  under  the  conditions  of  a  public  and  ceremonial 
trial.  There  is  thus  in  many  cases  an  uncertainty  about 
what  punishment  the  convicted  criminal  really  deserves. 
Under  these  circumstances  there  is  much  room  for  the  consi- 
deration  of  utilitarian  principles.  Bradley,  however,  went 
too  far  in  this  direction.  His  well  known  sentences: 
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"We  may  have  regard  for  whatever  circumstances 
we  please  -  our  own  convenience,  the  good  of 
society,  the  benefit  of  the  offender;  we  are 
fools,  and  worse,  if  we  fail  to  do  so.  Having 
once  the  right  to  punish,  we  may  modify  the 
punishment  according  to  the  useful  and  the 
pleasant", 
come  as  a  slap  in  the  face  after  his  determined  insistence 
that  no  man  may  be  punished  who  does  not  deserve  to  be.  ''' 
But  in  thus  representing  the  mafter  of  sentencing  as  a  ques- 
tion  utterly  divorced  from  principles  of  retributive  justice 
he  goes  far  beyond  what  the  judges  see  themselves  as  doing 
and  what  any  spectator  might  impersonally  approve.  Clearly 
the  question  of  the  degree  of  a  criminal's  guilt  -  his  desert iýl  ý 
-  and  the  question  of  the  seriousness  of  the  injury  he  com- 
mitted,  themselves  exercise  a  moral  compulsion  on  the  sen- 
tencing  judged  He  cannot  ignore  such  demands,  where  they 
are  clearly  felt,  or  felt  only  confusedly,  praticularly 
when  morals  in  general  are  confused.  And  here  there  is 
room  for  the  independent  consideration  of  utilitarian  prin- 
ciples.  Occasionally,  too,  to  stop  the  outbreak  of  a  $rush' 
of  untypical  crimes  or  of  a  certain  kind  of  crime.  that  has 
been  widely  publicized,  the  demand  of  justice,  even  when 
palpably  felt,  may  have  to  give  way  to  the  demand  of  other 
principles.  Indeed,  these  may  even  come  to  be  an  injustice 
in  ignoring  such  principles.  All  these  factors  together 
may  create  the  illusion  that  punishment  is  an  institution 
whose  prime  function  and  justification  does  lie  in  serving 
such  ends.  But  to  do  this  too  much  or  too  frequently  would 
be  in  the  end  to  subvert  justice  and,  indeed,  to  be  counter- 
productive  within  the  terms  set  by  the  demands  of  benevo- 
lence  themselves. 
However  there  is  no  need  to  imagine  that  because  in 
justifying  punishment  we  do  not  have  the  welfare  of  society 
and  of  the  criminal  at  the  forefront  of  our  gaze  we  are 
therefore  oblivious  or  heedless  of  it.  It  is  partly  that 
at  least  where  society  is  concerned,  and  to  a  certain  extent 
the  individual  also,  part  of  welfare  is  the  respect  for 
justice  which  its  scrupulous  observance  by  the  judiciary 
encourages.  Welfare,  considered  as  the  good  for  man,  is 
a 
not  just  a  matter  of  pleasures  and  pains,  but  also  of  the 418 
general  moral  climate  both  in  public  and  private  life. 
Furthermore,  the  particular  pursuit  of  welfare  -  in  this 
case  the  'prevention'  of  crime  -  is  best  carried  out  through 
a  response  to  the  demands  of  justice.  This  must  inevitably 
be  a  matter  of  faith  to  a  certain  degree  -  though  there  is 
much  plausibility  in  it.  To  be  fully  convinced  of  it  one 
has  to  be  fully  aware  of  the  relative  urgency  and  importance 
of  the  claims  of  justice  as  well  as  benevolence. 
Hitherto,  nothing  has  been  said  about  what  is  generally 
meant  today  by  the  term  'soci'al  justice'. 
37  What  about  the 
wives  and  families  of  prisoners,  what  about  the  'injustice' 
they  already  feel  for  which  crime  might  be  seen  by  some  as 
a  just  compensation?  Have  we  not  made  a  mockery  of  the  term 
'justice'  and  the  virtue  of  justice?  Surely  such  arguments 
exaggerate  the  'inhumanity'  of  retribütivism.  There  is  no 
reason  to  believe  that  a  utilitarian  theory  of  punishment 
will  result  in  a  greater  leniency  on  the  whole  than  retri- 
butivist.  Indeed,  a  society  whose  'public'  emphasis  is  more 
and  more  laid  on  benevolence  and  less  on  (retributive)  just- 
ice  is  not  likely  to  have  less  crime,  but  more,  since  people's 
aspirations  are  raised  and  it  begins  to  seem  to  them  more 
and  more  unjust  that  they  do  not  have  as  much  of  everything 
as  anyone  else.  In  such  a  society  it  would  become  more, 
not  less,  necessary  to  impose  'deterrent'  sentences;  and  in 
the  end  crime  would  increase  to  the  detriment  of  civilized 
living.  Also,  it  is  not,  nor  should  it  be,  the  task  of  the 
judiciary  but  of  quite  different  organs  of  government  to 419 
concern  themselves  directly  with  benevolence.  This  is  abso- 
lutely  crucial.  The  justice  of  retribution  may  share  the 
word  'justice'  with  what  is  known  as  'social  justice',  but 
the  two  things  are  utterly  distinct  and  must  be  kept  vigo- 
rously  apart.  If  we  thought  it  right  we  could  greatly  ease 
the  material  and  psychological  lot  of  the  wives  and  children 
of  prisoners  and  of  the  'deprived'  in  general.  They  will, 
of  course,  suffer  something.  But  theyfcould  be  helped  to 
suffer  much  less,  in  some  respects.  But  to  expect  the  Judi- 
ciary  to  be  with  such  and  similar  matters,  except  very  occa- 
sionally,  would  be,  once  again,  to  prevent  the  justice  they 
are  concerned  to  dispense.  As  for  the  fallacy  that  crime 
is  largely  the  work  of  the,  underprivileged  -  this  has  long 
been  exposed  by  criminologists. 
2.  RETRIBUTIVE  JUSTICE  IN  EDUCATION 
It  is  claimed  that  most  discussions  of  punishment  in  an 
educational  context  have  been  concerned  in  the  main  with 
, either  how  to  keep  order  or  moralizing  about  the  inappro- 
priateness  of  corporal  punishment.  This  approach  does  leave 
out  the  interesting  philosophical  question  which,  in  my  view 
centre  around  whether  or  not  punishment  (and  therefore 
reward  also)  are  educative.  Can  we  meaningfully  talk  about 
punishment  as  a  form  of  education,  and  can  punishment  ever 
be  part  of  teaching?  In  what  follows  it  will  be  agreed  that 
a  utilitarian  justification  of  punishment  as  a  deterrent 
may  have  limited  merit  in  the  area  of  social  control.  It 
has  a  definite  part  tof  play  in  moral 420 
education,  which  is  one  of  the  main  functions  of  the  school, 
and  contrary  to  some  opinion,  it  also  has  connections  with 
the  concept  of  teaching. 
T.  W.  Moore38  attempts  to  probe  the  actual  role  of  punish- 
ment  in  education,  and  his  main  concern  is  with  the  following 
question:  "...  supposing  punishment  to  be  relevant  to  educa- 
tion,  in  what  sense  and  to  what  extent  is  it  relevant?  And 
what  connection,  if  any,  is  there  between  punishing  a  pupil 
and  teaching  him?  "  His  technique  is  to  set  up  three  models 
.  which  draws  attentionä  to  different  aspects  of  punishment. 
He  then  examines  the  extent  to  which  they  are  applicable  to 
the  school  situation,  and  also  any  connection  between  the 
three  models  and  the  practice  of  teaching.  What  will  be 
considered  here  is  not  the  appropriateness  of  his  models  but 
his  denial  that  punishment  can  be  a  part  of  education. 
Moore's  argument  rests  upon  "a  logical  distinction"  he 
seeks  to  make  between  the  central  uses  of  the  concepts  of 
teaching  and  punishing.  For  Moore  the  process  of  telling 
or  showing  someone  what  to  do,  are  quite  different  from  the 
processes  of  getting  him  to  do  it.  "Punishment  may  result 
in  someone  making  the  right  moves  but  it  isn't  teaching  him 
to  do  so.  "  Punishment  is  thus  "an  activity  of  a  logidally 
different  kind  from  the  practice  of  pedagogy.  "  To  help  us 
see  this  he  provides  with  his  notion  of  "teaching".: 
"Teaching"  involves  attempts  at  the  communication 
of  knowledge,  skills  and  attitudes  usually,  but 
not  necessarily  to  someone  else.  Its  character- 
istic  methods  are,  for  example,  telling,  explain- 
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problemy  situations  and  so  on.  These  activities, 
no  doubt  overlap,  but  whenever  A  is  teaching  B, 
he  is  likely  to  be  doing  one  or  more  of  these 
things.  Teadhing  also  involves  some  degree  of 
systematic  re-approachment  between  the  teacher 
and  pupilo  Their  minds  must  come  into  contact. 
The  teacher  must  set  himself  to  elicit  some 
systematic  response  from  the  pupil  who,  in  turn, 
must  bring  himself  to  attend  to  and  co-operate 
with  the  teacher.  It  is  true  that  'teaching' 
may  be  merely  'intentional'  as  contrasted  with 
'successful',  but  'teaching'  even  in  its  'inten- 
tional'  sense  can  hardly  be  said  to  be  going  on 
unless  there  is  some  element  of  consciouslqy 
shared  activjýy  involti-ngsome  degree  of  rational 
explanation. 
Moore  admits  that  "...  it  is  open  to  anyone  to  say  that  this 
limits  the  concept  of  'teaching'  unnecessarily";  and  he  is 
right  to  do  soy  for  he  certainly  wishes  to  pack  a  great 
deal  into  his  concept  of  "teaching".  However,  some  other 
accounts  are  less  stringent.  G.  H.  Bantock, 
40  for  instance, 
defines  teaching  as  "the  conscious  bringing  about  in  others 
of  certain  desirable  mental  or  dispositional  changes  by 
morally  acceptable  means"r  This  could  obviously  be  less 
damaging  to  a  case  for  punishment  as  a  form  of  teaching. 
On  the  other  hand  Scheffler's41  account  of  teaching  involves 
submitting  "...  oneself  to  the  understanding  and  independent 
judgement  for  the  pupil,  to  his  demand  for  reasons,  to  his 
sense  of  what  constitutes  an  adequate  explanation".  This 
account  is,  however,  widely  rejected  as  too  light  and  too 
limiting.  J.  M.  Cooper42  successfully  criticizes  it  and 
shows,  amongst  other...,  things,  that  though  it  is  well  suited 
as  a  model  for  teaching  philosophy  to  university  students, 
it  rules  out  much  of  what  goes  on  in  primary  schools  and  what 
we  would  still  want  to  call  teaching. 422 
it  seems  to  me  that  the  case  for  punishment  as  a  form 
of  teaching  does  not  rest  upon  a  stipulative  definition  of 
teaching  and  we  could  therefore  allow  Moore  "his  concept" 
without  further  argument.  Using  an  example  of  punishing 
a  child  for  coming  to  school  late,  Moore  maintains-f,  ý:..  we 
are  not  thereby  teaching  him  not  to  come  late  in  future. 
The  lesson  has  already  been  learned;  teaching  a  child  to 
be  punctual  is  to  teach  him  not  to  come  late  in  future. 
What  we  do  when  we  punish  hiia  is:  we  try  to  get  him  to  do 
what  he  knows.  But  what  if  the  child  does  not  already 
know  that  it  is  wrong  to  come  to  school  late?  He  may  have 
some  understanding  of  the  notion  of  "punctuality"  but'he 
may  be  unaware  that  his  teachers  consider  it  to  be  a  virtue. 
Supposing  the  child  cannot  properly  understand  the  reason 
why  "lateness"  is  wrong,  either  because  he  is  too  young, 
too  slow-witted,  refuses  to  attend  to  the  explanation  or 
for  any  other  reason;  then  by  being  punished  for  "lateness" 
he  may  not  only  be  taught  that  "lateness"  is  wrong  but  also 
that  "lateness"  is  to  be  avoided  if  he  is  to  avoid  its  con- 
sequences  (or  one  of  them).  Indeed,  cause  Abd  effect  rela- 
tionship  is  what  is  learned.  At  this  stage,  this  is  the 
only  way  for  the  child  to  learn  this.  Later  he  may  come 
to  appreicate  the  reason  why  it  is  to  be  avoided,  assuming 
it  is  pointed  out  to  him  what  he  is  being  punished  for,  and 
that  he  has  at  least  some  basic  notion  of  right  and  wrong. 
Moore  thinks  that  "punishment  may  result  in  the  child  making 
the  right  moves,  but  it  isn't  teaching  him  to  do  so.  "  The 423 
counter  argument  is  that  punishment  may  be  the  most  effective 
way  of  teaching  the  child  which  are  in  fact  the  right  moves. 
We  can  agree  that  the  process  of  telling  someone  what  to  do, 
or  showing  him,  are  quite  distinct  from  the  process  of  get- 
ting  him  to  do  it;  but  in  this  case,  punishment  is  a  process 
of  telling  him  what  to  do  or  what  not  to  do  but  not  necessa- 
rily  one  of  getting  him  to  do  it.  Of  course  there  is  no 
reason  why  punishment  should  not,  contigently,  fulfil  both 
roles. 
Thei.,  way  is  now  open  for  Moore  to  reply  that  what  has 
been  described  is  a  technique  of  conditioning,  a  sort  of 
negative  reinforcement  that  is  no  part  of  his  notion  of  teach- 
ing.  But  can  such  an  objection  be  sustained?  Where  "punish- 
ment"  is  treated  as  part  of  the  mechanism  of  conditioning 
and  related  kinds  of  psychological  control,  the  emphasis  is 
placed  on  directing  the  subject  to  follow  a  set  of  programmed 
moves.  Pain  is  deliberately  administered  as  a  negative  re- 
inforcement  to  secure  the  kind  of  behaviour  which  is  desired 
by  the  manipulator.  Genuine  instances  of  conditioning  show 
no  concern  for  "right"  or  "wrong"  in  a  moral  sense  or  for 
the  "giving  of  reasons". 
A  more  promising  objection  might  be  that,  if  the  child 
cannot  properly  understand  the  reasons  why  "lateness"  is 
wrong,  then  "teaching"  him  by  penalizing  him  is  indoctrina- 
tion,  not  teaching.  A  number  of  moves  could  be  made  here, 
one  being  that  indoctrination  is  one  kind  of  teaching.  How- 
ever  as  we  are  staying  with  Moore's  notion  of  teaching  and 424 
it  is  unlikely  that  indoctrination  could  find  a  logical 
place  under  the  concept  of  education  this  will  not  be 
pursued.  The  problem  however  is  about  whether  or  not 
teaching  moral  values  without  rational  backing  to  young 
children  incapable  of  understanding  such  rules  is  indoc- 
trination.  But  the  answer  to  the  problem  depends  upon 
one's  definition  of  indoctrination.  If  one  agrees  with 
Hare43  that  it  is  not  indoctrination  so  long  as  there  is 
no  intention  to  stop  the  growth  in  children  of  the  capa- 
city  to  think  for  themselves,  then  a  little  more  needs  to 
be  said.  If  one  is  punishing  a  child  in  order  to  teach 
him  that  something  is  wrong,  one  is  not  necessarily  in- 
tending  to  implant  an  unshakable  belief;  "indoctrination 
only  begins  when  we  are  trying  to  stop  the  growth  in  our 
children  of  the  capacity  to  think  for  themselves  about 
moral  questions.  "44 
Much  more  difficult  to  meet,  however,  would  be  the 
objection  that  punishingta  child  in  order  to  teach  him 
that  something  is  wrong  or  to  be  avoided  is  not  really 
an  instance  of  punishment  because  the  child  is  not  guilty 
of  an  offence.  Was  it  not  argued  previously  that  for 
unpleasantness  to  count  as  an  instance  of  punishment  it 
must  be  imposed  on  an  offender?  How  can  the  child  be 
guilty  of  an  offence  if  he  did  not  previously  know  that 
"lateness"  was  to  be  avoided?  But  couldn't  one  offend 
unknowingly? 425 
Well  it  may  be  that  this  objection  cannot  be  disposed 
of  to  everyone's  satisfaction  for  here  tolerance  is  required 
of  the  special  teacher-pupil  relationships 
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and  for  the 
peculiarities  of  educational  situations  in  general.  The 
point  is  that  so  long  as  the  child  is  only  punished  when 
he  is  actually  guilty  of  "lateness",  by  being  punished  he 
can  be  made  to  see  by  the  force  of  punishment  that  he  has 
broken  a  rule  and  deserving  of  punishment.  This  distinc- 
tion  between  "force"  and  "meaning"  was  elaborated  by 
J.  L.  Austin, 
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chiefly  with  the  language  of  words  in  mind, 
rather  than  of  deeds,  but  it  is  no  less  applicable  to  the 
latter.  With  highly  articulate  young  children  teaching 
that  certain  things  are  morally  wrong  may  often  be  accom- 
panied  by  "doing  things  with  words"  with  others  it  will 
be  a  matter,  at  least,  to  begin  with,  of  saying  things  with 
deeds.  To  a  young  child  the  meaning  ofa  smack  can  be  edu- 
cative,  while  its  force  hurts. 
Moreover  it  was  also  agreed  earlier  that  the  notion 
of  "offence"  is  far  from  clear  and  straightforward  when 
related  to  punishment  in  educational  situations.  A  teacher 
need  not  always  have  announced  before  punishing  a  child 
who  has  done  something  wrong  that  no  one  was  to  do  "that". 
As  the  moral  development  of  children  is  a  crucial  function 
of  educational  institutions  it  is  often  desirable  that 
more  emphasis  is  placed  upon  the  question  of  motive  than 
the  nature  and  severity  of  the  offence.  It  can  therefore 
be  seen  that  the  "criterion"  is  far  more  complicated  in 
educational  situations  than  in  legal  systems. 426 
If  it  is  accepted  that  punishment  can  be  a  part  of 
teaching  the  question  then  arises  as  to  the  part  it  plays 
in  the  teaching  of  morality.  In  the  case  against  Moore  it 
was  suggested  that  punishment  can  teach  a  child  that  some- 
thing  is  wrong  or  is  to  be  avoided.  It  may  now  be  argued 
that,  strictly  speaking,  the  child  hasn't  learnt  that  some- 
thing  is  wrong  but  merely  that  it  is  disapproved  of  by  his 
teachers.  To  learn  a  moral  concept  requires  an  understand- 
ing  of  the  reasons  why  something  is  right  or  wrong,  good 
or  bad.  This  is  true,  but  does  it  not  invalidate  the  pre- 
vious  argument?  Even  if  the  child  has  not  learnt  the  moral 
concept  as  a  result  of  punishment,  he  has  learnt  that  a 
certain  action  is  regarded  as  wrong  by  his  teachers,  which 
is  a  significant  piece  of  learning  in  the  context  of  a 
child's  moral  development.  As  piaget  has  argued,  young 
children  regard  rules  as  more  or  less  transdentally  laid 
down.  The  notion  of  the  validity  of  rules  and  their  ground- 
ing  in  principles  takes  a  long  time  to  dawn.  "It  is  quite 
pointless  to  expect  very  young  children  to  do  what  they 
should  because  they  see  the  reasons  for  it.  in  the  early 
stages  they  have  to  learn  to  do  what  is  right  without  pro- 
perly  understanding  why.  "47 
It  may  safely  be  said  then,  certain  things  learnt  as  a 
consequence  of  punishment  have  significance  for  moral  educa- 
tion.  It  is  hard  to  see  in  fact  how  any  child  can  properly 
grasp  a  moral  principle  unless  he  has  undergone  a  certain 
minimum  training  in  moral  rules.  To  understand  a  moral 427 
principle  involves  being  able  to  recognise  certain  rules  as 
instances  of  it.  This  is  a  logical  point  applying  to  the 
formation  of  all  concepts.  Having  experience  of  some  instances 
to  which  the  concept  can  apply  is  logically  prior  to  having 
the  concept.  Children  therefore  need  to  pass  through  a 
stage  of  training  in  moral  rules  and  right  habits  before 
they  can  progress  to  the  stage  of  being  autonomous  moral 
agents.  The  contention  here  is  that  punishment  has  a  crucial 
role  to  play  in  this  period  of  training  in  moral  rules.  To 
this  extent  at  least  it  is  part  of  our  education.  It  helps 
to  initiate  us  into  a  moral  dimension  of  life. 
professor  R.  S.  Peters48  thinks  that  the  case  for  punish- 
ment  as  an  aid  to  education  is  pretty  weak.  He  declares 
that  "the  truth  of  the  matter  is  that  punishment  in  a  school 
is  at  best  a  necessary  nuisance.  It  is  necessary  as  a  de- 
terrent,  but  its  positive  educational  value  is  dubious. 
Education  cannot  go  on  unless  minimum  conditions  of  order 
obtain,  and  punishment  may  on  occasions  be  necessary  in  order 
to  ensure  such  conditions".  it  would,  6f  course,  be  foolish 
in  the  extreme  to  deny  that  general  conditions  of  order  have 
to  be  maintained  if  teaching  is  to  proceed.  However,  where 
there  is  some  mutual  agreement  on  the  intrinsic  value  of 
attempting  to  live  and  work  together  in  an  orderly  way, 
the  form  of  order  is  a  moral  as  well  as  a  social  one. 
Accordingly  its  development  is  a  matter  of  discipline,  rather 
than  of  control.  Now  this  distinction  between  discipline 
and  control  is  crucial  to  the  thesis  that  punishment  is  an 
intrinsic  part  of  education. 428 
The  form  of  argument  to  be  employed  here  will  be  simi- 
lar  to  that  pursued  in  chapter  six.  The  crux  of  the  argu- 
ment  is  that  discipline  is  a  kind  of  compulsion  to  which  it 
is  right  that  one  should  have  to  submit,  while  punishment 
is  the  infliction  of  a  kind  of  pain  which  it  is  right  that 
one  should  have  to  suffer,  not  for  breaking  the  rules  of  a 
particular  system  of  control,  but  for  moral  wrongdoing. 
in  other  words  for  faults  of  discipline.  As  I  pointed  out 
earlier,  discipline  and  control  are  forms  of  order  but  the 
order  in  each  case  is  of  a  logically  different  kind.  In 
a  "disciplined"  activity  order  is  achieved  by  virtue  of 
reasons  implicit  in,  or  for  the  sake  of  values  intrinsic  to 
the  activity  itself.  Thus  a  'control'  is  a  way  of  ordering 
things  which  is  considered  necessary  for  getting  something 
done.  By  contrast,  a  'discipline'  is  the  form  of  logical 
and  evaluative  order  which  must  be  learned  if  one  is  to 
understand  what  is  invoived  in  doing  something.  Both  con- 
trol  and  discipline  involve  compulsion,  but  in  the  former 
the  compulsion  is  not  in  the  first  instance  a  logical  or  a 
moral  one.  It  is  not  achieved  through  the  force  of  a  logi- 
cal  imperative.  The  force  is  physical,  ...  or  psychological. 
In  discipline,  on  the  other  hand,  the  compulsion  involved 
has  nothing  to  do  with  the  physical  and  psychological  force 
which  backs  orders-and  instructions  in  the  sense  of  commands. 
When  instruction  enters  into  the  achievement  of  discipline, 
it  is  'instruction'  in  the  sense  of  teaching,  not  in  the  sense 
of  giving  Orders.  When  we  'orders  or  'instruct'  someone  to 429 
do  something,  as  in  giving  commands,  we  are  not  teaching  him 
what  to  do.  We  are  telling  him. 
The  point  is  that  when  we  exercise  'control'  over  child- 
ren  we  are  not  "disciplining"  them,  as  is  frequently  taken 
to  be  the  case.  In  so  far  as  the  relationship  between 
teacher  and  class  is  simply  one  of  means  to  ends,  in  which 
the  teacher  tries  to  get  the  children  to  do  something,  the 
purpose  is  accomplished  at  the  moment  when  the  children  obeys 
Whether  or  not  the  children  can  see  the  intrinsic  point  of 
what  they  are  being  ordered  to  do  is  quite  irrelevant,  so 
long  as  they  do  it.  When-punishment  is  used  to  gain  "con- 
trol"  Peters  is  right  to  suggest  that  it  is  "at  best  a 
necessary  nuisance".  It  would  seem  that  its  positive  edu- 
cational  value  is  not  merely  "dubious"  but  entirely  non- 
existent.  _ 
Entwistle49  endeavours  to  contrast  disciplinei  not  with 
control  but  with  order.  This,  however,  seems  misguided  since 
discipline  is  itself  a  form  or  order.  As  was  pointed  out 
earlier,  it  is  confusing  to  speak  of  control  metaphorically 
as  "external  discipline',  for  the  whole  point  of  the  term 
"dis6ipline.  4.6,  in  the  sense  that  is  now  being  explicated,  is 
that  the  orderliness  characteristic  of  it  is  "external"  to 
the  activity  or  relationship  in  question.  To  say  that  a 
child  is  being  "externally  disciplined"  is  really  a  con- 
tradiction  in  terms,  since,  unless  the  child  can  see  at 
least  something  of  the  valuable  point  of  the  proposed  order 
he  will  not  submit  to  it  for  the  sake  of  its  intrinsic  value, 430 
but  only,  if  at  all,  for  the  sake  of  values  "external"  to  it 
-  perhaps,  -the  authority  of  the  teacher  or  the  threat  of 
"punishment".  Only  in  this  limited  respect  may  a  utilita- 
rian  justification  of  "punishment"  have  possible  merit. 
But  the  general  argument  has  been  that  instances.  of 
extrinsic  control  are  misrepresented  as  punishment.  Where 
the  hurt  which  we  inflict  upon  children  is  calculated  by 
standards  and  imposed  for  purposes  extrinsic  to  those  of 
the  situation  in  which  they  occur,  we  are  dealing  not  with 
discipline  but  with  control,  and  therefore  with  penalties, 
not  punishments.  Thus  penalties  can  be  awarded  only  by 
some  agent  formally  authorized  to  do  so,  but  one  can  be 
punished  by  anyone  with  whom  one  shares  an  interest.  This 
was  the  reason  for  ruling  out  the  fifth  of  Anthony  Flews 
criteria, 
We  should  once  again  emphasize  that  the  rules  governing 
the  authorisation  of  those  empowered  to  impose  penalties  are 
quite  separate  and  different  from  the  rules  which  they  are 
thereby  made  responsible  for  enforcing,  but  in  the  case  of 
punishment  the  two  sets  of  rules  are  identical  -  only  a 
moral  agent,  in  other  words,  is  capable  of  punishing  and 
being  punished,  One  is  penalized  for  infringing  the  autho- 
rized  rules  of  any  social  practice  in  which  one  engages, 
but  one  is  punished  for  breaking  specially  moral  rules.  A 
rule-breaker  is  liable  for  penalty  whether  or  not  he  can  see 
good  reason  for  the  rules,  but  a  wrongdoer  is  liable  for 
punishment  because  he  can  see  good  reason  for  the  rules 
(and  has  nevertheless  broken  them).  ...  One  is  penalized  for 
failing  to  behave  in  a  way  which  neither  you  nor  your  judge 
necessarily  regard  as  being  of  any  intrinsic  importance, 431 
but  one  is  punished  by  someone  with  whom  one  claims  to  share 
an  interest  but  towards  whom  one  has  failed  to  behave  in  a 
way  appropriate  to  the  interest  which  you  have. 
Thus  discipline,  unlike  control,  does  not  involve  the 
setting  up  of  some  previously  non-existent  order.  It  in- 
volves  to  understand  more  of  the  sort  of  order  which  is 
already  more  or  less  explicit  in  what  one  is  trying  to  do. 
A  teacher  does  not  set-out  to  'get'  discipline  over  his 
pupils,  although  he  may  try  to  get  control  in  this  way 
because  the  teacher  is  in  control  over  them  and  has  respon- 
sibility  for  them,  but  because  they  are  themselves  concerned 
to  discover  increasingly  the  "form"  or  order  tof  the  task 
or  situation  in  which  they  are  engaged.  '  Their  "disipline" 
is  the  educative  order  in  virtue  of  which  there  is  some  in- 
telligible  point  in  their  presence  as  pupils.  It  is  when 
this  discipline  is  absent  that  teachers  are  inclined  to  fall 
back  on  extrinsic  controls.  Our  educative  concern  is  there- 
fore  necessarily  with  matters  of  discipline  and  contingently 
with  matters  of  control.  Because  teachers  are  deliberate 
agents  in  the  education  of  others,  and  because  it  hurts  to 
be  shown  that  one  has  failed  to  do  the  very  thing  that  one 
was  ostensibly  endeavouring  to  do,  what  teachers  deliberately 
do  on  occasions  will  hurt,  just  as  on  other  occasions  it 
will  please.  Reward  and  punishment  are  essential  ingredients 
in  what  goes  on  in  educational  situations  since  such  situa- 
tions  are  intrinsically  rewarding,  and  therefore  intrinsica- 432 
lly  punishing  too.  They  could  not  be  one  if  they  were  not 
also  on  occasion  the  other.  In  a  sense  then,  retributive 
punishment  is,  logically,  a  feature  of  education. 
To  persuade  those  who  remain  unconvinced  and  still 
believe  that  the  only  strong  case  for  punishment  in  school 
is  in  the.:  sphere  of  general  rules  concerned  with  the 
smooth  running  of  the  school,  the  argument  can  perhaps  be 
put  in  a  different  way.  The  source  of  perplexity  might 
come  from  a  simplistic  view  ...  of  school  rules.  Rules 
exist  not  merely  to  maintain  conditions  of  order.  They 
also  have  educational  value  in  the  sense  that  conforming 
to  rules  helps  to  develop  the  child's  ability  to  choose, 
restrain  himself,  and  develop  as  an  autonomous  moral  being. 
The  presumption  in  punishment  in  dealing  with  adults  is 
that  they  are  rational  beings  in  the  sense  that  they  know 
the  difference  between  right  and  wrong  and  can  adjust  their 
actions  in  the  light  of  consideration  of  possible  consequences. 
Children  do  not  naturally  achieve  this  state.  They  achieve 
it  gradually  and  only  if  they  are  treated  progressively  as 
if  they  are  autonomous  persons.  It  happens  under  a  stable 
system  of  rules  that  guarantees  a  predictable  environment. 
it  does  not  happen  by  allowing  them  to  do  what-they  want. 
Children  have  to  learn  to  exdreise  self-restraint.  So  the 
argument  is  that  since  learning  to  obey  rules  is  necessary 
. 
to  developing  autonomy,  and  since  autonomy  is  generally 
accepted  as  an  end-state  of  education,  the  connection  between 
rules  and  education  is  something  more  than  mere  social  control. 433 
Whether  or  not  children  can  learn  to  obey  rules  without  the 
assistance  of  rewards  and  punishments  is  an  empirical  matter. 
What  is  being  suggested  here  is  that,  where  punishment  is 
called  upon  in  connection  with  tecching  children  to  obey 
rules,  it  is  mistaken  to  view  it  as  merely  part  of  an  un- 
pleasant  duty  to  make  children  suffer  so  that  they  will  con- 
trol  their  behaviour  in  future  and  conform  to  rules  out  of 
self-interest.  Its  function  is  also  educative. 
To  appreciate  this  argument  it  has  been  seen  that  the 
rules  of  a  purely  manipulative  situation  and  rules  of  an 
educative  one  have  different  logical  status.  In  the  former 
the  rules  are  only  "right"  in  the  sense  that  you  get  hurt 
if  you  break  them.  In  the  latter  it  is  because  the  rules 
are  right  that  it  hurts  to  break  them.  In  the  first  situa- 
tion  there  is  nothing  worth  learning  except  that  you  will 
get  hurt  if  you  break  the  rules.  In  the  second  there  is 
the  possibility  of  learning  something  of  the  intrinsic  point 
or  rightness  of  rules.  Manipulative  rules  have  no  intrinsic 
point  in  the  situation  they  govern;  they  have  no  value  in 
themselves.  The  values  are  other  than  those  implicit  in 
the  situation  itself  -  probably  the  values  of  the  manipulator. 
This  is  what  is  meant  by  suggesting  that  the  rules  connected 
with  education  are  far  from  simple.  Children  have  to  learn 
not  only  to  obey  rules  associated  with  social  order,  but 
also  those  associated  with  educative  order,  which  is  discipline. 
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not  astan  agency  of  psychological  manipulation  but  as  a 
logically  implicit  feature  of  the  notion  of  discipline. 
In  this  way,  punishment  is  an  intrinsic  part  of  education. 
in  conclusion,  it  has  been  argued  that  the  view  that 
punishment  in  education  is  a  necessary  evil  is  based  upon 
a  misunderstanding  of  the  concept.  It  is  a  mistake  to 
think  of  punishment  merely  in  terms  of  a  penalty  which  one 
has  to  pay  for  stepping  outside  the  limits  of  social  control. 
In  fact,  paying  a  penalty  may  only  be  interpreted  as  punish- 
ment  if  it  is  felt  that  breaking  the  rules  is  "wrong"  in 
moral  terms.  Unfortunately  identifying  punishment  with 
the  apparatus  of  control  is  quite  commonplace.  The  Plowden 
Report,  in  its  discussion  of  punishment,  sees  its  role  as 
entirely  connected  with  control  and  the  general  management 
of  children. 
"Few  indeed  will  now  consider  it  in  any  way 
positively  "good  for  children"  to  be  punished, 
and  few  will  regard  punishment  as  a  cure  either 
for  deep  seated  evils,  such  as  persistent 
cruelty,  or  for  laziness,  in  attention  and  poor 
work.  Punishment  wjll  be  defended  simply  as 
a  means  to  order.  "5 
Unfortunately,  too,  in  most  philosophical  writings,  the 
matter  of  punishment  and  reward,  like  that  of  discipline,  is 
commonly  treated  as  though  it  were  just  a  part  of  the  busi- 
ness  of  control,  Even  Professor  R.  S.  Peters  declares: 
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"It  is  important  to  grasp  that  the  case  for 
punishment  does  not  depend  on  the  possibility 
that  they  will  benefit  the  individual  punished. 
Their  justification  is  that  they  are  necessary 
for  preserving  the  system  of  order  which  is 
necessary  for  educational  activities  to  proceed.  " 435 
Oncthe  account  which  is  being  presented  here  punish- 
ment  is  a  part  of  education  and  is  only  evil  when  it  is 
undeserved  or  in-appropriate.  The  morally  distinctive 
feature  of  punishment  is  that  it  is  pain  which  one  deserves 
rather=  than  something  which  is  merely  expedient  to  avoid. 
Punishment  may  therefore  be  thought  of  as  moral  desert. 
Consequently,  it  would  not  be  possible  to  abandon  punish- 
ment  in  schools,  without  abandoning  moral  relationship 
with  children. 
Now  this  argument  that  punishment  is  in  some  sense  a 
"morally  fitting"  response  to  wrongdoing  rather  than  a 
"necessary  evil",  commits  one  to  defending  the  "moral 
right"  of  wrongdoers  to  be  punished.  As  Anthony  Quinton52 
points  out,  this  is  an  odd  sort  of  right: 
"...  if  we  are  to  treat  offenders  as  moral  agents, 
as  ends  and  not  as  means,  we  must  recognise  their 
right  to  punishment.  It  is  an  odd  sort  of  right 
where  holders  would  strenuously  resist  its 
recognition.  " 
Quinton  implies  that  whether  or  not  it  is  in  fact  true 
that  those  who  believe  themselves  to  deserve  punishment 
"strenuously  resist"  it,  is  an  empirical  matter.  But  isn't 
Quinton  misconstruing  the  expression  "a  right  to  punishment"? 
Surely  what  we  mean  when  we  talk  about  "a  right  to  punishment" 
is  that  offenders  have  the  right  to  be  regarded  as  respon- 
sible  persons,  worthy  of  recognition.  Not  to  be  punished 
when  one  feels  that  one  deserves  it  is  to  be  treated  either 
as  not  being  worth  bothetfng  about,  or  as  being  ybeyond  re- 
demptiono  in  the  writer's  experience  children  only  stre- 436 
nuously  resist  their  "right  to  punishment"  when  they  inter- 
prete  it  merely  as  an  attempt  at  psychological  coercion. 
To  the  extent  that  children  see  their  punishment  as  confir- 
ming  their  existence  in  a  moral  and  stable  order,  most  of 
them  recognise  their  right  to  be  punished  when  they  deserve 
it.  On  the  other  hand,  it  would  not  be  odd  for  children  to 
"strenuously  resist"  their  punishment  if  they  did  not  see 
the  point  of  it,  for  how  could  they  then  conceivably  regard 
themselves  as  being  entitled,  or  as  "having  a  right  to  it". 
It  is  being  punished  when  one  does  not  see  the  point  of  it 
that  cause  "alienation".  Not  being  punished  when  one  feels 
that  one  deserves  it  leads  "only  to  bewilderment,  dispair 
or  indifference". 
Morality,  is  at.  set  of  rules(or  quasi-rules).  It  is 
an  intrinsic  part  of  morality  that  those  who  do  wrong 
morally  deserve  to  be  punished.  So  one  cannot  initiate 
children  into  morality  without  initiating  them  into  the 
practice  of  punishment  with  its  attendant  notions  of  respon- 
sibility,  excuses  etc.  The  function  of  the  school  is  not 
just  to  teach  Mathematic3`Äx,  English,  History  and  so  on, 
but  to  initiate  children  into  'the  moral  institution  of  life'. 
Morality  is  not  a  separate  kind  of  activity  but  applies  to 
us  whatever  we  are  doing,  so  even  in  a  Mathematics  lesson 
the  teacher  must  be  concerned  to  initiate  children  into  the 
moral  way  of  life.  Thus,  punishment  is  a  necessary  part  of 
education  seen  in  this  way. 437 
In  conclusion,  however,  the  view  I  take  of  punishment 
in  education  is  part  and  parcel  of  my  overall  view.  That 
is  to  say,  we  must  treat  others  as  rule  following  members 
of  a  kingdom  of  ends.  Education  must  invbt"ve  initiating 
children  into  that  kingdom.  So  in  so  far  as  rewards 
and  punishments  are  a  necessary  condition  of  a  rule  governed 
community  education  must  involve  these. NOTES  AND  REFERENCES 
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